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ABSTRACT 
THE LIFE ON THE MARGINS: EXPERIENCES OF CHILDHOOD WITHIN THE 
MILITARY COMPLEX 
 
Key words: military, military family, militarism, childhood, governmentality, civil-military 
relations, school and education, military service.  
Based on an ethnographic research drawing on in-depth interviews and field work, this thesis 
brings into view the lives of children raised in military families, within the military complex, 
between the years of 1990s and 2010s. This study presents the rather ‘ordinary’ lives and 
experiences of children of military families, while unfolding the patterns of socialization 
common and specific to their lives. While doing so, it argues that the childhood of these 
children can also be conceptualized as being beset, both spatially and temporally, with three 
institutions, namely the family, the school and the military.  
After providing the reader with a historical context about the roots of ‘the military family’ as 
we know it today as well as the emergence of a new mode of governmentality in the military 
institution around the 1960s, this thesis forges connections between the universe of ideals 
upheld and disseminated by the military institution with regards to the members of military 
families and the lives of these members. Then it signals the dimensions wherein lies the 
significance and difficulties of the educational life for children and their parents.  
Underlining the role played by the military institution of Turkey in the governance and 
regulation of internal tensions, this thesis seeks an answer to the question as to how the 
military, in order to render its services more effective and legitimate, comes to grips with its 
bulky outliers, consisting of the children, spouses and parents of military officers, in other 
words, with multitudes whom it hails under the singular rubric of ‘the military dependents’. 
More specifically, it explores the ways in which the military tries to govern the children of 
military families in ways which can produce nationalized, gendered and militarized 
subjectivities catering to its institutional interests. 
Finally, this study concentrates on the ways in which the recent transformations of the 
military and its relationship to the political establishment and the society at large are being 
greeted and experienced by the children of military families. The narratives of the children in 
response to questions about the watershed political affairs which have precipitated major 
transformations in the public perception of the Turkish Armed Forces, shows that the 
military’s legitimacy and position in the relations of power depends much on its governing 
enterprises concerned with whom the institution hails as the military dependents.    
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ÖZET 
KIYILARDA YAŞAMAK: ORDU KOMPLEKSİNDE ÇOCUKLUK DENEYİMLERİ 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: ordu, subay ailesi, militarizm, çocukluk, yönetimsellik, sivil-asker 
ilişkileri, okul ve eğitim, askerlik hizmeti. 
Derinlemesine görüşmelerden ve saha çalışmasından faydalanarak yapılan bir etnografik 
araştırmaya dayanan bu tez çalışması, 1990 ve 2010 yılları arasında askeri komplekste 
büyüyen subay çocukların hayatlarını göz önüne getiriyor. Subay çocuklarının daha ziyade 
‘sıradan’ hayatlarına ve deneyimlerine dair bir ipucu sunmaya çalışırken, bu hayatları 
ortaklaştıran bazı özgül izlekleri serimliyor. Bu esnada subay çocuğu olmak deneyiminin hem 
mekânsal hem uzamsal olarak aile, okul ve orduyla kuşatılmak üzerinden 
kavramsallaştırılabileceğini iddia ediyor. 
Okuyucuya bugün bildiğimiz manasıyla ‘subay ailesinin’ tarihsel kökenlerine ve 1960’larda 
orduda ortaya çıkan yeni bir yönetimsellik biçimine dair tarihsel bir çerçeve sunulduktan 
sonra, bu tez çalışmasında subay ailesi üyelerinin yaşamları ile ordu tarafından bu üyelere 
yönelik tahkim ve tamim edilen idealler evreni arasındaki bağlantılar irdeleniyor. Akabinde 
çocukların eğitim hayatına odaklanılarak, eğitim hayatının çocuklar ve ebeveynleri için nasıl 
önem ve zorluklar teşkil ettiğine işaret ediliyor.  
Bu çalışma Türkiye’de ülke içi gerilimlerin yönetilmesi ve düzenlenmesinde ordunun 
oynadığı rolün altını çizerek, kurumun eylemlerini daha etkin ve meşru kılabilmek üzere, tekil 
bir ifadeyle, ‘askeri personelin bakmakla mükellef bulunduğu kimseler’ olarak hitap ettiği 
subay çocukları, eşleri ve ebeveynlerinden oluşan çokluklarla nasıl yüzleştiği sorusuna cevap 
arıyor. Daha özelde ise, ordunun, kendi kurumsal çıkarlarını besleyecek millileştirilmiş, 
cinsiyetlendirilmiş ve militarize edilmiş öznellikler inşa etmek üzere subay çocuklarını hangi 
şekillerde yönetmeye çalıştığını ifşa ediyor.  
Son olarak, bu çalışma ordunun siyasi düzenle ve toplumla ilişkilerinde yaşanan son 
dönemdeki dönüşümlerin subay çocukları tarafından nasıl karşılandığı ve deneyimlendiğine 
odaklanıyor. Çocukların Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin toplumda algılanışında büyük 
dönüşümler yaratan dönüm noktası niteliğindeki siyasi olaylarla ilgili sorulara verdikleri 
cevaplar, kurumun iktidar ilişkilerindeki yerinin ve meşruiyetinin, kendisine bağımlı kimseler 
olarak tanımladığı grupları yönetmeye yönelik girişimlerindeki başarısına ne denli bağımlı 
olduğuna gösteriyor.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Entering the Field 
 
The cab dropped me on a narrow street, squeezed from both sides by the fences and 
renowned warning plates of red colours, of the military institution. There was no one home. 
Tarık, my childhood friend from military lodgings, was away on a meeting to sort out 
something related to a business of his, which he started a year ago. His father and mother 
were at their workplaces, and would not return before sunset. I text-messaged and informed 
Tarık about my arrival. As I was waiting for his response, I raised my head to have a glance 
at my surroundings. There it was, rising before me, the housing blocks of lodgings with 
their jerry-built, monochromatic and monolithic looks. I was to spend three weeks there, for 
my field trip. There were three rows of housing blocks, and two adjacent apartments in 
each, planted perpendicular to the entrance. Everything about their appearance was more 
unkempt than usual, because there was a construction-work going on them. Perhaps for the 
first time I was seeing a construction of that scale in military lodgings. I rested my gaze on 
the posts, where conscripts usually keep watch. They were vacant, unlike the days of my 
childhood. It was not much to my surprise though, because I was not new to the place. The 
posts in this particular housing zone were vacant for a long time, but soldiers were still 
warding and patrolling in bigger lodgings down the road. Moments later, the voices of the 
workers, clinging to the next day on scaffolds, ringed in my ears. Now, there was 
something new to me, because they were speaking in Kurdish. Intrigued to have a short trip 
inside, before Tarık came home, I swept past the main entrance, without anyone took notice 
of me.  
  
 Only then I realized the bundle of insulating and sheathing materials piled up in 
corners and spread out over the ground. The construction was subcontracted, as I was to 
2 
learn from Tarık a couple hours later. I passed by the piles and reached one of the parking 
lots above a short hill. All numbered, and allocated to residents, the parking lot and its 
aluminium ceiling were overwhelmed by fallen leaves left unraked. The Renaults were in 
the majority as usual, but, I thought, not as much as in the past. The same went for the 
Goodyear tires and the stickers of Axa insurance company. There were other stickers on 
some though, of the drawings or signature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, but arguably no more 
than what one would see on the roads of any big city of Turkey. A small, shoddy car, on 
which the yellow sticker of Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square and the signature of Mustafa Kemal 
stood side by side, then garnered and released my attention. There was a football pitch in 
the vicinity, but no one jostling around to watch there, much to my chagrin. Only some kids 
were riding the seesaw on the playground next to the pitch, as women, presumably their 
mothers were seated in a wooden gazebo nearby, some knitting and weaving, and all 
pretending to the indifferent to the kids. While I was covering the rectangle of the lodgings 
in a circular route, I saw the basketball court on the corner, looking ransacked and empty, 
and bumped into other posts on whose windows were written call numbers for emergency 
situations. Then a sudden shout interrupted my quiet and solemn tour. I turned around, only 
to meet the guy who rushed forward from the site of the construction in order to cease my 
transgressions, by asking me: "What are you looking for? Where do you live?"1 Initially 
taken aback for being hailed as a complete outsider, I pulled myself together and pointed at 
the apartment where Tarık is living, while saying that I was a visitor. The guy in civilian 
outfits, the porter, as Tarık was to tell me later on, did not wait for the rest of my 
explanations before taking back to whatever his occupation was, after his curt reply: "I 
asked because I have not seen you before."2  
  
 I moved on, under the shade of trees to the building I pointed at. The apartment door 
was locked, so I sat on the bench across the entrance and watched the apartment. Sheets 
were strapped by the commissary directorate on the windows of its entrance door, 
announcing the working hours of commissaries. The plaster was flaking off its weary and 
worn-off walls. There were flowerpots and satellite dishes, almost in all balconies, but no 
                                                          
1 In Turkish: "Neye bakmıştınız? Hangi binada oturuyorsunuz?" 
2 In Turkish: "Daha önce görmedim de ondan sordum." 
3 
hint of the blue canvas flipping in between the iron railings, one of the trademarks of 
military lodgings. After a cigarette, a woman left the building, carrying a purse in her hand. 
I knew her from my previous visits. She was the upper floor neighbour. She greeted upon 
seeing me on the bench. After exchanging kind questions about each other, she invited me 
to wait inside the building, lest I should catch cold. I declined the offer first, supposing that 
Tarık was to arrive any minute. But my shivering limbs, instantly warmed to the idea, and 
let my body inside. There were announcements pinned on the apartment board before the 
stairs. I decided to amuse myself probing them. The first bunch was coming from the 
directorate of maintenance and repair, reminding the residents of their responsibilities to 
keep flats serviceable. I rolled my eyes to another bunch, where the feeding of birds with 
bread scraps was regulated to avoid rat raids and visual pollution. I could not hold my 
giggle, because there were instructions for paragraphs long, informing residents in detail 
about how and where to feed birds within the lodgings area. As I was flipping the sheets on 
the board, I was coming closer to solve the mystery of the blue canvas. I found an 
announcement about it, and first reckoned that they have vanished because it was no longer 
necessary to have them. It took seconds for me to realize that, it was not lifting of an 
obligation. Now it was forbidden to have them on balconies, as it was forbidden not to have 
them in the past. Finished probing the board, I descended the stairs to the basement of the 
apartment. The smell of rust and dust permeated the air and invaded my senses. Onion and 
potato sacks were standing independently by the side of the door. I went around the 
mountains of rusting bed frames and putrid mattresses to make my way into the oodles of 
unwrapped, empty parcel packages, most probably left by the previous residents of the 
apartment. I climbed the stairs back to sit at the entrance, in fatigue of a series of 
infiltrations. Five minutes later, Tarık called me to ask where I was. As I said I was inside 
the apartment, he appeared in seconds on the entrance door with a phone in his hand and a 
smile on his face. I invited him inside, before he rummaged his pockets to seek key rings. 
We went up the stairs to the second floor. He said, "Welcome," while his keys were turning 
inside the key hole, and one of the never-changing flats of military lodgings was appearing 
before me. I entered home.            
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1.2. Motivations, Possible Contributions and Outline of the Thesis 
 
 I had several impetuses and questions which propelled me to choose the military 
field to work on. The first one is quite personal. As a son of a military judge father and a 
pharmacist mother, I was always intrigued by 'the life inside' the military complex. My 
sojourn inside the gates of the military institution was interrupted by the early retirement of 
my father from the military. Then my ties with the institution and my family became more 
distanced, as I left behind Çorlu for a boarding school in İstanbul. But I had made many 
friends and acquaintances from military lodgings, Officers' Clubs, military vacation camps, 
and even from military hospitals, with some of whom I still meet every now and then. 
Therefore, I wanted to bring into view the socialization patterns specific to the lives of 
many 'military brats'.  
 
 The second reason is more connected to a tradition in the social sciences, that is, 
filling some gaps. First of all, the children of military families constitute a large, yet 
unexplored population. Given that there are 38728 'active' personnel of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (hereafter TSK) as of 2014, working as officers in the Land Forces, Air Forces, 
Navy and Gendarmerie;3 the number of young people in contemporary Turkey who have 
been raised in military families is likely to be over 75.000.4 One could say, just the sheer 
number warrants the analysis of this social group. However big the population may be, 
their presence is hardly visible in public life and academic debates. Occasionally, we see 
some of them on the television screen, in the martyr funerals of their fathers, as they are 
standing beside their grieving mothers in silence, sorrow or confusion, sometimes donning 
military officer caps on their head, or holding toy guns in their hand, while bidding 
farewells to their fathers with the soldier's salute, or embracing the Turkish flag stretched 
                                                          
3 A.A. (2013, May 5). Genelkurmay başkanlığı personel istatistiklerini güncelledi. Zaman 
Gündem. Retrieved January 8, 2014, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_genelkurmay-baskanligi-personel-istatistiklerini-
guncelledi_2061286.html 
4 This remains to be a bold prediction without firm basis though. The primary reason for 
that shortcoming is the lack of data and study concerning the military families in Turkey, 
including their population.  
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on the coffin in order to reach the deceased father for the last time.5 The media often 
partakes in the visual regulation of these children in ways which propagate the most 
venomous and revanchist versions of hegemonic nationalism. Yet often, the lives of 
children in military families passes in more 'ordinary' conditions, if we are to use the word 
in the sense that, without martyr fathers, ear-ringing sounds of gunshots and grenades. In 
the media there are occasional reports about the male ones being favoured in drafts for 
compulsory military service.6 Or about their lives in lush conditions, on the bone-weary 
bodies of conscripts and exploited public resources, without doing much to earn them. 
There are counters against almost every accusation as such, available in web forums, 
newspaper columns and periodicals, where authors rather take on a romantic view to 
portray the lives of children, riddled with hardships, deprivation and terror.7 Therefore, this 
study is also written to give a sense of the 'ordinary' lives of the children of military 
families, without veering into either poles of interpretation. Furthermore, despite the 
increasing number of studies in Turkey concerned with the military institution and 
militarism, these children remain above the fray, without exception. Whereas in limited 
studies written on them abroad, generally they become the subject of the discipline of 
psychology, along with their mothers (Flake, Davis, Johnson & Middleton, 2009; Park, 
                                                          
5 To see some coverage of the children of military officer fathers in martyr funerals: 
Habertürk. (2012, June 5). Şehit babasını oyuncak silahla uğurladı. Haberler Park. 
Retrieved January 8, 2014, from http://www.haberlerpark.com/haber.php?haberid=135065; 
Kozan, Ü. (2009, July 17). Şehit albayı eşi ve oğlu asker selamı ile uğurladı. Milliyet. 
Retrieved January 9, 2014, from http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/sehit-albayi-esi-ve-oglu-
asker-selami-ile-ugurladi/gundem/gundemdetay/17.07.2009/1118675/default.htm; Milliyet. 
(2012, March 21). Bak baban gökyüzünde ona el salla!. Milliyet Gündem. Retrieved 
January 9, 2014, from http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/bak-baban-gokyuzunde-ona-el-salla-
/gundem/gundemdetay/21.03.2012/1517859/default.htm; Demirci, R. (2012, February 15). 
Şehit subayı 5 bin kişi uğurladı. Milliyet. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from 
http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/sehit-subayi-5-bin-kisi-
ugurladi/gundem/gundemdetay/15.02.2012/1503543/default.htm.  
6 For example, see: Vakit. (2010, June 27). Paşa yakınlarına tatil gibi askerlik!. 
HaberVaktim. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from 
http://www.habervaktim.com/haber/128348/pasa-yakinlarina-tatil-gibi-askerlik.html 
7 One remarkable example was written by Yılmaz Özdil, during the period of trials of 
Balyoz and Ergenekon: Özdil, Y. (2012, September 23). Baba yarısı. Hürriyet. Retrieved 
January 9, 2014, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/21534549.asp. Also entries in 
websites such as Ekşi Sözlük, İtü Sözlük and Uludağ Sözlük can be illustrating to observe 
the clashing views on being a professional soldier's child.  
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2011; Willerton, Wadsworth & Riggs, 2011; Posada, Longoria, Cocker & Lu, 2011). The 
halfness of their lives, their psychological struggles, breakdowns and resilience while 
waiting with the mother for the deployed father, a figure of coherence and determination, 
who will bring the lives of 'womenandchildren' (Enloe, 1990) (often articulated in a single 
puff of breath) into completion when he returns are regurgitated themes in the literature 
through and through. But the lives of those 'womenandchildren' do not only pass with 
waiting for the assigned father. I am thus also writing this thesis to give the children their 
due respect and voice, by writing against psychologization and theses reigning in the 
literature which postulates an automatic dependency of 'womenandchildren' on the 'men' of 
the military institution.            
 
 Yet, this study does not only attempt to fill some gaps but also seek answers to 
specific questions of importance. First of all, if we take into account the immense role 
played by the military institution in Turkey, in the governance and regulation of internal 
tensions along different axes, how does it govern the tensions arising and regulate the 
figures living within its own institutional boundaries to render its services more effective 
and legitimate? Let me solidify the content of this question with an example and couple of 
more questions deriving from my personal ruminations on the subject. As conscientious 
objection gained more visibility in Turkey, I came to wonder what would happen to 
military brats if they were to declare conscientious objection, thereby showing that even the 
children of professional soldiers are not born soldiers in a country where conscientious 
objectors are sent to jail for asserting that. I tried to imagine a group of children raised in 
military families announcing in public that they will not volunteer to the military, even 
though they already reside within the borders of the military. I had a hard time trying to 
imagine it. How would a military judge father who decreed dozens of verdicts about 
deserters and conscientious objectors before take it if his child were to be one of those 
whom he once tried? How would an officer from the army who dealt with many 
undisciplined privates in the barracks take trouble erupting in his own home? Would the 
mother be able to attend tea gatherings of military wives anymore? What would the 
decision of the child tell about the parents? Would it make them bad parents? Would it 
make the father a bad father or a bad soldier? Then I tried to reassemble those questions 
7 
into research questions: How do the military families and the military institutions live with 
the possibility that their children can become fugitives, rotten, deserters, conscientious 
objectors, or slip out of the matrix of compulsory heterosexuality, in an environment and a 
nation, where hegemonic modes of masculinity are privileged and “the myth of the military 
nation” (Altınay, 2004a) still prevails? In that regard, I maintain that the examination of the 
lives of the children of military families yields fruitful results in the understanding of 
different modes of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1991) employed by the military institution 
and efforts poured by military families into raising 'proper' children responding or even 
living up to the expectations.  
 
 Therefore, in the following section and chapters, I explore the different ways in 
which we can conceptualize the lives of children raised in military families and within the 
military complex. Arguing that the family, the school and the military institution are the 
three institutions which primarily shape the experiences of these children, I direct my 
attention to the ‘military family’ and trace its historical roots, which, I argue, coincides with 
the emergence of a new form of governmentality in the military around the 1960s.  
 
In Chapter 1, I analyze the military family in order to have a better grasp on the 
lives of its members and models upheld by the military institution, throughout the first half 
of the first chapter. The second part of the chapter pertains to the second institution that 
shapes the experiences of these children and is dedicated to the lives of children in and 
related to the school.  
 
 In Chapter 2, I bring into view the third institution which has an impact on the lives 
of children, namely the military. While doing so, I examine the lives of the children in 
military settings, by focusing on institutional efforts to govern the children, and hence pre-
empt the possibility of deviation from a set of predefined norms and institutional order. I 
try to understand the institutional attempts to control the children, and dimensions proven 
crucial in the process of producing subjectivities catering to the interests of the military 
8 
institution. In that regard, I try to demonstrate how the military tries to govern the children 
with means which are based less on repression and more on what I call ‘encompassion’.8  
 
 In the final chapter, I focus on the ways in which the recent transformations of the 
military and its relationship to the political establishment and the society at large are being 
experienced by the children of military families. Given that this thesis is written in the 
aftermath of military’s falling from grace, I present the views and voices of children 
concerning the watershed political affairs which have precipitated major transformations in 
the perception, position and operations of TSK in the past decades. I do so with the hope of 
developing a better understanding of the discourses, affects and reactions circulating within 
the military community as it undergoes a major political, social and economic 
transformation. 
  
 I expect this study to contribute to the studies proliferating on the military institution 
on several grounds. Restoring the places of 'womenandchildren' in the studies conducted on 
the military institution, where they are usually written off from the framework of analysis, 
is one of those grounds. I also think that this thesis will contribute to the studies on 
militarism and militarization, by proposing fresh outlooks on the militarization of the 
children of military families, who defy the divide that is usually posed between civilian and 
military worlds. Finally, I hope that the thesis' focus on children will lend support, though 
indirectly, to the growing field of youth studies in Turkey and elsewhere.    
 
1.3. Methodological Considerations 
 
 This study draws on multiple resources and can be described as a multi-sited 
ethnography (Marcus, 1995). In this ethnography, I draw on online communities where the 
                                                          
8 I coin the term encompassion in order to signal the ways in which the military 
‘encompasses’ the lives of children by providing them with material assets, incentives, 
prestige, security and care in a life world it has created. I claim that the means deployed by 
the military thus connote a sense of ‘compassion’ rather than repression. 
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children of military families gather,9 my own experiences as a child of a military officer 
father, several visits paid to military vacation camps and three Officers' Clubs in Çorlu, 
İstanbul and Ankara, sometimes only to be turned down from the entrance.10 But the 
backbone of this thesis is made up from in-depth interviews conducted with ten (five 
female, five male) interlocutors and a three-week long field study during which I stayed at 
the house of my childhood friend Tarık in military lodgings.  
  
As for the interviews, first of all I should clarify that I conducted interviews only 
with the children of commissioned military officers (subay) and bracketed off the children 
of non-commissioned officers (astsubay), reserve officers (yedek subay), or civilian 
personnel working for the military institution in order to prevent the multiplication of 
parameters, caused by a set of disjunctions in terms of status, income, rights and 
responsibilities between commissioned military officers and aforementioned groups. A 
study that encompasses all these groups would have taken much longer and be beyond the 
scope of an MA thesis. Secondly, I conducted interviews with children who, in many ways, 
complied with the military institution. Put differently, I do not have any interlocutor who 
fell out of the military setting, by severely transgressing the institutional order imposed by 
the military. For example there are no children among my interlocutors who have asserted 
their homosexuality or declared conscientious objection. The interviews lasted from 45 
minutes up to 2 hours. Averagely, they were at the length of 1 hour and 15 minutes. I 
conducted the interviews in three different cities. One interview was conducted through 
Skype.   
 
                                                          
9 See: Asker Çocukları. (2009). Retrieved January 9, 2014, from 
https://www.facebook.com/askercocuklari; Asço Sözlük. (2008). Retrieved January 9, 
2014, from http://askercocuklari.sozlukspot.com/ 
10 My visit to the Sıhhiye Officers' Club in Ankara was not a successful one, because the 
male children of military officers, when they are past the age 25 need to apply for a daily 
entrance card (Günübirlik Kart) to use military facilities. For that reason, I made an 
application, but it took more than 3 months to have the card in my hands. In the meantime, 
I was given a document, certifying my application and status as a military brat. But this was 
not enough for me to pass the gates of Sıhhiye Officers’ Club, where the duty officer did 
not accept "a sheet of paper" for an entrance.   
10 
 As for my interlocutors, the first thing I should note is that, they took on, or were 
given, pseudonyms according to gender in order to ensure their anonymity in the thesis. All 
of my interlocutors have lived in places related to the military institution for a considerable 
amount of their lives. All have seen transfers of their fathers11 and followed them to 
wherever they were sent, with the exception of few occasional derailments. I was 
acquainted with three of my interlocutors beforehand. One was a childhood friend from the 
lodgings (Tarık), whereas I have known Kemal from my educational life. I also remember 
İrem, though barely, from the military lodgings as the daughter of our neighbours who went 
to another place when little. These acquaintances in particular and my identification as a 
‘military brat’ in general helped me to find access and interlocutors in a hardly penetrable 
field. Just to name a couple of examples, my mother helped me to find İrem's trace again 
after more than twenty years by giving me her mother’s phone number. This then led me to 
reach Merve, the younger sibling of İrem, who accepted an interview as did her sister. 
Meanwhile, Tarık’s mother gave a phone call to Mustafa’s mother, who then told Mustafa 
the news of a student just arrived town and looking for interviews with ‘other military 
brats’. Relieved to hear that I was also a military brat, Mustafa responded positively to the 
call and I met with him immediately, before he returned to his post in the Navy. Moreover, 
my trips within the different spaces of the military complex would be impossible had I not 
have a “halfie status” (Abu-Lughod, 1988), certified by a military identity card and ‘a sheet 
of paper’ I was carrying in my wallet.  
 
All of my interlocutors were born in mid to late 1980s or early 1990s into an era 
marked by the violent clashes between TSK and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK 
hereafter) and when having ties with the military institution was generally seen as a mark of 
privilege, prosperity and access, without carrying much of the negative connotations it has 
nowadays. The ages of my interlocutors range from 21 to 26,12 which is indeed going 
                                                          
11 I should note hereby that women also can and do volunteer in the military as officers 
since 1955, when the War College opened its doors to women (Altınay, 2011, p. 279). They 
cannot take the entrance tests for military high schools though. Although I may use the 
word ‘father’ as if it is a synonym for ‘military officer’ throughout the text, I will only do 
so for sake of convenience while writing, because none of my interlocutors has a military 
officer mother. 
12 I had interlocutors whose ages were 21 (1) , 22 (2), 23 (1), 24 (1), 25 (3) 26 (2) 
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against my initial intentions of finding interlocutors between the ages of 18 and 25. This 
little bump on the age range and the narrowed age interval unfortunately led to certain 
consequences. First of all, it resulted in the homogenization of the ranks of my 
interlocutors' fathers. For example, two of my interlocutors have lieutenant colonel fathers 
and one has a major general father, whereas the fathers of seven interlocutors were 
colonels. Second consequence of working on this particular age interval was the high rates 
of retirement from the military among fathers. For instance, of all my interlocutors, only 
one (Tarık) has a father who is actively working in the military institution, whereas the 
fathers of others are retired from the military. However, their retirements are rather recent, 
mostly after 2011, with the exception of Deniz whose father retired from the military when 
Deniz was in the secondary school. Leaving aside their ages, only two (İrem and Kemal) of 
my interlocutors are employed and working in private companies. One (Tarık) is running 
his own business, while considering a return to the university for getting a doctorate degree. 
One (Mustafa) decided to follow the footsteps of his father into the military and became an 
officer in the Navy. The rest of my interlocutors are students in different levels of the 
university education.  
 
 Another shortcoming of this study is the lack of interviews conducted with children 
whose fathers work in some branches of the military. Despite all efforts to maintain a 
balance between all of the branches of TSK while finding my interlocutors, I could not find 
any interlocutor whose father works for the Air Forces or as a military doctor. As for the 
fathers of my interlocutors, one father is from the military jurisdiction, one was from the 
Navy, one was from the Gendarmerie and the rest worked for the Land Forces. Two of the 
fathers in the army were infantry officers, three of them were artillery officers, one was in 
charge of the personnel and the other was in logistics. Furthermore, none of them have the 
title of staff officers. Eight out of ten fathers were graduates of both military high schools 
and War Colleges, with the only remaining exceptions being the fathers of Ayşe and 
Yasemin. 
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1.4. Conceptualizing the Childhood of the Children of Military Families 
 
One may propose a myriad of frameworks to understand the childhood of military 
brats. However, I argue that, the constitutive role of three institutions should be taken into 
any attempt of analysis as the lowest denominator of military brats' lives. The family, the 
school and the military are the three institutions which shape the experiences of the 
children to a great extent. They are the primary agencies of socialization in military brats' 
lives. Therefore, it is indispensable to take into account the ways in which these institutions 
encompass the children of military families in order to make sense of their experiences. Of 
course, one can argue that these institutions impinge upon the lives of every citizen, in any 
nation-state. However, military brats depart from others, because they are beset with at least 
one of them constantly, namely the military, physically and almost all the time until their 
participation in working life (or even later) and unless the professional military officer in 
the family retires from service. Rarely can they step out of this triangle. Let me detour to 
broader generalizations to adumbrate the scope and great extent to which these institutions 
surround the children's lives.  
 
 Overall, the childhood of a military brat passes within a military setting, until the 
start of primary school. The child is usually born in a military hospital, sometimes in the 
absence of the father who is away for a military task. As the family is ordinarily settled in 
there, the child plays and socializes with other sons and daughters of military families in 
the playgrounds of military lodgings. Most likely they have their haircuts in lodgings or 
Officers' Clubs. The candies and chocolate bars are generally bought from commissaries 
within the housing sites. If they trip and bruise a knee somewhere, the military hospital 
where they are born is often the address to go. Friends, alongside their families come and 
go at a rapid clip. The children start over with new acquaintances. A time arrives, however, 
when it is them instead of other families who should go somewhere distant on account of 
relocations. They rinse and repeat in other places. Wherever they may go, the stories of 
'askerabi'13s fascinate them, invoking fantasies in their minds about 'the life outside'. 
 
                                                          
13 In English: Soldier (elder) brother 
13 
 In fact, they can always see other people roaming outside, in between the grids, 
behind the bars and beyond the guns of conscripts in khaki which segregate two zones of 
habitation: civilian and military. Some even dare to venture into the other world, by 
circumventing families and soldiers, and convey their extraterritorial excursions to 
intrigued friends. Nevertheless, in earlier stages of children's lives, the outside is usually 
nothing more than an intermediary space to get through, spanning various military 
facilities. The points of departure and destination in these travels may change. But the 
permutations are not manifold. An occasional trip to a dinner at an Officers' Club on a 
winter night, a weekly escape to a military vacation camp on a summer day, or a short visit 
paid to the military supermarket14 in the city can allow the children to have a sense of the 
life outside. But, typically, the child pursues an insularized existence within the borders of 
an archipelago of military zones, which attempt to simulate 'the life outside' in many 
aspects. The life outside, on the other hand, remains to be a matter of growing concern and 
curiosity:   
 
"Çok kaotik gelirdi bana dışarısı. Böyle dışarıda belediye otobüsleri var, 
insanlar var, simitçi var, bilmem ne... Allahım ne kadar karmaşık bir dünya 
burası! Hâlbuki ben burada ne güzel ağaçlar, çiçekler... Her şey kare şeklinde 
kesilmiş, askerler var, çimleri biçiyorlar falan... Araba dediğin belediye 
otobüsü değil, herkesin nizami olarak bindiği sarı duraklar ve gri arabalar, 
servisler falan var. Çok düzenli gelirdi bana lojmanın içi. Dışarısı genelde çok 
karmaşık ve kaotik gelirdi sahiden de."15  
 
"Genelde mesela lojmanın içindesin. Hani lojmandan markete gittiğimde çok 
heyecanlanırdım gerçekten de, markete gideceğim şimdi, lojmanların dışına 
diye."16 
                                                          
14 Usually known as OYPA, such supermarkets which were owned by OYAK (Armed 
Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation) no longer exist under the ownership of the military.    
15 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “The outside seemed too 
chaotic to me. There were buses, people and peddlers outside… Oh my god, what a mess 
the outside is! But it is so good inside with trees and flowers… Everything is trimmed to a 
rectangular shape. There are conscripts, mowing the grasses… There are no buses, but only 
cars. There are yellow stops, grey cars and shuttles inside, which everyone uses regularly. 
The lodgings appeared very neat to me. The outside was too complicated and chaotic 
indeed.”   
16 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Usually you remain inside the 
lodgings. When I was going to the market from the lodgings, it was an excitement, like 
‘Now I will go to the market, outside the lodgings.’” 
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"Lojman içinde çocuk parkı sonradan yapıldı, orası boş bir alandı. Bir de 
topumuz türbeye kaçardı, bir türbe vardı lojman arazisinin içine doğru giriş 
yapmış. O topu almak konusunda her zaman sıkıntı yaşardık. Bir korku hâsıl 
olurdu yani bünyede. O türbe değişik bir türbeydi, tam bir türbe yeşili duvarı 
vardı. Sokaktan gelen kısmında mum yakmak için yerleri vardı. İnsanlar 
dışarıdan mum yakardı, biz içeriden top atar, sonra almak için tırsardık. Bazen 
o bahçeden kemik memik çıkardı. İnsan kemiği mi hayvan kemiği mi bilemez 
korkardık. (Güler) Su kulesine tırmanırdık. Su kulesi vardı ama galiba faal 
değildi. Boruları moruları yoktu. Su kulesine tırmanır onun üzerine otururduk 
falan. Dışarıyı seyrederdik. Böyle küçük maceralarımız vardı, ama bizim için 
baya heyecan veriyordu."17 (emphasis mine) 
 
"Acaba dışarısı da böyle mi? diye bir merakımız vardı bizim açıkçası. 
Dışarıdaki insanlar da böyle mi? diye bir merakımız vardı. Ama zaten biz 
okulla birlikte sosyalleştikten sonra bizim kadar güçlü bağları olmadığını 
gördük."18 (emphasis mine) 
 
 As the last sentence of Zeynep's speech hints at, all these change a bit when the 
children hit school age. Apart from the family and military as sites of primary socialization, 
the school begins to take a hold in the children's lives. It breaks the monopolies of the 
family and military over the lives of children to an extent, by being the venue where the 
military brats come into contact and mingle with their peers nurtured in civilian families. 
The children get a foothold in the life outside through education, usually for the first time in 
their lives:  
 
"Dediğim o bütün oyunlar, bilmem neler hep bir duvar içinde oynanan şeyler 
tabii. Okula gidince ne oluyor? Mesela ders verirdi sana elişi öğretmenin. 
                                                          
17 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “They built a playground in a 
free space inside the lodgings. Sometimes we were kicking the football to a shrine. There 
was a shrine, extending into the lodgings area. Retrieving the ball from there would be an 
issue for us. We would be scared. It was an interesting shrine. It had a green wall, typical of 
shrines. It had an area to the street side where people lit candles. People would light a 
candle and we would kick the ball from inside the lodgings. Then we would be afraid to 
bring it back. Sometimes we would find bones in the playground. We would be frightened, 
without knowing if they belonged to a human or an animal. (Laughing) We would climb 
the water tower. It was out of use I guess. It had not pipes or anything. We would climb and 
sit on one of the layers of the water tower. We would watch the outside. We had adventures 
as such, but they would give us a buzz.” (emphasis mine)     
18 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “We would wonder if the 
outside was the same. Were the people outside the same? After we socialized through the 
school, we nevertheless understood that they did not have ties as strong as ours.” (emphasis 
mine) 
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Gidip onun malzemelerini alırdın. İşte okulun yanında kesin bir tane çakal 
bakkal olurdu. Yok işte leblebi tozu satar, jelibon satar, bilmem ne falan. Ona 
giderdin."19  
 
 However, the military always slips in, one way or the other, as I will try to show 
through the end of this chapter. In a nutshell, the military continues to buffer the contacts of 
these children with the life outside throughout their education. It endeavors to squeeze itself 
into every imaginable gap, temporal and spatial, opened up in children's lives throughout 
their years of education. It remains to be a constant in their lives, which continues to engulf 
the children into its institutional boundaries.    
 
"Sabahleyin zar zor kalkardım. Uyku, sevdiğim şey. Askeriyenin servisi olurdu 
okula bırakan. O götürürdü [okula]. Sonra öğlene kadar ders dinlerdim. Fazla 
konuşkan bir çocuk değildim. Sesim çıkmazdı, hocayı dinlerdim. Öğle arasında 
yemeğimi yer, sonra bir daha derse girerdim. Doğru düzgün arkadaşım 
olmamıştır pek. Konuşursam da daha önceden [lojmandan] tanıştığım bir kişi, 
maksimum iki kişiyle konuşurdum. Sonra servisle geri dönerdim. Öyle geçerdi 
[bir ilkokul] günüm."20 
 
"Şöyle bir enteresan durum var. Yani aslında hep onun içindesin gerçekten de. 
Özellikle hani, işte servise biniyorsun, lojmandasın. Sonra servisten iniyorsun, 
gene lojmana bırakıyor falan. Böyle dışarıdaki dünyayı görüp sonra tekrar 
lojmana giriyorsun sürekli."21 (emphasis mine) 
 
                                                          
19 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “The games I mentioned and 
all were always played within the four walls. What happens then when you go to the 
school? Your handiworks course teacher would give you homework. You would go and 
fetch materials for that. There would always be a grocery next to the school. The trickster 
inside would sell jelly beans, ground chickpea and so forth. You would go there.”    
20 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I would have a hard time 
waking up. I am fond of sleeping. There was a military shuttle that took us to school. I 
would listen to the teacher until the lunch break. I was a silent type. I would listen to the 
lecture, without saying anything. I would eat my lunch in the break and return to class. I 
never had many friends. I would speak to one or two persons, whom I already know from 
the lodgings. I would return with the military shuttle. Such was a day in the primary 
school.”  
21 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “There is an interesting thing. 
Actually you are indeed always inside of it. You would take the shuttle from the military 
lodgings. You would depart the shuttle to come to the lodgings. You would constantly 
return to the lodgings after briefly seeing the world outside.” (emphasis mine) 
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 Of course, these are snapshots, condemned to be flawed and subject to innumerable 
rectifications, just because there are many parameters to be factored in military brats' lives, 
which shape their experiences. I will try to outline them as much as possible as this study 
unfolds. However, I hope these snapshots can help the reader capture some hallmarks of 
life as a military brat in Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s. Leastways, they can signal the 
extent to which this institutional vicious cycle encapsulates the lives of children, usually 
until they start working ‘outside.’   
  
 The institutional triangle, composed of the family, the school and the military is not 
any ordinary triangle. To begin with, according to Althusser (1994), the military is an 
element of the repressive state apparatus, whereas the other two belong to the category of 
ideological state apparatuses. Mosse (1983) addresses their pivotal roles in the reproduction 
and consolidation of nationalist ideologies. Therefore, they all have fundamental 
importance for activities of state-making and nation-constitution. However, another 
specificity of the triangle lies elsewhere.     
 
 Take the military for an example. The military has not only been the repressive 
apparatus of the state. Althusser (1994) also asserts that, "there is no such thing as a purely 
ideological or repressive apparatus" (pp. 111-112) but the ideological function of the 
military institution has been remarkably dominant in Turkey since the early republican 
years. Suffice it to recall the name of the chapter in Medeni Bilgiler [Civil Knowledge] 
(İnan, 1988 [1969]): "The Army Is School" (Ordu Mekteptir). Accordingly, the 
professional military officers, as Turan (2013) notes in an auto-ethnographical study on his 
military service, frequently refer to the barracks as the 'final school' (p. 298). Moreover, the 
military does not only present itself as a school, but also likens itself to a family. It is 
indeed in contention to constitute a modern model for other families in the society. The 
quotations below are drawn from an influential 1939 book, Ordu Sosyolojisi Yolunda Bir 
Deneme [An Attempt for Military Sociology] (Erker), approved by the general staff of the 
Republic of Turkey, and they might illustrate this point better:   
 
"Orduda aile toplu olarak ifade edilirse, bir alay numunesidir. Müstakil 
müesseseler, birlikler aynı hukuki manayı taşır. Fakat biz orduda aile dediğimiz 
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zaman bir alayın içtimai hayatını ve bağlarını kastediyoruz. Hakikaten 
böyledir. Orduya yeni giren bir subay ve askeri şahıs, önce bir alayda 
askerliğin içtimai ve mesleki bilgiler ile pratik olarak terbiye edilir. Orduda aile 
her vasfile, her vazifesile tarih boyunca görülen aile tiplerinin bir mecmuasıdır. 
Aile komutanı ailenin başkanıdır."22 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, pp. 90-
91) 
 
"Orduda fert denince aklımıza doğrudan doğruya sosyoloji kitaplarının tarif 
ettikleri ana, baba ve çocuklardan ibaret bir aile gelmelidir. Ordu sosyolojik 
hayatını kendi başına ayıran karakter budur. Öyleyse orduda fert bir mürekkep 
varlıktır. Fırsat düştükçe üstünde söz söyleneceği şekilde modern aile tipinin 
ahlaki bağlarla en çok sıkışmış, en fazla daralmış ve böyle ferd manasına 
ulaşmış mükemmel örneğidir. Böyle olduğu için ordu hayatı daha medeni bir 
dünyadır. Gün gelecek cemiyet hayatında da aile, orduda olduğu gibi 
ferdleşecektir."23 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, pp. 42-43) (emphasis 
mine) 
 
 "Just as the army is a school, so is the school an army," (as cited in Altınay, 2004a, 
p. 119) says Kadri Yaman, an official of the Turkish Ministry of Culture in 1938. 
Accordingly, Altınay astutely lays bare the ways in which the military and the school have 
been the "two fronts of the nation" (2004a, p. 119) in Turkey. Then, the school, along with 
the military, is a disciplinary institution which increases the docility and utility of bodies 
(Foucault, 1979).  
 
 As for the family, first of all, its significance for the nation-state seems to derive 
rather from the constitutive roles it undertakes for the physiological production of 
population and primary socialization of children (Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 169). Apart from that, 
                                                          
22 "The regiment can be likened to a family within the context of the military. The self-
contained units all have legal similitude. But what we mean by family in the military is the 
social life and bonds of a regiment. It’s really like this. Every officer and person subject to 
military law newly entering the military receives his practical induction into military social 
life and profession in the regiment. The family in the military is in every way the corpus of 
family types seen throughout history. The family commander is the head of the family." 
23 "When speaking of person in the military, what should come to mind immediately is the 
family of sociology books comprised of a mother, father and children. This is the character 
that alone distinguishes the sociological life of the military. Therefore, the person in the 
military is a composite entity. It can be said that through its moral bonds, the modern family 
type has reached its most concentrated and restricted form, and, therefore, is the most 
perfect example of what is meant by ‘person.’ Therefore, military life is a more civilized 
world. The day will come when the family in society, as is the case in the military, will 
become individualized." (emphasis mine) 
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it provides a metaphor extensively used to describe the military, the school and the nation. 
Conversely, just as the metaphor of the family is deployed with reference to schools, so the 
school often lends itself as a metaphor to identify the family. Althusser (1994) points out 
that the school, which has replaced the role of the Church as the dominant ideological state 
apparatus is coupled with the family today in the reproduction of the relations of production 
(pp. 119-120). Perhaps, as Belge (2012) warns us, it might not be reasonable at all times to 
conceptualize the realm of the family as a state apparatus, but one cannot downplay its 
importance and efficiency as an institution and a site of education for the reproduction and 
instilment of a particular ideology (p. 675).  
 
 The childhood of a military brat is a childhood played out against the backdrop of 
institutions, each of whose roles alternate with one another. From one perspective, it is a 
childhood played out against the backdrop of three schools. Looked at differently, it is a 
childhood confined within three families. One can as well formulate it as a childhood 
caught between the jaws of two primary disciplinary institutions, namely the school and the 
military. What happens to the children then? Do they turn into 'domesticated monkeys', 
who never stray from the designated rules wherever they are, as one user on the internet 
claims?24 There is no definite response to these questions, as the interplay of disciplinary 
power in different historical and social contexts produce, yet not determine different 
subjectivities. However, we cannot but probe these institutions in order to come up with 
more refined answers. Let's take first in the queue of our research the family into which 
these children are born.     
 
1.5. The Historical Roots of the Military Family 
 
 I should recall that the family which we speak of is a modern nuclear family, in 
which at least one of the parents is endowed with the knowledge of modern warfare, 
through an education taken almost always in War Schools, and commissioned to hold a 
position in the military institution as a professional military officer. As mentioned in the 
                                                          
24 See: Arapbebek. (2007, November 20). Asker çocuğu olmak. İtü Sözlük. Retrieved 
December 27, 2013, from  
http://www.itusozluk.com/goster.php/asker+%E7ocu%F0u+olmak/@2089801 
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introduction, I also bracket off in this study the families of non-commissioned officers or 
reserve officers, for it would otherwise require an effort to bring into consideration various 
parameters that are disproportionate to the time, space and knowledge at my disposal.   
 
 Logically, the birth of the family in question cannot precede the efforts of military 
modernization in the Ottoman Empire. 1826, the disbandment of janissary corps by the 
Auspicious Incident (Vaka-i Hayriye) as well as the establishment of the Mansure Army 
(Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye) is a turning point in that regard. The second milestone 
in this early period of military modernization is the inauguration of the War School 
(Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiye). Afterwards, the new compulsory conscription system for all 
male subjects of the sultan25 was implemented in the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 
(Islâhat Hatt-ı Hûmâyûn-û) so as to keep abreast with the developments in Europe 
concerning the emergence of new types of armies (citizen army) and war-making (total 
war). These changes increased the demand of the Ottoman Empire for military officers as 
well. Nonetheless, it is impossible to claim that the military family that we trace has come 
into existence at its full force in this early period of modernization. The primary cause of 
this was the absence of a traditional social class in the Ottoman Empire, from which the 
Empire could raise loyal military officers (Berkes, 1978), unlike many European states 
where the withering aristocracy is also known for its indulgence into the swashbuckling 
side of life (Belge, 2012). Moreover, the rate of graduation from the War School was quite 
low. For example, only 29 officers were graduated from the War School in 1850 (Beşikçi, 
2011, p. 50). Nor did the amount of graduates were to increase to a considerable number 
before the turn of the century (Beşikçi, 2011, p. 50). The temporary solution of the Empire 
to these problems was filling the slaves and eunuchs into the ranks as officers. But, despite 
all attempts to the contrary, the Ottoman Army relied heavily on rankers (alaylı)26 to 
appease its shortage of officers for a long time. The army was an unorganized mass and a 
mess, commented Auguste de Marmont, the French General and Marshal, upon watching a 
                                                          
25 However, this system was not implemented to the letter at those dates. It was only after 
1909, the non-Muslim males of the Ottoman Empire were enforced to attend their military 
service, because the exemption fee (known as iane-i askeriye or bedel-i askeriye) was 
finally repealed (Hacısalihoğlu, 2010).    
26 Literally: From the regiment 
20 
maneuver of the Ottoman troops, genuinely shocked to attest that the commander of a 
cavalry brigade (liva) was a black eunuch:    
 
"Bu bir ordu değil, bir yığın... Erden alay komutanına kadar ödevlerinin ne 
olduğu hakkında en küçük fikirleri bile yoktu... Acele birçok alaylar kurulmuş. 
Fakat başlarındaki subaylar bilgisiz ve ehliyetsiz... Hiçbirinde kendine ve 
ötekilere güven yok. Komutanlık yapmıyorlar... Türkiye'de subaylığın vekarı 
düşünülmüyor. Eski zamanın o gururlu, o görkemli, o yakışıklı Osmanlı 
komutanlarına ne olmuş diye insan şaşıyor. Bedence bir eksikliğin sebep 
olduğu bir aşağılık ve yüreksizlik içinde olan bir hadım nasıl liva komutanı 
olabilir? Böyle bir adam subaylarının ve erlerinin kafasında üstünlük 
kuramaz."27 (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 21-22) 
 
 Later, the 1870s and 80s brought about a paradigmatic shift in the Ottoman Army 
(Tokay, 2010a; Özcan, 2010). No sooner had the army taken a defeat in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78, the governing elites decided to abandon their struggle to implement 
reformations by making use of different military models (Güvenç, 2010). The Prussian 
army, which triumphed over French troops in the Franco-Prussian War, became the single 
model after which the Ottoman military was to be reorganized (Güvenç, 2010). The 
Prussian military mission arrived in the Empire in 1882 at the request of Abdul Hamid II 
(Tokay, 2010a).      
 
 The educated military officer deficit was an ongoing problem of the Empire for 
decades, and one of the main predicaments hindering military restructuring forays, and this 
was immediately noticed by the Prussian military mission. For example, a member of the 
mission, von der Goltz, the author of the well acclaimed and highly influential Das Volk in 
Waffen [the Nation in Arms], argued that the fate of the military reformations in the 
Ottoman Empire was contingent upon a change in officer classes (Tokay, 2010a, p. 39). 
                                                          
27 "This is not an army, it’s an aggregation… No one, from private all the way up to 
commander, had any idea about their duties... Many regiments were hastily put together. 
But the officers in charge are uninformed and incompetent... They have no confidence in 
themselves or others. They do not command... Officers in Turkey are not seen as dignified. 
People wonder what has happened to those proud, magnificent and handsome Ottoman 
commanders of the past. How can one who has suffered castration and is wallowing in 
baseness and timidity because of physical imperfection become the leader of a brigade? 
Such a man cannot be seen as superior in the minds of officers and privates." 
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Therefore, one of the priorities of the mission was to create a new class of military officers, 
while honing up those at hand through education so that there could be more officers 
equipped enough to detect how they can navigate the troops in their command to victory.  
 
 However, the strong impetus to create a new class of military officers, I claim, did 
not initially translate much into the fully-fledged appearance of military families which we 
seek for, for several reasons. On the one hand, we observe a steady increase in the numbers 
of graduate officers from the War College after 1880s. For example, while the sum of the 
graduates from the War College between the years 1834-1883 was 2.383, there were 353 
graduates only in 1900 (Beşikçi, 2011, p. 50). However, the backbone of the Ottoman 
officer class was still composed by rankers. Beşikçi (2011) states that the rate of officers 
who had graduated from the War College was not even one-tenth of the whole Ottoman 
officer class in 1877, and only 132 of them were commissioned officers out of 
approximately 20.000 officers (p. 50). According to Tokay (2010a), the rate finally reached 
one-tenth in 1884 (p. 40). In 1894, Hale states, the Ottoman army still consisted of 85% 
ranker officers and one-third of the officers were still illiterate (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, p. 
29). By 1900, the rate of the new type of educated officers was one-fourth of the officer 
class (Tokay, 2010a, p. 40). Overall, the officers who were graduates of the War College 
were still relatively few in numbers. Only after the discharges of 1909,28 and in the wake of 
the Balkan Wars, were they to become on par with ranker officers, in terms of numbers. 
Laying the numbers aside for a moment, the conditions of the last quarter of the longest 
century of the Empire also do not seem particularly fit for the marriage of military officers 
and hence the formation of “military families.” Inadequate and irregularly paid salaries, 
lacking supplies in terms of gear and nutrition, coupled with long terms of service in severe 
conditions should have posed an obstacle for marriage. For example, Tokay imparts how 
soldiers and officers borrowed money at interest and discounted their salaries with 
commissions up to 40% at money lenders, in this last quarter of the century, during which 
                                                          
28 Tokay (2010a) states that roughly 10.000 officers, most of whom were ranked officers, 
were dismissed from the military after 1909 (p. 43). Of all the discharges, the purge that 
took place in 1913, at the behest of Enver Pasha, was the most remarkable one. Although 
there is no consensus when it comes to numbers, it is believed that from 800 to 1100 
officers fell under the axe at a moment's notice (Akyaz, 2009, p. 32). As one can expect, it 
was mostly the ranked officers who were pruned from the military.  
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the Ottoman Empire was mired in the throes of a nascent bureaucracy and scarcity of 
resources which paved the way to a series of harsh economic crises (2010a, p. 41; 2010b, p. 
135).29 Lastly, one might suspect that the military elites shared the military institutions' 
universally "mixed feelings about the institution of marriage" (Enloe, 2000, p. 154) back 
then. To the best of my limited knowledge, no study to date has unraveled if there were any 
bachelor requirements for recruitment in the military institution in the Ottoman times. In 
that regard, the gender-blindness of studies in the discipline of history, especially on 
military histories, applies to the Turkish context as well. It is not clear as to how and to 
what extent did the institution's perception of marriage and 'womenandchildren' effect the 
ruminations of military modernization. Nor do we know if the revulsion (or lack thereof) 
against the institution of marriage had turned into an institutional policy. However, we 
know, for instance, that the newly constituted Ottoman gendarmerie favored in employment 
those applicants who were bachelors and childless from 1840s to 1910, even though it was 
known to be one of the least implemented principals, owing to the dearth of 'human 
resources' to fill the ranks (Özbek, 2010, p. 61) or that the married applicants were not 
accepted to the gendarmerie by Corci Pasha (Tokay, 2010b, p. 130). In a nutshell, the 
concern was skulking there, within the heart of security apparatuses.   
 
 Yet, it was not perhaps a convenient time to be selective and concerned with the 
marriage of officers, as the Empire was faced with the threat of extinction in the advent of 
the Balkan Wars. The deep ambivalence of the military institution when it comes to the 
marriage of officers was still lurking there around the 1910s, but more immediate was the 
necessity to channel all the forces of the Empire for purposes of war preparation under the 
imminent possibility of war. The concern of the married military was thus submitted to the 
desire invested in the creation and proliferation of educated commanders, because the latter 
was what mattered to the policy makers most. Accordingly, the 'ideal officer' was indeed 
given a prominent place in the huge corpus of literature emerging after the Balkan Wars, 
where the authors were preaching myriad recipes for salvation. One of the most striking 
outputs of this literature is Zabit ile Kumandan [the Officer and the Commander]. Written 
                                                          
29 This is despite the fact that the 40% of the state budget was reserved to military 
expenditures in the era of Abdul Hamid II (Tokay, 2010a, p. 41). 
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by Nuri Conker in 1913, appreciated and reviewed by Mustafa Kemal, this immensely 
significant book was calling for the replacement of the 'old officer', namely rankers, by the 
'new officer'. Conker’s call also reverberates in the review of the book, Zabit ve Kumandan 
ile Hasbihal [Dialogues with the Officer and The Commander], written by Mustafa Kemal 
in 1914:     
 
“Ve demiştik ki, ‘Bir kıta ve özellikle de subaylar kurulu, yalnız iyi örnek 
olacak rehberlerle yetiştirilir...’ ... Ve rica etmiştik ki, ‘Bugün için girişilecek 
iş; kayıtsız ve hiçbir şeye göz yummadan, nitelik ve iktidar sahibi olmak 
yeteneği gösterenlerden bir Komuta ve Subay Kurulu oluşturmak olmalıdır.’ Ve 
açıklamıştık ki, ‘Ancak bilgili, iktidar sahibi, etkin, girişimci ve yetki sahibi bir 
ordu müfettişinin denetimi altında bilgisiz, ordunun talim ve eğitimindeki 
amaçtan habersiz kolordu ve tümen komutanları barınamayacakları gibi ... 
böylece, ancak gereken niteliklere sahip kolordu komutanlarının 
kolordularında; dinlenmeye muhtaç olan ve zararlı bir heykel halini almaktan 
başka orduya iyiliği olmayan tümen ve alay komutanları, kabul görmez ve 
bunların tembelliklerine göz yumulmaz’."30 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 
2006 [1918], p.7)31 
 
 The book, Zabit ile Kumandan, has long stretches where the new type of ideal 
officer is delineated in detail. The officer in question resembles rather a reckless, selfless 
and virile beast, leading his troops to seek retaliation on behalf of the nation. The primary 
traits of this officer, according to Conker, are sacrifice and courage:  
 
"Bu önemli görevin en ayırt edici, başta gelen koşulu yukarıdaki maddelerde 
yazıldığı üzere fedakâr ve cesur olmak, kendini ve hayatı hiçe saymaktır. Bir 
                                                          
30 And we said: “‘Troops, officers in particular, are trained only by leaders who will set a 
good example…’ … And we requested: ‘The task before us today is creating a Council of 
Commanders and Officers composed of capable individuals ready to do what needs to be 
done without turning a blind eye.’ And we explained: ‘However, just the overseeing of a 
sophisticated, strong, effective, enterprising and capable military cannot be left to military 
corps and division commanders who are uninformed and ignorant of the purpose of drill 
and training … therefore, the military corps shall consist only qualified military corps 
commanders; the corps cannot tolerate the indolence of division and regiment commanders 
who are in need of being put out to pasture and have no other interest in the military than 
becoming a malign effigy’." 
31 The book, Zabit ve Kumandan is written by Nuri Conker in 1913 and first published in 
1914. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal’s Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal is written in 
1914 and first published in 1918. The version that I am using in this thesis brings together 
these two books and has 2006 as its publication date.  
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subay, sanatı adına, hayatına ve varlığına hiç önem vermeyecektir. Gerek 
kendinin ve gerek yanındakilerin hayat ve hatta rahatını en iyi biçimde 
korumaya çalışacak, ancak sanatının ve işinin gerektirdiği anlarda bunları 
gözden çıkarmaya ve feda etmeye hazır bekleyecektir. Ve bu gibi anlarda 
bunları hiç düşünmeyecektir."32 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 
[1918], p.38) (emphasis mine) 
 
 Hereby, the emphasis on 'those nearby' is significant. For we see that the silent 
referent in question is many times none other than the family of the officer, including his 
own parents.33 The existence of the family is thus acknowledged as a fact, but the same 
family is rendered utterly insignificant throughout the text. This indeed marks the place 
reserved to the family of the officer in those times, as the handmaiden of the military 
institution. The family, according to the military elites, had to be epiphenomenal to the 
profession itself. Perhaps, this approach is nowhere more evident than in the following 
lines, written by Mustafa Kemal in his review:  
 
"Başarı için en emin aracın saldırı olduğunu anlamakta ısrar olunmaz; ancak 
saldırı ordusu kuracak milletin, Japonların kyugeki zayşin dedikleri saldırı 
ruhuna sahip olması gerektir. Bu saldırı ruhu, 1904 yılında; 
 
Bin keder, bir üzüntü; fakat her şeye rağmen ileri! 
Başka hiçbir şey düşünmek lazım değil  
Cesedimi savaş meydanında gözler önüne sermek 
İşte bu, Cenabıhakk'ın emeli! 
 
şarkısını söylerek Kazumaro gemisiyle savaşa giden Albay Kujima'larda; Bu 
saldırı ruhu, Sasebo limanından savaşa çıkarken ailesine, ‘Bu andan itibaren 
benden haber beklemeyin! Görevimden başka bir şeyle ilgilenmeyeceğimden 
sizden de haber istemem!’ diye yazan Amiral Togo'larda; Bu saldırı ruhu, 
Nanşan Muharebesi'nde oğlunun göğsünden vurulduğu haberi üzerine, ailesine, 
‘Oğlumun külleri Tokyo'ya getirildiği zaman hemen gömülmesin! Yakında ben 
ve küçük oğlum da hayatı terk edeceğimizden, o zaman üçümüzü birden 
                                                          
32 "What most distinguishes this crucial duty is self-sacrifice and bravery under the 
conditions stated above and disregard of one’s own life. Because of his vocation, an officer 
cannot attach importance to his life and existence. He will strive to the best of his ability to 
preserve the life and even the comfort of himself and those nearby, but he will stand 
prepared to disregard and sacrifice them the moment duty demands it. They will not even 
be considered." (emphasis mine) 
33 The father of the military officer does not take place in these narratives. It is the mother 
who comes to the fore as a body on which the honor of the (male) nation and the male 
officer is stamped.  
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gömersiniz!’ emrini veren General Nogi'lerde; Ve bunları izleyenlerin hepsinde 
bütün aydınlığı, bereketiyle var olduğu içindir ki, narin Japonlar iri yapılı 
Ruslara meydan okudular."34 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 [1918], 
pp.15-16) 
 
 The family, in this account, seems to be a domain which should be jettisoned when 
the duty calls, as well as a site of procreation by virtue of which the nation raises its own 
prospective soldiers. Furthermore, it does not seem to be an element which should be 
regarded highly in the life of an officer. If anything, the narrative above highlights the 
family as a potential shackle inimical to the belligerence of officers. Therefore, the family 
is deemed disposable for the survival of the nation. Because, Conker propounds, the family 
survives if and insofar as the nation survives:  
  
"Er geç ölüme mahkûm olan önemsiz ve tek bir hayat, bunlardan daha değerli 
midir ki, esirgensin? Savaş meydanlarında isteyerek feda etmekten 
çekinmeyeceğimiz can ve hayatımızın az sonra düşmanın ayakları altında 
aşağılama ve hararetle çiğneneceğini düşünmeliyiz. Bu tek bir hayatın arasına 
subayın aile hayatı da dâhildir. Subayın şehitlik rütbesine ulaşmasından sonra, 
diyelim ki hükümetin, ailesine hiç sahip çıkmayacağı kabul edilse bile, bütün 
bir memleket halkının sefaleti yerine yalnız kendi ailesi sefil olmuş olsa ne 
çıkar? Kaldı ki, subay, kendi ailesinin sefaletten korunması için bedenini ortaya 
atmaktan çekinecek olursa, sonrasında çoluk çocuğunun sefaletini görmekten 
                                                          
34 "The best way to victory is attack; however, the nation that is to build an offensive 
army must have the spirit of attack the Japanese call kyugeki zayshin. This spirit of 
attack is exemplified in the song sung by Colonel Kujima as he was setting off for 
war in the warship Kazumaro in 1904: 
 
Great suffering and sorrow; in spite of everything, forward! 
There is no need of thinking of anything else  
Lay my corpse on the battlefield for all to see 
This is God’s desire! 
 
The same spirit of attack is seen in Admiral Togo, who on his way to war from the Port of 
Sasebo writes to his family, ‘From this moment on, do not expect any word from me! As I 
cannot pay attention to anything other than my assignment, I do not want any news from 
you!’ and in the order given by General Nogi during the Battle of Nanshan to his family 
when he gets word that his son has been shot in the chest, ‘When my son’s ashes are 
brought to Tokyo, do not bury them immediately! Because me and my young son are soon 
to die, too, bury the three of us all at the same time!’; And all of those following them were 
moved to greatness; they were so enveloped in their radiance and benediction that the slight 
Japanese squared off with the stalwart Russians." 
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başka bir sonuca ulaşamayacağı da apaçıktır. Subay, toplumun yararını 
düşünen en büyük varlık olmalıdır."35 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 
[1918], p.43) (emphasis mine) 
 
 The discursive ambivalence of the military institution with respect to the institution 
of marriage was to remain intact in the following years, but with an additional twist. I 
propose that, in the early years of the Republic, and especially after 1927, the relationship 
between the family and the nation was redefined through a reversal. This time, it seems as 
if the nation survives if and insofar as the family survives. The imperative was now: 
"Procreate!"   
 
"Her Türkün en büyük vazifesi Türkü korumak, Türkü çoğaltmak ve Türkü 
yükseltmektir. Türkü korumak için, Türkü çoğaltmak ve yükseltmek lazımdır. 
Bunun için de çocuk yetiştirmek, onları iyi, bilgili ve çalışkan olarak 
yetiştirmek lazımdır. Her Türk erkeği 18 yaşına varınca beğendiği bir Türk 
kıziyle nişanlanmalı, anlaşmalı ve evlenmelidir."36 (Uluboy, 1945 as cited in 
Şen, 2011, p.99) 
 
"Bir milletin derlenmesi, düzeni, selameti, millettaşların muayyen hedeflere 
doğru el birliğiyle yürümesi ile, her sahada itidal ile hareket ettirilmesi ile; 
onların yaşayış, duyuş, görüş tarz ve şekillerinin ahenkli bir hale getirilmesi ile 
temin olunur. Milleti çözülüşten kurtarmak, onu çerçevelemek için en iyi 
çarelerden biri de ... evvelce söylendiği veçhile aile bağlarını kuvvetlendirmek, 
aile reislerini zapturapt altına ve aile mensuplarını itaate alacak tedbirler 
düşünmek, mecburi evliliği kabul etmek ve bunu kolaylaştıracak tedbirler 
almak, mümkün olduğu kadar, memlekette bekâr bırakmamak, evlilere nüfus 
çoğaltmasına yardım edecek münasip bazı imtiyazlar vermek ve nihayet 
                                                          
35 “Is a single, inconsequential life doomed to die sooner or later so much more valuable 
than the lives of others that it be spared? It should be remembered that the life we do not 
hesitate to give up on the battlefields will soon be contemptuously and zealously trampled 
upon by the enemy. This includes the life of the officer’s family.  Even if the government 
won’t come to the assistance of the family of an officer after he has been martyred in battle, 
wouldn’t it be better for a single family to suffer than an entire nation? An officer may be 
reluctant to lay down his life with the intention of saving his family from a life of misery. 
But this decision may bring worse, unforeseen suffering afterwards. An officer should act 
in the interest of society as a whole." (emphasis mine) 
36 "The greatest duty of every Turk is protecting, procreating and exalting the Turk. To 
protect the Turk, the Turk must be proliferated and exalted. Therefore, children must be 
raised to be well-informed and hardworking. Every Turkish man should become engaged to 
and marry a Turkish woman to which he takes a liking when he turns 18 years old." 
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kuvvetli, ahlaklı ve imanlı bir gençlik yetiştirmek elzemdir."37 (Yiğitgüden, 
1941 as cited in Şen, 2010, p.153)  
 
 Perhaps, we should clarify here that the pro-natalist discourse was not an invention 
specific to this period. Such bio-political aspirations are shown to be endemic to nationalist 
and militarist discourses (Enloe, 2000; Lemke, 2013), both of which reigned since the 
Ottoman times. However, I propose that this period was when the pro-natalist position 
became hegemonic in the military, even though it remains to be a source of structural 
tension for the institution. Hence, I especially consider the year 1927 as a watershed 
moment in that regard. First of all, it was the year of the first census in Turkey, and the 
census is "one of the prerequisites for the successful introduction of a conscript army" 
(Lucassen & Zürcher, 1999, p. 10). Secondly, the first conscription law of the new nation-
state was issued in the same year (Altınay, 2004a, p. 27). Two statistics can help the reader 
to grasp the sweeping transformations that take place in and through the military after 1927. 
First of all, Bozdemir articulates that, while the rate of those who learned how to write and 
read during military service was below 10% in 1927, the same rate was to increase to 70% 
in 1931 (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 288). Secondly, heeding the calculations of Lerner and 
Robinson, Altınay states that, "there was a 900 percent increase in the number of 
conscripted soldiers between 1932 and 1939" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 28). These advancements 
make clear the great extent to which TSK operated as an ideological state apparatus to gel 
the various elements of the nation together, especially after 1927. The 'ideal officer' thus 
changed in concert with these developments as well. He was not any longer the guide of his 
command only in wartimes, but he was the guide of the whole nation, in war and peace.  
  
                                                          
37 "The resilience of a nation is achieved by walking hand in hand towards order, security 
and the common goals of its citizens, acting with restraint in every sphere, and 
harmoniously coalescing their ways of living, perceptions, and standpoints. In addition, 
indispensible to protecting the nation from dissolution and supporting it ... is reinforcing 
family bonds, thinking of what can be done to strengthen the head of the family and 
ensuring the obedience of family members to him; accepting  compulsory marriage and 
taking measures to facilitate this; to the extent possible, seeing to it that no one remains 
single in the country; encouraging population increase by providing married couples 
incentives to have children; and, finally, raising strong, moral and religious youth." 
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 As the military relatively reconciled with its worries concerning marriage, this 
prompted a new problem for the military elites. On the one hand, the officer had to be 
married if he were to be the guide of the nation and a true specimen to whom the rest of the 
nation should aspire to approximate. The pro-natalist discourse therefore gained 
prominence in the military. For example, the following quotations derived from Ordu 
Sosyolojisi Yolunda Bir Deneme seem to encourage the marriage of officers. The first one 
is pitting the Ottoman army against the Turkish military in the axis of marriage while doing 
so, whereas the latter underscores the obligation of officers to become fathers:   
 
"Aileler kurup evlenmemiş bir ordu elbette bekârdır. Ve bekâr bir cemiyet gibi, 
bekâr bir adam gibi bütün zekâ olgunluğuna rağmen yarım bir varlıktır. 
Osmanlı ordusu evlenmemiş ordunun örneğidir. Er kitlesi üstünde, annelik 
şefkat ve ihtimamını kuramayan komutan, ferdleri yani subayları bir aile 
halinde birleştiremez. Ferdlerin münasebetlerinde aksayışlar inzibatsızlıklar, 
geçimsizlikler hatta ihanetler görülür. Çünkü komutan, bir aile kurarak ordu 
evine girmemiştir. Evet orduya girmek, orduda muvaffak olmak, fakat ordu 
evinin dışında kalmak..."38 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 190) 
 
"Ordu bir Evdir: Bu ilmi kıymeti haiz terim ordunun içtimailiğini pek güzel 
ifade ediyor. Bunun için komutanlar, aileler kurmak suretiyle babalaşarak bu 
eve girmek mecburiyetindedirler..."39 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, 
pp. 190-191)  
  
 On the other hand, it was not easy for the military elites to shake off their 
professional doubts about marriage completely, because it would run the risk of diverting 
the attention of officers from the military to the family life. The presence of 
'womenandchildren' could be detrimental to the conduct of operations, by diluting the male 
                                                          
38 “An army without starting families and being married is, of course, a bachelor. And like 
a bachelor society… a bachelor… despite intellectual maturity, it is only a partial entity. 
The Ottoman army is an example of an unmarried army. The commander who is unable to 
extend maternal compassion and care to the privates under his command cannot bring 
individuals, i.e., officers, together as a family. Failings, lack of discipline, fractiousness, 
and even treachery, are seen in the relationships between individuals. This is because the 
commander starts a family but doesn’t enter the home of the military. Yes, joining the 
military, being successful there, but remaining outside the military home…" 
39 "The Military is a Home. This precious term greatly expresses the social character of the 
military. Commanders must enter this home by establishing families and performing 
fatherhood...." 
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bonding in the military, while dividing the loyalty of the officer and obstructing his 
mobility (Enloe, 2000, pp. 156-157). The predicament is that the officer had to be a 
professional on the one hand40 and he had to be married on the other hand. The rising 
tension between the discourses of pro-natalism and “radical professionalism” (Ünsaldı, 
2008, p. 285) thus gave way to a compromise formation, embodied in the figure of a 
married staff officer. In the following quotations, we can observe how the military also 
discouraged the marriage of officers, prior to the attainment of the title staff officer:  
 
"Ahlaki mükellefiyetleri Er kitlesi yetiştirmekle yüksek dereceyi alan kurmay 
subay, en doğru kararlarını, en açık emirlerini, sosyal moralin ideali olan 
ordudaki aile babalığının eşsiz vasıflarını verir. Bu sınavdan sonra subay artık 
ordu içinde içtimai bir insandır. Fakat ordu ferdliğine liyakatini en az 4 sene 
sonra isbat etmiş sayılır... Subay bu devreyi aştıktan sonra sabit bir karakter 
kazanıyor... Sabit karakter çağından sonra subay ferdliğini bütünlemek için 
evlenmeye izinli ad edilir. Bundan önce evlenmek zararlıdır."41 (Erker, 1939 as 
cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 188) 
 
"Her kız mutlaka refahlı ve gönençli bir hayat içinde, istikbali parlak bir koca 
(metinde hoca) tahayyül eder. Buna göre ben meslekte sabit karakter 
kazanmadan bir genç kızı hayali vaidlerle bağlayarak taliin sevkile layik 
olmadığı bir hayata sürüklemede haklı değilim. Önce içtimai karakterimi tesbit 
                                                          
40 It is widely affirmed that the Prussian model, alongside its rigid conception of discipline, 
adopted by the military was getting more and more consolidated during the early 
Republican period. Specifically, Akyaz and Şen addresses a transition in the Turkish 
military from an understanding of 'moderate discipline' to 'strict discipline' that took place 
around the 1930s (Akyaz, 2009; Şen, 2010). Apart from the ratification of a series of laws 
by which the personnel rights (özlük hakları) of military officers were regulated, they 
especially gather attention to the Military Penal Code (dated 15.06.1930) and Turkish 
Armed Forces Internal Service Law (dated 18.06.1935) as indicators of the concerted 
efforts to create the much desired new officer of the Republic. It is therefore quite possible 
to premise that, in the military, the discourse of professionalism was on the rise, much like 
the discourse of pro-natalism.  
41 "A staff officer reaches his rank after having trained swarms of privates. He is in the 
position of family patriarch. The accompanying moral obligations require that he make the 
most appropriate decisions, give the clearest orders and maintain a high standard of social 
morale. After having passed this test, the officer is finally a social being within the military. 
But the military considers him deserving of personhood only after at least four years… 
Within this time, the officer acquires patience and upon reaching the age of fixed character, 
the officer is given permission to marry in order to complete his personhood. Marrying 
before this time is harmful." 
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etmeliyim. Kurmay subay olmam gayemdir. ... Mamafî bütün azmim eşime 
içtimai bir mevki hazırlamaktır."42 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, p. 100)  
 
 As seen above, the title of the staff officer was the touchstone by which the 
professionalism of the officer was gauged, as well as the stage according to which the 
officer was tolerated to marry. However, there is little, if any, evidence at hand to assess if 
and whether the ambivalent discourse was approved and disseminated by the military elites 
of the period and how it was received in ranks lower than the staff officer. Did the military 
officers lend an ear to the suggestion and strive to be staff officers before they marry? Or 
did they ignore it? How did women perceive the idea of marrying with a military officer? 
Was it supposed to be a liberating or oppressing experience for them? How were their lives 
as wives of professional soldiers? How were the lives of the children of military families? 
Did the further functional differentiation of the military institution, with the births of the 
modern Navy and Air Forces (Barlas & Güvenç, 2010), entail the appearance of different 
types of military families? Or can we think of the military family rather as a homogenous 
category in this period? Unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide much 
material to address these questions. Still, that the family was to be held subordinate to the 
military profession in those years as it has hitherto been is an undeniable conclusion we can 
infer from the prevailing official institutional discourse. 
  
 In any case, the following years were to prove difficult for the marriage of military 
officers as well. Many studies concentrating on this 'exceptional period' (Bayramoğlu, 
2004; Cizre, 2004) as well as the memories of officers embark on to depict the middle and 
low ranked officers as a hackneyed figure in decline, despair and frustration, stricken with 
the widening chasm between his soaring personal-professional expectations43 and 
                                                          
42 “Every girl dreams of having an affluent life and a husband with a bright future. 
Therefore, without establishing myself professionally, I have no right to make unrealistic 
promises to a young woman and make her lead a life she doesn’t deserve. I should form my 
social character. My aim is to be a staff officer. ... At the same time, I should with all my 
heart prepare a social status for my wife." 
43 The outbreak of the World War II, the American Military Aid to Turkey and international 
assignments given to them especially after the admission of Turkey to the NATO as a 
member state were primary reasons precipitating an increase in the professional 
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downward socio-economic mobility. The officer also seems to be torn by the discrepancy 
between the utmost symbolic significance attributed to him and his tragic fall from 
eminence.44 The following part from a letter sent to the erstwhile Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes by the name of an American military officer45 may exemplify such portrayal of 
the Turkish officer, blighted by neglect within precarious conditions:  
 
"Washington D.C.'deki Türk B.Elçiliği subaylarınıza hükümetçe para 
verileceğini bildirmişti. Altı ay boyunca onlar para gelmesini beklemişlerse de 
hiçbir yardım gelmemiştir. Onlar Amerikalı arkadaşlarından borç almak 
zorunda kalmışlar ve sonunda bu borçlarını ödeyebilmek için parmaklarındaki 
yüzükleri, fotoğraf makineleri v.s.'ye varıncaya kadar satmağa mecbur 
olmuşlardır. Kışın soğuk havada palto satın alıp giyemediklerinden dolayı 
içlerinden bazıları hasta olmuşlardır... Büyük bir teessür duyarak söylemek 
zorundayım ki içlerinden bazılarını yamalı pantolonlarla bile görmüş 
bulunuyorum. Şerefli Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ni temsil etmekte olan 
subaylarınızı bu derece zaruret içinde görmek asla zevk verici bir şey değildir. 
Türk subaylarını bu derece ümitsiz, üniformalarını giymekten bu derece utanır 
ve bu derece fakir görmekten sonsuz derecede elem duymakta olduğumdan bu 
konuda size hakikati bütün açıklığı ile ve samimiyetle anlatmaya 
çalışıyorum..."46 (Ağaoğlu, 1972 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 86-87) 
 
 Once cherished as a hope for change, the Democrat Party (hereafter DP), with its 
capital accumulation strategy based on agricultural growth and exportation, had stirred up 
disappointment in the larger and lower sections of the military (Akça, 2004; Ünsaldı, 2008; 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
expectations of the Turkish military officers, which largely remained unfulfilled (Ünsaldı 
2008; Akyaz, 2009; Birand, 1986).  
44 Such memoirs should be read with a grain of salt though. Because it is obvious that some 
narratives are inflected by an inclination to justify the 1960 military coup on grounds of the 
worsening material conditions of military officers.  
45 Doğan Akyaz also specifies that, according to Samet Ağaoğlu, from whom he cites the 
text above, the letter was probably written by a Turkish military officer (2009, p. 87).  
46 "It was reported that money would be given by the government to officers at the Turkish 
embassy in Washington D.C. Despite waiting six months for the money, nothing came. 
They had to borrow money from their American friends and, in the end, to be able to pay 
off these debts, they had to sell whatever they could – their rings, cameras, etc. Some even 
got sick because they had no coats to wear in the cold winter weather because they had sold 
them... I have to state in sorrow that I even saw some wearing patched up trousers. There is 
nothing pleasurable about seeing your officers, who represent the honorable Turkish Armed 
Forces in a state of such enormous need. It caused me great mental anguish to see Turkish 
officers in such a desperate state, embarrassed by the condition of their uniforms and so 
impoverished. I am trying to sincerely present to you the heart of the problem..." 
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Akyaz, 2009; Birand, 1986). The majority of the officers had to manage their meager salary 
to keep up with the high rates of inflation (Akyaz, 2009, p. 86; Ünsaldı, 2008, pp. 59-64, 
Birand, 1986, p. 436). Their salaries had become 38% to 57% lower on average,47 when 
compared with the single party period (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 64). All of these were making 
marriage an unlikely exploit for military officers, especially for the lower ranking officers. 
For example, Birand (1986) discusses that the military officer was seen in the public as a 
person, "ineligible for renting a house, or giving away a daughter in marriage" (p. 436). 
Similarly, Akyaz (2009), citing Orhan Erkanlı, mentions that in 1954 the officers were 
simply deprived of material resources to be married (p. 86). In short, the distinguished 
officer had plummeted so much that he had turned into a figure subject to scorn and jokes 
of others, "for eating fried eggs all the time while drinking mineral water" (Yirmibeşoğlu, 
1999 as cited in Ünsaldı, 2008: 64).   
 
 The snubbed officer struck at full force with the military coup of 1960, outside the 
chain-of-command.48 This was also a defining moment, I suggest, which has given its 
current contours to the military family that we know today. First and foremost, it was a 
period during which the officer went from rags to riches. The socio-economic obstacles 
before marriage were thus removed by and large as the military officer regained its prestige 
and filled his pockets. In that regard, the establishment of the Armed Forces Mutual 
Assistance Foundation49 (OYAK hereafter) right after the military coup, on 3 January 1961 
                                                          
47 But the income brackets between general officers and other military officers were 
enlarging. Another development which caused a rife between general officers and others 
was that the chances of promotion were dwindling for middle and lower ranked officers as 
well, with the issued law no. 5611 (dated 20.03.1950). Ünsaldı (2008) also argues that, the 
cronyism of the Democrat Party elites did not help the situation either. For example, 16 
generals and 150 colonels were dismissed from the military, upon the request of Adnan 
Menderes, with the accusation of planning a coup against the elected government party 
(Akyaz, 2009, p. 66).      
48 By no means, I want to contend that the cause of the 1960 military coup was solely the 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the military officers. 
49 In line with Akça (2006) we can define OYAK “as a collective capital group running 
productive, commercial and financial economic activities as much as or even more than 
being a social security organization" (p. 323). Therefore one should be careful while 
accounting for the relation between the enrichment of military officers and OYAK, simply 
because the very members of OYAK often vocalize their complaints out loud about the 
foundation, which has grown focus more on financial gains and less on the benefit of its 
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by a special law, as an institution of compulsory saving, auxiliary social security and a 
military holding (Akça, 2006, p. 319) as well as a money box of militarism (Altınay, 2006, 
p. 58) can be considered as the harbinger of the upper-middle class and gentrified (and even 
bourgeoisie for Akça (2004, p. 263) military family that was to transpire in subsequent 
years. Accordingly, the rise in the incomes of the military officers was off the charts 
between the years 1960-1971. For instance, when compared to previous decade, the relative 
revenues of the officers skyrocketed more than 500% in 10 years and it even exceeded 
1000% in 1971 (Şaylan, 1978 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 383-384).50 The figures become 
even more astonishing if we turn our attention from salaries to numerous privileges which 
are hardly quantifiable in terms of cash wages. For Şaylan's study (1978) cannot account 
for the impact of the burgeoning institutional complex, involving military lodgings, 
Officers' Clubs, vacation facilities and military hospitals whose construction, Birand 
informs, started right after the coup (1986, p. 440). In fact, only four days before the 
OYAK law, the law concerning the temporary overloads to meet the lodgings needs of 
military officers and employees was issued.51 Many facilities were erected in the following 
decade, in accordance with such laws and from the budget so much so that some senior 
members of the Justice Party, which was overthrown from power by the 1971 military 
coup, expressed their dismay with reference to this issue:    
 
"Başbakan her istediklerini yaptı... Türk Ordusuna bizim kadar hizmet eden bir 
parti yok. Kışlasını biz yaptık Türk Ordusu'nun. Kışlasını, kışlasını... 
Lojmanını biz yaptırdık... Böyle bir şeyi [12 Mart'ı] tabii ki beklemiyorduk. 
Süleyman Bey'in kırgın olmaması mümkün değil."52 (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, p.  
243) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
members. For comprehensive studies on OYAK, see: Parla, 2004; Akça, 2004; Akça, 2006; 
Ünsaldı, 2008. For an earlier look to OYAK, see: Birand, 1986   
50 Akyaz (2009) also conveys that the rate of increase during the same years for the 
personnel of Ministry of Internal Affairs is 300% (pp. 383-384). 
51 See: Subay, Askerî Memur ve Astsubayların Lojman İhtiyacı için Gelecek Yıllara Geçici 
Yüklenmelere Girişilmesi Hakkında Kanun. (1960). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 10694, December 
30, 1960. Retrieved December 30, 2013, from 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc043/kanunm
bkc043/kanunmbkc04300186.pdf 
52 “The Prime Minister has given them everything they wanted… No party has served the 
Turkish military as well as we have. We were the ones who built their barracks… We built 
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 This brings us to the second quality which is usually ascribed to military families 
today. The military family was isolated, owing to the unprecedented emergence of a 
military complex which extended privileges to military officers and their families. As each 
coup cemented this isolation, the more the military family has "cocooned inside a 
militarized social world" (Enloe, 2000, pp. 165-166), demarcated from 'the life outside'. 
The following chapter takes a look at this family in question from within and surveys how 
it shapes the experience of military brats. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
their lodging… Of course, we were not expecting such a thing [the military coup of March 
12th]. It is not possible for Süleyman Bey to not be offended." 
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II. THE MILITARY FAMILY AND EDUCATION 
 
2.1. Fathering the Nation, Fathering the Military, Fathering the Children 
 
 The children's experiences may vary according to their age, gender, class, ethnicity, 
religion and place of residence. Their fathers' rank and force in the military institution as 
well as their mothers' status of employment are other significant parameters to be factored 
in. Since we have not adequate data to pursue all sorts of relations between their experience 
and such parameters, I am bound to remain on a more descriptive level, where I will try to 
outline some common patterns deriving from the interviews.  
 
 As stated before, the child is surrounded by many families, including the (military) 
family into which they are born, the military institution, the school, and the nation to boot. 
Interestingly, sometimes their own family seems to be the most absent among all. If the 
father is on a watch or duty afar, and the child has a working mother regularly attending the 
events held in the military setting, the paths of family members do not intersect much. 
Yasemin is one of those children whose family experience in late 1990s fits to this 
description:  
 
"Ben […]’dayken babam Şırnak'ta görev yapıyordu. Onun dönüp dönmeyeceği 
belli değildi. Korkulu şeyler vardı. Geldikten sonra da babamı sabah görmedim 
zaten. Akşam görüyordum, yemek yiyorduk. Sonra yatıyor, sızıyor bir yerde 
kalıyordu. Fazla zaman ayıramıyordu, hafta sonlarını ayırabiliyordu sadece. 
Annem de öğretmendi. O da sabah gider akşam gelirdi hafta içi her gün. 
Akşam yemekler olurdu, yemeklere giderlerdi. Hep yalnız kalırdım evde. O 
sayede korkmamayı öğrendim."53      
                                                          
53 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “When I was in […], my 
father was stationed in Şırnak. It was not certain whether he was going to return. There 
were scary things. Anyway, after he returned I did not see my father in the morning. I 
would see him in the evening, we were having dinner. Afterwards he would lie down and 
fall asleep in some place. He couldn’t spare much time, only the weekends. My mother was 
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İrem also complains about calls of duty which separated her father from the family, 
even during leisure times: 
 
"Yani babamla çok vakit geçiremedik. Çünkü […]'ta, [Doğu’da bir şehir]’da 
çok zor koşullarda çalışmıştı babam. Hatta bunaldığı zamanlar bile olmuştu 
yani. Babamı çoğu zaman göremiyorduk, sürekli nöbetlerde oluyordu. 
[…]'tayken tatile çıktığımızda bile apar topar geri dönmek zorunda kalıyorduk. 
Çağırıyorlardı falan."54   
 
 Even when the father is around, the endless chain of ceremonies, dinner invitations, 
proceedings of all sorts for which the parents should muster in does not make it easier for 
the child either. For instance, Zeynep mentions in the following how she took her elder 
sister for her mother, when she was a baby.  
 
"Yani annen baban devamlı yemeğe gidiyor, devamlı bir davete gidiyor. ... Şey 
gibi görüyordum: O onların görevleri. Mesela ben annemi de fazla göremezdim 
açıkçası. Annem de benimle birlikte olmazdı pek.  Çünkü o da subay eşlerinin 
günleri, işte bilmem ne komutanının eşi gelmiş onu karşılamaya gideceğiz... 
Bana zaten ablamlar bakmıştır. Ablamla aramda 11 yaş fark var. Mesela ilk 
anneyi ona demişim ben. Düşün yani devamlı onu gördüğüm için ‘anne’ diye 
ona seslenmişim."55 
 
 Therefore, the military community as a family, instead of the biological family of 
the child often runs to the rescue and fills the void in his/her life. The following story 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
a teacher. She would leave in the morning and return in the evenings on weekdays. In the 
evenings there were dinners, they would go to these dinners. I would stay alone at home. 
That’s how I learned not to be afraid.” 
54 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I mean we could not spend 
much time with my father.  Because he was working under harsh conditions in […] and [a 
city in the East]. There were even times when he was depressed. We hardly ever saw him, 
he would always be on guard duty. Even on holidays when we were in Cyprus, we would 
have to return all of a sudden, because they would call him back.”  
55 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I mean your mother and 
father constantly go somewhere, to dinners, to invitations. … I saw it like that: It was their 
duty. Actually, I wasn’t able to see my mother very often too. She wouldn’t spend much 
time with me. Because there were these at-home days for the wives of officers, or, she 
would welcome the wife of such and such commander when arrived… It was indeed my 
elder sisters who looked after me. There are 11 years difference between me and my elder 
sister. For example, I first said ‘mom’ to her. Just imagine that. I saw her all the time, so I 
called her ‘mom’.”  
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written by a military wife is quintessentially indicative of the role undertaken by the 
military community as reinforcement:  
 
"Bir akşam, bizim lojmanların erkek çocukları evimizin önündeki parka 
doluşmuşlardı. On yaşlarında üç-dört çocuk, Levent'in bisikletinin üzerine 
eğilmiş, bağıra çağıra konuşuyorlardı. Bir yandan yemek yapıyor, bir yandan 
da mutfak penceresinden onları izliyordum. Bir ara sessizlik oldu. Levent, önce 
ana-avrat küfretti ve ardından beni hıçkırıklara boğdu: ‘Ulan bir babamız da 
yok ki, şu bisikletimizi tamir etsin.’ Elimdeki tabak düşüverdi. Pencereden 
dışarı baktım. O sırada servisten inen ve bu isyanı duyan subaylardan biri 
üniformasıyla çocukların arasına daldı ve yerdeki bisikleti onarmaya başladı. 
Mutfağın ortasına çöküverdim. Saatlerce ağladım. Ve dışarıdan bana ulaşan 
konuşmaları dinledim: ‘-Koçum niye öyle diyorsun? Senin baban görevde 
değil mi?’ ‘-İyi de amca, kaç ay oldu gelmedi ya. Bu bisikleti kim tamir edecek 
şimdi?’ ‘-Ben yaparım aslanım. Ne oldu buna?’ ‘-Bırak amca ya. Babam 
gelince...’ ‘-Lan, yapsın işte. Bıraksana.’ ‘-Amca, benim babam da Şırnak'ta, 
benimkinin de selesi oynuyo, yapabilir misin?’ ‘-Yaparım tabii.’ ‘-Amca sen 
nerede oturuyon?’ ‘-Senin de çocuğun var mı?’ ‘-Amca sen de Apo'cularla 
savaştın mı?’”56 
  
 Not only passerby officers, but also other mothers, children and conscripts partake 
in the effort to soothe the desolate child. They pick up the slack left by the biological 
parents of the children, and become a supplementary family for them. Particularly the 
                                                          
56 “One night the boys living in our lodgings gathered in the park in front of our house. 
Three or four kids about 10 years old were leaning on Levent’s bicycle and shouting. I was 
cooking while watching them from the kitchen window. At one point it became silent. 
Levent first swore like hell and afterwards he made me break out in tears: ‘Damn it, I don’t 
even have a father who could repair that bike.’ The plate I was holding suddenly fell from 
my hands. I looked out from the window. At that moment, one of the officers getting off 
from the service leaped into the huddle of kids in his uniform upon hearing the rebellion 
and started repairing the bicycle on the ground. I collapsed right there in the kitchen. I cried 
for hours. And I listened to the conversation outside: ‘Hey lad, why do you say so? Isn’t 
your father on duty?’ ‘-Yeah sure uncle [informal expression in Turkish usually used by 
children to refer older man],56 but how many months have passed since his departure. Who 
is going to repair this bike now?’ ‘-I’ll do it boy. What’s wrong with it?’ ‘-Don’t worry 
about it. Once my father arrives…’ ‘-Hey bro, why don’t you just let him do it?’ ‘-Uncle, 
my father is also in Şırnak. My bike’s basket is also loose. Can you fix that as well?’ ‘-Of 
course I can.’ ‘-Uncle, where do you live?’ ‘-Do you also have kids?’ ‘-Uncle, did you also 
fight against the Apo followers?’” To see the whole story: Lojman. (2009). Retrieved 
December 21, 2013, from 
http://www.hakanevrensel.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5:guene
ydoudan-oeykueler-2&Itemid=11  
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military lodgings provide a zone convenient to encounters and relationships whereby to 
quench the child's desire for care:    
 
"Lojman hayatı boyunca anne babadan çok asker abi dediğimi hatırlıyorum 
ya."57 
"En çok o lojman ortamını özlüyorum diyebilirim. Bir tek bende değil, mesela 
ablam da aynı şeyi söyler: ‘Biliyor musun, [rüyamda] […]’taki [askeri 
lojmandaki] evi gördüm,’ falan der. Demek ki onda da öyle bir etki bırakmış. 
Demek ki bize çok huzur vermiş. Gördüğüm rüyalar travmatik ya da huzursuz 
rüyalar değil. Gerçekten mutlu hissediyorum o rüyaları görerek uyandığım 
zaman. Demek ki gerçekten çok mutlu bir çocukluğum olmuş benim orada. O 
sırada annemin babamın evde olmayışı da çok dert değildi. Çünkü annemle 
babam olmadığı zaman da benim orada bir ailem vardı. Ben öyle 
hissediyordum en azından. Hiçbir zaman onların eksikliğini de hissetmedim 
açıkçası. Sen bana bu soruyu sorduğunda gerçekten annemle babam o zaman 
nasıldı diye düşündüm açıkçası. Geriye baktığımda, kendi kendime 
düşündüğümde, ‘Çok yalnızdım ya, annem de babam da yoktu,’ gibi bir şey 
hissetmiyorum. Orada ortamı da seviyordum, o asker abileri de seviyordum. 
Çok mutlu çok huzurluydu. Güzel bir çocukluktu benim için açıkçası."58 
(emphasis mine) 
 
 It is not only the family life, but also the kinship ties worn out by constant transfers 
that the military community comes to mend, if not replace. Many children repeatedly told 
that they are still unable to identify their relatives in family reunions that are typical of 
weddings, religious festivals or circumcision celebrations. They are unequivocal in 
narrating that the profession of their fathers has severely disarticulated their relationship 
                                                          
57 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “During my time in the 
lodgings I remember saying more ‘asker abi’ than mom or dad.” 
58 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I miss the lodgings 
atmosphere the most. It’s not just me. My elder sister says the same thing as well. 
Sometimes she says, like: ‘You know what, I dreamt of the house in [the military 
lodgings].’ So she’s been influenced in the same way. So it’s given us a lot of comfort. My 
dreams aren’t traumatic or uncomforting. I really feel happy when I wake up from those 
dreams. It means that I really had a happy childhood there. It wasn’t a big deal that my 
mom and dad weren’t at home. Because I had a family there, even though they were absent. 
That’s how I felt at least. Indeed, I never felt their absence. Actually, I thought how it was 
then with my parents, when you asked me this question. When I hark back, I don’t feel 
something like thinking, ‘I used to be so lonely, I didn’t have my parents around.’ I was 
fond of the atmosphere there. I was fond of ‘asker abi’s. It was very happy and very 
peaceful [there]. Actually, it was a nice childhood.” 
39 
with their kin. For them, the primary cause of this is basically the physical distance 
engendered by relocations:  
 
"Bu sürekli tayinlerden dolayı en çok etkileyen şey akrabalık ilişkileri. Ben 
[Doğu’da bir şehir]'de yaşadım; [Doğu’daki şehir]'den […]’a babaannemin, 
dedemin yanına gitmek kaç saatlik yol. Bir de orada [Doğu’daki şehirde] 
mesela 3 tatilden birinde gidebiliyorsak, [daha Batı’da bir şehir]'deyken 6 saat 
tutuyor. İstediğimiz zaman gidebiliyoruz. O yüzden çok etkiliyor bence, 
göremiyorsun edemiyorsun."59 
 
"Akrabalık ilişkilerini pek yaşamadım. Sürekli tayinler. Bütün akrabalarımız, 
anne tarafı da baba tarafı da […]’de. Ama […]’e sadece bayramdan bayrama 
gidiyorduk. Tanıştırıyorlardı, bir dahaki bayrama unutuyorduk. Tanımıyorduk 
falan. Hâlâ çok sık gördüğüm insanların isimlerini unutuyorum. Getiriyor, 
‘[…] teyzen,’ diyor; ‘Kim?’ diyorum. (Gülüşmeler) Hâlâ bir boşluk var orada. 
Onlar beni tanıyorlar ama ben hepsini bilmiyorum."60 
 
 The physical distance does not seem to be the only obstruction though. For instance, 
Nuri conveys how his father's socialization in military schools since early childhood has 
influenced their kinship relations. For Nuri, his father's occupation is less a profession, and 
more a life-style. This is why, he says, they cannot get along with their relatives during 
family visits, especially on political grounds:    
  
"Babam çok ufakken [askeri liseye] gittiği, ailesinden ayrıldığı için, ailesiyle 
[arasında] kültürel olarak olsun, ekonomik olarak olsun farklılar [oluşmuş]. 
Çok farklılar baktığınız zaman. … Ama görüş çok farklılaşıyor. Baya bir görüş 
farklılıkları ortaya çıkıyor. E tabii bizde de ortaya çıkıyor. Bir de tabii çok fazla 
                                                          
59 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “What’s most affected by the 
constant transfers were the kinship relations. For instance, I lived in [the city in the East], 
do you how many hours does it take to go from [the city in the East] to my grandparents in 
[…]? While in [the city in the East] we could only go [to the grandparents] one out of three 
holidays. But it takes only 6 hours from [another city to the West]. We can go whenever we 
want. Therefore it affects [the kinship relations] a lot, because you can’t meet and see 
them.” 
60 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I never quite experienced 
kinship relations. Constant transfers. All of our relatives, both my mother’s and my father’s 
sides are in […]. But we only went to […] from one holiday to the next. They would 
introduce us with each other, but we would forget until the next holiday. We were not 
recognizing them. I still forget the names of people I see very often. They were introducing 
somebody to me, and telling, ‘This is your aunt […].’ I’d say ‘Who?’ (Laughing) There is 
still a blank there. They know me, but I don’t know all of them.” 
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gidemiyoruz, göremiyoruz. Dolaşıyoruz sürekli, o da çok etkili. Hiçbir zaman 
geniş bir aile olamıyoruz yani. Baktığın zaman aslında siyasi görüş yönünden 
hâlâ sorunlar yaşıyoruz baya. Bakıyorsun amcamlara, babam bu aileden 
değildir herhalde dersin. ‘Evlatlık mı edinmişler?’ dersin yani. Çünkü çok 
değiştiriyor. Mesela asker olmasa bu kadar etkilemezdi akrabalık ilişkilerini. 
Özellikle o görüş diyorum ya hani. Ekonomik durumu bile farklı olsa, görüşleri 
aynı olabilirdi. Oradan [birbirlerini] yakalayabilirlerdi. Ama askeri lise... 
Dedim ya hani, [sadece bir] meslek değil askerlik."61  
 
 While the kinship relations are not regarded highly, many children uphold a positive 
image of the military community as a site of solidarity, and even organic unity. Such and 
such a relative may be unapproachably distant, but the community swarms with people, to 
whom they can turn anytime to seek help, attention and affection:  
 
"Asker ailesinden geçen çocukluk[ta], sonuçta lojmanda kalıyorsunuz. 
Komşuluk ilişkileri had safhada [oluyor]. Çok güzel komşuluklarımız oldu. 
Bayramlar olsun, özel günler olsun, resmi-dini bayramlar olsun hep iç içe, 
sıcak bir ortam oluyordu açıkçası. Bu yandan dayanışma vardı."62  
 
"[B]iz okulla birlikte sosyalleştikten sonra [dışarıdaki insanların] bizim kadar 
güçlü bağları olmadığını gördük. Çok belliydi bu. Biz mesela, en basiti, birinin 
yardımına koşuyorduk. Ona yardım etmeye çalışıyorduk, uğraşıyorduk falan 
ama karşılığında biz onu alamıyorduk. Yine bizim yardımımıza koşan, o kadar 
                                                          
61 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Because my father went there 
[to the military high school] when he was very young and separated from his family, 
cultural and economic differences have emerged between him and his family. They are very 
different when you look at it. … It [military schools] differentiates views so much. This 
also has an influence on us. And of course we cannot visit them very often. We are 
constantly on the move and that has a big impact. So, we cannot become an extended 
family. We still experience troubles in terms of political views. If you’d look at my uncles, 
you’d say that my father probably does not belong to that family. You’d ask, ‘Did they 
adopt him?’ Because it [military education] changes [you] a lot. If my father were not a 
soldier, our kinship relations would not have been influenced that much. I mean especially 
that ‘view’. Even if their economic conditions had been different, their views still could 
have been the same. They could get along with each other somehow. But the military 
school… As I said, being in the military is not only a profession.”    
62 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “During a childhood spent in a 
military family, you stay in lodgings after all. Relationships between neighbors are at a 
peak level there. We had great relations with our neighbors. There was always a very close 
and warm atmosphere, whether it be on special days, official or religious holidays. There 
was solidarity.”  
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hevesi olan gene o bizim lojman arkadaşlarımızdı. Dayanışma daha 
kuvvetliydi. O açıdan tek geçerim lojman dayanışmasını."63 
 
 Let's return to the biological nuclear family of the child and look at its members one 
by one. The military officer father actually constitutes a strange superimposition worthy of 
examination. The category of fatherhood is as much central to his business in the military 
as to his position in the family. Put clearly, the military officer, according to sources which 
designate his idealized versions, should be the father of all enlisted males in the military, as 
is he the father of his own children:  
 
"Orduda Aile Babacı Aile Gibidir: Babacı ailede baba, ailenin hâkimi ve dini 
başkanıdır. Ordu ailesinde de baba, birliğin ve vazifenin teşkil ettiği dinin 
başkanıdır... Baba isterse ferdi, aileden (birlikten) kovabilir. Ferdi evlendirmek 
hakkı da vardır. Ferd evlenebilmek için babanın müsaadesine muhtaçtır."64 
(Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 189) 
 
 Clearly, he is conferred with huge responsibilities and 'rights' over whom he holds 
sway in the barracks. But what does it take to be a father of the (male) nation? Of course, 
he should be a man first. In fact, he should be the epitome of masculinity:  
 
"Manevi gücün sarsıldığını gösteren böyle bir durumda ortaya çıkacak olanlar, 
subaylardır. Subay, o sırada başı yukarıda ve göğsü ileride duruşuyla baştan 
ayağa sinir kesilerek, erkeklik damarları gevşemeye başlamış olan askerlerini 
derhal uyarır ve onları kendine getirir."65 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 
2006 [1918], p.39) 
                                                          
63 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “After we socialized through 
the school, we nevertheless understood that they [the people outside] did not have ties as 
strong as ours. It was obvious. Just a very basic example, but we would run to help 
someone. We would try to help them and so forth but we would not get it [help] in return. 
Those who would come to help us, made an effort were again our friends from the 
lodgings. The solidarity was much stronger. In that respect, I hold nothing above the 
lodgings solidarity.”   
64 "The Family in the Military is a Paternalistic Family: In a paternalistic family, the father 
has the final say and is the religious leader. The same is the case for the family in the 
military... If he wants, the father can banish the individual from the family (the unit). He 
has the right to marry off the individual. The individual requires permission from the father 
to get married." 
65 "When spirit is shaken, it is officers who rise to the occasion … with their heads held up 
high and their chests emboldened, they stand firm and immediately warn their soldiers 
whose veins of masculinity has begun to falter to shape up." 
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 Yet, commanding and muscling up the shrinking masculinity of his troops requires 
more than 'having' what it takes to be a man. He should be able to guide his men to 
manhood in particular and to subjecthood in general by means of training. He should be a 
great educator who is held responsible for the creation of the modern subjects of the (male) 
nation. In order to achieve this end, he should first conjure up a 'soul' in his men "as an 
instrument of power through which the body is cultivated and formed" (Foucault, 1979). 
This way, the military officer can sculpt the modern, nationalized subject out of the 
conscripted bodies:     
 
"Şimdi, bizim yönlendireceğimiz ve yöneteceğimiz insanların emelleri, 
düşünceleri, ruhlarında saklı özellikleri nelerdir? Biz komuta edeceğimiz 
insanların hangi emellerini kendimizde ortaya çıkartıp somutlaştırarak onların 
kalplerini, güvenlerini kazanacağız? Ve onlara manevi güçlerin esin kaynağı 
olacak [hangi] araçları belirleyeceğiz? Ve insanlardaki, ancak hayal edilen 
amacın ve idealin bir araya geldiği görünmez özelliklere, görünür amaçlarla mı 
hitap edeceğiz? Herhalde askerlerimizin ruhunu kazanmak bizim için bir görev 
olduğu gibi; öncelikle onlarda bir ruh, bir emel, bir kişilik yaratmak da 
Allah'tan ve Medine-i Münevvere'de yatan Cenabı Peygamber'den sonra bize 
düşüyor."66 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 [1918], pp.13-14) 
 
"Ordu komuta ve subay heyeti, umumi bir millet gençliğini yedi terbiyesinden 
geçirecek bir vaziyete girmiş bulunmaktadır. Binaenaleyh ruhiyatı takip etmek 
hak ve mecburiyetini taşımaktayız."67 (Yiğitgüden, 1941 as cited in Şen, 2011, 
p. 45) 
  
 As Mustafa Kemal implies above, the military officer should be only second to gods 
and prophets in his qualifications to fulfill such expectations. His heavy tasks need him to 
be a perfect specimen, superior in every imaginable aspect to everyone who falls under his 
reach.  
                                                          
66 "Now, what are the characteristics shrouded in the desires, thoughts and soul of people 
whom we are to guide and govern? Which of the desires of the people we are to command 
shall we embrace and concretize in ourselves to be able to win their hearts and trust? Can 
we designate the sources of inspiration for them?  Shall we appeal to invisible qualities 
arising when goal and ideal come together, something that can only be dreamed of?  
Probably just as winning the hearts of our soldiers is a duty for us, after God and the 
Prophet, the responsibility of creating a soul, a desire, and a personality in them falls upon 
us." 
67 "The Council of Military Commanders and Officers has the duty to train the youth of an 
entire nation. Therefore, we have the right and obligation to monitor its psychological 
state." 
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"‘Subay nedir?’ sorusuna, Piyade Talimnamesi maddelerinden birinin verdiği 
‘Subay, emrindeki erler için en iyi örnektir’ cevabının üstünde duran senin, 
‘Subay komuta ettiği insanların kendi bilgi ve yetkinliğinden yararlanması için, 
emrindekilerin dayanıklılık ve yiğitliklerinin bileşkesinden daha fazla 
dayanıklılık ve yiğitliğe sahip olmalıdır’ sözünü her subay pek büyük dikkat ve 
ciddiyetle okumalı ve onun anlamını belleğine kazımalıdır.”68 (Zabit ve 
Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 [1918], p.12) 
 
 All these do not necessarily require the officer to exercise power over the bodies 
falling under his command. On the contrary, he is rather expected to treat his privates 
kindly, as though they are his own children. Only this way, he can be a better guide and a 
father to them:  
 
"Erler, askerlik hizmeti sırasında subayların öz çocukları gibidir. Bir insan 
kendi çocuğunun yetişmesi için eğitim ve öğretimini, sağlığını, tavır ve 
davranışlarını nasıl gözetir ve bunların üstüne düşerse; subay babalar da er 
çocuklarının sağlık ve esenliği, görev ve sanatını güzel öğrenmesi, ahlakının 
düzgünlüğü, kısacası her şey için; aynı bağlılık ve özenle çalışacak ve bunları 
gözetecektir."69 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 [1918], p.57) 
"Gözü kanlanmış, benzi sararmış, dili paslanmış erlerle derhal tıpkı babaları 
gibi konuşmalı, bu durumun nedenleri aranmalı. Subay, erleri her sabah bu 
suretle bir kere yoklamaya mecburdur. Hastalığını saklayan veya ona önem 
vermeyen erler bulunur. Bunlar derhal hastaneye gönderilir. Bu gibi durumlar 
diğerlerine ders olur. Hastanelere gönderilen erler orada unutulmaz. Her hafta 
bir onbaşı veya çavuş ve bir iki er hastanedeki erlerin yüzbaşı adına hatırını 
sorar ve yüzbaşının selamını bunlara götürür. Hastanede yatışı uzayan erler 
varsa, ara sıra subaylardan biri veya bizzat yüzbaşı da gider ve gitmelidir. Bu 
sırada bir iki portakalcık veya bir paket tütüncük de götürülürse, erlerin dağlar 
kadar gönlü olur. Subaya olan bağlılığı çok güçlenir. Subay erin yemeğine 
yatağına, arkadaşlarıyla geçinmesine, çokça parası geliyorsa ne yolda 
                                                          
68 “An answer to the question ‘What is an Officer?’ can be found in one of the articles of 
the Infantry Training Manual that you remind us of and highlight: ‘An officer sets the best 
example for the privates under his command.’ These words should be taken to heart: ‘To 
enable the men he commands to benefit from his own knowledge and competence, the 
officer should have greater durability and more bravery than all the durability and bravery 
of those he commands combined.’” 
69 "During their military service, privates are like their own children to officers. They 
should treat them the same. Whatever they would do to provide for the education and 
training of their own children should be done for the privates. Officer ‘fathers’ will work to 
ensure the health and happiness of their private ‘children’ and see to it that they learn their 
jobs well and maintain moral rectitude; in short, they will demonstrate the same 
commitment and care in their dealings with them." 
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harcadığına ve dışarıda kimlerle görüştüğüne, memleketteki işine ve ekmek 
kapısına, aile üyelerine, çamaşırına, temizliğine, saçına, tırnağına; kısacası her 
şeyine, her türlü haline bakacak, gerekenler hakkında öğütler verecek, yol 
gösterecek ve onları düzeltecektir."70 (Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal, 2006 
[1918], p.63) 
 
 Of course, these are moulds to which the military officers are expected to conform 
as much as possible. More often than not, there is little, if any correlation between the 
idealized image of the sublime military officer and the military officer we come across in 
streets every now and then, simply because the ideals are so hard, if not impossible to 
reach. This is also a valid statement for military wives or brats, for whom the institution 
charts out different moulds. Further, although in reality only few can "manage to squeeze 
themselves into these snug, idealized moulds," (Enloe, 2000, p. 164) many in the military 
community try to live up to the expectations tailored for them.  
  
 Therefore, I propose, since the officer is to be a quintessential model, true guide, 
and a proper father for everyone around him, we cannot but assume a continuum between 
his fatherhood in the military and his fatherhood in the house. Then, a series of questions 
gains immediate relevance: If the military officer is to raise his troops as his own children, 
how is he to raise his own children? Are they to be treated as if they are privates living in 
home? If so, how does he cope with a daughter? If the officer were to fail in molding his 
                                                          
70 "Privates with bloodshot eyes, pale complexion and corroded tongue should be spoken to 
in a father-like fashion and the reasons for why they are like this should be sought. The 
officer must inspect them each morning for this purpose. Soldiers who are concealing 
illness or not taking it seriously should be found and immediately sent to the hospital. 
Situations of this type are instructive to the other soldiers. Soldiers sent to the hospital are 
not forgotten. Every week a corporal or sergeant and two privates inquire on behalf of the 
captain about the soldiers in the hospital and relay the captain’s best wishes to them. In 
cases where the soldiers are in-patients at the hospital for an extended period of time, from 
time to time, one of the officers or the captain himself should go visit. In the meantime, if 
the soldiers are taken some fruit or a package of cigarettes, they will be made very happy. 
Their commitment to the officer is strengthened. The officer will ask about the food the 
soldier eats, his bed, how he is getting along with his friends, if he gets quite a bit of 
money, how he is spending it, who he sees from the outside, his work and how he makes a 
living back home, his family, his laundry, his hair and nails, in short, about everything. He 
will look at how he is doing and, if necessary, give him advice, show him the way, and 
correct him." 
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children into an ideal shape, what would happen to his status as father, both in the military 
and in the family? What happens to the children as he attempts to succeed, lest that a 
spoiled child should tarnish his status and reputation? How do the children wrest away a 
space of relief amidst all efforts to inform them? And is it possible to construe a military 
family independently from the military institution? Let's turn to the narratives to understand 
what takes place outside the realm of ideals.  
 
 First of all, it seems that, however much he may be wrapped up in his own work the 
father's authority goes unchallenged, without the slightest scuffle, when he is home. But the 
fathers hold this authority in different ways and they have different personalities. Roughly 
said, the children describe in their narratives two types of fathers. The dividing line 
between the two appears to be 'carrying work to home'. So much seems to hinge on fathers' 
conception of the military profession as well. The first type of fathers is known for the strict 
discipline and authority over familial matters. They demand undivided attention and 
obedience in their presence. Some children think that this attitude relates to their education 
and socialization in military schools:  
 
"Babam Askeri Lise'de ve devamında Kara Harp Okulu'nda okumuş olmanın 
etkisiyle çok disiplinli bir insan. Yani disiplin ister istemez bizim üzerimize, 
ailenin üzerine de çok yansıdı. Hâlâ da yansımaya devam ediyor. Başta bu 
disiplinli yönüne dikkat çekebilirim. Ayrıca çok stresli bir insan. Olumsuz 
olarak kendi üzerimden bunları gördüğümü söyleyebilirim. Onun dışında 
genelde sakindir, hırslı bir insandır."71 
 
"...[S]inirli bir adamdır. Öyle dokunsan ne oluyor diye patlar. ... Askeri Lise'de 
okumuş, Harp Okulu'na gitmiş, çok disiplinli. Her şey düzenli olmak zorunda, 
her şey planlı olmak zorunda."72 
 
                                                          
71 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “Because he received 
education from the Military High School and then from the War College, my father is a 
very disciplined person. It [his discipline] inevitably had an impact on us, on our family. It 
is still the case. First of all, I can draw attention to this quality in him. He is also a much 
stressed person. Negatively, these are what I’ve seen. In other times, he’s usually a quiet 
and ambitious person.”  
72 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “…He is an angry person. 
When you touch him, he explodes. … He studied at the Military High School and then 
went to the War College, so he’s quite disciplined. Everything always has to be in its 
proper place and order, everything should be planned.” 
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 Whereas, Mustafa believes that his father's strictness should have something 
to do with his adverse working conditions:     
     
"Babam serttir. Kararlıdır. Çocukken pek görmezdim. Terör vardı, göreve 
giderdi, Doğu'da çatışırdı. Biz de lojmandaydık, bazen gelirdi."73 
 
 Kemal, on the other hand, particularly recalls how his father was enforcing studying 
and resting:   
 
"Yani şimdi böyle çok vıcık vıcık, daha çocuk doğmadan Facebook'ta hesabını 
açan babalar var ya; [babam] öyle değil bir kere. Daha böyle geleneksel; baba 
dediğin işten gelir, pijamalarını giyer, mandalinasını soyar, televizyonun 
kumandası ondadır, otoriterdir, ondan izin alırsın, izin vermezse bir yere 
gidemezsin falan. Öyle geçti çocukluğum. Öyle bir babadır. ... Otoriterdi, o 
hiçbir zaman değişmedi. Biraz katıydı bazı prensipleri. Ders çalışılacaksa ders, 
mola verilecekse mola hesabı. Bu gece hiçbir şey yapmadın, yan geldin yattın, 
böyle bir dünya yok. Senin kaytardığını fark ederse elbet gelir, odanın 
kapısında biter o. Uyuyorsan uyandırır, zorla çalıştırır. Belki senin iyiliğin için 
yapıyordu bunu ama psikopatça yaptığı zamanlar oluyordu. Ben mesela ders 
çalışırken televizyon izlemek isterdim deli gibi. Çocuksun abi, televizyon 
izlemek istiyorsun. Televizyonda ne var dersen, Bizimkiler var yani. Çok süper 
bir şey de yok, ama istiyorsun. Duyuyorsun sesini uzaktan. Ama ders çalışman 
da lazım, test çözmen lazım falan. Gelirdi mesela, bir saat çalışırdım. On 
dakika mola [derdi, içeri giderdim]. Hakikaten 10. dakika dolduğu zaman 
babam televizyonu kapardı abi. Kapardı. ‘Ben de izlemem o zaman,’ derdi. Sen 
de kös kös odana dönerdin. O televizyon açılmazdı yani. Sen orada otursan da 
sabaha kadar açılmayacağını bilirdin. Geri dönerdin odana."74 
                                                          
73 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “He is strict. He is a man of 
firm decisions. I did not see him much when I was a child. There was terror and he’d be on 
duty. He’d fight in the East. We were in the lodgings, he would visit us sometimes.” 
74 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I mean, he is not the buddy-
buddy type who create a Facebook account before the birth of his child. Well, he is not like 
that. He is rather traditional; he comes home, wears his pyjamas, peels his mandarin, holds 
the remote control, and has the authority, you ask permission from him and if he does not 
permit, you cannot go anywhere. He is that kind of a father. This is how my childhood 
passed. He was authoritarian and it never changed. Some of his principles were a bit strict. 
Like, when it’s study time you study, when it’s break time, you take a break. You did 
nothing tonight, just lied down. Such a world does not exist. If he’d realize that you are 
coasting, he’d appear at the door frame and that would be it. If you sleep, he’d wake you up 
and force you to work. Maybe he was doing so because he thought it was for my good. But 
there were times he did so like a maniac. For example, I would crave to watch the TV while 
studying. You are a child after all; you want to watch it, right? If you’d ask what was on the 
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 The first type of fathers goes as 'soldierly fathers' for some interlocutors. All of 
them work for the Land Forces and they are graduates of military high schools and the War 
College. Therefore, some children whose fathers are falling under the rubric of soldierly 
fathers wish their fathers were from the Navy or Air Forces to be more at ease. But, these 
qualities alone do not determine fathers' demeanor. Nuri thinks that his father is soldierly 
and not at once, because and despite his experience in the army since his adolescence:   
 
"Babam bir yönüyle baktığın zaman tipik asker, sert, belli kuralları olan 
birisidir. Ama bir yönüyle baktığın zaman da hiç askeriyeye uyumlu olan birisi 
değilmiş gibi geliyor aslında. Çünkü ilişkileri çok iyi birisi. Çok iyi iletişim 
kurabilen birisi. Genelde asker olan birisi oraya liseden beri gittiği için, artık 
onun için bir meslek değil de bir yaşam tarzı oluyor o. Bir yaşam felsefesi 
oluyor yani. Etkisinden çıkamıyorlar. Babam o tarzda bir insan değil. O yönden 
değişik birisi diyebilirim."75 
  
In the narratives, the relationship with soldierly fathers is usually characterized by an 
invisible and unsurpassable distance, as Deniz recounts in the following: 
 
"Beklediğim sıcaklığı sonuçta göremedim diyebilirim çocuklukta. Elbette 
ilgilendi, sevdi, oynadı benimle. Ama sonuçta bir sınır var gibiydi. Nasıl 
anlatayım onu? Disiplinin vermiş olduğu bir şey mi diyeyim ne diyeyim bir 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
screed, there was Bizimkiler. It is not great but you want it. You hear its sound from a 
distance. But you also have to study. You have to practice for exams and so forth. He’d 
come for instance and I’d study for an hour. ‘Ten minutes break,’ he’d say [and I would 
follow him to the living room]. Man, exactly at the 10th minute mark my father would turn 
off the TV. He’d turn it off. ‘I also won’t watch,’ he would say. And you would return to 
your room with your head down. That TV would not be turned on. You would know that 
even if you insist waiting till the next morning, it would not be turned on. So you would go 
back to your room.” 
75 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “From a certain angle, my father 
is a typical soldier, a tough man with certain rules. On the other hand, it seems like he is the 
least person to be made for the military. Because he is very sociable. He has great 
communication skills. A typical soldier has usually been a soldier since high school, so it 
becomes something more than a profession; it becomes a way of life. I mean, a philosophy 
of life. They can’t get their minds out of it. My father’s not like that. That’s why, I could 
say he is a different person.” 
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sınır vardı aramızda. Hani bir yere kadar yakınlaşabiliyorduk. Bunun etkisini 
gördüm diyebilirim."76  
   
 Nuri also feels this distance. He narrates how he prefers to turn into himself instead 
of overstepping the respect due to his father who seems to possess an awe-inspiring 
authority:  
 
"Hani çok severim, belki de dünyada saygı duyduğum ilk insandır, ama bazı 
şeyleri hâlâ ona [babama] anlatamam. Çekinirim. Çok saygı duyarım. Mesela 
asla sesimi yükseltmem. Karşı çıkmam. Hiç sesimi yükseltmemişimdir bugüne 
kadar. Çünkü biraz da asker olmasından kaynaklanan [bir] korku var. Hani 
korkarsın böyle, çünkü ne yapacağı belli olmaz. Çok kızmaz ama kızdığı 
zaman da... Ben bir defa gördüm öyle çok kızdığını. O yüzden çok saygı 
duyarım. Asker olmasından da kaynaklanıyor. Bir sertlik vardır yani onda. ... 
[B]irbirimizi severiz ama özellikle babamla aramda bir mesafe vardır."77  
 
 On the flipside, the second type which I call the 'unsoldierly fathers' does not 
resemble at first glance the former type at all. Unlike the callous 'soldierly fathers' who 
seem ready to gush out all sorts of pressures, they are remembered not so much with an 
aura of discipline and authority as with their congenial charm. The frequented adjectives to 
describe them are 'sweet', 'cotton-like' and 'soft'. They are thought to be amicable, 
benevolent guides. It is even assumed that they are less disciplined than their fellow 
officers. The children who have this type of fathers contend that there is no continuum 
                                                          
76 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “I couldn’t receive the warmth 
that I expected when I was a child. Of course he took care of me, loved me, played games 
with me. But it seemed like there was a limit. How can I express that? A thing about his 
discipline or not, there was this distance between us. I mean, we could only grow close up 
to a certain extent. I can say that I felt the effects of this.” 
77 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “I mean I love him a lot, perhaps 
he is the person whom I respect the most, but I still can’t talk about certain things with him. 
I shy away. I respect him a lot. But I never raise my voice, for example. I never oppose 
him. I’ve never raised my voice in front of him. I have a fear that partially stems from him 
being a soldier. You know you’re scared, because he is unpredictable? He rarely gets angry, 
but when he does… I saw him got mad like that once. That’s why I respect him a lot. Its 
because he is a soldier. There is toughness in him. … We love each other but there is 
especially a distance between me and him.” 
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between their fathers' working life and family life. While the father is a soldier in his job, 
he is solely a father in home: 
 
"Pamuk gibi diyebilirim. İnanılmaz. Ama dışarıdan görünüşüyle çok farklı bir 
insan. O büyük ihtimalle mesleğinin vermiş olduğu bir şey. Dışarıya öyle 
gözüküp, öyle olmak zorundayken evde çok çok farklı. Bağlarımız çok 
kuvvetlidir bizim. … birimiz babamın kafasında, birimiz kolunun altında falan 
[olur].  Çok iyidir, pamuk gibi bir kalbi vardır diyebilirim."78 
  
For Ayşe, the fact that he did not go to the Naval Military College explains his 
father’s unsoldierliness:  
 
"Babam çok tatlıdır. ... Yumuşaktır biraz, daha sakin biridir. Agresif biri 
değildir. ‘Denizci olduğu için böyle, yoksa askerler böyle değil,’ falan derler 
mesela genelde babamı gördüklerinde. Ya da şey der herkes: ‘Deniz Harp 
Okulu'nda okusaydı böyle olmazdı.’ Babam sevecen bir insandır. İnsanlar 
genelde şaşırırlar: ‘Allah allah, hiç asker gibi durmuyor,’ derler mesela. Babam 
da çok sert biri olmadığı için çok sıkıntı yaşamadım galiba [bir] asker çocuğu 
gibi. Babam, ‘Sen asker çocuğusun. Şunları yapmamalısın. Böyle 
davranmalısın,’ falan gibi bir şey demedi bana. Genelde serbest bıraktı. Öyle 
olunca ben, ‘Babam asker,’ gibi çok bir şey hissetmedim. Tepemde bir baskı 
yoktu yani."79 
 
 Whereas Tarık explains that it should be his father's branch in the military which 
helped his father to maintain a boundary between his job and family life:    
                                                          
78 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “Like a cotton. He is 
incredible. But the way he looks from outside is different. It’s probably a thing about his 
profession. He has to look tough, act tough, but he is very different when he’s home. Our 
bonds are very strong. I mean, like one of us sleeps on top of his head, the other under his 
arm. He is really nice, he has a golden heart.” 
79 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “My father is a very sweet 
person… He is a bit soft, calmer person. He is not aggressive. ‘He is like that because he is 
a navy officer. Other soldiers are not like that,’ people say upon seeing my father. Or they 
say: ‘If he had gone to the Naval War College he wouldn’t be like that.’ He is a tender 
person. People tend to get surprised: ‘How strange, he does not seem like a soldier at all.’  
Since my father is not a strict person, I didn’t experience much difficulty during my 
childhood, as a usual soldier’s child would do. My father didn’t tell me things like: ‘You 
are a military brat, you shouldn’t do this, and you should not behave like that.’ He usually 
let me free. That’s why, I never felt much something like, ‘My father is a soldier.’ There 
was no pressure hanging over me.” 
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"İş yaşamında karşılaştığı zorluklar varsa bile bize bunu fazla fark ettirmedi, 
hissettirmedi. Zaten yaşadığı iş hayatının, hâkimlik-savcılık, yani mahkeme 
görevi olması dolayısıyla, [babamın] askerlerle iç içe olma, araziye tatbikata 
çıkma, göreve gitme, orayı burayı teftişe gitme gibi ağır bir askerlik görevi 
yok. Örneğin bir karargâh subayıyla karşılaştırırsak, yine askerlerle içli dışlı 
olma, daha askerlik mesleğine yakın, fiziksel olarak zorlayan işler yapma gibi 
şeyler hayatımızda olsaydı belki etki edebilirdi.”80 
  
Yasemin, having a retired general officer father, thinks that her father is not as 
soldierly as others too: 
 
"Babamı normalde herkes sert sanır. Ama sert değildir kesinlikle. Boğuşuruz, 
güreşiriz. Benimle zaman geçirmeyi çok sever, oyunlar oynamayı çok sever. 
Babam benim için ayrı bir yerdedir her zaman.  Diğer babalara hiç benzemez, 
her şeyi açıkça konuşabilirsiniz. Normalde erkek arkadaşınız olduğu zaman bir 
bayan kesinlikle babaya söylenmez. En son baba duyar. Ama bende ilk baba 
duyar. Kendisi bana rahatlamamı söyler. Bir şey olursa, ‘Gel ilk önce bana 
söyle, ben bileyim. Sen ne yapıyorsan yap,’ der. Askeri Lise'de okumadığı için, 
[askeriyeye] liseden sonra geçtiği için askeri yanları pek kuvvetli değil. 
Disiplin[i] falan diğer askerler kadar fazla değil."81  
 
 However, the line demarcating the unsoldierly fathers from soldierly ones can get 
thinner than one may initially suppose. The categories of soldierly and unsoldierly 
fatherhood are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it seems to be a false binary at times. For, 
                                                          
80 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “Even if he had problems at 
work life, he didn’t let us know about it or make us aware of it. Because of the professional 
life he has, being a judge or a prosecutor, he is at court on duty. He did not have demanding 
military duties like taking care of soldiers, performing military drills, inspecting this and 
that. For example, if when we compare him to officers working in headquarters, if there had 
been things in his life like socializing with conscripts, carrying out laborious tasks closer in 
essence to the routines of the military profession, it could have had an effect on us.”  
81 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Everyone thinks he is 
strict. But he is certainly not. We romp and wrestle. He loves spending time and playing 
with me. He always has a special place in my heart. Unlike other fathers, you can talk to 
him about everything. Usually girls do not tell their father when they have a boyfriend. 
Generally the father is the last one to hear the news. But my father hears it first in our 
family. He tells me to relax. If anything happens, he tells me: ‘Come and let me know in 
the first place and then do whatever you want.’ Since he did not go to the Military High 
School and joined the military in the War College, his military aspects are not so strong. He 
is less disciplined than other soldiers.”  
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they are rather porous to each other. This does not mean that all fathers are equally soldiers 
in the home, and their children are equally privates in their presence. Nor does it mean that 
they all leave their profession hanging in the rack when they enter home. There are some 
fathers who may be less or more disciplined and disciplining than others. There can be 
fathers who are able to maintain a separation between their profession and family life better 
than others. However, nothing inheres in the qualities ascribed to unsoldierly fathers that 
make them lesser soldiers than soldierly ones. Because, I suggest, one should bear in mind 
that strict disciplining and benevolent guidance are in fact two sides of the coin of 
fatherhood assigned to the military officer. Belonging to any type does not detract from the 
fatherliness or soldierliness of the officer, neither in the military, nor in the family. Perhaps, 
the transitivity between the two types becomes most apparent in the juxtaposed accounts of 
two sisters. İrem considers that her father definitely belongs to the second type:     
 
"Ailesine çok düşkündür babam. Bizsiz yapamıyor hayatta yani. Bizi aramadan 
ya da bizsiz vakit geçirmeden çok mutsuz bir insan oluyor yani. Evine çok 
düşkün. Ama asker babaları hep böyle sert olur, çok disiplinli olur falan. 
Babamda pek öyle yok. İşini eve getirmek şeyi yoktur yani."82 
 
 On the other hand, Merve parts company with her elder sister over the issue, 
and proposes that hers is a soldierly father, owing to his socialization and education 
in the military:       
 
"Babamın kendisi çok disiplinlidir. Her gün saat 5'te kalkar. Dolabında her 
şeyin yeri bellidir. Gittiğinde bir şeyi orada bulur ve her şey düzenlidir. Kendi 
açısından disiplinli ama bana bunu hiç yansıtmadı. ‘Sen böyle olacaksın, şöyle 
yapmak zorundasın,’ diye yansıtmadı. Ama sinirli bir adamdır. Öyle dokunsan 
ne oluyor diye patlar. ... Askeri Lise'de okumuş, Harp Okulu'na gitmiş, çok 
disiplinli. Her şey düzenli olmak zorunda, her şey planlı olmak zorunda. Bana 
bu yönünü tamam yansıtmıştır ama zorlama olmadı. Ama mesela benim 
hakkımda da bir sürü plan yapmıştır, her şey şu planda gidecek diye. Asker 
                                                          
82 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “My father is a family man. I 
mean, he cannot do without us. He becomes miserable if he can’t talk to us or spend time 
with us. He is so dedicated to his home. You know, officer fathers are supposed to be so 
though, so disciplined, and so forth. My father is not like that. He never brings work 
home.” 
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olduğundan dolayı evet yansıtmış oluyor da baskı olmadı yani."83 (emphases 
mine) 
  
 Apparently, there are several inconsistencies in Merve's narrative. She first utters 
that her father's strict discipline having its roots in the military does not have an influence 
on her. She then concedes that there may be certain reflections of it over her. But she 
definitely refrains from admitting that her father's disciplinary demeanour has amounted to 
repression over her life and choices, despite the following acknowledgement that her 
university preference form was indeed filled by her parents, against her wishes:    
 
"[Üniversitedeki bölümüme] isteyerek girmedim. Fen çıkışlıydım. Hiç 
istemiyordum yani. Aslında ben sosyal, böyle daha TS'den girip, fotoğrafçılık, 
reklamcılık tarzında şeyler istiyordum. Ama babam, ‘Öyle olunca para 
kazanamazsın ileride,’ dedi. Ben istemeyerek, onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı. 
Onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı derken tabii ki şey değil… İyi niyetle. Benim 
iyiliğimi düşündükleri için yaptılar ama istemediğim çok şey vardı. Birisi 
geldi: [...]. Sondan bir önceki tercihimdi."84 
  
 Then, we can conclude that, the line between both types is tenuous. As the children 
internalize the disciplinary measures and practices that are usually attributed to the military, 
the perception of fathers may tilt toward the unsoldierly edge.  
 
                                                          
83 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “My father is a very 
disciplined person. Every morning he wakes up at 5 am. Everything has its own place in his 
wardrobe. When he looks for something he finds it immediately and he keeps everything 
tidy. He is well disciplined but he never reflected it upon me. He did not say, like, ‘You 
have to be like this, you have to do that.’ But he is an angry person. When you touch him, 
he explodes. … He studied at the Military High School and then went to the War College, 
so he’s quite disciplined. Everything always has to be in its proper place and order, 
everything should be planned. Okay, maybe he reflected this aspect of his upon me but he 
did not force me to anything. But, for example, he had made lots of plans about my future. 
Yes, because he is a soldier he reflects it, but there was no pressure I mean.”  
84 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I didn’t want to study in the 
department I registered in the university. I was a science student. Actually I was more into 
social stuff like photography, advertising and so forth. But my father said that, ‘You cannot 
earn your life if you choose them.’ Against my wishes, they made my preferences. When I 
say they made it, it’s not like... They did it on good intentions, for my well-being. But there 
were many things in the preference list I was not fond of. I got into one of them: [...]. It was 
my next to the last choice." 
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2.2. Mothering the Nation, Mothering the Military, Mothering the Children 
 
 Now let's look at the second member of the military family, namely the mother. Just 
as the male military officer is assigned to be the father of the (male) nation and his own 
children in accordance with a set of ideals, so is a woman the mother of the (male) nation 
and has her own share of militarized ideals after which she is expected to strive. Cynthia 
Enloe, in her Maneuvers, (2000) sorts out a good deal of features which makes a model 
military wife. The crux of her arguments is that, "a woman's wifely femininity ... is valued 
by military officials only insofar as it enhances militarized masculinity" (2000, p. 156).      
 
This, I propose, is equally true for the Turkish context. The military institution in 
Turkey "is prone to send out messages about what the ideal spouse should be," (Enloe, 
2000, p. 162) and what is distinctive about militaries, when compared to other institutions 
that rely on employees who are married, is how clear and how patriarchally feminized that 
message is (Enloe, 2000, p. 162). First and foremost, the military discourse in Turkey 
pigeonholes women as mothers:  
 
"Hislerin 30 yaşından sonra kuvvetlenen idrak çağında, erkek için en makbul 
kadın, anneliği en güzel temsil edendir. ... Kadın yalnız annedir ve bütün 
anlamile annedir. Baba annenin emeğini ancak çocuklarının hayatında arar. 
Evlenilirken arayacağı bir ahçı bir işçi değil, çocuklarına en iyi anne 
olabilecektir. Evlendikten sonra ise arayacağı isteyeceği ancak anneliktir. Bu 
günün boşanma sebeplerinden biri de erkeğin evde kadından annelikten başka 
vazifeler isteyişidir."85 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, p. 93) 
  
The military elites promote women only and only as mothers; hence as the vehicles of 
the reproduction of the nation. Otherwise it would be a disaster, they suggest, leading to 
undesirable consequences such as divorce. Thus, the military wife should zealously devote 
                                                          
85 "For a man, at some point in his thirties, when he becomes more aware of his feelings, 
the ideal woman is a woman who best represents motherhood. ... A woman is only a mother 
and is a mother in the fullest sense. A father looks for the labor of the mother only in the 
lives of his children. What he seeks when he gets married is not a cook or a worker but a 
good mother for his children. After marrying, all that he wants and asks for is motherhood.  
One of the reasons for divorce today is the men expecting duties other than motherhood 
from the woman." 
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herself to the upbringing of 'proper' children. Just as the 'proper' raising of each child turns 
into an insignia for officer fathers' competence for good guidance in the eyes of the military 
institution, as well as their masculinity (Enloe, 2008, p. 106), the wives too can prove their 
worth to the institution by selflessly performing nothing but good motherhood, thereby 
raising model children. The following quotation exemplifies the conception of wives as the 
'angels of the house' (Enloe, 2000, p. 159): 
 
"Ordunun hizmet dışı hayatı... orduevlerinde geçer. Bu esnada aile babası 
eşiyle musaveten ailenin başkanlığı ifa ederler. Fertler bu hayata karışırlar. 
Ailenin annesi, babaya olduğu gibi, sevgi ile sayılır. İçeri girdiği zaman 
oturanlar ayağa kalkarlar, yani itaat duyguları ondan esirgenmez. Çünkü o çok 
nazik, çok müşfik bir annedir... Hizmet esnasında sert, keskin babanın, bu 
anlarda o derin sevgisini ve yumuşaklığını temin ediyor... Fertliğin cüzülerine 
çocuk bakımının, evlat sevgisinin ve kocaya karşı munis duyguların okuludur... 
Ailenin resmi hayatı ve ideali uğrunda feragat, fedakârlık ve dayanıklılığın 
zevk halinde tecelli ettiği çehredir. Ödeve teşvik edişin, istemeden yalnız 
verişin, istetmeyişin misalidir... Ordu sosyal hayatına yeni girmiş cüzüleri o 
terbiye eder içtimai kaidelere alıştırır."86 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 
2011, p. 191) 
 
 The military elites maintain that, everything else should be left aside for the good of 
the children. Working life outside home is one of those major fields that the military wants 
to foreclose for wives, perhaps so that the wives remain to be 'dependent' on their husbands 
and thence to the military institution to which the husbands depend, not simply for their 
financial well-being, but for their very identity (Enloe, 2000, p. 155):  
 
"Eşim adımla, mevkiimle iftihar etmeli ve iyi saygı itibar görmeli... Beni 
tamamlayacak eşim, ordu mesleğine ve Ordu Evi'ne olan sonsuz sevgiyle beni 
                                                          
86 "In the military, time off-duty is spent at the homes of the military. Meanwhile, the 
officer performs equally with his spouse the role of the head of the family. Individuals 
intermingle in this life. The mother of the family, like the father, is met with fondness. 
When she enters, those seated stand up. She is greeted with deference.  This is because she 
is a very a very gentle, loving mother… The father, stern and intense while on duty, is full 
of love and gentleness at these moments.... She is the school for other members where 
personhood, childcare, a child’s love and friendly feelings towards one’s husband are 
learned… She encompasses renunciation, self-sacrifice at her countenance marked by the 
pleasure taken from endurance of the official life and the ideal of the family. She is a model 
of incentive to perform duty, delivery without asking... She trains members new to the 
social life and social rules of the military" 
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tamamlamalı. Böylece ordu sosyal hayatının hususi terbiyesiyle büyümüş 
olmalı. Bu hususta çok kuvvetli olması, Ordu Evi'nin kızı olması ile kabildir, 
yani bir asker kızı olmalıdır. Kurmay subay olacağıma göre, eşim bir üniversite 
tahsili yapar. Bu asker kızı, feragat, dayanıklılık gibi askeri hisleri, ilmi 
sebepler ile kıymetlendirerek kuvvetini ve cesaretini arttırmış bulunur. 
Evlenmem için finansal salahiyet gereklidir. Hali hazır kazancım buna 
yetmiyorsa eşim tamamlamak vazifesini temin eder. Ancak hayat alanında 
çalışarak değil... Belki gelirlerle."87 (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 
192)  
 
 Perhaps needless to say, the 'proper' daughters are designated to be chaste mother 
prospects, while the 'proper' sons are patriotic professional soldiers waiting to happen so 
that a lineage of professional soldiers can be preserved in the family a la aristocracy:  
 
"Subay gençliği en geniş temellere dayanmalıdır. Tek temel asalet, mülkiyet ve 
ortadan yukarı bir mesleki aileye mensubiyettir. Eskiden olduğu gibi babadan 
oğla intikal eden bir subay soyunu korumalı ve ihya etmelidir... En iyileri, 
sulhte arayıp bulmalıdır ve subay heyeti milli şuurunda bir en iyiler camiası 
olarak yaşamalıdır."88 (Nadas, 1944 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 38-39) 
 
 Two consequences ensue from the militarization of motherhood as such. The former 
is the plain conceptualization of spouses' wombs as stations whereby to recruit (Enloe, 
2000, p. 248) prospective praetorians of the nation. Second, if the military officers are to be 
conceived as an eminent coterie consisting of distinguishable individuals, and if their wives 
deserve their due credit as long as they live up to the expectations by raising prospective 
mothers and professional soldiers, then it follows from that, the wives are expected to 
                                                          
87 "My wife should take pride in my name and position and enjoy respect... My wife should 
round me out with the eternal love for the military profession and the Military Home. She 
should have been brought up with the special civility of military social life. She must 
conform to this to the letter. She must be the girl of the Military Home … that is, a military 
girl. Since I’m going to be a staff officer, my wife should have a university education. In 
addition to such soldiery feelings as self denial and resilience, this military girl will have 
strength and courage reinforced by her understanding of scientific explanations. I need to 
be financially prepared to get married. If my earnings are not enough, my wife will have to 
contribute. Not by working in life… but perhaps through other sorts of income which does 
not require working." 
88 “The officer youth should be based on the broadest of foundations. The fundamental 
nobility is belonging to a tenured professional family. An officer lineage that passes down 
from father to son, as it used to, should be revived and preserved... The best should be 
sought and found in peacetime, and the officers should be seen as the best in the national 
consciousness." 
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accomplish a consuming, albeit strange task. In the best case scenario, the wife can 
reproduce the copies of herself and her husband in the children. Because, in the military 
discourse the parents of the military family is situated as the ceiling to what the mother 
should elevate her children. It is only when the family comes to full circle the mother is 
seen to succeed in her task. Every other possibility condemns her to failure. Let's get out of 
this circular and quite narcissistic discursive universe of ideals for a moment and see what 
happens in reality via a detour to the narratives of interlocutors. 
  
 Initially, the mothers of my interlocutors are not exactly the 'angels of the house'. 
More than half of the mothers (6) are employed outside their houses, while the rest are 
working in the home as 'housewives'. All of those employed outside are teachers. This may 
seem to be a statistical aberration at first. But, it is in fact quite a widespread condition 
among wives of military officers, given that school teaching is one of the occupations 
which can get along with requirements originating from the constant relocation of 
husbands.  
  
 The mother is indubitably the most invisible member of the family in the narratives 
of the children. She occasionally comes forward to handle some tasks in the absence of the 
husband who has gone to his post nearby or afar on duty. As the husband returns home, she 
usually vanishes in the narratives. She ensures that the children are safe to school and back, 
they make good friends, have good grades, get good education, and keep good health and 
complexion. She may be reserved a trifling bit in memories of packing up or unpacking as 
well. In other cases, she seems to profess in silence whatever she is doing in wherever she 
is working, with one noticeable exception. She is often the inexhaustible attendant of what 
the children like to call 'the protocol'. She regularly participates in tea-hours, at-home days, 
conversations, and dinner invitations held in various military settings, usually on a 
rotational basis. She shows up with her husband, while dragging her children behind in a 
series of militarized rituals, including promotion ceremonies, change-of-command 
ceremonies, oath-taking ceremonies, weddings, circumcision feasts and funerals. She minds 
her manners in the presence of 'higher-ranked' wives, knows how to act according to 'the 
etiquette' and teach it to neophyte wives. In Enloe's words (2000), she is "quite comfortable 
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with social relations based on rank" (p. 164). Not all military wives fit to the descriptions 
above of course. But the majority of them consume remarkable time and energy to the 
requirements entailed by the protocol. For example, Zeynep recounts in the following that 
even though her mother was a house worker, she was away most of the time during her 
childhood because of the call of the protocol:     
 
"Yani annen baban devamlı yemeğe gidiyor, devamlı bir davete gidiyor. ... Şey 
gibi görüyordum: O onların görevleri. Mesela ben annemi de fazla göremezdim 
açıkçası. Annem de benimle birlikte olmazdı pek.  Çünkü o da subay eşlerinin 
günleri, işte bilmem ne komutanının eşi gelmiş onu karşılamaya gideceğiz..."89 
 
 On the other hand, Mustafa complains about wives who live by the ranks of their 
husbands: 
 
"Lojman dedikodu ortamı. Kadınlar lojmanda koca rütbesiyle yaşar. 
Sevmiyorum lojman ortamını."90   
 
 Kemal aligns himself with Mustafa in stating that, the rank hierarchies between 
officer husbands figure in the social relations between their wives more than children:  
 
"Günleri olurdu mesela annemlerin, subay eşlerinin bilmem ne. Mesela o 
şehrin en büyük komutanının karısına ne derlerdi ya... Hanımefendi derlerdi 
mesela. Sanki diğerleri hanımefendi değilmiş gibi. Onun [komutanın karısının] 
ismi ne olursa olsun o hanımefendidir. Mesela o şehirde en büyük [birlik 
olarak] alay varsa, alay komutanı albayın karısı hanımefendi olur. 
‘Hanımefendi geliyormuş,’ falan [denir]. Gelecek gelecek bir tane pörsümüş, 
60 yaşında bir karı gelecek. O hanımefendi oluyor diğerleri de subay karıları. 
Mesela onlar [subay eşleri] arasında [rütbe ilişkileri] vardı. ... Onlarda mesela 
subay karısı - astsubay karısı ayrımı da daha fazla vardır. Eminim yani. 
Çocuklar için yok, çok yok yani."91 
                                                          
89 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I mean your mother and 
father constantly go somewhere, to dinners, to invitations. … I saw it like that: It was their 
duty. Actually, I wasn’t able to see my mother very often too. She wouldn’t spend much 
time with me. Because there were these at-home days for the wives of officers, or, she 
would welcome the wife of such and such commander when arrived.” 
90 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “The lodgings are an 
environment of gossiping. The women in the lodgings live by the ranks of their husbands. I 
don’t like the lodgings.” 
91 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “For example, my mother had 
these at-home days with the wives of officers. How were they calling the wife of the 
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 Let’s finally turn to the last member of the military family to outline what kinds of 
moulds they are expected to get into. 
 
2.3. The Model Military Brat 
  
Thus far, in our analyses of the members of the military family, we initially reflected 
on the ideal models and then, through the narratives of my interlocutors, moved on to what 
takes place in reality. The discourse of the military institution, when it comes to the youth 
of the nation, abounds with projections which draw on nationalist-militarist imaginations as 
well. In fact, the youth is one of the social categories that the military institution seems 
passionate about addressing. However, the military institution does not provide us with 
much discourse specifically aiming at the children of military officers, as it was the case 
with male military officers and their wives. Neither the books, nor the top-rank officers that 
I know of have publicly taken a stand and defined the distinctive characteristics of the 
model military brat. One could have concluded from this, that the child of a military officer 
deals with the burden of expectations, pressures and obstacles that are similar to that of the 
child of any other father. This condition, which applies to the lives of military wives as 
well, is indeed true to a great extent. On the other hand, we can appropriate the diagnoses of 
Enloe (2000) for the context of the children. As is the case for wives of officers, the child 
of an officer "has to cope with the demands peculiar to being a military [brat], s/he is 
defined by society not only by his/her relation to a particular father, but by his/her 
membership in a powerful state institution; s/he is seen not just as a particular soldier's 
child, but as a military brat" (p. 156). For example, Ayşe remarks that her father's 
profession appears to define her identity in the eyes of others. She thus keeps it to herself 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
highest ranked commander of the city... Ah, they’d say ‘the lady’, as if others are not. 
Whatever her [the wife of the commander] name may be, she is the lady. Or if the largest 
unit in the city is a regiment, then the wife of the colonel would be the lady. They’d say, 
‘The lady is coming,’ and so forth. Who’s going to come is indeed nothing but 60 years old 
wizened old woman. She is the lady though, while the others are just the wives of officers. 
For instance they had it. I mean their relationships were based on rank relations [of their 
husbands]. ... I am pretty sure that there was a stronger distinction between the wives of 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers. For children it was not that significant.”     
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most of the time in order to prevent the prejudices surfacing in the minds of others the 
moment she shares that she is the daughter of a military officer:   
 
"Çok fazla kişiye söylemem babamın asker olduğunu falan. Öyle bir durum 
hâlâ var. İlk söylediğinde, seni de belirliyor çünkü hani. Baban askerse sen de 
otomatik olarak o görüşlerle doğuyorsun gibi bir hadise oluyor. O yüzden, 
‘Hm, baban asker mi? Şey...’ diye hafif bir tereddüt geliyor. Hâlâ [geliyor] 
yani. ... Mesela üniversitede birinci yılda herkese söylemiyorsun da samimi 
olduğun arkadaşlarla, ‘Babam da asker,’ diye muhabbet ediyorsun. Yani 
babanın mesleğini bir türlü söyleyememek hadisesi biraz sıkıntı yaratıyor. Ya 
da söylediğinde de en başta seninle ilgili de enteresan bir görüş oluşturuyor 
kafasında insanlar. ‘Babam asker,’ dediğinde sanki sen o zaman solcu 
olamazmışsın gibi bir şey oluşuyor. Ya da işte daha muhafazakâr çevrelerle 
görüşme yaptığımda, ‘Baban askerse demek ki sen de asker kafalısın, 
milliyetçisin,’ gibi şeyler oluşuyor kafalarında seninle ilgili."92  
 
 
 Then, we can attempt to discern those demands that remain peculiar to the lives of 
these children, and this is exactly what I will try to do in the remaining part of this section. 
This time, in a reverse fashion, I will try to infer from the narratives at hand the ideal 
moulds set up for the children of military families. I will make use of Enloe's list (2000, pp. 
162-166) featuring the characteristics of the model military wife to come up with my own 
list concerning children. 
 
 First, the model child takes pride in father and the institution which he works for: 
 
"[Asker çocuğu olmak] gurur verici bir şey. İyi ki böyle bir ortamda 
büyümüşüm diyorum. İyi ki asker çocuğuyum diyorum. Çünkü dışarıdaki çoğu 
insan tabii bilmiyor yaşantımızı. Ama birçok şeyin içindesin ve daha çok bilgin 
                                                          
92 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “I do not tell many people that 
my father is a soldier. I still don’t. Because when you say that, it kind of determines who 
you are. As if you are automatically born with the views of your father if he is a 
professional soldier. People hesitate: ‘Hmm, your father is a soldier? Well…’ They still 
hesitate. You don’t tell to everyone about your father in the first year of university, but you 
only converse with your close friends about it. The hardship of telling about your father’s 
profession thus causes a bit of distress for me. When you say it, people begin to have 
prejudices about you. Like you cannot be a leftist when you say, ‘My father is a soldier.’ 
Or, when I interview more conservative people, they seem to think that, ‘If your father is a 
soldier, then you are also military-minded and nationalist.’”     
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oluyor. Daha yakından görüyorsun bazı şeyleri. Bu da babam sayesinde oldu 
tabii."93  
 
"TSK her şey yani. Türk milletinin her şeyi diye düşünüyorum. Öyle de olması 
gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Çünkü zaten çok zor koşullarda bu durumlara 
gelebildik. Ülkemizin kurulmasından beri askerin de bu konuda çok yardımı 
vardır yani. Her zaman da olmuştur. Her zaman da hazırdır her şeye asker 
vatanı için. Asker bizim için her şeydir ya. Ötesi yok yani, her şeydir."94 
 
"Bence asker ailesinde çocuk olmak, asker bir babanın olması gurur verici bir 
şey."95 
 
"[B]ence çok gurur verici bir şey Türk ordusu, Türk askeri. Sonuçta bu zamana 
kadar Türk tarihi diye bir şey var yani. Bu zamana kadar yaşanmış şeyler var. 
Onun içinde Türk askeri var, Türk ordusu var. O yüzden bence çok önemli, 
daha fazla değer verilmesi gereken bir şey."96 
 
"Şu an mesela ben hâlâ babamın subay olduğunu söylemekle gurur 
duyuyorum. Ama yine de söylediğim zaman karşı tarafın bakışını 
görebiliyorum. Mesela eskiden çok farklıydı, şimdi daha farklı oldu."97 
 
 S/he acknowledges the hardships that the constant transfers of a soldier father cause 
in his/her life. But s/he embraces them as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. She 
takes them as opportunities helping to his/her maturation or self-realization. She 
                                                          
93 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “[Being a military brat] is 
something to take pride in. I am so glad to have grown up in an environment as such. I am 
so glad to be a military brat. People outside do not know much about our lives. But you get 
involved in many circumstances when you are a military brat and it makes you 
knowledgeable. You see some things closer. Of course this has happened thanks to my 
father.” 
94 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “TSK is everything. It is 
everything to the Turkish nation. And, I think, it should be kept this way. Military has been 
a great help since the foundation of the nation-state, as we struggled our way to today. It 
has always been so. Soldiers are always ready for anything for their fatherland. They are 
everything to us. Nothing can top them, they are everything.”   
95 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I think that being a child of a 
military family, having a soldier father is a prideful thing.” 
96 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “The Turkish military, the 
Turkish soldiers… These are things to take pride in. After all, there is something called as 
the Turkish history, isn’t it? And there are lots of things into it, where the Turkish soldiers 
and the military have been involved. They are therefore very important and to be esteemed 
higher.” 
97 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I am still proud of saying 
that my father is a military officer. But I can see the looks in the eyes of others. It was 
different back then, it has become different nowadays.” 
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subordinates the sorrow of broken relationships and bygone places to the curiosity of 
making new friends and exploring new places, even though s/he knows that his/her ties in 
wherever s/he goes may be no less transient than previous ones. She believes adaptation to 
be his/her forte, much to be praised:  
 
"Tayin deyince önce biraz üzülüyorum. Çünkü alıştığın bir ortamı, 
arkadaşlarını bırakıyorsun. Ama sonra da heyecan verici bir duyguya 
dönüşüyor. Çünkü yeni bir yer tanıma merakı; acaba orada kimler var, nasıl bir 
ortamım olacak, okulum neresi olacak, orası nasıl bir yer... Gittiğimde de işte o 
merakla üzüntünü unutuyorsun zaten. Yepyeni bir hayata başlıyorsun."98 
 
"Asker çocuğu olmak zor bir şey. Devamlı taşınmak, yeni insanlarla tanışmak 
hem zor hem de güzel. Eğitimini etkiliyor, ama çok farklı insanlarla 
tanışıyorsun. Eğitimden daha çok, görerek insanları tanımaya başlıyorsun. 
Yapılarını anlıyorsun, nasıl bir insan olacağını tahmin edebiliyorsun. ... Mesela 
şöyle bir örnek vereyim. […]’ta gittiğimiz evde piyano vardı. Ev tamamen 
döşeli bir evdi. O zaman piyanoyla tanıştım ben. Merak saldım, oturdum 
başına. Hiçbir şey bilmediğim halde, kimse bir şey demeden dangır dungur 
çaldım piyanoyu. Babam böyle görünce, ‘Piyano dersi alır mısın?’ diye sordu. 
Piyano dersi aldım bu sayede. Hem de ünlü bir piyanistin babası tarafından. 
İnsanlarla tanışma, değişik şeyler, mesela atletizm. […]’ta çok önemlidir 
atletizm. Onun sayesinde atletizme başladım, spora böyle başladım. Türkiye'de 
atletizm diye bir şey yok. Atletizmle tanışmış oldum."99 
 
"En çok etkilediği kısım çok tayin olması. Aslında bence bu bir dezavantaj 
değil, avantaj. Çünkü seni daha çok küçük yaştan farklı şartlara adapte olmayı 
öğretiyor abi. Sen sadece bir şehirde ilkokul 1'den üniversiteye kadar okursan 
                                                          
98 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Transfers would initially 
sadden me a bit. Because you would leave your friends and environments you are used to. 
After a while, they would turn into an excitement though. Because you would become 
curious about your new place: Who lives there, what kind of an environment will you find 
there, in which school will you study, what kind of a place is it…  You would forget your 
sadness by this curiosity and turn over a new leaf.”  
99 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "It is difficult to be a 
military brat. Constant transfers, meeting new people is simultaneously difficult and nice. It 
severely affects your education, but it makes you acquainted with very different people. 
You come to know people by seeing and living, rather than education. You become able to 
understand their kinds, and predict what they are up to. … For example, the house we 
stayed in […] was a fully furnished one, with a piano inside. This was when I first saw a 
piano. I grew an interest to the instrument. As I was hammering at it without knowing how 
to play, my father took notice and asked me if I would like to take piano lessons. And I 
took lessons, from the father of a famous pianist to boot. Furthermore, unlike Turkey, 
athletics is quite important in […]. I started athletics and sports there thanks to that.”  
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başka kültürleri, başka insanları göremezsin. Üniversitede tanışırsın o 
insanlarla. Ama oradan oraya sürüklenince birçok yer görüyorsun. ... 
[H]asbelkader ortalama üstü yerlerde bulunduysan avantajı çok. Şimdi 
biliyorsun zaten çeşitliliği desteklemek için bütün dünya götünü yırtıyor. 
Çeşitlilik, çeşitlilik, bilmem ne, diversity muhabbeti. Onu biraz yapıyorsun 
aslında asker çocuğu olarak. Çeşitliliğin bir parçası sen oluyorsun zaten çoğu 
zaman.”100 
     
"Tayinler bir bakıma olgunlaşmam için iyi oldu. Mecburen adapte oluyorsun. 
Eğitim için kötü ama olgunlaşmak için iyi bir şey."101 
 
 S/he is willing to make sacrifices, especially in his/her education life, so that the 
family stays together after whatever uprooting the job of his father requires. S/he does not 
mind attending whatever schools s/he ends up, because s/he is capable anyway to warp the 
conditions s/he faces into his/her liking. Nor does s/he mind scaling down possibilities for 
him/her in terms of education. S/he is grateful to the father if he is the one who makes 
sacrifices by leaving him/her behind with other family members so that the children can 
pursue their education in their current schools and a safer environment:   
 
"Lise Fen Lisesi oldu burada. İlginç olabilecek bir nokta şuydu: Babamın 
[Doğu]'daki görev süresi dolmuştu. Tayin isteyecekti, o dönemde sınavdan 
önce tercih yapılıyordu. Bana sordu: ‘[Batı’da bir şehir]'e mi gidelim, [Batı’da 
başka bir şehir]'e mi gidelim?’ Bir yerde kendini yoklayıp, kendini kestirip ona 
göre cevap veriyorsun. Önceliği […]'ya verdik. […] olsun, hem yaşaması biraz 
daha kolay, hem yakın yer gibi düşünerek Fen Lisesi ve arkasından […]'daki 
Anadolu liselerini yazdık. Neyse ki Allahtan […]’yı kazandım, geldim. "102 
                                                          
100 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “The transfers are the most 
impactful bit of it. In fact they are not drawbacks. I rather see them as an advantage. 
Because from very early ages, it teaches you to adapt to different conditions. You would 
not see other cultures and people if you would spend your educational life until university 
within a single city. You would meet them in the university. But when you are driven from 
pillar to post, you see a lot of places. … If you live in above average places by chance, I see 
lots of advantages into it. You know, now the whole world is raving about supporting 
diversity. Diversity this, diversity that, so on and so forth. It is a big deal now. Actually, as 
a child of a soldier you do that. Most of the time, you become an element of diversity.”    
101 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “In a way, the transfers 
have proven good for my maturation, because you have to adapt yourself. They are bad for 
education, but good for maturation.” 
102 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “I went to the Science High 
School here. The interesting thing was that, my father’s term of office in [the East] was 
finished and he was about to ask for a transfer. Back then high school preferences were 
made before the high school entrance exams. He asked me: ‘Do you want to go to [a city in 
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 During the period of university preferences, which has a decisive impact on her 
future occupation, s/he gives way to the wishes of his/her parents, despite his/her initial 
inclinations. S/he surrenders him/herself to the true guidance of his/her parents and admits 
that it is for the greater well-being of everyone. S/he often finds consolation in the fact that 
s/he was too young to make better choices anyway: 
  
"Ben ilk başta bunlardan [hukuktan] öte konservatuar düşünüyordum 
enstrüman çaldığımdan dolayı. Gitar, davul çalıyorum. İşte aile baskısı şu 
yönde gelişti: ‘Konservatuarda ne yapacaksın, ne işine yarayacak? Gelecek 
planların arasında konservatuarla ilgili ne seçebilirsin, ne yapabilirsin? Aç 
kalırsın.’ O mantıkla yaklaştılar. Ben de sonuçta abi avukat, baba [askeriyeden 
emekli olduktan sonra] avukat, onların etkisinde kaldım ister istemez. Hani 
hem maddi yönden, hem de rahat olurum mantığıyla [seçtim]. Baskı sonuç 
verdi diyeyim."103 
 
"Aslında ben sosyal, böyle daha TS'den girip, fotoğrafçılık, reklamcılık 
tarzında şeyler istiyordum. Ama babam, ‘Öyle olunca para kazanamazsın 
ileride,’ dedi. Ben istemeyerek, onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı. Onlar benim 
tercihlerimi yaptı derken tabii ki şey değil... İyi niyetle [yaptılar]. Benim 
iyiliğimi düşündükleri için yaptılar. Ama istemediğim çok şey vardı. Birisi 
geldi: [...]. Sondan bir önceki tercihimdi."104 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the West] or [another city in the West]?’ I asked myself and estimated an answer. We gave 
the priority to […]. Because it was closer and it is easier to live in there. We thus gave the 
top priority to the Science High School and then wrote in the preference list all the 
Anatolian High Schools in […]. Fortunately, I succeeded enough to get into the Science 
High School.” 
103 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “At first, I was thinking of 
attending the conservatory more than anything else. I was playing guitar and drums. But 
there was a pressure from the family: ‘What will you do in the conservatory, what is its 
use? What can you do in the future with an education taken in the conservatory? You will 
end up starving.’ They approached it like that. My brother is a lawyer, my father [after his 
retirement from the military] is a lawyer, and eventually I willy-nilly found myself drifting 
with the tide. I preferred the law school for material reasons and comfort. Well, the pressure 
yielded a result as such.” 
104 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Actually I was more into 
social stuff like photography, advertising and so forth. But my father said that, ‘You cannot 
earn your life if you choose them.’ Against my wishes, they made my preferences. When I 
say they made it, it’s not like... They did it on good intentions, for my well-being. But there 
were many things in the preference list I was not fond of. I got into one of them: [...]. It was 
my next to the last choice." 
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 If a son, he seriously considers joining the military as a teenager. He takes the 
military schools exam, even if his parents may discourage him to be a soldier for some 
reason. He may not be an aspirant to become an officer, but at least he gives it a shot by 
taking the exam, perhaps out of his own fickle will or parental orientations:  
 
"Küçükken ya subay ya otobüs şoförü olacağım dedim."105 
 
"[G]enelde asker çocukları[nın] hepsi askeri lise sınavına bir girer. Ben de 
girdim. Ben kazanamadım. Çok zordu.”106 
 
 If a daughter, she fantasizes being a soldier. She may not register in a military 
school, but she underlines that she would decide to take the exams and join the military if 
she were a male:   
 
"[Erkek olsam] asker olmak isterdim. Kesinlikle ben de subay olmak isterdim. 
Çünkü senin rol modelin baban olacak haliyle. Onu örnek alacaksın. Onun her 
yaptığı senin için doğru olduğu için [sen] de onun yolunda gitmek isteyeceksin. 
Babam da öyle bir şey isteyebilirdi açıkçası erkek olsaydım. ... Evet. İsterdi 
yani. Babam çünkü mesleğine aşık bir insan. İnanılmaz seviyor. ... Babam da 
kesin isterdi. Ama ben de çok isterdim. Yani erkek olsaydım düşünürdüm. Ben 
zaten düşünmedim değil, düşündüm. Ama bir kadın olarak senin subay olman 
olanaksız. Yani olanaklı da bir yere kadar yükselebiliyorsun. Ne kadar başarılı 
olursan ol bir rütbeye kadar olabiliyorsun. Bir de erkek hâkim o camiaya. Pek 
fazla kadından söz edilmiyor. O yüzden belki de direkt kafamdan atmış 
olabilirim yani. Ama erkek olsaydım kesinlikle subay olmak isterdim."107 
 
                                                          
105 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “When I was little, I wanted 
to be a professional military officer or a bus driver.” 
106 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Generally, all children of 
military families take the military school tests. I took it as well. I could not succeed. It was 
very difficult.” 
107 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “If I were a male, I would 
want to be a soldier. Definitely I would. Because your father is your role model. Whatever 
he does is true for you, so you would also want to follow in his footsteps, right? My father 
could have wanted it too, if I were a male. … He would want it, because my father is in 
love with his job. He is immensely infatuated with it. … He would want it. But I would 
want it too. Actually I gave a thought about it as well. As a female, it is impossible for you 
to be a military officer though. I mean it is technically possible, but you can be promoted to 
a certain rank, regardless of your success. Also, it is a male dominated field, where women 
are not visible much. Perhaps this is why I took it out of my mind. But I would definitely 
want to be a military officer, if I were a male.”    
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"[Erkek olsam] belki babam asker olmam konusunda ısrarcı olabilirdi. Bunu 
dile getiriyor da zaten. Çünkü mesleğini çok severek yaparak bir insan. ‘Bir 
daha yine dünyaya gelsem yine asker olurum,’ diyen birisi. Belki bu konuda 
beni de teşvik etmek isterdi. Ama onun dışında, erkek olsaydım, kesin hevesim 
olurdu da. Çünkü lojmanda arkadaşlarımda bir ara furyaydı. Herkes lise 
zamanında bunun sınavlarına giriyordu."108 
 
"A yok, ben de [subay olmak] istedim yani. Kızları alsalardı lisede ben de 
isterdim. O çocukluk hevesi ama yani. Babana özendiğin için bütün asker 
çocukları ister tabii yani. ... Kesin değil tabii. Almama ihtimalleri de var da 
asker olurdum muhtemelen. İsterdim. Kesin o zaman lisede Askeri Lise 
sınavına girerdim, ama oradan da devam ederdim diye düşünüyorum."109 
 
 S/he works in tandem with other family members as a supporting cast, providing 
emotional assistance, moral uplift and comfort to the tired and stressful father so that he 
performs his military job well. S/he loves his/her father for what he is and endures his 
shifting moods. However, the primary means of the child to help the father is to maintain 
his peace of mind, by ensuring that everyone around is safe and does not get into trouble. 
Most importantly, s/he should not leave the father's mind preoccupied (aklı kalmamak) with 
him/her. And the best way to obtain this objective is to immerse and traverse the self within 
the military setting. As the child stands aloof from the 'heart of darkness', where s/he can 
see the murmurs, shades and shapes of the civilians passing by, s/he usually subscribes to 
the widespread discourse of securitization and accepts the conditions of his/her 
confinement as logical and even desirable for his/her own security and well-being:  
 
                                                          
108 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "[If I were a male] my father 
would have insisted that I become a soldier. He articulates this as well. Because he loves 
his job. He is a person who says that he would be a soldier, if he would be born again. 
Perhaps, he would have encouraged me to become a soldier. But if I were a male, I would 
be inclined to become so as well. It was once quite popular among my friends in military 
lodgings. Everybody was taking the military school tests.” 
109 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Ah, I wanted to become a 
professional military officer as well. If only, they would accept females to military high 
schools. But it is like a childhood fad. You want to be like your father, so all the children 
want it. … Of course, it is not guaranteed. They may not accept you to the military school. 
But still, I would have been a soldier. I would want it. I would take the military high school 
tests and proceed to become an officer.” 
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"Sevmiyorum lojman ortamını. ... Ha ama bir avantajı var, o da güvenli 
[olması]. Eşim, çocuğum olsa isterim yani. Aklım kalmaz geride. Çocuğunun 
nerede oynadığı belli. Karın onunla beraber."110 (emphasis mine) 
"[Orduevi'nde] güvenebileceğin insanlarla bir aradasın yani. Sonuçta ailenin de 
aklı kalmıyor orada kaldığın için. Öyle işte amcalarla, teyzelerle oturuyorduk. 
Onlar da her gün orada, biz de her gün orada. Yani rahattı okuluma gidip gelme 
açısından. Ailem açısından da rahattı. Büyük bir fırsattı benim için yani. Ben 
de sonuna kadar değerlendirmiş oldum."111 (emphasis mine) 
 
 S/he also does not put the father through hassle by pestering him to recite the tales 
of his exploits, unless the father wants to share them. S/he takes his prolonged absences as 
an integral part of the job, which s/he reveres and finds necessary:    
  
"[Doğu’da babamın görev yaptığı yer]'e gittiğimde devamlı babamın makam 
odasındaydım. Onunla her yere gitmeye çalışıyordum. Tabii ki ne mümkün? 
Beni yine orada bırakıyordu, o kendisi gidip geliyordu. Tabii o sıralar nereye 
gidiyor, ne yapıyor bilmiyorum. Ama beni kandırıyordu. İşte, ‘Denetlemeye 
gideceğim, asker abilerine bakacağım,’ falan [diyordu]. ... Nereye gittiğini 
söyleseydi ben baya bir diretirdim zaten herhalde. Ağlardım, zırlardım. Ama o 
benim zaten öyle bir şey yapacağımı hissettiği için ve beni korkutmamak için 
hiçbir şekilde oranın kötü bir yer olduğunu [söylemedi]. ‘Burası böyle, buna 
alışmak zorundayız,’ gibi bir şey de yapmadı. ‘Yani bunlar olur. Böyle bir 
dönem. Ama bunlar geçecek,’ diye devamlı beni sakinleştirmeye çalışırdı."112 
 
                                                          
110 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “I do not like the lodgings. 
… But there is an advantage to it and it is the safety of lodgings. If I had a spouse and 
children, then I would want it. I would not worry. You know where your children would be 
playing. You know your wife would be with them.” (emphasis mine)   
111 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “You are with people whom 
you can trust [in the Officers’ Club]. The minds of your parents are not wrapped up in you 
as you stay in there. We would sit in the Club with elder people. They were there every 
day, as we were. It was convenient for me to go to school. It was convenient for my family. 
It was a great opportunity. I welcomed it all the way.” (emphasis mine) 
112 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “When I went to [the 
father’s station in the East], I was in my father’s office all the time. I was trying to follow 
him to wherever he goes. It was impossible of course. He would leave me behind at the 
office. He would trick me, by saying things like, ‘I am going to an inspection, I will check 
your soldier brothers.’ … Had he tell me his whereabouts, I would not let him. I would cry 
and whine. As he knew I was capable of doing such things, he did not ever say that it was a 
bad place, so as to not frighten me. He did not say, ‘This place is what it is, and we have to 
get used to it.’ He would try to soothe me all the time, by saying ‘This is normal. Such are 
the times we live in. It will pass.’”     
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"[Doğu’da bir şehir]’den ilk geldiği zaman çok anlatmıyordu. Ama sonradan 
tabii ben de büyüyünce biraz anlatıyor işte. Orada çektiği fotoğrafları 
gösteriyor. Çok zor tabii."113 
 
 S/he keeps his/her siblings in check, lest that they should go astray in terms of 
education, habits and relationships: 
 
"Ben de sıkılıyordum, dinlemiyordum, geziyordum sınıfta falan. Çizgi 
çizdirirlerdi deftere, ben cetvelle çizerdim falan. Öğretmen [aileme] şikâyet 
ederdi. Mesela okula gidip gelme konusunda hiç net hatırladığım bir şey yok 
onun dışında. Ablam [İrem] vardı. Ablamla aynı okulda olunca o beni servise 
bindirirdi, dönüşte de alırdı. Servise tekrar binip eve gelirdi. Onun dışında pek 
bir şey hatırlamıyorum."114 
 
 If a son, he shall take the man-of-household mantle when his father sails away. He 
relinquishes the symbolic title when his father returns home. Although I do not have any 
narrative deriving from the interviews to demonstrate how the sons may be assigned to 
protect the honour of their fathers by keeping an eye on the female members of the family, I 
have come across the following statements after an hour of basic search in the internet:  
 
"[Asker çocuğu olmak] babanın oğluna, ‘Bak oğlum ben operasyona gidiyorum 
bir hafta yokum. Bu tabancayı gerektiği yerde kullanacaksın. Annen kardeşin 
sana emanet,’ demesidir."115 
 
"[Subay çocukları içinde] daha çocuk yaşta her operasyon öncesi bir odaya 
çekilip, ‘Oğlum, bana bir şey olursa, annenle kardeşin sana emanet. Ben 
                                                          
113 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “When my father first returned 
from [a city in the East], he did not tell much. As I grew up, he began to tell more. 
Sometimes he shows the photos he has taken. It is very difficult of course.”  
114 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I was bored, not listening 
and wandering in the classroom. We would draw lines on our notebooks and I was using a 
ruler. The teacher would complain [to my family]. I do not really remember anything other 
than that. I had an elder sister [İrem]. She would put me to the shuttle and take me home 
when I return. She would get into the shuttle again to come back home [after she put me to 
the school]. Apart from that, I do not remember much.”  
115 To see the full entry: Commodore 69. (2013, July 30). Asker çocuğu olmak. Uludağ 
Sözlük. Retrieved January 1, 2014, from http://www.uludagsozluk.com/e/20713242/: “[To 
be a child of a soldier] is to hear from the father that, ‘Look, son. I’m away for an operation 
until next week. You will use this gun if needed. I am entrusting your sibling and mother to 
your care.’”   
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yokken bu evin erkeği sensin,’ türevi konuşmalara (çaresizlikten ve 
mecburiyetten de olsa) maruz kalıp, çocukluğu örselenenleri de vardır."116 
 
 Conversely, if a daughter, she protects her purity because, in streams of nationalist-
militarist ideologies, the honour of the protective males as well as the nation is thought to 
be embodied in vulnerable women. When we bring into consideration that the daughter is 
the figure where the 'womenandchildren' of the nation coalesce (Altınay, 2004a, p. 79), she 
is extremely careful about preventing anything that would besmirch the honour of her 
father.   
 
 S/he outshines his/her civilian peers by manners, diligence, orderliness, wit and 
success. S/he makes parents proud of advances made in the field of education: 
 
"Küçükken ya subay ya otobüs şoförü olacağım dedim. Birinci olurdum 
genelde. […] Dershanesi'ne gittim burada. Orada birinci oldum ki orada birinci 
olmak zordur."117 
 
"Ben orada [Doğu’da bir şehirdeki okulda] 1 sene okudum. Sene sonunda şöyle 
bir muhabbet var. O zamanlar Milliyet gazetesi Türkiye çapında sınav 
yapıyordu, kupa veriyordu böyle. Bu Final [dershanesi] sınavları, Öz-De-Bir 
sınavları çıkmadan gazete sınavları vardı. O gün içinde Türkiye içinde yapılır, 
sonra sonuçları açıklanırdı. Ben ona girdim. İşte [şehir]'de 3. mü oldum, 2. mi 
oldum bilmiyorum. Kupa verdiler işte. Abi müdür bana bir yapıştı: ‘Kupayı ver 
işte biz vitrine koyacağız, kupayı ver vitrine koyacağız.’ Ben de müdüre 
demişim ki: ‘Beni siz yetiştirmediniz. Ben burada bir bok öğrenmedim. 
Bildiklerimle yaptım.’ Vermedim abi. Vermemek için de kupa […] postanesine 
gidince ben okuldan önce gidip postaneden kendim almışım. Vermedim. 
Oradan bir kıl oldular zaten."118   
                                                          
116 To see the full entry: Hayhay. (2007, March 3). Subay çocuğu olmak. Ekşi Sözlük. 
Retrieved January 1, 2014, from https://eksisozluk.com/entry/10631242: “There are some 
[the children of military officers] whose childhood is ruined by talks given in rooms to 
which they are dragged before each military operation: ‘Son, if anything happens to me, 
you will look after your sibling and mother. When I’m away, you are the man of this 
house.’”   
117 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “When I was little, I wanted 
to be a professional military officer or a bus driver. I was often ranked first. I went to the 
[…] Lesson School here. I was the top scoring student in exams and it is not an easy 
achievement in there.” 
118 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I studied there [the school in 
an Eastern city] for a year. There was this thing at the end of the year. Back then, the 
newspaper, Milliyet was holding Turkey-wide exams. They were giving cups and all to 
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"Orada da [Batı’da bir Anadolu Lisesi] şöyle bir şey yaşadım. Okul birincisi 
muhabbetleri oluyordu. Şimdi ben geldim oraya, [Anadolu Lisesi]'ne, orada da 
şöyle bir sistem vardı: Mesela Fen dersi. Hani şey oluyordu hatırlar mısın? Bir 
dönem kimya oluyordu, bir dönem biyoloji oluyordu, bir dönem fizik 
oluyordu. Öyle olunca da 4-5 sınıf varsa hepsine aynı sınavı yapıyorlardı, sonra 
herkesin genel puanlarını asıyorlardı. Sanki dershanedeki sınavlar gibi 
puanlarına bakıyorsun hesabı. Abi ben paso 100 alıyorum tamam mı; listenin 
hep en başındayım falan. Orada da bir başladı millet kıl olmaya falan. Orada da 
bir tane Arda diye bir eleman vardı, ot. O da ilkokuldan beri okulun birincisi. 
(Gülüşmeler) Böyle eski birinci. Abi ben geldim, çocuktan iyi alıyorum her 
şeyi. Bir Almanca'da şey yapıyorum [tekliyorum] falan. Sonra onu da 
toparladım. Ondan da başladım 95 almaya falan. Sonra ortaokul bitti. Annem 
de sırf piçliğine müdüre sordu: ‘Ya ne oldu, kim oldu okul birincisi?’ Ben de 
boş ver diyorum falan. Onlarda da şey oldu böyle: ‘Bir sene okudu, sayılmaz 
bununki’ hesabı. Ben okumaya orta 3'ten başlamadım ki. Oraya gelirken de 
benim bir notum vardı. Burada da aldığım şeyler var. Öyle bir muhabbet oldu. 
Aslında ben birinciydim ama onu orada diyemediler."119 (emphasis mine) 
 
 S/he may be banished by his/her cohort in the school on the basis of being an 
outsider due to his/her recent arrival after relocations, but s/he cannot afford to be a loser 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
winners. Before the advent of Final [lesson school] or Öz-De-Bir exams, there were 
newspaper exams. They would be held in a single day and the results would be announced 
afterwards. Anyway, I entered the exam. I came second or third in [the city]. They gave me 
a trophy for it. But the headmaster of the school clung like a leech to me: ‘Give us the 
trophy, we will showcase it.’ It’s said that, I told him: ‘You did not raise me. I did not learn 
a lick of nothing here. I did what I did with what I knew before.’ I did not give it. I grabbed 
the trophy from the post office before them. I did not give it. They were pissed.”  
119 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "And the following happened 
when I arrived there [an Anatolian High School in a Western city]. There was this deal 
about becoming the top student of the school. The system in that school was like this: Let’s 
say you have a science course. I don’t know if you remember, but in those times we were 
getting the courses of chemistry, biology and physics one by one, each for a term. They 
were making the same exams for all students studying in the same grade, and then they 
were announcing our total scores. You would see your score among others, just as you do 
in lesson schools. Man, I was on a roll for getting those 100s. Always at the top of the 
scoring list. People started to get irritated. There was this guy in the school, Arda, a 
simpleton. And he had been the top student there since the primary school prior to my 
arrival. (Laughs) The former winner. But, I came and started to get better grades than him 
in all courses. Only the German course was an itch. But I pulled it together and started 
getting like 95s in German too. Thereafter, the secondary school ended. My mother asked 
the headmaster on purpose that: ‘Well, who is the top student?’ I was telling her to let it go. 
Because they were thinking like: ‘He studied here only for a year. It does not count.’ But I 
did not start studying from the 8th grade, right? I had my grades before going there, and I 
had my grades over there. Actually I was the top student, but they could not make it 
public.” (emphasis mine) 
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(ezik olmak) or simpleton (ot olmak) as a child of a family, that is presumed to be involving 
the ideal father and mother of the nation. S/he develops elegant tastes, but s/he does not 
drift away from the spaces where s/he can mingle with other members of the military 
community, while trailing behind sources to gratify him/herself. S/he has a distinctive 
'habitus' (Bourdieu, 2010) that is indicative of his/her good nurturing and various sorts of 
capital at his/her disposal: 
 
"Genelde subay çocukları, giyim olarak, ailenin verdiği şeyler olarak belirli bir 
kalitenin üzerinde olurlar. Ezik olmazlar. Bak mesela şu masaya (pencere 
kenarında 2 kız 1 erkek öğrencinin oturduğu masalardan birini gösterir); bence 
şu oğlan ezik. Kız da ezik. Ama gözlüklü kız onlardan farklı. Pembeliyle 
konuşmam, dost olmam. Ama diğer kızla tanışırım, istersem onu alır yemeğe 
çıkarırım. ... Kızın gözlüğünden belli. Ray-Ban'ın gözlüğü var, şu (model ismi 
anlaşılmıyor). Kenarları böyle (kendi güneş gözlüğünü gösterir). Her erkeğin 
dolabında bulunmalı. Cüzdan vardır böyle, müzik vardır, takım [elbise] vardır, 
her erkeğin dolabında bulunması gereken. Benim 5 tane güneş gözlüğüm var. 
Ama astsubay adamın mesela 30.000 TL'si var, araba alacak. Gider Honda 
Civic alırsın mesela değil mi? Adam gidiyor, Palio alıyor."120 (emphasis mine) 
 
"Ben her müziği dinlerim. Bak mesela sen anlıyorsun [müzikten] belli. Müzikte 
de şey vardır. Mesela sen ilkokul 2-3'teki bir çocuğa dünya klasiklerini 
okutamazsın. Ya da çok kitap okuyan, 40-50 yaşında biri Beyaz Diş'i okumaz. 
Müzik de böyle. En tepede jazz var, bir altında funk var. Daha aşağısı klasik 
rock. Lynyrd Skynyrd severim ben. Sonra Elic Clapton. Ama sen sokaktan tut 
birini çevir, Miles Davis dinletirsen anlamaz."121  
                                                          
120 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “Generally, the children of 
military officers are above a certain level in terms of their attire and family training. They 
do not turn out to be losers. Look at this table (pointing towards three students sitting on a 
table nearby the window); that guy is a loser. So is that girl. But the girl with glasses is of a 
different kind. I would not talk to the one dressed in pinks. I would not be friends with her. 
But I would meet the other one. I would take her to dinner if I want. … Her glasses speak 
for herself. She wears a Ray-Ban; you know this (mumbling the name of some model of 
Ray-Ban sunglasses). It has edges similar to this (showing his glasses). Every man should 
have it in his wardrobe. There are wallets, music, and suits essential to be a man. I have 
five sunglasses. But, let’s say a non-commissioned military officer has 30.000 TL to spend 
on a car. You would buy a Honda Civic, right? The guy goes and gets a Palio.” (emphasis 
mine)     
121 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “I listen to all kinds of 
music. You seem to know about music as well. And there is this thing in music. For 
example, a primary school child at the second or third grade cannot read world classics. 
Conversely, a 40-50 years old bookworm would not read the White Fang. It is the same in 
music. Jazz is the ultimate peak. Then comes funk at the penultimate step. A step below, 
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"Ortaokula [Batı’da bir şehir]'e geldim. Ortaokulda aslında biraz ilk başlarda 
sıkıntı yaşadım gibi. [Önceki tayin yeri]'nden gelince, bilmiyorum nedense 
kendimi bir ezik hissetme durumu oldu. Çünkü [Batı’daki şehir] ufak bir yer. 
Herkes birbirini tanıyordu. Gelince böyle bir alışamadım. Hiç tahmin 
etmiyordum hani. Çok rahat olurum gene [diye düşünüyordum]. Çünkü hiç 
böyle bir sıkıntı yaşamamıştım. Böyle bir de asker çocuğu falan olunca, belki o 
zaman ilk defa tribe girmiş olabilirim. ... Genelde astsubay çocukları falan 
böyle... Onu hissedersin. Böyle biraz ezik oluyorlardı. Özellikle astsubay 
çocukları mesela. Ben de [Batı’daki şehirde okula ilk başladığımda] kendim 
nedense biraz öyle oldum. Ama ondan da çabuk çıktım yani. Biraz da belki 
derslerden de kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Derslere de uyum sağlayamadım. Baya 
zayıf kaldım. Ama sonra da toparladım. İlişkilerimi kurdum, rahat. Çok iyi 
arkadaşlar edindim. Yavaş yavaş bu […]’daki ortamı da tanımaya 
başladım."122 (emphases mine) 
 
"Astsubay çocukları ezik oluyorlar biraz daha yani. Hani ekonomik durumdan 
da kaynaklanan, kıyafetleri olsun… Subay çocuklarının böyle daha kendine 
güveni oluyordu. Ha bazıları aşırı güvenden dolayı çok artist olabiliyordu tabii. 
Hemen hissedebiliyorsun onları. Astsubay çocukları daha böyle şey 
oluyordu… Konuşmaları... Astsubay çocuklarının aileleri biraz daha böyle 
yerel oluyordu nedense. Çok garip, ama öyle oluyordu bir şekilde. Onu belki 
tam anlatamam ama anlayabiliyorsun yani. O da tabii ilişkileri biraz 
değiştiriyordu."123 (emphasis mine) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
there is classic rock. I like Lynyrd Skynyrd, also Eric Clapton. But if you would pick 
people from the street, they would not understand what they are listening to, if you would 
make them listen to Miles Davis.” 
122 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “I came to [the city in the 
West] for the secondary school. Actually, I struggled a bit at the beginning. I felt like a 
loser for some reason, after I came from [the former city of residence]. [The city in the 
West] is a small town. Everyone knows each other. I could not get used to it. I was not 
expecting that. I thought that I would be at ease once again, because I haven’t had such 
trouble before.  I was vexed, perhaps for the first time in my life and being a soldier’s child 
did not help it. ... Usually, the children of non-commissioned military officers... You can 
sense it. It just occurs that, they were losers a bit. I mean, especially the children of non-
commissioned military officers. [When I first started school in that Western city] I became 
like that. But I shook it off quickly. Perhaps the courses had a finger in it. I could not 
accommodate myself to the courses. I was doing poorly in the school. But I bounced back. I 
grew relationships, easily. I made great friends. Slowly, I came to know the place.” 
(emphases mine) 
123 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “The children of non-
commissioned military officers were more losers. It is also caused by their economic 
conditions, and their outfits…  The children of commissioned military officers had more 
self-confidence. Sometimes they even had too much swag. You could easily notice them. 
However, the children of non-commissioned military officers were more like… I mean 
their speech… Their families were more local for some reason. It is strange, but it just 
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As seen above, his/her distinctive tastes seem to enact a "practical affirmation of an 
inevitable difference" (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 49), which testifies his/her eminent position in 
the society, especially by rendering the philistine and rustic non-commissioned officers and 
their meek children as others. But the child bears no enmity to his/her fellows with whom 
s/he lives and plays within the military complex. S/he will have no foe among children of 
other military families. S/he may question or even envy sometimes the privileges bestowed 
to the children of higher ranked, general-officer fathers. But s/he refrains from making a 
fuss about it. S/he keeps his/her dignity intact, if bullied by them:  
 
"Onlar [general çocukları] daha bir el üstünde tutulurlar, aman bir şey olmasın 
hesabı. Sanki generallerin çocuğu, ataerkilmiş gibi, o da paşa olacakmış gibi 
davranılır. Hâlbuki çocuk gider gitarist falan olur saçma sapan. Öyle aptalca bir 
şey var. Onlar konutta kalır mesela. Onlar lojmanda kalmaz, ayrı bir konut 
vardır o şehrin en büyük komutanına tahsis edilen valilik konutu gibi 
hesabı."124 
 
"Mesela ben, […]’tayken bizim komşu vardı, Gökhan. Mesela çocuk çok 
artistti. Asker çocuklarının bazıları çok takıntılı olur. Zaten o sonradan askeri 
liseye falan gitti. Belliydi zaten onun gideceği, o tarz bir şey olacağı. Seni aşağı 
görme durumları oluyordu yani, onu hissedebiliyorsun. ... Onun babası 
babamdan daha rütbeliydi. Ama ondan ziyade kişilikle alakalı bir durum. Beni 
hiçbir zaman öyle ezen birisi olmadı. Zaten subay olduğu için babam öyle 
hiçbir zaman şey olmadı, işte, ‘Seni küçük görüyorum,’ falan."125 (emphasis 
mine) 
        
                                                                                                                                                                                 
happens to be the case. I cannot exactly name it, but you can understand what I mean. This 
was influencing our relations of course.” (emphasis mine) 
124 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “The children of general 
officers are held dear more than others. They are treated as if patrilineally they are meant to 
be general officers too. Then the child usually becomes a guitar player or something like 
that. It’s silly. For example, they reside in a house. They reside in a different house, 
reserved for the top ranked military officer of the city, unlike those who stay in military 
lodgings.”    
125 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “When we were in […], there 
was this neighbor, Gökhan. The guy had an unbearable swagger. Some children of officers 
happen to be so obsessive. This guy went to a military high school afterwards. I knew that 
it was bound to happen. He was contemptuous, you’d feel it. … His father had a rank on 
mine. But these things rather have to do with one’s personality. No one ever trampled me 
down. ‘I am looking down on you,’ said no one ever, as my father was also a military 
officer.” (emphasis mine)  
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 Just as the mother, s/he is quite comfortable with social relations based on rank. 
S/he can be aware of the social and spatial segregations in life that the ranks of the officer 
fathers entail. However, s/he accepts them for what they are and acts accordingly:    
 
"Çocuk olarak ben öyle bir şey [rütbe ilişkilerinin çocuklar arası ilişkilere 
yansıması] çok hissetmedim. Bir tek general çocuklarını çok kayırırlardı. 
Biliyorsun, general masası ayrıdır. Hep boştur o böyle, generale ayrılmıştır, 
amirale ayrılmıştır falan. En manzaralı yerdeki masa hep boştur. Senin baban 
da gelip oturamaz oraya. Onların çocukları o açıdan çok kayrılıyor. Sinir 
olduğumuz da oluyordu o yüzden bizim mesela."126 
 
"Sadece şunu hissettim. Okuldan ziyade askeri kamplara falan gittiğimde 
astsubay, üstsubay, subay falan gibi farklı bölmeler olur ya; astsubayların 
denizi en kötü, en çakıllı yerdedir de üstsubayların denizi iskelenin ucundadır 
falan mesela. Orada yaşadım ben, ilk defa orada oldu. Bak işte astsubay 
masaları var, onların önünden havalı havalı geçiyorsun, bir de subay masası 
var. Ben küçükken babam herhalde subay kısmındaydık, yüzbaşı, binbaşı 
falandı. Sen oraya götürüyorsun işte. Denizin sadece o kısmı senin. Eğer bir 
adım ileri atarsan ya da havlunu diğer şezlonga koyarsan orası general 
şezlongu. Orada oturamazsın yani. Bunu en fazla orada yaşadım galiba, 
orduevlerinde ve askeri kamplarda. Sivil dünyada arkadaşlarımla beraber değil 
de askeri kamplarda masaların ve şezlongların farklılaştığını gördüğüm 
zaman."127128  
                                                          
126 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “As a child I did not feel that 
[the ranking hierarchies between military officer fathers influence the relations between 
their children]. Only, they were favoring the children of general officers too much. You 
know, the table of the general officer is distinct from others. It is always unoccupied, yet 
reserved for the general, or the admiral. The table with the best scenery always remains 
empty. No one can take a seat in that table, including your father. Their children are 
favored quite much. Sometimes this was thus getting to our nerves as well.”     
127 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “I felt that in military vacation 
facilities rather than school. When you go to these facilities, you know, they are segregated 
according to whether your father is a non-commissioned military officer, commissioned 
military officer or higher ranked commissioned military officer. Non-commissioned 
officers swim in the worst part of the sea, with most pebbles under their feet, whereas 
higher ranked officers have a place by the pier. I first experienced it there. There are tables 
of non-commissioned officers where you prance by and there are tables of commissioned 
officers. When I was little, I suppose we were on the part of commissioned officers. My 
father was a captain or major back then. Only a part of the sea is yours. If you take an extra 
step or put your towel to the next chaise lounge, it belongs to a general officer. You cannot 
sit there. I guess I experienced it there the most; not with my friends in the civilian world, 
but in military vacation camps where tables and chaise lounges are differentiated.” 
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S/he is proud of the father's rank. However, s/he does not spam it over others to 
exploit advantages in ways that would disappoint the father: 
 
"Bazı çocuklar vardır, albayların, babasının rütbesiyle yatıp kalkar. Biz onlarla 
takılmazdık zaten. Çocuklar babayla övünmeyi sever. Ama kendin olarak var 
olacaksın. Babalar bazen çekerler zaten çocukları. Benim babam mesela, 
‘Kendin var olacaksın, rütbemi kullandığını duymayacağım,’ demişti. Kimisi 
öyleydi bizimle oldu, kimisi babasının rütbesini kullanırdı, bizden ayrı 
oldu."129 
 
 S/he occasionally attends the 'protocol' with his/her parents as a well-behaved 
member of the military family and the military institution as a family. S/he represents 
his/her family to the best of his/her abilities. His/her demeanours are attuned to the 
requirements of the protocol and ranking hierarchies. The father's reputation comes before 
his/her joy and comfort. S/he thus restrains him/herself if warned, so that s/he does not let 
down the father in the presence of others. S/he takes the full blunt of such restrictions if 
they are to help the father out in his profession:   
 
"Askeri kamp [demek], ucuz, ucuzluk ve devamlı selam verme [demek]. Hâlâ 
protokolün sürmesi ama bir yandan da tatil yapma isteği. Rahat olamıyorsun. 
Yok şunu giyme, yok bunu giyme. Hem uygun bir yer tatil yapabilmek için, 
hem de kasılıyorsun. Tatil mi yapıyorsun, yapamıyor musun belli değil yani. 
Rahatlayamıyorsun. ... Ne yapsam kızardı babam. ‘Yok öyle davranma, yok 
buraya gel, yok yaramazlık yapma, yok gitme.’ Devamlı bir kontrol. Hani 
başkalarına karşı mahcup olmama düşüncesiyle kontrol ederdi."130  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
128 As of 2012, the spatial segregation of Officers’ Clubs and military vacation facilities 
according to attaining the status of general officer (general), high officer (üst subay) and 
officer (subay) was abolished.  
129 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “Some children live and die 
by the ranks of their fathers. We were not hanging out with them anyway. Children like to 
boast with their fathers. But you have to learn existing as you are and not otherwise. Some 
fathers specifically warn their children to do so. For example, my father once said to me 
that, ‘You will exist as yourself. I will not hear that you are exploiting my rank.’ Those 
who do that came on our board, those who made use of their fathers’ ranks drifted away 
from us.”  
130 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Military vacation camp 
means cheapness and constant saluting to me. It means the clash between continuing 
protocol and desire for vacation. You cannot be at ease. Don’t wear this, don’t wear that. 
On the one hand, it is a convenient place to have a good vacation, but it is stressful. It is 
uncertain whether or not you are on holiday. You cannot relax. … Whatever I was doing 
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"Orduevi deyince saçma sapan bir müzik eşliğinde oturan subay aileleri geliyor 
aklıma yemek esnasında. Besame [Mucho] falan çalıyor. (Gülüşmeler)"131  
 
"Orduevi deyince orduevinde yılbaşı yemeği, dışarıda yemek yemek, bir 
orduevinde yemek yeme ritüeli geliyor aklıma. Yemek yemek hadisesi geliyor 
aklıma. ... Güzel giyinirsin, çatalları şuna göre kullanırsın, amcalar gelir müzik 
yapar falan."132   
 
"Mesela milli bayramlarda, yılbaşlarında, orduevlerinde kokteyl olur, eğlence 
olur, onlara katılınır. Sen de o ailelerin bir parçası olarak istemesen de bazen 
zorla gidersin. Çünkü baban gitmek zorundadır, protokol hesabı. Bayramlar 
olur mesela. Normalde nasıldır? İnsanların arkadaşları vardır, bayramda 
birbirlerine giderler. Ama normalde bu insanlar denktir, arkadaştır. Ama baban 
yüzbaşıysa ve çalıştığı birliğin komutanı albaysa ve [eve] gelecekse evde bir 
telaş olur mesela. Çünkü albay geliyordur sana ziyarete. Ama senin dengin 
gelecekse daha rahat karşılar baban onu. Ama öbür türlü sen de o gerilimi baya 
böyle yaşarsın çocuk bile olsan. Sen de hareketlerini ona göre kısarsın. Çok 
cıvıma falan yoktu bizde mesela. Çok şımarıklık, bilmem ne hiç bilmem 
mesela. Çocukluğumda öyle bir şey yaşamadım. Hep böyle bir dizginleme 
hesabı."133 (emphasis mine) 
 
 S/he facilitates the promotion of the father, primarily by behaving well and not 
getting into trouble. However, as Enloe (2000) reminds us via the story of an African 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
was making my father angry at me. ‘Don’t do that, come here, don’t misbehave, don’t go 
there.’ Constant control. He was controlling me to avoid embarrassment.”   
131 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Officers’ Club evokes in my 
mind the families of military officers sitting in dinner tables, accompanied by silly live 
music. I mean something like Besame [Mucho] (Laughs).” 
132 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “Officers’ Club evokes in my 
mind things like the Christmas dinner, dining outside, and the ritual of eating in an 
Officers’ Club. It evokes dining. … You dress well and use your fork accordingly, while 
some people are making music in the background.” 
133 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "On days like Christmas or 
national holidays, there are cocktails or festivities held in Officers’ Clubs. As a part of these 
families you attend them, even though you may not want it. Because your father has to 
attend them. Let’s say it is a feast day. What happens normally? People have friends and 
they visit each other. But these people are friends and they are equivalents of each other. 
But when your father is a captain and a colonel is going to pay a visit home, there is a rush 
in the house. Because it is a colonel who is going to pay a visit. If it is your rank equivalent, 
your father welcomes him at ease though. Although you are a child, you feel the anxiety of 
such things at home. You restrain yourself. For example, there was not much impertinence 
in us. We did not know what kicking over the traces was. I did not experience such things 
during my childhood. Always keeping a rein on yourself." (emphasis mine) 
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American woman once married to a soldier, "the general's son may be on the same [little 
league baseball] team as the corporal's son, so sometimes kids can be used to help 
advancement" (p. 158). If we re-appropriate the story in the Turkish context, s/he can take 
lesser roles as a defender and goalkeeper in a football pitch or as a glue-guy or substitute of 
the roster in a basketball game, as the higher ranked officer's child chucks shot after shot 
without any conscious whatsoever to the demise of team play and success. 
 
 S/he feels indebted to the military institution for providing material benefits and 
lush conditions for military families. However, s/he also assumes that these should not be 
spared from military officers and their families who devote their whole lives to the security, 
well-being and development of the nation. S/he holds onto them as if they are his/her 
natural rights more than being rewards that are specifically reaped by the members of the 
praetorian cast:   
 
"Orduevi tabii ki de askerlere verilen bir imkân. Asker ve asker çocuklarına 
verilen güzel bir imkân. Yani sonuçta bu kadar hizmet etmiş, bu kadar emeği 
olan insanların da böyle şeylerden faydalanmasının normal olduğunu, hak 
ettiklerini düşünüyorum.”134 
  
"Sivil bile olsam desteklerim ben askeri lojmanları. Göreve gidiyor adam. Ben 
her yurtdışına gidişimde ülkemi temsil ediyorum. Bunları subaylardan 
esirgememek lazım."135 
  
 Although s/he may not join the military, s/he is fond of the idea of working for 
companies affiliated with the military institution:  
 
"Her mühendisin istediği gibi bir Aselsan, Havelsan hayalim var. Olmazsa da 
bir şirkete girip ya Ankara ya İstanbul'da çalışmak istiyorum."136 
                                                          
134 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Officers’ Club is an 
opportunity provided to soldiers. It is a nice opportunity provided to their children as well. I 
think it is normal for people who served so much and so well to benefit from such things. I 
think they deserve it.”    
135 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “If I were a civilian I would 
still give my support for the military lodgings. These guys are performing their duties. I 
represent my country every time I go abroad. They should not be spared from military 
officers.”  
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"Yani mesela girdiğim […] şirketi eskiden OYAK'tı. Şimdi OYAK kalktı artık. 
Orada tabii asker ailelerine daha çok önem veriliyormuş. E mesela şimdi de 
görüşmeye gittiğimde, ‘Asker çocuğuyum,’ dediğimde insanların bir şekilde 
dikkatini çekiyor bu yani."137 
 
 S/he is not troubled by his/her parents' absences, by coming to the conclusion that it 
is warranted for the well-being of his/her family. His/her grief and yearning for the parents 
simmer down as s/he embraces the military institution as his/her family, writ large. S/he 
sees him/herself as a member belonging to a distinguished society and a military family:   
 
"Demek ki gerçekten çok mutlu bir çocukluğum olmuş benim orada. O sırada 
annemin babamın evde olmayışı da çok dert değildi. Çünkü annemle babam 
olmadığı zaman da benim orada bir ailem vardı. Ben öyle hissediyordum en 
azından. Hiçbir zaman onların eksikliğini de hissetmedim açıkçası. Sen bana 
bu soruyu sorduğunda gerçekten annemle babam o zaman nasıldı diye 
düşündüm açıkçası. Geriye baktığımda, kendi kendime düşündüğümde, ‘Çok 
yalnızdım ya, annem de babam da yoktu,’ gibi bir şey hissetmiyorum."138  
(emphasis mine) 
 
 S/he is proud of this distinct belonging and identity. S/he reifies them by uttering, 
claiming, and performing them. S/he believes that his/her experience as a child of a military 
family segues him/her into a better awareness and consciousness than his/her peers. She 
conceives that as a privilege which s/he would be deprived of otherwise, as a civilian: 
 
"[Asker çocuğu olmak] bir farklılık da iyi yönde bir farklılık. Hiçbir anlamda 
kötü bir şeyini düşünmüyorum zaten. Bence asker çocukları dışarıdakilere göre 
daha bilinçli, daha oturaklı oluyor diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü babalarımız da 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
136 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Just like every engineer, I 
am dreaming of Aselsan or Havelsan. I would like to work for a company in Ankara or 
İstanbul otherwise.” 
137 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “The […] company I am 
working for was OYAK back in the past. Now there is no OYAK. Military families are 
given more importance in the company of course. When I say that ‘I am a child of a 
soldier,’ it attracts attention in the job interview.”  
138 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “So, I really had a very 
happy childhood there. The absence of my parents was not much of an issue. Because I had 
a family in there, even when my father and mother were away. Leastways, this is what I 
was feeling. I never felt their absence. When you asked me this question, I really gave a 
thought about it. When I think, in hindsight, I do not feel that ‘I was very alone, away from 
the care of my father and mother.’” (emphasis mine) 
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daha gündemle ilgili olsun, Türkiye'de yaşananlarla ilgili olsun çok şey 
öğretiyorlar bize. Bir kere babalarımızın yaşadığını görüyoruz. Yaşanan 
olayları görüyoruz. Bakış açılarımız çok farklı oluyor dışarıdaki insanlara göre. 
Ortamı görüyoruz. Sonuçta çok zor koşullara onunla birlikte gidiyoruz biz de. 
Biz de görüyoruz ne koşullarda yaşandığını ve daha farklı bakabiliyoruz 
olaylara. Bu hani gündemde herhangi bir olay olmasa da, farklı bir olayda bile 
[olsa], o yönümüz ortaya çıkabiliyor diye düşünüyorum."139 
 
2.4. Education of the Children 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I have hinted that education marks the beginning of 
a different phase in the lives of children of military families. With the advent of educational 
life, a new institutional contender, namely the school, emerges as a force to be reckoned 
with. The children substantially and systematically come into contact with zones and 
people outside the military complex, or in the words of my interlocutors, with 'the life 
outside'. Therefore, the school often weakens the monopolies of the family and the military 
over the lives of children. And this weakening is where the primary importance of 
education for the children of military families derives. However, two points deserve to be 
highlighted in that regard. First, the school in its effects of normalization may or may not 
be at odds with the family and the military. It is not as if the school entices and then whisks 
away the children from their inhabitances, or inculcates in them unorthodox teachings, 
equips them with new lenses to see life completely anew and induces alienation from the 
former institutions. Put differently, there is no guarantee that the school breaks away the 
effects of normalization of the family and the military. Quite the contrary, a strengthening 
of ties that the children establish with their families and the military is possible as well.140 
Schools can ossify the convictions of children which preliminarily derive from multiple 
                                                          
139 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “[Being a military brat] is a 
difference, though a positive one. I do not ever see any downside to it actually. I think 
military brats have more awareness and dignity than those outside. Our fathers teach us lots 
of things about what happens in Turkey, contemporary or not. We are seeing what they are 
going through. We are seeing what is happening out there. Our viewpoints become so much 
different from that of people outside. We are following our fathers into very harsh 
conditions. We are seeing the conditions within which they live and we can thus bring in 
different perspectives to events. Although it may not be about a contemporary thing, I think 
that this quality of ours can surface in many events.”   
140 The reader may want to look at several studies drawing attention to the militarist content 
of education given until and even in universities. See: Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2004b; 
Altınay, 2009; Kancı & Altınay, 2007; Kancı, 2008; Ünder, 1999  
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sources most of which are embedded in the military complex. Secondly, I have also argued 
at the beginning of this chapter that, the military institution in particular always finds a way 
to slide and glide into the educational life of the children. The family and the military 
institution never lose their grips on children completely, as the children ebb and flow 
between military lodgings and schools. For example, leaving aside its subtler interventions 
for a moment, the military provides transportation to schools by military shuttles where 
(sometimes armed) soldiers, mothers and children enjoy a peculiar trip. The military grants 
scholarships and dormitories to many military brats who pursue their university 
education.141 It reserves rooms for students in the Officers' Clubs of some bigger cities.142 It 
may encourage them to be professional soldiers, by giving extra score or quota to military 
brats at military schools examination.143 In some larger military lodgings, there are even 
kindergartens, so that the children can remain within the institutional boundaries of the 
military for another year. Sometimes the military creeps into spaces where children take 
education in subtler ways, as Ayşe recounts in the following:   
 
"Benim ilkokulumun adı Donanma İlköğretim Okulu'ydu. Biz […]’nda 
oturuyorduk. Donanma Komutanlığı o sırada […]'teydi. Donanma 
Komutanlığı'nın yanında olduğu için ilkokulumun adı Donanma İlköğretim 
Okulu'ydu. ... Öyle olunca üniversitede iyice dalga konusu oluyor, ‘İlkokulda 
Donanma Sualtı Taarruz Eğitimi aldılar,’ falan diye."144 
  
 Further, it is not as if the children are hurled all the time from their life world into 
completely alien worlds, where they have and will have no acquaintances or friends. Most 
                                                          
141 One of my interlocutors, Deniz, has stayed in a dormitory of the Turkish Armed Forces 
Education Foundation (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Eğitim Vakfı), during his university years. 
He was staying in an Officers' Club beforehand, then he moved to the dorm, because ‘the 
discipline matters less in the dorm than an Officers' Club.’   
142 Irem is one of them, who spent five years in different Officers' Clubs in sum, during her 
education process. 
143 One of my interlocutors, Mustafa, said to me that, at the year he entered the Naval High 
School, he got an extra score in the exam just for being a military brat. There was also a 
quota, he said, allocated to the children of military families those days.  
144 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “The name of my primary 
school was the Naval Primary School. We were staying in […]. The fleet command was in 
[…] and my primary school was next to it, hence its name. … This became a joking matter 
in university years. ‘She took special underwater training in primary school,’ my friends 
were saying.”    
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of the time, they have many friends in their classroom whom they know from the 
playgrounds of military lodgings or other military facilities. Sometimes, their neighbors in 
the lodgings become their teachers in the school:      
 
"Okul lojmanların dışındaydı, ama lojmanlara çok yakındı. Okula gelen 
arkadaşlarımın da yüzde 70'i falan asker çocuğuydu. Bizim sınıfın yüzde 60'ı 
falan asker çocuğuydu. Zaten hocamızın da eşi askerdi, o da yine subay 
birisiydi. İşte okulun gri bir tane servisi vardı. Servisi asker kullanıyordu, 
içinde de tüfekli bir asker oturuyordu. Biz böyle minik minik servise doğru, 
‘Bu ne böyle, tüfekli bir adam?’ diye [biniyorduk]."145 
  
 Secondly, the importance of education in the lives of the children of military 
families basically stems from the importance ascribed to the education by military families. 
But, we should not think of it as a condition specific to the fracture of military families. It is 
rather typical of middle classes in Turkey to invest high hopes and resources in children's 
education in Turkey, as Tarık remarks:  
 
Tarık: "Annemin her zaman söylediği bir şey vardır, kendisi de öğretmen. 
Asker çocuğu olanların genellikle daha iyi bir akademik performans sahibi 
olabildiğini, ama belki biraz daha şımarıkça olabildiklerini [söyler]. Belki 
ailelerin eğitime verdiği önemden kaynaklanıyor. Bizden de biliyorsun. Epey 
bir zorlandık yani beklentilere cevap verebilmek noktasında. Epey sıkı çalıştık. 
Belki bu olabilir. Ailelerin bilinç seviyesi yüksek olduğu için, eğitime de bir 
inanmışlık olduğu için..."  
Sertaç: "Peki bunu daha çok ne ile bağlantılandırıyorsun? Ailenin asker ailesi 
olması mı [etmen] sence? Yani asker aileleri mi böyle yapıyor, yoksa daha 
farklı bir etmen mi var?" 
Tarık: "Ben burada asker ailesi olmanın bir parametre olduğunu 
düşünmüyorum. Türkiye'de orta sınıf diyebileceğimiz bir kesim ne kadar var, 
ne zamandan beri var bilmiyorum. Ama bir miktar okumuş aydınlanmış bir 
kesimin eğitime önem verişinin çok çok eskiye gittiğini görebiliyoruz bu 
konuda yapılan çalışmalarda. ... Yani eğitimin memleketin kara bahtını 
değiştireceğine dair yoğun inanç bizim için çok içselleştirilmiş bir şey. Çok çok 
                                                          
145 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “The school was outside of the 
lodgings, but it was very close. 70% of my friends coming to school were children of 
soldiers. 60% of the students in our class were children of soldiers. Our teacher was 
married to a military officer. We had a grey school shuttle, driven by a soldier, and 
protected by an armed soldier. We as weenies were embarking on it like, ‘What’s that, why 
there is a guy inside, holding a gun?’”  
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derinden gelen bir şey. Hiç asker ailesiyle ilgili olduğunu düşünmüyorum 
yani."146 
  
However, we should not think of the middle class here as a social group which exists 
as a pre-given in reality. The category of middle classes is rather an intractable one, and 
necessarily an ill-defined entity (Wacquant, 1991). The middle class position of military 
families, just as other families "should be constituted through material and symbolic 
struggles waged simultaneously over class and between classes" (Wacquant, 1991, p. 57). 
At this juncture, the education of children emerges as a field, and becomes one of the 
favorite fronts for the middle-classes of Turkey where the competition intensifies more and 
more as the families invest more resources to differentiate themselves from lower classes, 
reproduce and reify their class positions, while preserving hopes for upward class mobility 
(Rutz & Balkan, 2009; Erdoğan, 2012). Bora also puts forward that the middle classes in 
Turkey, whether they are old and new, are defined rather through education and working 
(Bora A. , 2012, p. 182). And military families prove no exception to that. Accordingly, all 
my interlocutors are pursuing or have pursued education at least in the university degree. 
Three of them hold a master degree in various fields; one is about to earn her master degree 
in a year; and another is bustling about in a doctorate program abroad.     
  
 The exception concerning military families rather derives from conditions 
precipitated by a family member working for the military. As the constant relocations 
scatter the children across the map in haphazard ways, dragging them to different regions 
and encounters, chances are jeopardized for the family to raise a well-educated kid who is 
                                                          
146 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: “My mom, who is also 
a teacher, always says that the children of military families usually perform better 
academically, but they can be more mischievous. Perhaps it is because of the importance 
given by families to education. You know it from us. We struggled much to meet the 
expectations. We studied hard. Maybe this is the reason. Maybe it is because the families 
have a better awareness and dedication for education.” Sertaç: “So what does it related to? 
Having a military family? Is it specific to military families or do you think there are other 
things to be factored in?” Tarık: “The military family is not a parameter here. I don’t know 
for how long and since when we have middle-classes in Turkey. But the importance 
attached to education by somewhat educated and enlightened people dates quite back. … I 
mean, the belief in education to mend the ill-fortune of the country has been internalized by 
us. It is a very deep belief. I don’t think it has anything to do with military families.”     
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seen destined to get a good diploma, a decent job and a high salary in the future. Impelled 
by the teleological middle-class mandate to win a place for their child in one of the better 
schools to ensure their future prospects, yet imperiled by the looming requirements of the 
military job, many parents thus engage in damage-control maneuvers for the education of 
their children, according to the accumulation of multiple capitals at their disposal, as they 
are sleepwalking into further crises concerning education, entailed by being periodically 
tossed back and forth within the country.  
  
 Let's proceed to the narratives in order to understand how these dynamics have 
played out in the lives of my interlocutors. To begin with, it is impossible to talk about the 
experience of a single military brat in ways applicable for the whole population of children 
of military families, as is always the case. But, there are converging patterns in the 
narratives concerning the educational life of children which we can reflect on, even though 
they are hardly generalizable for other children's experiences. Take the impact of transfers 
for example. There are basically two groups of children in the narratives with respect to the 
issue at hand. First, there are those whose educational lives were severely interrupted by 
their fathers' transfers. It is quite common to attest such narratives among children of 
military families:  
 
"İşte [şehir 1]'de 1. sınıfı okudum. Sonra [şehir 2]’'de 2 sene okudum. Orada 
bir köy okulunda okudum hatta. Feciydi. Ondan sonra [şehir 3]'e gittim. Geri 
kalan 4-5. sınıfı [şehir 3]'te okudum. ... Ortaokula [şehir 3]’te başladım. 2 yıl 
[şehir 3]'te gittim. Son yıl da [Şehir 4]'e gittim."147  
 
Yasemin: "İlkokulda 1. sınıfı [şehir 1]'de okudum. 2-3-4'ü [şehir 2]’de okudum. 
5'i de gene [şehir 1]’de. ... Ortaokul çok sıradan olmadı. Çünkü [şehir 
3]'teydik." 
Sertaç: "Peki ortaokulda tekrar okul değiştirdin mi ayriyeten?" 
Yasemin: “Evet. Orta 1'de şeydeydim, [şehir 3]’te. Pardon, yanlış oldu ya. Orta 
1 [şehir 1]’da, orta son [şehir 3]’te."148  
                                                          
147 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I studied the first grade in 
[city 1]. Then I was in [city 2] for two years. I went to a village school there, it was terrible. 
Thereafter, I went to [city 3]. I studied the rest of the primary school in [city 3]. I started the 
secondary school in [city 3] and spent two years there. In the last year, I went to [city 4].”   
148 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: “I studied the 
first grade in [city 1]. Second, third and fourth grades were in [city 2]. I returned to [city 1] 
in the fifth grade. … The secondary school was not ordinary. Because we were in [city 3].” 
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"İlkokul 3-4'e kadar zorlandım. Her sene okul değiştirdim ilkokul 4'e kadar. 
İlkokul 1 [şehir 1]’de, 2 [şehir 2]’de, 3 [şehir 3]’te."149 
 
 But there are also those who consider themselves 'lucky' on grounds that the flurry 
of transfers did not interfere much with their educational lives. Sometimes this luck is 
based on the transfers coinciding (denk gelmek) with the thresholds of education:  
 
"Benim 1-2. sınıf [şehir 1]'deydi. O zaten 1-2. sınıf hani. O zaman zaten 
arkadaşlarımdan ayrılıyorum diye çok bir şey anlamıyorsun. Üçüncü sınıftan 
ortaokulu bitirene kadar [şehir 2]'deydim. Tam en yakın arkadaşım döneminde 
falan okul değiştirmedim. Sonra liseye geçtiğimde de işte tam o aralıkta [şehir 
3]’e geçtim. [Şehir 2] bitti liseye geçtim, lise bitti zaten hani. Öyle okul 
değiştirme şeyim olmadı yani. ... Ben çok yaşamadım ama arkadaşlarım var. 
Lise 3'te tayini çıkıyor, lise 4'ü gidiyor başka bir yerde okuyor. O kötü yani. 
Bana denk gelmedi. Ben bu yönden şanslıyım. Ama dediğim gibi babam başka 
bir şey olsaydı; havacı olsaydı, denizci olsaydı böyle şeyler olmayacaktı. Yani 
daha da az [tayin] olacaktı belki."150 
 
 As Merve hints, the branch for which the father works in the military institution 
usually has a decisive impact in that respect, basically because the officers working for the 
Gendarmerie and Land Forces see more frequent transfers within a wider range than other 
officers. Ayşe owes her luck to a strange combination of having a father employed in the 
Navy and a catastrophe, namely the 1999 Gölcük Earthquake:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Sertaç: “Did you switch schools again in the secondary school?” Yasemin: “Yes. In the 
sixth grade I was in [city 3]. Sorry, I made a mistake. The sixth grade was in [city 1], the 
eighth grade was in [city 3].” 
149 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “I struggled until the third 
or fourth grade. I switched schools every year until the fourth grade. First grade in [city 1], 
second in [a school in city 2], third in [another school in city 2].” 
150 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I was in [city 1] for the first 
two grades. And you know, they are the first and second grades. At that time, you do not 
understand that you are leaving your friends behind. From the third grade to the end of the 
secondary school I was in [city 2]. I did not change schools in this best-friends period. 
When I proceeded to high school, we moved to [city 3]. [City 2] ended and I proceeded to 
high school. Then the high school ended. Therefore I did not switch schools much. … I did 
not experience it, but I have friends who experienced it. They finish the eleventh grade and 
then they go to another city in the twelfth grade. It is bad of course. But it did not befall me. 
I am lucky in that regard. But if my father were to be something else, if he were to be a 
marine, we could have seen fewer transfers.” 
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"Okul değiştirmek zorunda kalmadım. O çok güzel denk geldi. Tabii güzel 
denk gelmedi de, şöyle: 99 yılına kadar […]'te yaşadık biz. 99 depreminden 
sonra [tayinle] […]'a taşındık. 99 da benim tam ortaokulun hazırlık yılını 
bitirdiğim, orta 1'e başlayacağım yıldı. O yüzden ben beş yılı blok aynı sınıfta 
okudum. Hiç sınıf değiştirmek zorunda kalmadım."151 
 
 But the branch alone does not determine whether or not the child will be lucky. For 
example, Tarık, whose father works in the field of military jurisdiction, thinks that the 
transfer of his father hit him at a critical period of his education: 
 
"Fazla tayinimiz çıkmadı. Ama benim için çok kritik bir yerde tayin çıktı. 
Örneğin bugün iyi bir iş, iyi bir hayat için iyi bir üniversite öngörülüyor. İyi bir 
üniversite için de iyi bir lise olsun falan diye geriye doğru giden bir süreç bu. 
Artık anaokullarında bile millet kurayla birbirinin üstüne çıkıyor. Biz tam 
ilkokuldan sonra sınav olacak mı, olmayacak mı, ne olacak derken önemli bir 
ortaokul eğitimi döneminde [Doğu’da bir şehir]'e gittik. Yani ben o zaman 
farkında değilim olayın, ama annemin sıkıntıya girdiğini düşünüyorum. Eğitim 
adına çok önemli kullanılacak bir dönemi orada harcamak aslında çok 
istenilecek bir şey değil."152 
 
 Sometimes, the early retirement of the father from the military brings luck to the 
children, as in the case of Deniz:  
 
Sertaç: "Peki hep [...]'da mı okudun? Aynı yerde mi bitirdin?" 
Deniz: "Evet, evet. Ortaöğretimi de orada bitirdikten sonra lise."153 
                                                          
151 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “I did not have to change 
schools. It was a great coincidence. Of course it was not great, but it was like that: We lived 
in […] until 1999. After the earthquake we were transferred to […]. 1999 was the year 
when I finished the prep school and about to start the sixth grade. Therefore I stayed in the 
same class for 5 years, without changing it.”    
152 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “I did not see many transfers. 
But we were relocated at a critical moment. Nowadays, it is envisioned that you have to get 
into a good university in order to have a good job and a good life. And you can take this 
argument back a step, because this is a process where you should get a good high school 
education to get into a good university. People are now stepping on each other for the 
education of their children even in the preschool level. At a time when we did not know 
whether there will be an exam after the primary school, we moved to [a city in the East]. I 
was not aware of the situation back then, but I think my mother was stressed out. One 
would not want to spend a crucial time for education over there.”     
153 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Sertaç: “Did you study in the 
same school? Did you finish there?” Deniz: “Yes indeed. I finished the secondary school 
there, and then came the high school.” 
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 Another possibility is that, the parents may decide to scatter the family, instead of 
being scattered together to somewhere remote, in order to prevent harm to the educational 
life of their children. Zeynep is the youngest daughter of one of those parents, who took 
lessons from their experience with elder daughters:   
 
"Yok, benim şansım oydu. Ben hiç okul değiştirmedim. İlkokul, ortaokul hep 
aynıydı. ... Zaten ablamlar aynı şeyi yaşadığı için; ablamların mesela belirli bir 
diploması yok. Devamlı bir sene, iki sene, üç sene hep farklı okullarda 
okumuşlar. Annemle babam da bunu bildikleri için beni özellikle böyle bir 
şeye maruz bırakmamak için çok uğraştılar yani. İstemediler. O yüzden babam 
tayin dönemlerinde, ne olursa olsun, neresi çıkarsa çıksın, ‘Siz burada 
kalacaksınız, ben gidip geleceğim,’ derdi."154 
 
 Generally, the possibility of a transfer is seen by the families as a bad omen for the 
children's education, especially if it is to the Eastern regions at a time of an armed-conflict 
between PKK and TSK. However, some children also narrate that not all transfers are 
menaces to their education. Sometimes, not lifting the nose from textbooks may anchor a 
life characterized by the ephemerality of things. Almost every attachment that the military 
brats can have to anything in life can be condemned to rapid changes, but one can find 
refuge in the perennial universe of studying. Tarık is one of those children who feel 
motivated by relocations:    
 
"[B]elki benim kişisel deneyimimden kaynaklanıyor olabilir, ama üç yıllık bir 
yerdesin. Üç yıllığına bir yerde olduğunu biliyorsun, oranın görev süresi belli. 
Bu sana bir motivasyon sağlıyor. Ya işte şuradaki zamanımda çalışayım 
edeyim [diyorsun]. Veyahut belki çok sevmeyeceğin bir şehir, kısıtlı bir süre 
orada kalacağını bildiğin için oranın iyi, güzel yanlarına odaklanıyorsun. Kötü 
tarafları varsa da pek görmüyorsun ve o geçmişte senin için güzel bir anı olarak 
kalıyor. Eğitim anlamında da aynı şekilde. Yani devamında daha iyi olması için 
orada biraz dişini sıkarak çalışıyorsun."155  
                                                          
154 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “No, I got lucky. I did not 
change any schools at all. The primary school, the secondary school, all in the same and 
one place. … Because my elder sisters went through that. They do not have a particular 
diploma. They always studied in different schools for couple of years. As my parents knew 
it, they specifically did not want me to go through that, which is why, my father was telling 
in transfer periods that, ‘Whatever happens, you will stay here. I will go and return.’”  
155 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “Perhaps it was my personal 
experience, but let’s say you are sent to a place for three years. You know that it will last 
only three years, until the end of your father’s term of office. This motivates you. You say 
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 Or, the transfer of the father may mark the opportunity of a transfer to a better 
school, as in the case of Yasemin:  
 
"Liseyi [Doğu’da bir şehir]’de kazandım gene. [Doğu’daki şehir]'e alışmıştım, 
güzel bir ortamım oldu. Rahattım bu sefer. Herkes tanıyor beni. Rahat 
takılıyordum. Lise hazırlıktan sonra Lise 1'de [Batı’da bir şehir]'e tayinimiz 
çıktı yine. Bu sefer oraya gittim. Bu sefer yatay geçiş yaptım, baya iyi bir okula 
yatay geçiş yaptım. İlk 5'in içerisindeki bir Anadolu Üniversitesi'ne gittim."156  
 
 However, being transferred to a better school does not by itself equal to better 
consequences in terms of education. Let's hear the rest of what Yasemin has to say about 
her experience in this well-respected Anatolian High School: 
 
"Çok zorlandım. İlk 5'in içerisindeki bir Anadolu Üniversitesi'ne gittim. 
Eğitimim zaten zayıf. Arkadaş ortamı desen, tekrar baştan. Bir de [Doğu’daki 
şehir]’deki sıcaklığı hiç kimsede bulamadım. Orada insanlar içinde olduğu gibi 
davranıyorlar sana. [Batı’daki şehir]’e geldiğim zaman böyle değildi, herkes 
sanki seni arkandan bıçaklayacakmış gibi hissediyordum. Güvensizlik 
vardı."157 
  
 Most of my interlocutors also seem to accord with Yasemin in articulating that the 
relocations of their father have proven quite inimical to their educational life. They 
particularly attract attention to three sources of distress, the first of which regards the 
changing and often worsening quality of education.  
    
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that, ‘Well, I should better be sticking to my studies during this time.’ Or maybe it is a city 
which you will dislike. As you know that your days are numbered there, you focus on what 
is good and beautiful. You gloss over the bad things and the city remains a nice memory to 
you. It is the same for education. For things to be better in the future, you just grit your 
teeth and study.” 
156 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I was accepted to a high 
school in [a city in the East]. I was habituated to there, I had a good company. I was 
comfortable. Everybody knew me. I was hanging out. After the prep year of the high 
school, we were transferred back to [a city in the West]. Then I went there. I was 
transferred to a very good school. It was one of the top five Anatolian High Schools.”  
157 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I struggled hard. My 
education was already weak and as for the friends, I started over. Also, I could not find the 
warmth of [the city in the East] in [the city in the West]. The people of [the city in the East] 
treat you sincerely. It was different in [the city in the West]. It was as if everyone was going 
to backstab me. I could not trust anyone.”  
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"[…]’daki okula gelirsek, önce bir devlet okuluna gittim. Fakat ilk bir ay ve 
son bir ay dersin işlenmediği, hocaların bulunmadığı falan lakayt bir 
kurumdu."158 
 
"[Batı’da bir şehir]’deki okulum çok iyiydi benim. İyiymiş yani, sonradan 
algılıyorsun bunu.  Sonra [Doğu’da bir şehir]’e gittim. Çok kolpa geldi dersler 
bana. Orası biraz daha laylaylom bir devlet okuluydu."159 
"[B]izim [şehir 1]'de eğitimimiz çok iyiydi. O yaşta bile sürekli elimizde test 
kitaplarıyla dolaşıyorduk. ‘Sen şurayı bitirdin mi, ben burayı bitirdim,’ diye 
tatilde bile soru çözüyorduk, ders çalışıyorduk yani. [Şehir 2]’de böyle değildi. 
Zaten konuşmalarına adapte olmam biraz vakit almıştı. Ders sistemi falan çok 
farklıydı. Farklı hocalar geliyordu farklı derslere. Onlara adapte olmak zordu. 
Çevreye çok adapte olamadım. Bir de tabii köy okuluydu, orada imkânlar 
kısıtlıydı yani. 2 yılda bana çok bir şey katmadı açıkçası [şehir 2]."160 
 
 Secondly, many interlocutors discuss the ever-stirring problem of adaptation to new 
surroundings in educational life, as the family moves to its new settlement. Most of them 
seem fed up with starting from the scratch, being at the bottom, and arriving as the 'new 
kid' of the class over and over. Entrapped in the hectic cycle of adjust-set sail, Yasemin and 
Nuri mention in the following how their educational performances have declined because 
of the problem of adaptation prompted by ceaseless transfers: 
 
"Notlarım hep kötüydü. Çalışkan bir çocuk olmadım. Çünkü hep gidiyordum 
bir ortama, ortama alıştım diyordum, bu sefer derslerime yoğunlaşacaktım. 
                                                          
158 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “As for the school in […], I 
first went to a state school. It was a frivolous institution, where the courses were wasted in 
the first and last months of the school year and teachers were not showing up.” 
159 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “My school in [a city in the 
West] was great. I mean, later on you come to the realization that it had been great. Then I 
went to [the city in the East]. The courses were piece of cake to me. It was rather a 
frivolous state school.”  
160 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Our education in [city 1] was 
great. We were walking around with test books in our hands, even in those ages. We were 
studying, solving test questions even on holidays: ‘Did you finish this, I finished that.’ 
[City 2] was a different story. It already took some time for me to adjust to the vernacular. 
The tutorial system was also very different. We had separate teachers for each course. It 
was hard to adapt to them. I could not adapt to the environment. Also it was a village 
school and their resources were scarce. I did not learn much there.”    
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Gene tayinimiz çıkıyordu. Ortama alışana kadar çalışma süresi gidiyordu. 
Derslerle alakam olmuyordu bu sayede."161 
 
"Bir sürü yer dolaşıyorsun, oraya alışayım derken dersler var. Derslere 
alışayım derken...  Onlara çok zor adapte oluyorsun. Onlar çok kötü etkiliyor 
yani. Alışamıyorsun yani, çok zor adapte oluyorsun. O yönden çok etkileniyor 
yani."162 
  
 The children usually find difficulty in blending in and for some the experiences of 
alienation, exclusion and even discrimination is not uncommon. Such experiences seem to 
have roots in three sources. First is related to the basic status of outsiderness. Usually the 
children are able to overcome the initial setbacks caused by that, as they are accustomed to 
their surroundings:  
 
"Hocan değişiyor, arkadaşların değişiyor. Mesela gidiyorsun 10 senedir 
arkadaş oradakiler. Dışlanıyorsun."163 
 
 Second is related to the social, economic and cultural disjunctions between them 
and their new inhabitance which lead to feelings of alienation and exclusion. For example, 
Kemal articulates in the long quotation below how he stood like a sore thumb in wherever 
he went during his secondary school years:       
  
"Tam ilkokulu bitireceğim, çat [Doğu’da bir şehir]'e gittik. ... Mesela 1 sene 
okudum orada. Orası daha travmatikti. İki yönden travmatikti. Bir kere 
[Doğu’daki şehir]'e gitmiş Alman bebesi gibi bir tip düşün. Herkes esmer, sen 
sapsarısın. Ben küçükken çok sarıydım. Zaten bırak asker çocukluğunu falan, 
zenciler arasındaki beyaz gibi duruyorsun. 100 metreden parlıyorsun. Bir de 
                                                          
161 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “My grades were always 
stinking. I have never been a hardworking student. Because just as I was getting used to a 
new place, while telling to myself that I was going concentrate on my courses this time, 
another transfer was coming on its way. Getting used to a new place was consuming my 
time for studying. Therefore, I was not interested in courses.”  
162 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “You travel lots of places. 
While you are getting used to a new place, you realize that there are courses to study. While 
you are getting used to your courses… It is very hard to adapt yourself. They make a 
negative impact. It is hard to accommodate or adapt yourself. It affects too much in that 
respect.”  
163 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “Your teachers change, 
your friends change. Let’s say you are going to a new place, but people over there are 
friends for 10 years. You are excluded.”  
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hepsi birbirine alışmış [oradakilerin], sen gidiyorsun 5. sınıfta cart diye 
aralarına giriyorsun. Dünya görüşü olarak da biraz farklılar. [Doğu’daki 
şehir]'in kitlesiyle senin oğlunun arasında hakikaten bariz fark var yani. ... Orta 
2'yi de orada bitirdim. Tam oraya alıştım, çevre edindim falan filan, haydi 
oradan da tayin. Bu sefer de tam tersi oldu bu [Doğu’daki şehir]'e geldiğimde 
yaşadıklarımın. Mesela, [Batı’da bir şehir]'den, daha büyük bir yerden gelip 
[Doğu’daki şehir]'de daha rahatken, [Doğu’daki şehir]'den bu sefer İstanbul’a 
geldim. Oradakilerin bana bakışı şey oldu: Hani ben [Doğu’daki şehir]'den 
gelmişim, sanki orada doğup büyümüşüm gibi oldu.  O zaman da mesela orta 
3'e başlayacağım. ... Sonra [İstanbul’da bir Anadolu Lisesi]'ne girdim. Oranın 1 
seneymiş hazırlığı. Sıkıntı olmadı, oraya gittim. Orada da şunu yaşadım. 
[Doğu’daki şehir]’den gelen cahil köylü muhabbeti oldu. Şimdi [Anadolu 
Lisesi]'ne geldim; hakikaten bambaşka bir ortam. [Doğu’daki şehir]’de 
paltolarla gezip, işte kösele ayakkabılar, hafif bıçaklama olayları falan 
[derken], oradan gelip bir anda Barbıri montlar, Burberry bilmem neler... Yani 
abuk subuk bir ortam. Bir anda Bağdat Caddesi kavramları üzerine bir tokat 
gibi [iniyor]. Bebelerin çoğu Bağdat Caddesi'nde falan oturan tiplerdi. İşte 
şimdinin Ugg giyen kızları o zamanlar oralardan yetiştiler. Bir karış etekler 
falan, bir kültürel şok geçiriyorsun yani. ... Oraya gittik öyle bir şok yaşadık bu 
sefer. [Doğu’daki şehir]'den gelmiş, bir boktan anlamaz hesabı."164  
  
                                                          
164 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “When I was just finishing 
the primary school, we were suddenly sent to [a city in the East]. … I spent a year in that 
school. It was more traumatic for me. It was traumatic in two ways. First of all, try to 
imagine a German kiddo who went to [that city in the East]. Everybody is brown and you 
are so pale. When I was little I was even paler. Let alone being a military brat, I was 
already like a white among blacks. I was glowing from miles away. And the children over 
there know each other for years and you instantly intercalate yourself among them. They 
are also a bit different in terms of their worldview. I mean, there is a clear gap between 
your son and the people of [that Eastern city]. … Anyway, I finished the seventh grade 
there as well. Just as I was blending in, making friends, another transfer popped up. This 
time it was the other way around. Coming from a bigger city such as [a city in the West], I 
was more comfortable in [the city in the East]. Now, I was going from [the city in the East] 
to İstanbul. Those in İstanbul perceived me as if I was born and raised in [the city in the 
East]. I was about to start the eighth grade back then. … Thereafter, I was admitted to [an 
Anatolian High School in İstanbul]. They had a one year preparation school. They did not 
cause any trouble, so I went there. This time, I was seen like an ignoramus peasant from 
[the city in the East]. It was a wholly different environment indeed. From [the city in the 
East] where mild-stabbing incidents were occurring, as we were clad in coats and lousy 
oxfords, I came to [the Anatolian High School] where I found myself among Barbıri coats, 
Burberry whatever. It was ridiculous. Notions like the Baghdad Avenue smack you in the 
face. The kids in the school were usually types living on the Baghdad Avenue. The Ugg 
wearer girls of today raised from there and I was a witness. Micro-skirts and all these make 
you go into a culture shock. I had a turnaround, as a low-brow guy from [the city in the 
East].” 
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The second reason is related to a set of prejudices and stereotypes based on their 
identification with reference to their father's profession. Some children narrate that they 
were treated differently not because they were only newcomers, but also because they were 
military brats. Sometimes these prejudices take the form of simple, verbal exchanges 
between classmates, as Tarık conveys in the following one of his friendly quarrels with his 
friends in the secondary school: 
 
"Örneğin bir din dersi. Din dersinin sözlüsü, yazılısı nasıl olur? [Öğretmen] 
dua okutur, bir şey yapar. Sözlüde dua okutuyor mesela. Yanına çağırıyor, sınıf 
kendi halinde takılıyor. Sırayla adamları çağırıp şey yapıyor. İşte beni de 
çağırdı, okutuyor falan. Bir iki uzun dua seçmişim herhalde ki onları okuyorum 
falan. Arkadaşın biri şey demişti mesela: ‘Ya hadi hatim mi indiriyon, ne biçim 
Atatürkçüsün sen,’ falan demişti. Yani bu ölçüde, çok böyle yüzeysel, 
alabildiğine şekilci, atışma şeklindeydi."165 
 
 Zeynep's story on the other hand, speaks of a little more than a harmless friction 
among peers. She figures that, she was treated unjustly by her teacher, after he learned that 
she is a child of a military officer:    
 
"[Asker çocuğu olduğunu öğrendiklerinde] öğretmenlerin bir algısı 
değişiyordu. ... [K]imisi mesela takıyordu. Çok iyi hatırlıyorum, Diyarbakırlı 
bir edebiyat hocam vardı. Asker çocuğu olduğumu öğrendikten sonra 180 
derece değişti diyebilirim."166 
 
 Kemal, always a successful student in his class, recites a similar story, where he 
thinks that he was wronged by his teacher in his religion and ethics course. He maintains 
that he was a victim of the stereotype, the ominous spawn of an irreligious institution:   
 
                                                          
165 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.01.2013: “Let’s say it is a religion and 
ethics course. How do they make oral or written exams in the religion and ethics course? 
You recite some prayers, right? The teacher calls you and other students keep messing 
around. The teacher picks students one by one. Anyway, the teacher called me and I began 
to recite. I suppose I was reciting one of the longer prayers, so one of my friends heckled 
me: ‘Hey, what kind of a Kemalist are you, reading the Quran from beginning to end?’ I 
mean, there were superfluous, completely shallow quarrels as such.” 
166 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “[When they learned that I 
am a child of a soldier] the perception of my teachers was shifting. … Some of them were 
picking on me. I remember very well. There was this literature teacher from Diyarbakır. 
When he learned that I was a child of a soldier, his attitude completely flipped around.” 
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"Şimdi ben asker çocuğuyum ya; bunlar dinle hiç alakan yok zannediyor. Baya 
ateist falan [zannediyorlar]. Öyle bir dünya yok aslında. Herkes kadar bayram 
kutluyorsun, herkes kadar şey yapıyorsun. Sadece yaşam biçimi açısından belli 
semboller yok yani. Aslına bakarsan anne babanın yaşamı yine bildiğin klasik 
muhafazakâr Türk ailesi. Ne fark var işte? Kadınların başı kapalı değil. Öyle 
bir fark var. Yani dışarıdan bakıp gördüğün şeyler yok sadece. Ama karşıdan 
öyle gözükmüyor. Yani [Doğu’daki şehir]’deki o adamlar için, Müslümanları 
kılıçla kesmeye gelmişler hesabı bir şey var. Bizim ilkokul 5'teki sınıf 
öğretmeni, aynı zamanda bütün derslerin öğretmeni[ydi]. Bir öğretmen var, her 
şeyden anlıyor. Öyle bir öğretmen. Mesela Din Kültürü dersine giriyordu. 
Neredeyse Yasin'i ezberleyecek hale geldim, herif inatla bana 4 veriyor. Şimdi 
bizi de öyle yetiştirmişler, hep 5 olacak, hep başarılı olacaksın bilmem ne diye. 
Bu bana ilk dönem 4 verdi. Sonra ben hocaya şey demişim, din min ayakları 
yapıyor ya: ‘Hocam sen benim hakkımı yedin, ben de seninle öbür tarafta 
görüşeceğim,’ demişim. Bu dediğim de ilkokul 5 falan oluyor yani."167 
    
 The narratives of my interlocutors are also replete with instances in which a certain 
hesitation or a moment of silence sets in between friends when their friends learn that they 
are acquainted with a child of a professional soldier. More often than not, such hesitations 
disappear as the others come to the realization that it is not the child, but the father is a 
military officer:  
 
"Hazırlığa ilk başladığımda, en yakın sıra arkadaşım muhafazakâr bir aileden 
geliyordu hatta. Anneannesi başörtülüydü, babası da muhafazakâr biriydi falan. 
Öyle olunca, böyle enteresan; ilk defa orada yüzleşmiştim hani. O da hani, ‘Aa, 
baban asker mi?’ falan diye biraz daha temkinli yaklaşmıştı falan. Sonra tabii 
                                                          
167 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Just because you are a child 
of a military officer, people suppose that you have no relation whatsoever to religion. They 
regard you as an outright atheist. There is no such thing of course. You celebrate religious 
festivals, you engage in religious stuff as much as the next person. Only some symbols 
affiliated with religion and observable from outside do not exist in your lifestyle. The life 
of your parents is indeed the same with any classical, conservative Turkish family. Only, 
your mother does not wear a head scarf. That is the only difference. But it does not seem 
like that from an external perspective. For those guys [in the city in the East], it is as if we 
are on a crusade mission. Our class teacher in the fifth grade was the teacher for all courses. 
There was this single teacher, who presumably understands it all. Such was the man I’m 
talking about. He was coming to our religion and ethics course. Although I was on the 
verge of memorizing all the verses of Yasin, the guy kept grading me 4 out of 5. But I was 
raised to be a successful student, to get the full grades all the time. He gave me 4 out of 5 in 
the first school term. Then, as he was putting on a religious act, I told him that, ‘What you 
did is unjust. I will see you in the afterlife.’ I was like in the fifth grade when I said that.”    
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birbirimizi tanıyıp, birbirimizi biraz daha gördükten sonra, asker olan neticede 
ben değilim, babam diye anlaşmaya başladık."168 
 
On the other hand, there are those who may think that these are the general symptoms 
of a condition, caused by the distance between the two life worlds, a condition which 
influences not only particular individuals coming from military families, but the all children 
raised by these families: 
 
"[S]ivillerin her zaman 'asker çocuğu' diye bir tabirleri vardır, sanki tamamen 
farklı bir dünyadan geliyormuşuz gibi. Ama bir nebze de haklılar, çünkü 
lojmanda büyüdük. Lojmanda tamamen arkadaş ortamları farklı, yaşadığımız 
şeyler farklı, devamlı [orada] yaşadığımız için gördüğümüz şeyler farklı. Onlar 
hep aynı yerde büyüyüp, ne gördülerse etraflarında ona göre davranıyorlar. Biz 
de onlara benzemediğimiz için değişik görüyorlardı bizi. O yüzden dışlanma 
gibi şeyler söz konusu olabiliyordu."169 
 
"Sonuçta lojmanda yaşıyorsunuz. Yaşadığınız yer farklı, öğrenim gördüğünüz 
yer farklı. Öğrenim gördüğünüz yerde sivil insanlarla birlikte bu ilişkiyi 
yürütüyorsunuz. Bu durumda subay çocuğu olmanız, nasıl diyeyim, sanki 
böyle toplumdan dışlanmış[lık] hissi veriyor bazen insana. Yani bazı çevreler 
tarafından. Bunun etkisini ben de gördüm. Lisede başlayan etkisini halen 
üniversitede görüyorum. ... Ya dışlanma demeyeyim de… [M]esela subay 
çocuğu olduğumu öğrenen bazı arkadaşlarım bana şey yaptı. Dışladı mı 
diyeyim ne diyeyim? Farklı bir gözle bakmaya başladılar. Başlayan kesim oldu 
açıkçası. Bu da benim üzerimde olumsuz bir etki yarattı. Sonuçta babamın 
mesleği üzerinden benimle ilgili bir sonuca vardı arkadaşlarım."170 
                                                          
168 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “In the preparation year, my 
desk mate was coming from a conservative family. Her mother was wearing a head scarf 
and her father was a conservative person. It was the first time I faced with it. She was 
cautious like, ‘Oh, is your father a soldier?’ As we got acquainted with each other, we 
started to get along, since it was not me, but my father who was a soldier.”  
169 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “The civilians always have 
had this term, ‘the military brat’. As if we are coming from an alien world. Actually, they 
are right about it in a sense. Because we have grown up in lodgings. The friends we made, 
the experiences we had, the things we saw while living there are different. They are raised 
in the same place, and they behave in accordance with what they see in that place. We did 
not resemble them, so they were seeing us with different eyes. Sometimes this was leading 
to ends like exclusion.”  
170 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “All in all, you live in military 
lodgings. The place where you live and the place where you get education are distinct. You 
are with civilian people in your educational life. Because of that, being a child of a military 
officer can make you feel like excluded sometimes. I mean, excluded by some people. I 
went through that since the high school and I still experience that in the university. … 
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 Much as the children may encounter alienation, exclusion and outright 
discrimination in and through their educational lives, the reverse can also be true many 
times. In other words, the children may have their share from the polarized views and 
prejudices pertaining to the military institution. While their identification through their 
father's belonging to the military institution may repel such and such a teacher or a friend, 
others may favor them for the very same reason in turn. In some cases, it seems that the 
positive perception of the institution may take the form of basic sympathy, without any 
strings attached. In others, the children may be privileged over others just for being the 
child of a military officer. Those who favor these children are sometimes none other than 
teachers whom the children know from lodgings as wives of male military officers:  
 
"Hocamın kendi de asker eşi olduğu için, mesela sanki o da asker çocuklarını 
daha çok severdi. Hep bir en öne otururduk falan. Öyle bir hava vardı, 
hissediyordum onu ben. O zaman rahatsız olmuyorsun ama tabii, ‘Aa, ne güzel 
işte en önde oturuyoruz,’ falan diyorsun yani."171 
 
 Of course, it is not necessarily a teacher wife of an officer who may privilege the 
children of military families over others, as Zeynep informs us:  
 
"[B]abamın mesleğiyle ilgili öğretmenlerimin ayrıca bir ilgisi oluyordu. 
Arkadaşlarımdan yana değil, ama onlar daha çok saygı duyuyordu. Daha bir 
ciddileşiyorlardı diyeyim. Hani ne bileyim subay dediğin zaman, asker dediğin 
zaman hep daha çok ilgi gösteriyorlardı, o bir gerçek. Yani bir ayrıcalık gibi bir 
durum vardı. O da tabii öğretmenlerle alakalı."172 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Perhaps, I should not have called it exclusion. … Some friends who learned that I’m a child 
of a military officer did… I don’t know if I should call it exclusion, but they started to 
perceive me with different eyes. And this had a negative impact on me. After all, they 
judged me by my father’s profession.”    
171 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “My teacher was married to an 
officer and she seemed to like us more than others. We were always sitting at the front of 
the classroom. I was getting this vibe. It does not disturb you when you are a child. ‘Oh 
great, we are sitting at the front,’ you say.”   
172 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “My teachers were taking a 
special interest in my father’s profession. Not my friends, but my teachers had an utmost 
respect for it. They were getting more serious I mean. When you say that your father is a 
professional soldier, they pay more heed to you, to tell the truth. It was like a privilege, 
depending on the teachers.”   
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 Apart from the problems of adaptation and the changing quality of education 
because of transfers, the problems in bureaucratic procedures emerge as the third source of 
distress, which may plague the educational life of children as well. For example, Mustafa 
mentions in the following how he had to deal with registration problems after transfers, 
which delayed his start at school during his years in the primary school:  
 
"Ben hep en dipte başladım, ama hep şansıma iyi okullara gittim. Çok 
çalışırdım, dershaneye de giderdim. Dershane şart zaten. İlkokul 4'te okula 
gittiğimde flüt bilmiyordum. 4 hafta İstiklal Marşı ezberleyecekler mesela, ben 
2-3. haftada gidebiliyordum okula. Biliyorsun öyle okul değiştirince pat diye 
başlayamıyorsun. Kayıt problemleri oluyor, geç başlıyorsun."173  
 
 As the child advances in education, more serious problems may occur, concerning 
the registration of children at schools they want to attend. Especially the matter of 
'equivalence' comes to the fore as a potential obstruction in that regard. Although the child 
may be adept and successful enough to pursue his/her education anywhere, school 
principals may not figure if the child is capable enough to be invited to the school the 
family applies for. Kemal, for example, was rejected from an Anatolian High School, 
because he was not given a chance to prove his merits:  
 
"Mesela orta 3'e başlayacağım. İşte Anadolu Lisesi arıyorlar bizimkiler, 
annemle abim. Önce […]'ya baktılar. Fakat […]'nun götü biraz kalkıktı. 
Onların 2 sene İngilizce hazırlığı var ya, sen de [Doğu’da bir şehir]’den 
gelmişsin, sanki sen beginner'sın, onların hepsi advanced. ‘Sen anlamazsın, 
siktir git,’ hesabı var yani. Hatta annem demiş: ‘Madem öyle, sınav yapın 
çocuğa.’ Öyle bir şey ki ben [Doğu]’daki Anadolu Lisesi’ni ya 1. ya 2. 
kazanmıştım. Orada başka okul yok, nereye gideceğim? Bunu da zaten 
dereceyle kazanmışım. Elinde başka imkân yok, nasıl kanıtlayacaksın ki? 
Kanıtlayamıyorsun işte."174 
                                                          
173 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “I always started at the 
bottom but I went to good schools by chance. I was working hard. I was also going to a 
lesson school but it was like an obligation anyway. When I was starting the fourth grade, I 
did not know how to play the flute. Let’s say the students were going to learn and sing the 
National Anthem by the fourth week of the school term, but I was only able to go to the 
school no sooner than the second or third weeks. You know, you cannot start whenever you 
want. There are registration problems when you switch schools.”      
174 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I was to start the eighth 
grade. My mom and elder brother were seeking an Anatolian High School. They first 
investigated the […]. But they [those at the administration of the school] were jerks. They 
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 The constant transfers of the father may lead to farcical bureaucratic ends for 
children as well. For instance, Yasemin articulates in the following how and why she holds 
two primary school degrees:  
 
"Hatta şöyle bir şey. 5. sınıfta ilkokul diploması aldım. [şehir 1]'de 5'te ilkokul 
biter. Sonra geldim [şehir 2]’deyken gene ilkokul diploması aldım. Orta sonda 
ilkokulla birleşti ya ortaokul. Ben de ilkokul diploması aldım. İki tane ilkokul 
diplomam var yani."175 
 
 Then, how do the parents and children try to cope with these difficulties? How do 
the parents reconcile with the tension between their desire to provide better education for 
the children and requirements arising from military duties? What kind of strategies do they 
deploy to get back in the track en-route to the projected schools which are envisioned to 
eventually lead the children to promised lands?   
 
 Most of the military families are bound to live by the inevitable unpredictability that 
haunts them with the impending possibility of a transfer. They seem condemned to lag 
behind others in the competitive field of education for the reason that it is almost 
impossible to settle an exact itinerary for children's education. Nevertheless, they often 
show willingness to send their children to the best available options wherever they go. At 
the same time, they also prioritize the security of their children and want them nearby.176 
The latter concern may trim down the possibilities which are already slim because of the 
former. The second difficulty stems from time constraints, which hasten them to decide 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
had a two years English prep school and they did not admit me, just because I was coming 
from [a city in the East], as if I was a beginner unable to have a grasp on the language, 
while all the other students had an advanced proficiency. Like, ‘you don’t understand, so 
bugger off.’ My mother even had replied them: ‘Well then, take him to a test or something.’ 
I had gotten into the [the city in the East] Anatolian High School as the first or second best 
student. There was nowhere better for me to go. And I got into that school with a degree. 
How was I to prove myself, when I did not have any other chance? You cannot prove it.”     
175 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “As a matter of fact, it was 
like this. I received my primary school diploma in [city 1], at the end of the fifth grade, 
because in [city] the primary school ends there. Then I came to [city 2] and got myself 
another diploma. Because you know, when I was in the eighth grade, they changed the 
system and merged the primary and secondary schools. And I received a primary school 
diploma again, which means, I have two of them.” 
176 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013 
96 
which school the children should go to in a place about which they usually have little if any 
knowledge.177 Therefore, they may recourse to practical solutions, such as surveying 
pamphlets for school preference and picking the hardest school to get into as the target. For 
example, Kemal recounts in the following the half-baked and ill-advised schemes his 
family made use of when the decision times came up:   
 
"Aslında bizimkilerin kafasında hep şey vardır: Gittiğin şehrin en iyi okulu 
hangisiyse, en yüksek puanla girilen okulu hangisiyse orada olman gerekiyor. 
Hani aslında bambaşka bir okul olsa da oraya gideceksin. Belki çok iğrenç bir 
okul, ama herkes oraya gidiyorsa sen de oraya gideceksin. Çünkü bilmiyorlar 
okulun içini, ne olduğunu, ne olabileceğini, nereye gideceğini. Hani o bilgi 
yok. Tek bilgi şey: ‘-Aa, en yüksek puanı alanlar buraya gidiyor.’ ‘-Ulan niye 
gidiyor?’ ‘-Bilmiyoruz.’ Koyun hesabı herkes birbirini takip ediyor. Daha ben 
orta 3'e başlarken babam dershaneye yazdırırken, ‘İşte Fen Lisesi'ne gidecek bu 
çocuk,’ falan diyordu. Ulan daha yeni gelmişim […]’a. Fen Lisesi'nden 
haberim bile yok. Adını bile bilmiyorum […]'daki Fen Lisesi'nin. Ama ille de 
ona gitçekmişiz de bilmem ne."178  
 
 Overall, the parental strategies to win a place for their children in better schools do 
not seem to differ much from other middle-class families in their content. Perhaps, it is the 
intensity of the efforts that differs. For instance, all of my interlocutors, some from very 
early ages were sent to lesson schools.179 Three of them state that they took private tutoring 
in order to compensate the damages caused by transfers. Six of them registered to 
foundation universities either for their university education or to get a master degree. There 
are even parents, who enforce their children into foundation universities, out of guilt trips: 
 
                                                          
177 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013 
178 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Actually my parents always 
have in their mind that I should go to the school which admits students with the highest 
scores, to the best school in wherever we go. It may be a terrible school, but it does not 
matter. If everyone is going there, I had to go there. Because they did not have any clue 
about schools. They did not know anything. Only thing they knew is: ‘-Oh, those who have 
better scores in entrance exams go there.’ ‘-Alright, but why?’ ‘-We don’t know.’ 
Everybody thus flocks there. When I was to start the eighth grade, my father was telling 
that, ‘My boy will go to the Science High School,’ while he was registering me to a lesson 
school. Man, I just arrived to […]. I did not even know the name of the Science High 
School in […]. But I had to go there.”    
179 Lesson schools (in Turkish: Dershane) are private tutoring institutions.   
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"Babam en son baktı, bu deneme sınavı sonuçlarını gördü. ‘Benim yüzümden 
bu haldesin,’ dedi. ‘O yüzden ben sana özel ders aldıracağım,’ dedi. Özel ders 
dediğim bir tane özel ders aldım.  O da matematik. Matematik sınavda daha 
önemli diye. ... Ben devlette bir yerde okumak istiyordum çünkü zaten son 
sene, özel derstir falan baya bir yük oldu babama para açısından. Para 
açısından yük olunca bari devlete gideyim dedim. Devlette bir bölüm 
kazanayım, orada devam ederim, en azından bir mühendislik olsun, nerede 
tutarsa dedim. Şehir dışına falan çıkmak istedim. Üniversite sonucum geldi, 
normalde beklediğimden 30 puan düşüktü. İstediğim yerler rahat gelmiyordu. 
İşte babamla oturduk, konuştuk. Babam, ‘Kazanamaman gene benim 
yüzümden,’ dedi. ‘Özeli yaz, ben seni okuturum. İstediğin bölümü oku. 
Mühendislik istiyorsun, […] Mühendisliği istiyorsun özellikle, yaz,’ dedi. 
‘Özelde ben seni okuturum,’ dedi. Ben karşı çıktım falan ama o kendisi bütün 
bu tercih listesini sildi baştan aşağı. Özel okullardaki mühendislikleri yazdı. 
Kendisi yazdı yani. Öyle gönderdi beni."180 
  
But the paid educational alternatives prior to university years appear to be rarely 
adopted. Only one of my interlocutors, Tarık was sent to a private school, after her mother 
saw in his state school in an Eastern city that the courses were wasted, because the school 
teachers were not showing up. Perhaps, the most genuine strategy deployed to cope with 
the difficulties in educational life of the children is, in Tarık's words, the military family 
think-tanks (Asker Ailesi teati örgütleri)181: 
 
"...Asker ailelerinde daima bir aman dershane, okul neymiş, ne değilmiş, 
hangisi iyi, [diye] birbirleriyle arasında bir fikir teatrisi vardır. Ana 
gündemlerden biri çoluğun çocuğun eğitimidir. Tabii rütbe seviyesine göre 
değişir. Bugün artık çoluğun çocuğun işi bizim babalarımız arasında 
                                                          
180 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “My father went over the 
exam results. ‘This is entirely my fault. I will hire private tutors for you,’ he said. I took 
private tutoring only for a course. It was for mathematics, because it had an overweighing 
significance in the university entrance exams. … I was willing to study in a state university, 
because the expenses made for my education in the last year had been a financial burden on 
my father. I said to myself, let’s first go to a state university, at least for an engineering 
department in any of them, and then you will sort it out. I wanted out of the city. Then my 
results came, quite lower than I expected. It was impossible for me to enter the schools I 
wanted to. I talked with my father. My father said that: ‘It is again my fault. Write the 
private ones into your preference list. Just study whatever you want. I can support you. I 
know you want to study engineering, especially […] Engineering. Don’t shy away. I can 
send you to a private university.’ I objected to him, but he filled the preference list from top 
to bottom. He filled it with engineering departments in private universities. He filled it by 
himself I mean. He sent me that way.”       
181 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013  
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konuşulan. İşi, düğünleri, şusu busu. Ama o yaşlarda: ‘Hangi okul, hangi 
dershane? Şu hoca iyiymiş, şurada şu varmış.’ Onlar da belki bir yerde belki 
onların yüzünden oluşan bir dezavantaja karşı bir çaba gösteriyorlar, bunu 
bastırmak için."182 
 
 The likelihood of sending the children to schools elsewhere than the location of 
transfer seems low, but not improbable. I have already mentioned Zeynep, who was 'left 
behind' with her sisters and mother in their previous house in the lodgings, when her father 
went to his station in another city alone. The other option is to send the children to better 
schools in cities other than the location of transfer. However, none of my interlocutors had 
an experience as such. It was only after the retirement of their fathers from the military, 
some disembarked the family boat (sometimes only to embark on the military boat while 
getting education) and went to schools in cities different than their parents' place of 
residence. Also gender seems to take part in the decision to break the family for purposes of 
education, as Deniz suggests in the following: 
 
Deniz: "Subay kızı olsaydım, babamı baz alarak konuşursak, herhalde 
üniversitede […]'a gelmeme falan belki izin vermeyebilirdi veya korkuyor 
olabilirdi. Onun dışında cinsiyet farkının çok bir etkisi olacağını 
düşünmüyorum."  
Sertaç: "Aileden uzak kalmaman için mi diyorsun?" 
Deniz: "Evet, evet." 
Sertaç: "Erkek olunca bu bir avantaj mı oluyor?" 
Deniz: "Evet."183  
 
 Then, as Deniz suspects, it may be less likely for girls to move away from their 
family during their fathers' active duty years, whereas boys would be allowed occasionally 
                                                          
182 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “Military families constantly 
exchange information about lesson schools, better schools, etc. with each other. One of the 
primary agendas of theirs is always the education of children. Of course, much hinges on 
the rank of the father. Today, our fathers are rather talking about the jobs, weddings and 
whatever of the children. Back then, they were discussing like: ‘Which schools and lesson 
schools provide the best education? I heard that the guy is a great tutor.’ In a way they 
attempt to compensate for damages probably caused by them.”   
183 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Deniz: “If I were a daughter, 
my father would not probably allow me to come to […] for the university. Or he could be 
afraid. Having a different sex would not take part in any other case I think.” Sertaç: “You 
mean he would not allow you in order to keep you close to the family?” Deniz: “Yes.” 
Sertaç: “Being a male gives you an edge in that case?” Deniz: “Yes.” 
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to venture into the life outside for their education. But the children are not given free rein to 
explore this other world all the time. In some cases, economical considerations and 
heightened concerns for security render the military facilities, such as Officers' Clubs or 
dormitories of the Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation,184 as the ideal destinations 
for accommodation. The military present itself as the optimal choice, sometimes not only to 
the parents, but also to the children. For example, İrem recites in the following how her 
eerie experiences in a house she rented with her sister gave her the heebie-jeebies, for no 
apparent reason. Some months later, they were to move together in an Officers' Club:    
 
"Kardeşimle eve çıktık ben yüksek lisansa başladığımda. O zaman tabii askeri 
bir ortam değil. Orada evde yalnız kaldığımızda hiçbir zaman korkmazdık yani. 
Çünkü bizi koruyan birileri vardı. Lojman ortamında zaten hiçbir şey olmazdı. 
Ama dışarıda en ufak bir ses duysan korkuyorsun, ürperiyorsun, ‘Ne oluyor 
                                                          
184 To the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study on the foundations 
established by the Turkish Armed Forces. There are some studies (Akça, 2004; Akça, 2006; 
Parla, 2004; Ünsaldı, 2008) attracting attention to and concentrated on the Foundation for 
Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV). However, the Turkish Armed Forces 
Education Foundation is one of those foundations which have hitherto remained 
unexplored. Founded on the 16th of March, 1957 by the name of 'The Facility for the 
Support of Education of the Children of Military Members' (Ordu Mensupları Çocuklarının 
Tahsiline Yardım Tesisi), with a founding capital 52.000 TL, the foundation now runs 8 
dormitories in 4 cities, presumably following a downsize in the previous years, from 13 
dormitories in 7 cities. Its name was changed to ‘The Foundation for the Support of the 
Education of the Children of the Turkish Armed Forces' Members’ (TSK Mensupları 
Çocuklarının Tahsiline Yardım Vakfı) in 13.10.1998, and another change followed in 
21.03.2006 to its current name. It seems that the foundation took a boost after the 1960 
military coup (see: 1964 Yılı Bütçe Kanunu. (1964). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 11645, February 
29, 1964. Retrieved January 2, 2014, from 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc047/kanuntb
mmc047/kanuntbmmc04700438.pdf) and its capital now exceeds a not too shabby amount 
of 26.000.000 TL. It invests in and makes association with few companies, it has an alumni 
association (TAÇ-DER) which runs an office in İstanbul, and it even aims to establish 
'educational institutions including universities'. I assume that a little less than 2000 children 
of military families stay in its dormitories, under the auspices of the military institution, 
while their university education. Another striking point which pertains to gender is that the 
majority of dormitory capacities are reserved for the daughters of military officers. If we 
add the untraceable number of those who are accommodated in Officers' Clubs, the 
magnitude of operations and efforts invested by the military institution to plaster over the 
gaps caused by the educational life of the children may be perceived better. 
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acaba?’ diye. ‘Daha önce böyle bir şey yaşamadım, ne ki bu…’ diyorsun 
yani."185  
 
 Another probable militarized solution to the problem of education is encouraging 
children, especially the sons, to take the military schools tests. This also means that the 
parental orientation towards military schools may not be ideologically charged, if we were 
to define the word ideology in a narrower sense. Because, this way, the parents can entrust 
their children to an institution which provides decent education and future prospects, and an 
environment as safe as it can get. Nonetheless, perhaps despite the common-sense 
perception of military families, not all parents advise their children to take this route. They 
can discourage their children from joining the military as well. This is exactly what Deniz 
experienced when he wanted to take the test:  
 
"Askeri Lise sınavlarına girdim ben. ... Mülakat oldu, sağlıkta elendim. Gerçi 
şöyle bir durum var; babam pek istemiyordu askeriyeye girmemi. Niye 
bilmiyorum, ama onaylamadı hiçbir zaman. Ben çok istiyorum diye sesini 
çıkarmadı diyebilirim. Denemek için değil, ben cidden istiyordum denizci 
olmak. Ama olmayınca o da şey yapmadı sonra. En başından beri 
desteklemediğini biliyorum. Hissettim diyelim. Her zaman derdi, ‘Ben sizin 
yerinize de askerlik yaptım, ne yapacaksınız boş verin.’ Zorluklarıyla başa 
çıkmanın zor olması [nedeniyle] olabilir yani."186 
  
 Deniz's story prompts the question of why the children might desire to give military 
schools a shot. We can approach the question at hand from different directions. The child 
                                                          
185 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: I moved into a house with my 
sister when I started my masters degree. Of course it was a different environment than the 
military setting. Back there, we would not be afraid when we were alone in the house. 
Because there were people protecting us. Nothing would happen in military lodgings 
anyway. But at the outside, you shiver when you hear a cracking noise. ‘What is going on 
there? I haven’t experienced this before, what was that?’ you say.  
186 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “I entered the exams for 
military high schools. … I passed the interview but I was eliminated in the health tests. In 
fact my father was not much a fan of my decision. I don’t know why but he did not approve 
my choice. He remained silent though, perceiving that I was eager. I really wanted so much 
to be a marine. It was not simply a matter of giving a shot. It did not happen though and he 
did not say anything about it. But I know that he was not supporting the idea since the 
beginning. Let’s say I felt it. He was always saying, ‘I served in the military on behalf of 
you too. Just forget about it.’ Perhaps it was because he knows about the hardships of 
overcoming difficulties entailed by being a soldier.” 
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whose life is riddled with transitivity and unpredictability, because of the transfers of his 
father, may want to anchor his/her life by registering to a military school. This may give a 
relative fixity to the identity, relationships and surroundings of the child by putting an end 
to the vicious cycle of 'adjust-set sail', which requires the child to perpetually adapt.187 In 
this sense, the military institution may run to the rescue of some children to cushion the 
blow indeed inflicted by the institution itself. But the children, as well as their parents, may 
see the military schools as a desirable option, not only because of transfers, but also 
because of the sinking horizons of future in the working life. As the Keynesian 
macroeconomic logic and the welfare state recede globally, only to be superseded by a 
model characterized by neo-Taylorism, financialization, precarization, and flexibilization 
(Bora & Erdoğan, 2012), the traditional middle-class groups feel threatened, if not 
possessed by a fear of falling (Ehrenreich, 1989; Newman, 1988). The more the market 
conditions swiftly change and the transition from a "hot-air balloon society" to "hourglass 
society" (Lipietz, 2001) gains pace in Turkey, the more the children and parents become 
prone to turn to the military institution, which grants resilience to those who stay within the 
bubble it has summoned, by providing decent wages and welfare opportunities. But the 
very same bubble often prevents the familiarization of military families with the market 
into which the children will venture in some later time. For example, the following 
narrative of Kemal, in response to a question concerning the advantages and disadvantages 
of being a child in a military family, dwells on this predicament:  
 
“Mesela biz [Doğu’da bir şehir]’den [Batı’da bir şehir]’e yaz tatiline geliriz. 
Babam 20 gün yıllık iznini alıyor, arabayla tek şöför geliyoruz. Mecbur bir 
yerde kalması lazım. Ya Amasya'da ya Samsun'da kalırdık. Yüzde 100 
orduevine gider kalırdık. (Gülerek) ‘Samsun'da 7 yıldızlı otel var, ama 10 
liraya gecesi’ desen bile babam gitmez abi, gidemez yani. Körleşmiş adam ya, 
onu duymaz bile. Kolundan çeksen gitmez. Gidecek o orduevine. Maalesef 
öyleydi. Avantajları şöyle: Daha kötüsünü düşünürsek, baban maaşlı başka bir 
yerde çalışıyor olabilirdi. Mesela senin orduevinde gördüğün imkânları sana 
sağlayamayabilirdi. Orada tıka basa yediğin şeyleri dışarıda yapmaya çalışsan 
çok daha masraflı. Ya da kampa gidersin; şimdi nerede nasıldır bilmiyorum, 
ama benim çocukluğumda biz mesela Bodrum'da askeri kampa gittik, 
Antalya'da Karpuzkaldıran'da askeri kampa gittik. Buralar bildiğin 5 yıldızlı bir 
                                                          
187 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 
30.11.2013 
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tatil köyünün verdiği imkânları veriyor sana. Hiç yok pahasına falan böyle. Sen 
daha çocukken bunları yaşayınca sana çok kolaymış gibi geliyor. Ama kendin 
piyasaya çıkıp çalışıp, bir tatil ayarlayıp kendine uçak bileti falan alınca bu 
işlerin aslında çok masraflı olduğunu anlıyorsun. Avantajları, dediğim gibi, 
bazı sabit yaşam koşulları paket olarak sana geliyor. Hani işe girerken sosyal 
haklardan bahsedersin ya, ‘Maaşın + ne var?’ diye; bu adamların da 
[subayların] 'o'su var. Plus kısmı belli başlı şartlar. Çok lüks değil bu şartlar, 
ama belirli bir ortalamanın üstünde. Mesela biz Fenerbahçe'deydik. 
Fenerbahçe'nin havuzuna dışarıdan gelmek isteyenler kendini yırtardı oraya 
gelmek için, ‘Günlük kart çıkarsam, bir şekilde beni içeri alsa da girsem,’ diye. 
Senin için hiçbir özelliği yok. Zaten fiks gelen bir şey. Öyle olunca sen 
gitmezdin mesela, dışarıdan gitmeye çalışan kastırırdı falan. Sen alışık 
oluyorsun zaten. Belirli şeyleri görüyorsun tabii, hayatta bir vizyon sahibi 
oluyorsun. Ama belirli şeyleri de hiç görmüyorsun. Mesela evinin en ufak bir 
tamirat işi olduğu zaman, ustayla münasebet, birilerini bulmak, kendin bir 
şeyler yapmak falan böyle şeyler yoktur askerlerin hayatında. Asker gelir 
yapar. Bir şekilde halledilir yani. Subayların dışarıdaki adamla alakası yoktur. 
Ama askeriyenin içinde belirli bir yüzde 5'lik bir kısım, bunları tamamen aşmış 
insanlar da var. Onlar mesela çok öyle lojmanda kalmaz, dışarıda kalır. Onlar 
da genelde subaylardan çıkmaz. Ya astsubaylardan çıkar, ya uzmanlardan 
çıkar. Ama subaylar öyle değildir abi. ‘Hadi el ele verelim, hepimiz subayız, 
aman dışarı çıkmayalım, hepimiz burada böyle takılalım,’ falan. Biraz öyledir. 
Avantajları böyle abi. Belli başlı şeyleri sana sağlar. Dışarıda baban aynı parayı 
alsa, mesela İstanbul'da, Fenerbahçe'de ben […] sene oturdum, oturduğumuz 
daire deniz manzaralıydı; git şimdi bakayım Fenerbahçe'de deniz manzaralı bir 
daire tutabilecek misin? Neredesinden tutacaksın?"188 (emphases mine) 
                                                          
188 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “For example, we were 
coming on summers from [a city in the East] to [a city in the West] for vacation. My father 
was taking his annual leave from the military for 20 days. He was the only driver, so we 
had to pull in somewhere on the road to take a rest. We were resting either in Samsun or 
Amasya, always in Officers’ Clubs. (Laughing) If you’d tell my father, ‘There is a 7 stars 
hotel in Samsun, charging its customers only ten Turkish liras for a night,’ he would not go 
there. I mean he could not. He was blinded so much that he could not even realize the no-
brainer. He would not go there even if you would pull him by the arm. He had to go to the 
Officers’ Club. Sad but true. As for the advantages, it could have been worse for us. My 
father could have been working for another salary job. He could have been unable to 
provide as much as what one can enjoy in Officers’ Clubs. If you were to try doing at the 
outside what you have done in those places, your expenditures would soar. For example, I 
don’t know how it is now, but once we went to a military vacation facility in Antalya, 
Karpuzkaldıran. It was not much different than a 5 stars holiday village in terms of what it 
offers. At a bargain price too! When you see that as a child, you consider that the life will 
be easy. But when you come into the market and work, when you plan a vacation and buy 
plane tickets, you realize how much everything can cost you. The upside is that, you receive 
some fixed living conditions as a package. You know how they talk of social rights before 
getting a job, like ‘What is your salary + benefits package?’ These guys [military officers] 
have that package. The plus side is an accompanying set of living conditions. Not luxurious 
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 Kemal was an engineer until he came to the rude awakening that he was fishing in 
an ocean, with his parents, in pursuit of the unfulfilled hope that the time will come to reap 
the promised rewards, after all the years of hard work, that even the transfers of his father 
could not interrupt. Perhaps it was too late for him to try his chances in the military as a 
professional soldier. Perhaps he did not even think of it. He instead switched his career path 
to finance. But it seems that both the parents and children may find relief in military 
schools, because they can get rid of unpredictabilities of many kinds by embracing the 
option, instead of fishing in an ocean about which they remain blithely ignorant, more often 
than not:     
 
Nuri: "[G]enelde asker çocukları[nın] hepsi askeri lise sınavına bir girer. Ben 
de girdim. Ben kazanamadım. Çok zordu.”  
Sertaç: "Kazansan gitmek ister miydin?" 
Nuri: "Ben de onu düşünüyorum, ‘Kazansaydım gider miydim?’ diye. Çünkü 
şu anda […] yaşına geldim, hâlâ kendim ne yapacağımı [bilmiyorum]. 
Mesleğinde, kafanda soru işaretleri varsa, ufakken, 13-14 yaşında belki de 
giderdim hiç düşünmeden. Bir deneyebilirdim yani." 
Sertaç: "Peki tüm asker çocukları askeri lise sınavına girer dedin. Sence bu 
neden oluyor? " 
Nuri: "Bir deniyorlar kendilerini. Mesela asker olmak istemeyenler vardır da 
çoğu asker olmak ister yani. Çünkü alışmışsın artık o yaşama. O yaşam 
standardına. Daha kolay geliyor sana yani. Sonuçta insanlar daha kolay 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
maybe, but always above a certain average. For example, we were staying in Fenerbahçe. 
People outside were imploring to use the pool inside the Fenerbahçe Officers’ Club, like 
‘Only if I had a daily entrance card to step in.’ But it means nothing to you. It is something 
already given in your life. Just because you are already used to it, you would not care, 
while people outside were endeavoring to get inside. [When you are a military brat] you see 
certain things in life and they all give you a certain vision. But you remain blind to certain 
other things. Let’s say there is something that requires repair in the house. Officers do not 
bother with handling it by themselves, or finding a repairman and relating to him. The 
conscripts arrive and repair for them. Things sort themselves out anyway. Military officers 
thus have no correspondence with the men outside. But there is also a group of people in 
the military, maybe like, the five percent of the whole population, who is above all these 
things mentioned. Usually, they don’t stay in military lodgings. They rather rent a place 
outside. They usually emerge from non-commissioned military officers and qualified 
sergeants. But commissioned military officers are a different story. They rather happen to 
be like, ‘Let’s join hands, we are all officers, let’s never venture out and hang inside 
together.’ That’s somewhat the case. These are the advantages, as I told you man. It 
provides you certain resources. I stayed in a sea-view house in Fenerbahçe for […] years. 
Well, let’s see if you could handle renting that house, had your father worked at the outside 
for the same wage? Let’s see how much of it you could handle?” (emphases mine) 
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olabilecek şeyleri seçer, zoru seçmez kimse yani. Çoğu insan seçmez. O 
yüzden alıştığın için asker olmak istiyorsun. Kafandan geçiyor en azından. 
Şimdi dışarıdaki bir insanın, bir doktorun çocuğu ya da başka bir memurun 
çocuğunun hiç aklına bile gelmeyebilir askeri lise sınavlarına gireyim diye."189 
 
2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
 
The first day of the school. I was standing still in the school yard, with my parents, 
waiting for my initiation to educational life. A chaos that I was not much familiar with 
descended upon me. Now, I found myself right inside the Grand Guignol which had 
intrigued me for so long and I was nothing if not regretful. The coarse noises of cars 
parking by the school and the happy screams of children running pell-mell after each other 
invaded my ears. I felt that I did not have enough sense organs, or a neural system capable 
enough to funnel all that’s going around into my understanding. I was deprived of even the 
most tentative illusion of perspicacity. I was yearning for the military lodgings, where 
everything was orderly, where everything was spick and span despite their crude 
appearances. How I could disembroil myself from all of that and return back there? There 
were cars and children running around in military lodgings too, but something was not 
clicking here. I started whining and crying. For the next two months, my mother was going 
to mediate my transition to education, by escorting me to the school, appearing at the door 
every school bell if she was not already sharing a desk with me in the classroom, and 
waiting for the class to be dismissed. Nearly twenty years later, my memories of the first 
day of the school came flooding back as Deniz told me of his:  
                                                          
189 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Nuri: “Generally, all children 
of military families take the military school tests. I took it as well. I could not succeed. It 
was very difficult.” Sertaç: “Would you want to go if you could succeed?” Nuri: “This is 
what I am contemplating on. I’m 22 now. I still don’t know what to do in life. If you have 
doubts about your profession, perhaps you could have gone to a military school when you 
were 13-14 years old, without thinking twice. I mean I could give it a try.” Sertaç: “Well, 
you said that all children of military families take the military school tests. What do you 
think is the reason?” Nuri: “They try themselves. There may be some who do not want to 
be soldiers, but the majority wants to. Because you are used to that life and standards 
accompanying it. It comes easier to you. People choose what comes easy to them, right? 
Nobody takes the hard path. Most people do not take the hard path. And you want to be a 
soldier, because you are used to it. Leastways, it glimpses in your mind. The children of 
people outside, I mean, the child of a doctor or a civil servant may not be even thinking 
about taking the military school tests.”    
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“Lojmanda hani küçük de olsanız belirli arkadaşlarınız var. Sabahtan akşama 
kadar onlarlasınız. Ertesi gün yine onlarla olacağınızı biliyorsunuz. Bir anda 
yabancı bir yere [ilkokula] geçince ben, şok etkisi mi oldu diyeyim, ne diyeyim. 
Hani içime kapandım, kimseyle konuşmadım. Tek başıma oturdum hatta, 
öğretmenleri annem ikna etmişti. Onlara alışamayacağım gibi geliyordu.”190   
  
However, I also have interlocutors who did not have any trouble in adapting 
themselves to school life. For example, Mustafa narrates how he easily overcame the 
trouble of adaptation during his transition to school life as follows: 
 
“[Okula başladığımda] [z]orlanmadım. Evde baban, okulda öğretmenin oluyor. 
[Okulda] [a]rkadaşlarım vardı. Lojmanda da arkadaşlarım vardı. Lojmandan 
dışarı çıkamazdık, okuldan da dışarı çıkartmazlardı zaten. Öyle baktığım zaman 
bana yabancı gelmedi.”191   
 
 So, what would have happened if I, or Deniz, were to be born out of the military 
setting? What would be the reference of our desires, when we found difficulty in adapting 
to school life? Or would it make any difference for Mustafa, whose transition to school 
became easier once he started drawing similarities between the disciplined ways of living in 
the military setting and school? What would have happened if he had lacked such an initial 
reference of discipline deriving from his experiences in the military setting? In fact, both 
types of narratives signify how the military continues to stand in the lives of children as a 
strong framework of reference to which the children turn to make sense of various spheres 
in life. Let’s then turn to the third of institutions, namely the military to understand why it 
may be so. 
 
                                                          
190 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “Even though you are little, 
you have certain friends in lodgings. You are with them the whole day. You know that you 
would be with them the next day. Suddenly shifting to an unfamiliar place [primary school] 
makes you stunned. I did not talk to anyone. I even sat alone, after my mother convinced 
my teachers to permit so. It was like I would never get used to them.”       
191 Personal interview with Mustafa, 08.11.2013: “I did not have any difficulty [when I 
started school]. You have a father in home, just as you have a teacher in the school. I had 
friends [in the school]. So had I in the lodgings. We could not leave the lodgings area, 
neither could we leave the school area. When I perceived it that way, it [the school] did not 
look unfamiliar to me.”     
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III. GOVERNING THE CHILDREN AND THE MAKING OF MILITARY 
DEPENDENTS 
 
3.1. Why to Govern, How to Govern? 
 
"Ama yok işte istihkâmcılar, personeller, bilmem neler, dağıtımcılar, 
askeriyenin içindeki leş birlikler falan. Yani manasız abi. Manasız bir büyük. O 
yüzden idare etmesi, kontrol etmesi zor. Sırf o yüzden böyle saçma sapan 
kurallar var, çok değişik fraksiyonlar oluşmasın ordunun içinde diye. Tek bir 
görüşten olsun, bizim olsun hesabı. Mesela ben babamın, asker benim babam, 
ne silahla bir şey yaptığını gördüm, ne silahtı, askerlikti, manevra kabiliyeti, 
strateji kurma... Hani anlatabildim mi? Askerliğe dair şeyler yaptı mı yapmadı 
mı emin değilim. Benim babam 40 sene askerlik yaptı. … [B]enim gördüğüm 
15-20 senelik kısımda askerliğe dair hiçbir şey yok abi. O yüzden ben 
istiyorum ki bu tarz insanlara istihdam yaratmaktan çok gerçekten profesyonel 
olarak işi bu olacak. ... Onu [profesyonel askeri] baştan aşağı, full teçhizat 
donatacaksın. O zaman zaten, bu adamlar dallanıp budaklanıp, aile kurup 
bilmem ne adamlar olmayacağı için bu tarz problemler olmayacak. Ama sen 
böyle çok büyük, 'bulk' bir kitle yaratıyorsun anladın mı? E bir de onların 
aileleri, çocukları, anaları, danaları bilmem ne... O zaman milyonlarca kişilik 
bir zümre oluşuyor. Nasıl kontrol edeceksin? Belli kuralları olması lazım. Soru 
neydi?"192 (emphasis mine) 
                                                          
192 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “But military engineers, staff, 
distributors and so forth, I mean, the ridiculous units of the military. It’s meaningless bro. It 
is unnecessarily big. It is therefore hard to manage and control. For that reason, there are 
ridiculous rules to prevent the emergence of different factions and viewpoints within the 
military. For example, I did not ever see my father doing anything to do with guns, 
military, maneuverability, strategy development, if you catch my drift. I am not sure 
whether he did anything in particular about the military job. My father served in the 
military for 40 years. … As far as the last 15-20 years which I know are concerned, he did 
nothing about the military. That’s why I rather want the military to be professional, instead 
of creating jobs to such people. … But you have to equip these guys [professional soldiers] 
from top to toe. Then, these guys would not spread out by starting families, so there would 
be no such trouble. But, you know, when you create a huge bulk of people, their families, 
children, mothers and oxen come along … Then you have in your hand a community with 
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 While asking 'what was the question', Kemal of course did not have the slightest 
intention of helping me out in formulating a beginning for a chapter. He was rather busy 
with calling for a "transition from an institutional to an occupation model" (Segal, 2006, p. 
357) in TSK, a transition, which he assumed, would arrive with the enactment of a 
professional army. The question he sought to remember was: "What would happen if you 
were to be born today as a child of a military officer?" Obviously, his response is, by and 
large, quite oblivious to what I asked. But it signals an even more scorching question, 
which has guided my research, since the beginning: How does the military institution in 
Turkey come to grips with its own bulky outliers, in Kemal’s unfettered words, consisting 
of families, children, mothers and animals? Now let me rewind the question in order to 
concretize its significance to the issue at hand, before grappling with it thoroughly.  
  
The emergence of the modern nation-state goes hand by hand with the 
diversification in techniques of power that are put into circulation to achieve the 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations (Foucault, 1990). In this sense, one 
may claim that, the modern state has become less reliant on violence and its repressive 
apparatus, as it is endowed with various means to penetrate into wider regions and 
populations. Accordingly, there is a theoretical stream which posits an inversely 
proportional relationship between the increasing and effective reach of the state by the 
growth as well as diversification of state practices, and its use of coercion (Paker & Akça, 
2010, p. 3). As the optimist theoretical approach goes, wars, militaries and militarism will 
be dumped into the garbage of history, when industrial society, market economy, free trade 
and liberal democracy gain more footholds in our lives (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 4).   
  
But none of these have been heretofore thrown into any garbage let alone the 
garbage of history, despite the advancements shown in industrial capitalism and different 
techniques of power deployed by nation-states, which were supposed to be catalysts to 
more peaceful societies. The repressive apparatus of the state has undergone under a 
succession of tempests and transformations, but it has not evaporated. Another stream of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
millions of people. How will you control it? You need to have some ground rules to achieve 
control. What was the question again?” (emphasis mine)    
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theory connects this outcome to the interrelation between war-making and state-making, by 
reversing some of the premises proposed by the proponents of the theses of peaceful 
capitalism (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 8). According to the theory, the primary function of the 
state is not simply economic, but rather the state is an entity predicated on warfare (Tilly, 
1985). In other words, war-making and war-preparation are constitutive of the nation-state 
(Tilly, 1985; Giddens, 1985). Just because they are integral to the constitution and 
centralization of state formations, neither wars, nor the militaries to make wars, nor the 
militarism to ensure both will disappear as long as the nation-states which hinges on them 
to survive continues its existence. Accordingly, nation-states are still preoccupied with the 
question of mobilizing the consent of populations to sustain organized violence anywhere 
in the world. Because, from different Marxist perspectives, the military is still one of the 
most convenient provinces of accumulation for nation-states to overcome the crises of 
capitalism, they are invited on many occasions to regulate various sorts of internal tensions, 
along the lines of class, ethnicity, gender, religion and modernization and they are the 
primary means to fulfill imperialist aspirations (Paker & Akça, 2010, pp. 5-7).  
  
Of all its uses in and for the nation-state, I argue that, one of the most salient 
features of the military institution in Turkey has been its (sometimes self-) invitation to 
regulate the tensions inside. Although one of the conditions that is seen emblematic of 
nation-states is the separation of the inside and outside in the use of coercion, or in Giddens' 
terms (1985), 'internal pacification', the breadth of operations undertaken by the military 
institution of Turkey in subjugating the masses that are deemed peripheral to the nation has 
been nothing short of astonishing. Often, the military endeavoured to regulate the tensions 
inside the country by functioning as an ideological state apparatus (Şen, 2010; Altınay, 
2004a; Ünsaldı, 2008). Numerous times, as in the Dersim massacre of 1937-38 or through 
the unacknowledged internal war waged to put an end to “the Kurdish Question,” the 
military thumped its iron fist. It has become more than an instrument of power in the hands 
of ruling classes (Akça, 2004), while it was "protecting and watching over the Republic."193 
It has played an immense role among (and sometimes in place of) all security apparatuses 
                                                          
193 With the changes ratified on 30.08.2013 in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law, the mission of the military 'to protect and watch over the Republic' has been finally 
repealed.   
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of the nation-state in the governmentalization of the modern nation-state and controlling of 
the populations, especially those who reside at what is located to be the peripheries of the 
nation.  
  
Then, if the military institution is to play an effective role in the governance and 
regulation of internal tensions, in favour of the centralization of power in the nation-state, 
how does it govern the tensions arising and the figures living within its own institutional 
borders, despite not being deemed essential to the proceedings of the military? How does it 
cope with them to render its services more effective and legitimate? Particularly, how does 
it deal with multitudes that are hailed through the conceptual lens of the military as 'military 
dependents'?194 As Lutz (2001) suggest that, perhaps “[we are] all military dependents, 
wearers of civilian camouflage” (p. 9). However, the militaries specifically situate the 
spouses and children of military officers in a liminal space, by hailing them as military 
dependents. As Lutz (2001) puts it, "by cultural definition, a dependent is someone not fully 
mature or capable. In a society that values independence and individualism, a dependent 
has an ambiguous status, perhaps even less than full cultural citizenship" (p. 209). The 
ambiguity of the term echoes in the status of spouses and children of military officers as 
well. Because, the term military dependent, on the one hand, certifies an authentic relation 
between the institution and whom it describes as 'military dependents’. On the other hand, 
it withholds full membership, by underlining their shortcomings as military 'dependents'. 
Then again, how does the military attempt to plaster over the cracks that can emerge in and 
through its bulky outliers which the institution itself addresses as ‘the military dependents’? 
What routes does the institution take before these cracks widen and threaten the efficacy 
and legitimacy of its operations? 
  
Of all the figures deemed peripheral to the institution, I propose that, the spouses 
and children are one of the most permanent elements which pose the question of 
'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991) to the institution elites most persistently. I have tried to 
                                                          
194 In Turkish: [Askeri] Personelin kanunen bakmakla mükellef bulunduğu kimse. I should 
also remind that the term is not only specific to the military institution, but applies to all 
public servants. The term military dependent is also not specific to the spouses and children 
of military officers. It can include other family members of the military officers as well. 
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insinuate the scope of the problematic in the introduction, while discussing the historical 
roots of the military family, and I have marked 1960 as a turning point. Only then did the 
military institution, I suggested, introduce a new form of governmentality for the 
management of these multitudes, beyond officially discouraging officers from marriage. 
Only then did the financial and discursive disincentives for officers to marry were gradually 
removed. Instead of casting out the spouses and children, the institution encouraged the 
burgeoning military families to be nested within its borders. But these changes also resulted 
in the institution's extending reach and control over spouses and children. As the military 
invited in 'womenandchildren', they became more of an administrative issue for the 
institution. Professional soldiers, for example, still need the permission of the general staff 
of the Republic of Turkey to marry with foreigners.195 Marrying or living with an unchaste 
person has been a ground for dismissal from the institution, according to the Turkish 
Armed Forces Discipline Act.196 Even a facile search in the database of verdicts given by 
the Military High Administrative Court (AYİM hereafter) brings numerous cases into view 
testifying that the issues of military wives and children have been routinely handled within 
administrative and judicial frameworks. There are officers discharged from the military, 
because of not straightening the attire and ideological views of their spouses.197 There are 
families whose dismissal from military lodgings for conducts in violation of the order and 
life of the military community were rescinded at the last moment by the AYİM.198 The 
military may dispose of officers if their wives continue what the military regards as 
                                                          
195 See: Yabancı Uyruklu Kişilerle Evlenen Subay, Astsubay, Sözleşmeli Subay, 
Sözleşmeli Astsubay, Uzman Jandarma, Uzman Erbaş ile Sözleşmeli Erbaş ve Erler 
Hakkında Yönetmelik.  (1997). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 22931, March 12, 1997. Retrieved 
January 5, 2014, from  
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5922&MevzuatIliski=0&source
XmlSearch=  
196 See: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Disiplin Kanunu. (2013). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 28561, 
February 16, 2013. Retrieved January 5, 2014, from 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/02/20130216-1.htm 
197 See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court’s verdict with the case 
number 1999/754 and the decision number 2000/205 dated February 22, 2000.   
198 See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court’s verdict with the case 
number 1994/81 and the decision number 1994/1068 dated September 13, 1994. 
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“immoral behaviours” despite numerous warnings.199 Children also take their share from 
the administrative lens of the military. Families can be thrown out from military lodgings, 
if their children do not comply with the principles to abide by.200  
  
As seen above, it is quite obvious that, by "controlling the soldier, the army controls 
others" (Lutz, 2001, p. 188), with the reverse, I assume, being equally true as well. The 
military exercises institution control over 'womenandchildren' (Enloe, 2000, p. 157). But 
this institutional control does not merely draw on "technologies of domination" to subjugate 
its intended subjects (Foucault, 1988). It does not simply take the form of policing over 
bodies. If the institutional measures were simply to be an external constraint over the 
bodies, it would be rather easy to deal with them. Those women and children would try to 
run away from the external constraints that act upon them (Massumi, 2002, p. 223). But the 
majority, however, do not. On the contrary, many interlocutors repeatedly underscore that 
the setting provided them by the military institution is quite 'comfortable'. In the interviews, 
comfort and ease (rahat olmak) are perhaps the most recurring of all adjectives and verbs. 
Then how are we to account for the juxtaposition of the 'ease' (rahat) and 'peace' (huzur) 
that my interlocutors feel within the borders of the military institution, with a 'total 
institution' (Goffman, 1961) identified rather by the command of 'attention!' (hazır ol) and 
'warfare'?  
  
This is why I use the notion of 'governmentality' instead of domination, because the 
former is useful in the investigation of "the connections between the technologies of the 
self and technologies of domination" (Lemke, 2000, s. 2). I claim that, understanding the 
control of 'womenandchildren' within the military complex requires an emphasis less on 
institutional prohibitions and injunctions and more on productive aspects of power. The 
military does not simply enclose the bodies of 'womenandchildren', forbid certain things 
that are thought to be inimical to the well-being of the institution, and sack them if they do 
                                                          
199 See the Chamber Council of the Military High Administrative Court’s verdict with the 
case number 1994/81 and the decision number 1994/1068 dated September 13, 1994. 
200 See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court’s verdict with the 
decision number 2001/545 dated January 22, 2002. To reach another complaint of a non-
commissioned officer's wife: Alyans. (2008, March 14). Askeri lojman [Msg 1]. Message 
posted to http://www.hukuki.net/showthread.php?35527-Askeri-Lojman 
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not show compliance. Prohibitions, though important, constitute only one part of the story. 
Rather, the military "encloses them in order to find ways of producing more regularity in 
the[ir] behaviour ... and to find ways of doing the same thing without the enclosure" 
(Massumi, 2002, p. 224). It seeks to induce regularities in ways to produce subjectivities 
which cater to the interests of the institution.    
 
 Therefore, I will employ a two-pronged approach to tackle the issue at hand. In the 
following section, I will first look at the more prohibitive aspects of power, by analyzing 
the lives of my interlocutors within the military complex. Then, I will examine more 
productive aspects of power, and mention three crucial dimensions (nationalizing, 
gendering and militarizing bodies) in the production of subjectivities which contribute to 
the well-being of the military institution.  
 
3.2. Living in a Bell-Jar 
 
 The control of children begins even before their birth, as the military institution 
attempts to take a hold on the lives of their fathers and mothers. The construction of each 
lodgings, Officers' Club, vacation facility and military hospital partakes in the control of 
children. For example, according to the Public Housing Regulations,201 the military officers 
who are married with children are more advantageous than others to be accommodated in 
military lodgings allocated by a scoring scale (sıra tahsisli lojman).202 The regulation gives 
officers 3 extra scores for each child (up to 2 children though) and 6 extra scores for being 
married.203 Such regulations, I suspect, may also have bio-political implications for 
families. Although a very small sample size, 9 out of 10 interlocutors of mine are two 
siblings. This condition also surprises some children:   
                                                          
201 See: Kamu Konutları Yönetmeliği. (1984). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 18524, September 23, 
1984. Retrieved January 6, 2014, from http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/18524_0.html  
202 There are four types of housing available to public officers: Allocated specially (özel 
tahsisli), allocated by assignment (görev tahsisli), allocated by a scoring scale (sıra tahsisli) 
and allocated by service (hizmet tahsisli).  
203 See: Kamu Konutları Yönetmeliği. (1984). T. C. Resmi Gazete, 18524, September 23, 
1984. Retrieved January 6, 2014, from http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/18524_0.html 
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"Bize […]’ta müstakil ev tahsis etmişlerdi. Orada komşularımızın çocukları da 
hep askerdi. Şansıma da hep böyle, 2'şer çocuklu asker. 2'si de erkek böyle. 
Öyle denk geldi. Hepsi de benim yaşlarımda ve aynı sınıfta oluyorduk."204 
  
Unlike the military institution prior to 1960s, the institution encourages the families 
to be hosted in its borders. At this juncture, one may duly ask what differentiates military 
families from other families in which at least one parent works as a public officer. First, 
there is a matter of facts and figures. Facilities allocated to TSK far outnumber those which 
are offered to any other branch of public service. For example, as of 2001, İnsel (2004) 
announces that half of the non-commissioned and commissioned military officers is housed 
in military lodgings, whereas the ratio is one to fourteen for members of the Ministry of 
National Education (p. 51). The ratio of lodgings/personnel of TSK even exceeds the ratio 
for institutions such as the Turkish Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Court of 
Accounts and the Constitutional Court (İnsel, 2004, p. 51). Secondly, the wide range of 
services usually offered in cheaper prices by TSK within the military complex surpasses 
other public institutions. Also there are many differences in terms of spatial organization 
between facilities provided to the personnel of TSK and other public institutions. Just to 
name one, often the conscripts ensure the security of facilities belonging to the institution.    
 
 The military lodgings in particular offer great zones amenable to the control of 
children. Usually, they have a rectangular formation, fenced from all sides, and in the 
middle of which resides an immense space for children to indulge in plays and pastimes. 
Usually, there is only one entrance to the lodgings, and in this main entrance (nizamiye) the 
soldiers keep their watch in sentry posts. As the children are immured within lodgings, 
prancing around, riding bicycles, kicking the football, hustling and bustling on 'the street', 
the intersecting gazes of soldiers and families can pierce their bodies anytime. The spatial 
organization of military lodgings also exposes the children to the constant possibility of 
interpellation by their elders:  
 
                                                          
204 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “We were accommodated in a 
separate house in […]. The children of our neighbors were all military brats. Luckily, all of 
them were two siblings, both male. It was a coincidence. We were the same age and class.”   
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"Lojmanda bisiklet sürerdik, basket oynardık. Bir defasında sabah baya erken 
saatte, 5-6 gibi, tak tak topu sektirerek basket oynamaya çıktığımı ve nöbetçi 
askerin korkunç bir şekilde, ‘Ne oluyor burada!’ diye geldiğini ve ‘Git şimdi, 
sonra oynarsın,’ diye beni kovaladığımı hatırlıyorum. Çünkü basket sahası 
lojmanların, lojman binalarının ortasındaydı. Ses gidiyor diye herhalde...”205 
  
It is not much possible for children to go 'out' without parents and soldiers wiser to 
their presence. Some interlocutors state that they were not able to leave the military setting, 
because it was forbidden. When I asked who was forbidding it, they replied that sometimes 
it was the parents that prohibited an exit:   
 
Ayşe: "0-6 yaş öyle. […] baya soğuktu tabii. Ama dışarı çıkmak falan yine de 
güzeldi. Lojmanlar da güzeldi aslında, çevresi falan iyiydi. O sırada çok fazla 
şuurlu olmadığınız için her şey güzel geliyor zaten." 
Sertaç: "Peki dışarısı dediğin daha çok lojmanın bahçesi mi? Yoksa lojmanın 
dışına da oynamaya çıkıyor muydunuz?"  
Ayşe: "Yok yok. Lojmanın içi canım. Dışarıda 0-6 yaş çocuğun ne işi var? 
Çıkarmaz annem. Hayatta çıkarmazdı."206 
 
 Sometimes, the military institution itself blocks the exit, as Nuri informs in the 
following:  
 
Sertaç: "Nasıl yasak ya, dışarı çıkamıyor muydunuz siz?"  
Nuri: "Ya mesela bizim […]'dayken şeydi. Bir yer vardı, oradan hiç dışarı 
çıkamıyordun. Harp Okulu'na giriş vardı."  
Sertaç: "Harp Okulu'na girişi mi geçemiyordun?"  
Nuri: "Hı hı. Öyle şeyler vardı."207 
                                                          
205 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “We would ride bicycle and 
play basketball. I remember that once I was bouncing the basketball quite early in the 
morning and a conscript chased me away, like ‘What the heck is going on! Go away now, 
you will play later on.’ Because the basketball court was in the middle of lodgings area. 
[He chased me away] [b]ecause of the noise I guess…”  
206 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Ayşe: “0-6 ages were like that. 
The weather was quite cold in […] of course. But it was nice to go outside. Actually 
military lodgings and its surroundings were nice. When you are not much aware of 
anything, everything is nice to you anyway.” Sertaç: “Do you mean the lodgings yard when 
you say outside? Or would you go outside of the lodgings?” Ayşe: “No. It is the yard of 
course. The outside was out of question. My mom would not allow that. She would never 
ever let me.”  
207 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Sertaç: “What do you mean, it 
was forbidden? Were you not allowed to go out?” Nuri: “When we were in […], you 
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Or, the soldiers may not allow the children to plunge themselves into the life outside, 
as Mustafa acknowledges:  
  
Mustafa: "[Asker çocuğu olmak] ... [a]nnenin seni büyütmesi demek. Anneye 
çok bağlı oluyorsun. Baba pek etken olamaz. Bir fanus içinde büyürsün. Pek 
dışarı çıkamazsın."  
Sertaç: "Ailen mi, başka bir şey mi? Yasak mı çıkmak?"  
Mustafa: "Askerler de çıkarmaz. Ancak çok nadiren bisiklet sürmeye çıkarsın. 
Çok çevren olmaz."208 (emphasis mine) 
 
 At times, the children do not step out of the bell-jar within which they continue their 
existence, for no apparent cause, other than self-imposed restrictions. For example, Zeynep 
cannot recall any substantial reason other than parental pressure as to why she did not go 
out. She is not sure if it was the parents who forbid going out either:  
 
Zeynep: "[B]iz o sırada çocuğuz, canımız ne istiyorsa onu yaparız. Ama şöyle 
bir şey vardı, biz o lojmanın dışına çıkamazdık. O bizim için belki de bir merak 
uyandırabiliyordu. ‘Neden dışarı çıkamıyoruz?’ İşte diğer arkadaşlarım mesela 
bizim lojmana gelmezdi."  
Sertaç: "Yasak mıydı [dışarı çıkmak]?"  
Zeynep: "Yok yasak değildi de bilmiyorum. Benim arkadaşlarım da öyleydi 
hani, çıkmıyorduk. Onların da aileleri izin vermiyordu galiba. Hiçbir zaman 
sormadım, ama belki de küçük olduğumuz için izin vermiyorlardı diye 
düşünüyorum."209 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
know… There was a place which you could not trespass. It was the entrance of the War 
College.” Sertaç: “And you could not pass the entrance?” Nuri: “Yep. Such was the case.” 
208 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: Mustafa: “[Being a military 
brat]… is to be brought up by mother. It makes you tied to the mother. The father is not a 
factor. You grow up in a bell-jar. You cannot go out much.” Sertaç: “You mean, because of 
parents or something else? Was it forbidden to go out?” Mustafa: “Conscripts would not 
allow us to go out as well. Maybe for a bicycle ride, but rarely [we would go out]. You 
would not have many friends.” (emphasis mine) 
209 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: “We were children 
and we would do whatever we want. But we could not go out of the lodgings. It would 
make us curious as to why we could not go out. My other friends would not come to the 
lodgings as well.” Sertaç: “Was it forbidden?” Zeynep: “No, it wasn’t. But I don’t know. 
My friends were like that too. We would not go out. Perhaps their parents did not allow 
them to go out. I never asked, but I presume that it was because we were very little.”    
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 Consequently, the military lodgings seem to offer an almost perfect place for 
leaving the minds of parents unpreoccupied, by ensuring an effective control over the 
bodies of children:   
 
"Bir kere bizim lojmanda hani kocaman bahçe [vardı]. İstediğini yap. Annenin 
babanın aklı kalmıyor yani, nerede olduğunu biliyor[lar] sonuçta. Şimdi burada 
dışarı adım atsan, her yerden araba geçiyor, bir şey var. Ne top oynayabilirsin, 
ne bisiklete binebilirsin. Biz daha rahat bir çocukluk geçirdik diye 
inanıyorum."210 (emphases mine)   
 
"Lojman tabii güvenli bir yer olduğu için genelde sabah çıkıp akşam eve 
dönmek rahat oluyordu. ... [S]onuçta nerede olduğun, nerede oynadığın 
belli."211 (emphases mine) 
 
 However, as the above quotations imply, some children do not find the conditions of 
their isolation oppressive, despite the constant possibility of surveillance over their bodies. 
It seems as if they do not mind much as long as they can gleefully continue running around. 
Some even delineate those conditions which bring about the effective control of 
'womenandchildren' in terms connoting comfort and emancipation, instead of discipline, 
imprisonment or disempowerment. For example, the following narratives shed light on the 
two-faces of military dependency (Lutz, 2001, p. 209; Enloe, 2000, p. 154):  
 
"Yani bir de lojmanda oturuyorsun, etrafın tellerle çevrili, her tarafta askerler 
var, dışarıdaki çocuğu senin ailen tanıyor. Mesela lojmanda istediğin saate 
kadar, 1-2'ye kadar otur, hiçbir sıkıntın olmaz. Lojman rahattır."212 (emphasis 
mine) 
 
                                                          
210 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “We had a huge yard in the 
lodgings where you could do whatever you want. Your parents would not be preoccupied, 
because after all, they would know where you are. However, here at the outside, if you step 
into the street it is swarming with cars and so forth. You can neither play, nor cycle. I think 
we had a more comfortable childhood.” (emphases mine)  
211 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “It was comfortable to stay 
out late as the lodgings are safe. … After all, it is known where you are and where you 
play.” (emphases mine) 
212 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I mean you stay in lodgings 
covered by fences. There are conscripts everywhere and your parents know the children 
outside. You can stay up late until whenever you want, until 1 or 2 AM, without any 
trouble. The military lodgings are comfortable.” (emphasis mine) 
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 Much as the children may describe their experience in the military complex by 
evoking comfort, peace and even liberty, they also seem aware of the constant possibility 
of surveillance. Their narratives gives us the clues of "the dialectics of control" (Giddens, 
1999), and brings testimony to that the concerted efforts to exercise control over children 
do not simply determine docile bodies incapable of resistance (Foucault, 1990; Butler, 
1997a). On the contrary, the narratives suggest some ways in which the children try to 
thwart their controlling. They try to let themselves off the hook of gazes, by skulking 
around back alleys, climbing idle water-towers and trees, creeping into hollows, playing on 
the dirt, mud and mess, and seeking furtive pleasures in every nook and cranny of the 
lodgings. They escape to "awkward corners" (Turan, 2013, pp. 296-297), turning them into 
playgrounds and play in those spaces that are far less convenient than the pristine centre of 
the lodgings: 
 
"Ağaçlara çıkardık. Lojmanda. Arkada orman vardı. O ormana arada girerdik, 
çıkardık. Böyle heyecanlı işler yapardık."213 
 
"Mesela bizde 3 tane birleşik apartman yan yanaydı. Yan tarafında kocaman bir 
boşluk vardı ve binanın yan tarafı bu tuvalet kısmına geliyordu ve hafif içeri 
dönüktü, içeri kıvrımı vardı. Oraya kale yapardık, futbol oynardık."214 
 
"Lojmanın arka bahçesi tabir edebileceğimiz orta avlu vardı ve avlunun 
arkasındaki arka bahçelerde, sonradan kömürlük falan yaptıkları yerlerde 
bisiklet sürerdik. Daha bakımsız yerlerde, doğal ortammışçasına bisiklet 
sürerdik."215 
  
 One can argue that, almost all children play hide-and-seek. But my interlocutors 
recite that they invested much profound meaning, time and energy to the game. Some 
                                                          
213 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “We would climb trees. There 
was a forest at the back. We used to go in and out of the forest. We would do such stuff 
which would excite us.”  
214 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Three blocks were 
adjacent to each other in our lodgings. To the side of the blocks there were huge spaces 
neighbored on the toilets of the end blocks. They were slightly sloped inwards. We would 
turn them into goal posts to play football.”  
215 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “There was a backyard in the 
lodgings. At the rear side of that backyard, which was used afterwards to store coal, we 
would ride bicycle. We would ride bike in those wilderness as though it was a natural 
cycling track.” 
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children even identify the game with the military lodgings, and their childhood. It indeed 
seems as if the game has a different charm, when it is played within the military complex. 
They play it fervently, in hordes, for hours, after the dark, with variations.  
  
"[Çocukluğumdan] hatırladığım saklambaç yani. Çok klasik lojman şeyidir o. 
Sürekli saklambaç oynardık. ... Lojmanlar deyince çocukluk, saklambaç. 
Lojmanın sahasında, varsa, tabii var hepsinde, yaptığımız maçlar. Ama benim 
tek bir şeyim vardı kalıplaşmış. Hangi lojmana gidersem gideyim, saklambaç 
vardır yani. Bütün lojmanlarda, lojmanın içinde nereye gidersen git 
saklanabilirsin yani. Hiçbir sınır yok yani. Bütün çocukluğum öyle geçti. 
Herhangi bir lojmanda saklambaçla yani."216 
Deniz: "Genelde lojmanda oynadığım oyunlardan bahsedecek olursak, bizim 
lojmanın stratejik konumunu göz önüne alırsak saklambaç diyebilirim."  
Sertaç: "Stratejik konum derken peki, biraz daha farklı bir lojman mıydı?"  
Deniz: "Yani böyle nasıl diyeyim, tepeler, ormanlık alan falan yoğundu."217  
 
 Some, for example Zeynep, play it with their beloved 'askerabi's:  
 
"Bir de kukalı saklambaç vardır bilir misin? Akşam oynanır. Topla oynanır. 
Topu uzağa fırlatırsın, ebe onu alana kadar sen saklanırsın. Ondan sonra 
aramaya başlar, karanlıkta oynanır. Asker abiler de bizim oynardı. Onların 
kulübelerine saklanırdık mesela. O tabii tüfek tutuyor haliyle, mesela tıngır 
tıngır onun sesini duyardık."218 
 
                                                          
216 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “What I remember from my 
childhood is hide and seek. It is a classic in lodgings. We would play hide and seek all the 
time. … The military lodgings reminds me of childhood, hide and seek and football 
matches. But one thing was a constant in my childhood. Whichever lodgings I would go, 
we would play hide and seek. You could hide anywhere within the lodgings. There were no 
boundaries I mean. I spent all my childhood playing hide and seek. In any lodgings, I 
mean.”   
217 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Deniz: “As for the games I 
played in the lodgings and as far as the strategic position of our lodgings is concerned, I 
would say hide and seek [was my favourite].” Sertaç: “What do you mean by strategic 
position? Was it a different residence?” Deniz: “I mean, ours was rich in hills and woods.” 
218 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “Do you know how to play 
hide and seek with a ball? It is played in the evening with a ball. You would kick the ball 
away and hide, before ‘it’ catches the ball. Then ‘it’ would begin searching in the dark. 
Soldiers would also play with us. We would hide in their sentry posts. We would hear the 
rattling noise of the guns they hold while hiding there.”    
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 Whereas some play it against them. Possessed by the atmosphere of secrecy 
surrounding the institution, and fascinated by the possibility to evade everyone's attention 
before grasping the awe-inspiring secrets of the military institution, Tarık explains the 
version of hide-and-seek he played in the following:  
 
Tarık: "Orduevinde askerlerden saklanmaca oynardık. En eski, en kadim 
oyunumuz budur."  
Sertaç: "Nasıl bir oyundu mesela?"  
Tarık: "Omurtak Salonu vardı orduevinde. (Güler) Amaç, askerler 
görünülmemesi gereken, yani bunlara görünmeden orduevinin en derin, en gizli 
köşelerine ulaşmak şeklinde bir amaçtı. Bizde bu amacı tetikleyen de Omurtak 
Salonu'nun kapılarının katlanır kapı olmasıydı, yani perde gibi açılan kapanan. 
‘Ne var içeride?’ diye manyakça bir merak içindeydik. Ve o noktaya ulaşmak 
için bütün ‘stealth’ özelliklerimizi kullanarak en alt katlardan başlayıp 
yukarılara doğru çıkıyorduk."219    
  
 The soldiers with and against whom they play hide and seek are of utmost 
significance for children, also because they are the gatekeepers between their lives and the 
life outside. Therefore, some children also seek allies among them so that they can gain the 
"right of passage" in military spaces composed of various thresholds and gateways which 
they have little access on their own:     
 
Nuri: "Asker abi. (Gülerek) Nedense öyle bir şey var yani asker çocuklarında. 
‘Asker abi, asker abi!’ [diye] peşinden koşarsın. Ve o nedense hiç değişmez. 
Nedense hep asker abi. Başka bir şey demezsin. Hani hiç tanımadığına asker 
abi [dersin], hemen muhabbeti kurarsın asker abi[yle]. Hani samimi olsan da, 
ismini bilsen de asker abi. Sürekli biz de derdik asker abi diye."   
Sertaç: "Peki nasıl insanlardı? Küçükken nasıl canlanırdı sizin için bir asker 
abi?"  
Nuri: "Bazıları, işte onlarla, nizamiyedekilerle samimi ilişkiler kurmaya 
çalışırdık ki sanki hayatımızı böyle daha kolaylaştıracakmış gibi. Arada bir 
                                                          
219 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: “We would play hiding 
from soldiers in the Officers’ Club. It is the oldest and most ancient game we have ever 
played.” Sertaç: “What kind of a game was that?” Tarık: “There was this Omurtak Hall in 
the Officers’ Club. (Laughing) The objective was to reach the most secret and deepest 
corners of the Officers’ Club, without being seen by any of the roving soldiers. The curtain-
like folding doors of the Omurtak Hall were the propelling reason for us to do so. We were 
dying from curiosity to see what’s inside. We would use all of our ‘stealth’ abilities to 
sneak from ground to the upstairs in order to reach the Omurtak Hall.”  
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bisikletle çıkardık hani. Normalde yasak işte böyle şeyler. Girerdik, çıkardık. 
Onlarla samimi ilişkiler kurmaya çalışırdık."220  
 
 But prohibitions and evading prohibitions, as I said, constitute only one part of the 
story. Let's look at the other part, which pertains to the more productive aspects of power. 
As I have noted before, nationalization, gendering and militarization are the three 
interrelated dimensions indispensable to the process of subjection in concert with the well-
being of the military institution. Here, I will discuss not discuss all of the ways in which the 
subjection of children with respect to these dimensions takes place. Because, children's 
experiences in schools, in the family and in the daily encounters outside the military setting 
may also participate in their subjection along these lines, in ways common to more or less 
everyone living in a given nation-state. Therefore, I will not address, for example, how the 
gendering of children's bodies begins through the matrix of gender relations which are prior 
to their birth, continues in the family, in the schools, streets and achieved performatively all 
the time by the expressions of gender (Butler, 1999, p. 33). By the same token, nor will I 
pursue the effects of the militarization of education in the lives of my children in this 
context, because it is an issue from which almost none of the children receiving education 
are exempt. In the following sections, I will rather examine conditions common and 
specific to the experiences of children entailed by having a military officer parent.  
 
3.3. Nationalization of the Children 
 
 Our first dimension regards the nationalization of children. By nationalization, I 
mean the array of practices, arrangements and conditions which results in a "positive 
imagining of a national self and community" (Anderson, 1991). In that regard, first and 
                                                          
220 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Nuri: “Asker abi. (Laughing) I 
don’t know why, but all the military brats run after conscripts by shouting that: ‘Asker abi, 
asker abi!’ And for some reason it never changes. It is always asker abi and not something 
else. It does not matter if you don’t know any of them one iota or know them by name. We 
would also call them asker abi and start a conversation.” Sertaç: “Well, what kind of people 
were they? How would you imagine them in your minds when you were little?” Nuri: 
“Some would try to keep it on good terms with soldiers, especially with those at the main 
gates, as if it could facilitate our lives. We would occasionally go out cycling. Normally, 
such things were forbidden. We would enter and leave the lodgings. We would try to 
establish better relations with them.” 
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foremost, the transfers of the father should be mentioned. All my interlocutors have been 
relocated at least once, before the age of 7. The one who has seen the least number of 
transfers is Deniz with only two because of his father's early retirement from the military. 
On average, my interlocutors moved to four or five different cities, owing to the transfers of 
their father, and the number may even reach up to 8. I claim that, the experience of 
relocations, starting from very early ages, to different places across the country, because of 
a military officer father who is assigned by TSK to “protect the nation from threats,” have 
an impact on turning the children into national subjects. As they are dispersed with their 
families from one city to another, some of the children do not grow attachments even to 
their birthplace. In turn, a “more generalized sense of the nation” may replace one's 
affiliation with a hometown. Then, the relocations become important moments in children's 
lives through which they learn about their nation as their hometown, while also "learning 
about their nation as a community and their homeland as a territory" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 
70). The motto of a Facebook group, named "Military Children" (Asker Çocukları) which 
have more than 13.000 members perfectly summarizes my point. The group presents itself 
as the biggest community (in Facebook) where military families meet and it makes a call to 
other military brats "who have learned the love of the nation, not by reading from books, 
but by living it."221 From the narratives, these dynamics become most apparent in the 
following statements of İrem: 
 
"4 yıl [Doğu’da bir şehir]’de kaldım ben. Daha doğusuna gitmedim, 
bilmiyorum. Ama [o şehir] bile bir tane caddesi olan bir şehir. Koskoca şehir 
güya, ama gidip de görülmesi gereken bir yer diye düşünüyorum. Bir sürü 
tarihi yer var yani. Orası da senin ülken, orada da yaşanmışlıklar var yani ve o 
tarihi eserleri gördükçe yani işte ‘A bu da olmuş,’ diyorsun."222 (emphasis 
mine) 
 
                                                          
221 See: Asker Çocukları. (2009). Retrieved January 6, 2014, from 
https://www.facebook.com/askercocuklari 
222 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I spent 4 years in [a city in the 
East]. I never travelled to the east of [that city], so I don’t know how it is. [The city in the 
East] is supposedly one of the bigger cities, but even it has a single main street. It is must-
visit though. Lots of history over there. It is also a part of your country, there are lots of 
memories to that place and as you see these historical artifacts, ‘Oh, so it happened then,’ 
you say.” (emphasis mine)  
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"[Asker çocuğu olmak] bir farklılık da iyi yönde bir farklılık. ... Çünkü 
babalarımız da daha gündemle ilgili olsun, Türkiye'de yaşananlarla ilgili olsun 
çok şey öğretiyorlar bize. Bir kere babalarımızın yaşadığını görüyoruz. 
Yaşanan olayları görüyoruz."223 (emphases mine) 
 
 I should draw attention to a contradiction here. As one can discern in the last 
quotation, there is a certain tension lurking in the statements of many children who 
lay claim to higher levels of awareness and knowledge than others, with regards to 
the “truths” of the nation-state. For example, instead of talking about her direct 
experiences concerning those truths, İrem says that, she saw them in what her father 
was living. This is actually a quite typical pattern in the narratives of many 
interlocutors. On the one hand, these interlocutors seem to argue that it is their 
constant moving, or institutional nomadism, that brings various sorts of revelations to 
their lives. On the other hand, this is rather an isolated nomadism after all, because 
they also confirm that they did not so much step out of the borders of the military 
complex, especially those of the lodgings, during their childhood. Suffice it to recall 
how Mustafa described his life as a military brat through the metaphor of "living in a 
bell-jar". Nevertheless, the same Mustafa thinks that he has seen it all, the terrorist 
and the martyr, the friend and the foe, the truth and the lie. For example, he despises 
in the following those who 'talk', without seeing 'it':  
 
Sertaç: "Peki Doğu deyince ne geliyor aklına?" 
Mustafa: "Kale. Kaledir yani. Herkes baskı altındadır. Küçük yaşta şehidi, 
teröristi görürsün. Şehit cenazesine gitmeyen tipler konuşur, ama kaledir 
Doğu."224 
 
 The obvious question is: How could he possibly have seen ‘it’ all while living in a 
bell-jar? It seems that, often the body of the father arriving home, pale and torn, is the 
                                                          
223 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “[Being a military brat] is a 
difference, though a positive one. ... Our fathers teach us lots of things about what happens 
in Turkey, contemporary or not. We are seeing what they are going through. We are seeing 
what is happening out there.” (emphases mine) 
224 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: Sertaç: “What does ‘the 
East’ evoke in your mind?” Mustafa: “Castle. It is a castle. Everybody is under pressure. 
You see the martyr and the terrorist there at early ages. Those who have never attended 
martyr funerals talk nonsense, but the East is a castle.”  
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surface where many children decipher the codes of the truth of the nation. The talks of the 
parents, broken and anxious, are where they derive a sense of ‘it’. The funeral of martyrs, 
and other militarized rituals orchestrated by the military institution and its supporters, by 
which the various affects gushing out of one's dead body is brokered into the nationalist 
economy of pain (Açıksöz, 2013, pp. 471-472), amidst revanchist clamors for vengeance, 
is where they come to learn about ‘it’. So, the military institution plays huge part in the 
emergence of a sense of belonging to the nation, and in the prevention of the disruption of 
this sense, also by demarcating the children from what remains beyond its institutional 
borders, thereby positioning the elements in the life outside as potential intruders, while 
instilling in these children the sense of distinctions between inside and outside, ally and 
enemy.  
 
 However, the transfers of the father does not equal to the emergence of this sense. In 
some cases, the sights that the children bear witness themselves in those regions, may 
alienate them from an understanding of the nation as an organic community, living and 
working together in peace for the good of the nation: 
 
Tarık: "[Doğu’da bir şehir]’e gittiğimde fark ettiğim şeylerden biri, oradaki 
gündem ve yaşamla, yani yaşam pratikleriyle ülkenin genel gündemi ve 
farkındalığı arasında baya fark olduğuydu. Bu farkın bugün de devam ettiğini 
düşünüyorum." 
Sertaç: "Nasıl bir farktan bahsediyoruz mesela burada?" 
Tarık: "Yani mesela o zaman [...]'nin [Tarık’ın kardeşi] sürekli söylediği şöyle 
bir şey vardı. Tabii o zaman 8 yaşında. 7-8 yaşlarında bir çocuk işte devamlı 
‘[Doğu’daki şehir]’de böyle miymiş?’ derdi. (Gülerek) Çok basit bir şey 
olabilir yani, çok çok basit. Kaleye gidersin, [şehrin] kalesine. İşte orada güzel 
bir kaynak suyu vardır, su doldurursun getirirsin. Buna ‘[Doğu’daki şehir]’de 
böyle miymiş?’ der mesela. Oradan tut da genel ana akım medyanın konuştuğu 
şeylere bakarsın, Türkiye'nin gündemine, kamuoyu gündemine. Bir de oradaki 
vaziyete bakarsın, oradaki insanların dünyaya bakışına, oradaki insanların 
kendi içindeki kamuoyuna, kendi gündemine. Ve bunların birbirleriyle pek 
alakası olmadığını görünce, ‘Ya demek ki biz burayı tanımıyormuşuz, 
bilmiyormuşuz. Böyle bir durum varmış,’ diyorsun. Geliyorsun [geriye], aynı 
ülke gündeminin devam ettiğini görüyorsun."225  
                                                          
225 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: “One of the things I 
realized when I arrived to [a city in the East] was the disjuncture between the prose of life 
and agenda in [that city] and the rest of the country. The difference still continues, I think.” 
Sertaç: “What kind of a disjuncture are we talking about here?” Tarık: “I mean, my sister 
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 Another experience common and specific to these children which results in the 
development of a “nationalist structure of feeling” (Anderson, 1991) consists in the 
encounters of children with 'askerabi's. Conscripts take different shapes and meanings 
throughout the lives of children. Sometimes they are the kind saviors to call when they run 
into trouble. Sometimes, as I have shown, they are the gatekeepers with whom the children 
should negotiate to gain the right of passage. Sometimes, they may become the servants of 
children when the children anticipate that the rank of their fathers give them a leverage over 
soldiers. Sometimes, they are the figures to play with and against. They remain mostly 
anonymous to children, as they head back to their hometown and the next bunch takes the 
watch from them. They always seem replaceable with one another. Only one of my 
interlocutors is able to remember a name of a conscript whom she met, and it is probably 
because he was the gardener of a house which was given to the general officer father. 
However, one of the distinctive features of 'askerabi's for children is their storytelling. They 
carry the stories of their hometowns, their lovers and families to children. As the soldiers 
tell, the children listen and give wings to their imagination. The warmth of feeling attached 
to people whom they do not know, but related through the stories of their 'askerabi's 
envelop them:    
 
"Asker abi [şehir 1]’i çağrıştırıyor, [şehir 2]’yi çağrıştırıyor.  Asker abi vardır 
ya, hayatımda vardır yani. Mesela [şehir 1]’de asker abi dediğimiz, adını hâlâ 
bilmiyorum, sadece asker abidir o, giderdik böyle yanına, saçma sapan 
hikâyeler anlatırdı, ‘Şu kadar günüm kaldı, bu kadar günüm kaldı,’ falan diye. 
Şu an olsa başka da ben o zamanlar anlamıyorum tabii. Dinlerdik asker abinin 
yanına oturup. ... Zaten benim hatırladığım [kadarıyla], bütün asker abilerin 
anlatacak uzun hikâyeleri vardı. [Şehir 1]’dekilerin de vardı, [şehir 2]’dekilerin 
de vardı. Hep böyle hayatını anlatır. Oturup dinliyorsun yani. Belki şu an yolda 
görsen, ‘Ne anlatıyor bu,’ diyeceksin, ‘Bana ne,’ diyeceksin. Ama yok işte kız 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
was 7-8 years old and she had a saying. She used to say frequently, ‘Oh, then is this how 
it’s done in [this city]?’ (Laughing) It could be a very simple thing, a trifle. We would go to 
the [city] castle to bottle and drink the nice spring water flowing there and there she’d go, 
‘Oh, then is this how it’s done in [this city]?’ You’d look over the news, public opinion and 
the agenda of Turkey in the mainstream media. Then you’d see the circumstances there, the 
worldviews of the local people, their own public opinion and agendas. When you figure out 
that there is not much connection between the two, you say that ‘So, we had not known 
about this place. We had been unfamiliar to [this city]. There has been this issue then.’ But 
when you return [to the Western part of the country], you see that the same old agenda of 
the country still prevails.” 
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arkadaşını anlatıyor, memleketini anlatıyor. Oturup dinliyorsun böyle 
saatlerce."226 
 
"Onlarla [asker abilerle] biz çok uğraşırdık. Daha doğrusu çok severdik. Onlar 
da bizi çok severdi. Devamlı oyunumuza dâhil olurlardı. Mesela mutlaka 
memleketleriyle ilgili şeyler anlatırlardı. Devamlı sevgililerini anlatırlardı. Ve 
onları dinlerdik. Düşünsene onlar orada kulübede nöbet tutuyor, biz etrafında 
oturmuşuz, onu dinliyoruz. Ama neyi dinliyoruz bilmiyoruz yani. Bizim için o 
aşk ne anlama geliyor, onun o yaşadığı yer nasıl bir yer, ailesi nasıl? O anı 
düşünmüyorsun. O anda böyle oturuyorsun, bakıyorsun. Kafanda, herkesin 
kafasında başka şeyler canlanıyor eminim yani. Hayal dünyası işte."227 
 
3.4. Gendering the Bodies of the Children 
 
 Gendering is perhaps the most important dimension of all the three, first because 
gender is constitutive of nationalist constructions (Altınay, 2011, p. 19). The sense of 
nation that the children grasp should be accompanied by a process of gendering which 
results in the production of males who see themselves as the protectors of the family and 
the nation, and females who represents the honor of the nation which they reproduce. But 
the never-ending process of gendering is significant, not only because of its crucial 
positioning in the nationalist constructions, but also because its importance in the 
                                                          
226 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Asker abi reminds me of 
[city 1]. It reminds me of [city 2]. … There is really such thing as asker abi. Asker abi has 
existed in my life. We would simply call them ‘asker abi’. For example, in [city 1], we 
would go to one of them. I still do not know his name. They were simply ‘asker abi’s to us. 
He’d recite ridiculous stories and say ‘I have so and so days left.’ I guess it would be 
different now, because back then, I was not aware of what they were telling us. We would 
sit down and listen. … As far as I can remember, all soldiers had long stories to narrate. 
Those in [city 1] had them, so had those in [city 2]. They’d always tell their lives. You 
would just sit and listen. If you would come across one of them on the streets now, ‘What 
the heck is he talking about?’ you’d perhaps ask to yourself. ‘Who cares?’ you’d say. But 
back then, he would tell his girlfriend, his hometown. And you would be all ears, for hours 
and hours.”  
227 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “We would mess with 
soldiers. Actually we would love them so much. They would love us too. They would 
participate in our games. They would definitely tell stories about their homelands. They 
would speak of their lovers all the time. And we would listen. Imagine a soldier on guard 
duty, and children sitting around him, listening. But we did not even know what we were 
listening. What does his love meant to us, what kind of a place was he living in, what’s his 
family like? We would not think of the moment we were living in. We would just sit down 
and look. I am sure that everyone was imagining different things. But such is the world of 
imagination.” 
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militarization of the nation. As Enloe (2000) states, "masculinity has been intimately tied to 
militarism, yet the two sets of ideas are not inseparable" (p. 235). The military institution 
has to control men to ensure that its ranks will be filled in a country which insists on male-
only conscription. The more they are militarized, the better it is for the institution which 
"can have a hard time getting all the manpower they think they need" (Enloe, 2000, p. 235). 
However it is not only men, but also women have to be controlled effectively by those in 
order to sustain the need of manpower they think they need (Enloe, 2000, p. 235). 
Otherwise, men's participation in the military enterprise cannot be guaranteed. But if men 
and women are to be controlled to ensure the success of the military enterprise, the bodies 
of children should be materialized within a heterosexual matrix of power, and gendered as 
males and females first. Especially for the military institution, which upholds idealized 
imaginations of masculinity and femininity, and in a setting where "compulsory 
heterosexuality", that is, the "dominant order in which men and women are required or even 
forced to be a heterosexual" (Salih, 2002, p. 49) prevails, the process of gendering the 
bodies of children gains utmost importance.    
 
 The military lodgings offer convenient zones for the gendering of children, by 
providing spaces to engage in games specifically predicated on distinctions between us and 
them winners and losers. Almost in all lodgings, there are large fields to play football, 
basketball, and many other sports depending on the size and residents of the lodgings, by 
virtue of which the children can and do compete with each other. In some cases, when 
opportunities to play such games are obstructed, the children and their parents may roll up 
their sleeves and repair, or even construct themselves zones of competition.228 Perhaps 
needless to say, many boys take these games seriously, as Kemal imparts in the following: 
 
"Futbol çok oynardım ben. O zamanlar gözlük takıyordum. Her yaz bir gözlük 
kırmışlığım vardır. Kesin suratımda böyle top patlar, ortadan ikiye ayrılırdı 
gözlük."229 
                                                          
228 From my field notes, after the interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013 
229 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I would play football so 
much. I had eyeglasses back then. I would break one each summer. The ball would always 
hit me in the face and my glasses would be torn asunder.”   
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 Of course nothing inheres in football, basketball or in any other sports which makes 
them men's sports. But, I argue that, taking serious the games which sublimate and simulate 
warfare, and characterized by a will to triumph and challenge modeled after warfare, or in 
Bourdieu's (2001) words, 'libido dominandi', is the linchpin of an 'illusio' constitutive of 
manhood (Bora T. , 2013, p. 492). There is an additional case which complicates things 
though. As the lodgings abound with zones to engage in competitive games and sports, the 
daughters of military families too often chime in and play football or basketball with boys. 
On the one hand, there are some girls who were happy to play in home with their dolls:  
 
"Oyuncaklarım da tam klasik kız çocuk oyuncakları gibi tarif edebileceğim 
oyuncaklar vardı, bebek falan."230 
 
"Bir sürü Barbie'lerim vardı. Onları böyle dizerdim, sürekli Barbie 
biriktirirdim. En çok Barbie biriktirirdim zaten. Çiftliğim falan vardı, onları 
hatırlıyorum."231 
 
 However, many prefer to go out and kick the football or shoot the basketball with 
boys in a setting where masculinity is privileged. For example three of my female 
interlocutors stated that they played football and basketball for a long time, even after the 
high school. Two of them were even licensed players:   
 
Yasemin: "Ben biraz erkek gibi takıldığım için, kızlarla takılmazdım. 
Erkeklerle futbol maçı oynardım."  
Sertaç: "Hep erkeklerle mi oynardın?" 
Yasemin: "Hep erkeklerle takılırdım evet. ... Hatta şöyle bir şey. Futbolda iyi 
oynadığım için, takımlarına seçmeye çalışıyorlardı, kavga çıkıyordu aralarında, 
‘Benim takımıma gel, hayır benim takımıma geleceksin,’ diye." 
Sertaç: "Baya oynadın mı futbol?"  
Yasemin: "Evet, oynuyordum. Sadece bir sene lisanslı futbolcu oldum. Onda 
da kalecilik yaptım. Onun dışında şu anda basket oynuyorum."232 
                                                          
230 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “I had typical girl toys, like 
dolls I mean.”  
231 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I had so many Barbie dolls 
that I could align them in a line. I would collect Barbie dolls the most. I had a farm [toy set 
of Barbie], I remember that.”  
232 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: “I was more like 
a boy so I would not hang around with girls. I would play football with boys.” Sertaç: “Did 
you play with boys all the time?” Yasemin: “Yes. … Actually, I was quite good at football 
and boys would fight with each other to pick me on their teams, like ‘Come to our team, no 
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"Futbol çok oynardım. Genellikle arkadaşlarım erkekti.  Kızlar da vardı ama 
kızlar da futbol oynardı. Hatta şöyle söyleyeyim, benim lise 2'ye kadar falan 
futbol oynamışlığım var."233 
 
 Although not desirable, the parents may tolerate the mischief of their daughters until 
later periods. One can argue that, the opposite, for example, boys who play with the dolls of 
their sisters and show 'feminine traits', would not be tolerated as much. Because, in a setting 
where the cohesion of a straight male community should be maintained as a priority, it is 
even more crucial to bring boys within the boundaries of hegemonic masculinity which 
contours and defines their body. On the other hand, the girls also seem to take notice that 
their behavior is not given a free-pass, but only excused for some time. For instance, Merve 
links her naughtiness during childhood to her engagement in practices which transgress 
traditional gender divides:   
 
"Ya ben zaten çok yaramaz bir çocuktum yani. Şu an benim çocukluğum 
benim yanımda olsa şımarık bir şey der atardım yani, o derece şımarıktım. Çok 
yaramazdım. Hiç kız arkadaşım yoktu çevremde. Sürekli erkeklerle top 
oynardım. Mavi önlük var etekle hani, çıkıp oynardım."234 
 
 In later periods though, the effort of parents for the 'proper' gendering of the bodies 
of their daughters seems to intensify. Ayşe argues that, especially after the age of 15, the 
parents invest more energy and thought for that end. She acknowledges that this condition 
is not only endemic to those who live in a military setting, but she suspects that the 
intensity is doubled, if one happens to be a daughter of a military officer:  
 
"[S]ubay kızı olmak deyince en fazla şey geliyor aklıma. Daha büyüdün ve 15 
yaşından sonra aileden daha fazla baskı alıyormuşsun gibi oluyor sanki baban 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
she has to play for our team.’” Sertaç: “Did you play it often?” Yasemin: “Yes, I did. I was 
a licensed player in football, only for a year though. I was a goalkeeper. Apart from that, I 
currently play basketball.”  
233 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “Generally I had male 
friends. I had female friends as well, but they would play football too. Actually I was 
playing football quite frequently until the tenth grade.”  
234 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I was very mischievous as a 
child. I was spoiled so much so that if my childhood version were to appear in front of me, 
I would instantly get rid of him. I was quite a scamp. I had no female friends. I would 
always play football with boys. I would play in a blue school uniform and a skirt, without 
thinking twice.”  
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subay olduğu zaman. Ama bence onun genelde Türkiye'de kız çocuğu olmakla 
daha fazla alakası var. Belki [baban] asker olduğu zaman bir de ikileniyordur o 
hadise. Küçükken subay oğlu olmak diye bir şey var bence gerçekten de. Onun 
böyle bir gazı, söylemek gerekirse, erkeklerin içine daha farklı bir şekilde 
yansıyor yani. Onlarda daha bir rekabet alanı oluşturuyor galiba."235 
 
 Zeynep's experience in those ages, appear to confirm the evaluations of Ayşe. She 
recounts in the following how she turned down the offer of a prestigious sports club, 
because she was preparing for the Fine Arts exams, an intrigue awakened after her mother's 
exhortations:   
  
Zeynep: "Futbol devam ediyor ama bu sırada. Lise sona kadar boş 
zamanlarımda yine futbol oynuyordum yani. O benim için çok güzel bir 
deneyimdi. İki yıl oynadım ben basketbol. Hatta profesyonel bir kulüpten, 
Fenerbahçe’den falan da teklif geldi de istemedim. Bu sırada Güzel Sanatlar 
Fakültesi'ne hazırlanma aşamam oldu. İşte şan, solfej dersleri almaya başladım. 
Çok farklı oldu, çok yoğun oldu benim için."  
Sertaç: "Güzel Sanatlar mı istemeye başlamıştın o dönemde?"  
Zeynep: "Evet."  
Sertaç: "O ilgi nasıl uyandı mesela?"  
Zeynep: "O çok tesadüf eseri. Annemin arkadaşının kızı konservatuar 
öğrencisiydi. Bir gün bize gelmişlerdi. İşte annem de ‘[Zeynep] de acaba 
olabilir mi?’ diye hep sorardı zaten. İşte kız şey yaptı, sesli denemeler olur ya 
hani, nota çıkarmaya çalışırsın falan. Öyle başladı. Sonra dedi ki: ‘Çok yatkın, 
ben hocalarımla görüşeyim.’”236 (emphasis mine) 
                                                          
235 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “Being the daughter of a 
military officer means… I mean, it feels like being more repressed by your parents past the 
age of 15. I think that this condition has more to do with being a daughter in Turkey 
however. Perhaps it is redoubled if your father works for the military. When little, there is 
really such thing as being a military officer’s son though. Boys happen to be more pumped 
up about it. As if it reverberates differently for them. It creates a competition zone for boys 
I suppose.”  
236 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: “I was still engaged 
in football. Actually I played football in leisure, until the end of the high school. It was a 
great experience. I played basketball for two years. I even received an offer from a 
professional sports club, Fenerbahçe, but I did not accept. Meanwhile, I was preparing for 
the Fine Arts exams. I was taking singing and solmization lessons. These were hectic and 
different times for me.” Sertaç: “Were you getting interested in Fine Arts back then?” 
Zeynep: “Yes.” Sertaç: “How did it occur to you?” Zeynep: “By a pure coincidence. The 
daughter of my mom’s friend was a student in the conservatory. She visited us one day with 
her mother. My mom would always ask if I could be one [student in the conservatory]. 
Anyway, the girl [the daughter of the mother’s friend] gave me a vocal trial. Then she said, 
‘She has talent. Let me talk to my teachers.’” (emphasis mine) 
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 The second point which contributes to the gendering of bodies along a heterosexual 
axis of gender relations is the discourses of military institution on homosexuality. The 
military setting is not only the one where masculinity is privileged and femininity is usually 
degraded, especially if it does not give way to the enhancement of militarized masculinity 
(Enloe, 2000), but also one where homosexuality is strictly forbidden. The military has an 
institutionalized way of dealing with homosexuality. Accordingly, in the judicial term, 
"unnatural intercourse" (gayri-tabii mukarenet) has historically been a ground for dismissal 
from the military. But the prohibition of homosexuality in the military should not be 
understood as a simple ban, by which the homosexuality is constrained to utter invisibility 
and silence. On the contrary, the military rather regulates the homosexuality within its 
repose, by immensely producing discourses on what it seeks to proscribe. Homosexuality in 
the military is thus never renounced completely, but rather, it is "retained in the speaking of 
the prohibition" (Butler, 1997b, p. 117). In Butler's words, "the military does not merely 
confront the homosexual as a problem to be regulated and contained, but it actively 
produces this figure of the homosexual, insisting that this homosexual be deprived of the 
power of self-ascription, remaining named and animated by the state and its powers of 
interpellation" (Butler, 1997b, p. 122). Perhaps this is why the most frequented swearwords 
in the military institution usually derive from the figure of the homosexual. For example, 
my father would passionately shout at the television the word 'faggot' when irritated, 
whether it be a politician, singer, talk-show host, ordinary citizen, commentator or a 
football analyst appearing on the screen, irrespective of their assumed sex. After his 
retirement, when he opened up a lawyer office with his fellow military judges who have a 
law degree and retired from the military as well, all would gather and passionately swore at 
'faggot' horses and jockeys which lost them money in horse-races. In line with Butler, I thus 
claim that, the military discourse animates the figure of the homosexual consistently and in 
graphic terms, only to prohibit the very same figure it produces, so that the construction of 
the "masculinist citizen" (Butler, 1997b, p. 121) becomes possible. Perhaps the 
simultaneous production of both crystallizes best in the following narrative of Mustafa, 
where he tells the times he spent in a home he rented a few years ago:         
 
"İki tane ev tuttum. İyi ama laubali çocuklardı. Çocuklardan ayıracaktım evi, 
ama ayırmadım. Pişman oldum. İbneliğin bini bir para. [Ama sonraki evimde] 
131 
bir tane süper ev arkadaşım vardı. Şurası dağılmayacak deriz, dağılmaz. Evde 
sigara içilmeyecek deriz, içilmez. Eve arkadaş çağırmayacağız deriz, kimse 
gelmez. Her zaman dürüstüzdür. Evde yemek yaparız, dışarıda yemeyiz. 
Disiplini bozmayız."237 
 
3.5. Militarization of the Children 
 
 Now we have to look at the third crucial dimension of subjection, namely 
militarization. First, I should give definitions of militarism and militarization. Roughly, the 
widespread definition of militarism goes as the unquestioning embrace of military values, 
ethos, principles and attitudes above other considerations in ways which shape one's daily 
practices and blur the distinctions between peace and war, military and civilian (Vagts, 
1959 [1937]; Belge, 2013; Öztan, T., 2013; Altınay, 2004a; Sjoberg & Via, 2010). It is an 
ideology, "a set of ideas and structures that glorify practices and norms associated with 
militaries" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 2). Accordingly, we can define militarization as a social and 
gendered process (Enloe, 2000) by which the militarist ideology becomes transposed onto 
other realms of life and institutionalized (Altınay, 2004b; Altınay, 2009). But is it possible 
to define both militarism and militarization in a specific way which would help us to have a 
better grasp on the militarization of 'womenandchildren' of military families? Because, just 
as the social process of militarization cuts across the binaries of state/civil society, 
centre/periphery and inside/outside (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 32), the 'womenandchildren' in 
military families also cuts across such divides, but most importantly, the one between what 
is civilian and military. The 'womenandchildren' are seen on the one hand relevant enough 
by the military institution to let them into its own borders, but not so much, on the other 
hand, to confer them with full membership, because the institutional discourse pinpoints 
them as military dependents. At this juncture, I especially find Enloe's definition of 
militarization suitable for taking a more nuanced look at the case of children in our context. 
According to Enloe (2000), "militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a 
                                                          
237 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “I rented a house two times. 
[In the first one], [t]hey [the flat mates] were good but saucy kids. I thought to move out 
somewhere else, but I did not. I regretted that decision. Faggotry was off the charts. [But in 
the next rental] I had a great flat mate. When we say that a particular place in the house will 
be kept tidy, it is kept tidy. When we say no smoking in the house, no one smokes. When 
we say no friends will be invited to the house, no one comes. We are always honest. We 
cook home. We do not eat outside. We keep the discipline.”    
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thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its-well being 
on militaristic ideas" (p. 3). Enloe's emphases on control and dependence in her definition 
are quite crucial and relevant to the content of this research for proposing a distinguished 
formulation for the militarization of 'womenandchildren' of military families. I claim that, 
the militarization of the 'womenandchildren' of military families is a process by which their 
bodies are made subjects dependent on the military institution. The militarization of them is 
to make them military dependents. It is to forge correspondences between the bodies that 
the judicial discourse of the military law pigeonholes as military dependents and the 
institutional and judicial discourse itself. Then, the question that we have to answer is as the 
following: What are the practices common and specific to the experience of childhood 
within the military complex by which the children are brought into the institutional and 
judicial discourse?  
 
 First of all, we can again address the games. For example, sometimes the children 
play games with toys which replicate war equipments:  
 
"O zamanlar işte silahlar falan yok. Boncuklu tabanca. O şeylere falan sarardık. 
Onlarla ilgilendirdik."238 
 
"Benim oyuncaklarım direkt arabalardı ve asker, hani minyatürler vardır ya, 
onlardandı. Çok severdim. Ben pek oyuncakla oynamayı da sevmem açıkçası. 
Bebek, işte evcilik falan onları hiç sevmiyorum."239 
 
"Benim çocukluğumda doğum günü klişesi çok yaygındı. Mesela doğum 
günün olacak, bir önceki gün gidip bütün arkadaşlarının evine annelerinden 
izin istersin. ... Onlar da gider sana kıytırık bir hediye alır. Kitap alır, kalem 
alır. Genelde kitap, oyuncak. Hatta bir doğum gününü hatırlıyorum, 3 tane aynı 
oyuncak gelmişti. Oyuncak da polis seti, kask, plastik cop, kemer. Plastik bir 
şey için büyük, gösterişli duran bir hediye yani. Plastikten olduğu için değeri 
yüksek değil, ama kocaman. Aynı şeyden üç tane gelmişti. Her rengi vardı. 
                                                          
238 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “There were not much guns to 
play with back then. [There were] air soft toy guns. We would indulge in such things. We’d 
be interested in them.” 
239 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I had toy cars and soldiers. 
You know these plastic miniature soldier figures, right? I’d love them so much. Actually I 
don’t like much playing with toys. I hate dolls or playing house.”   
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Sonra ne yapıyordun? İki tanesini açmıyordun. Bir sonraki doğum gününde 
belki alan çocuğa geri veriyordun."240 
 
 But, it is not as if only the children of military families play with toy guns and 
engage in militarized games. We should bring into consideration the spatial organization of 
the military complex, which offers quite favorable conditions to indulge in games, which 
are not imitable in the life outside easily. For example, military lodgings often provide the 
opportunity for children to simulate the conditions of warfare in a large-scale, as Kemal 
narrates in the following: 
 
Kemal: "İşte bu külah yapıp ufak borulardan hani silah gibi yaparsın."  
Sertaç: "Tüftüf!"  
Kemal: "Tüftüf hesabı. Onu çok oynardık lojmanın içinde olduğumuz için. 
[…]’da 12 blokluk bir lojmanda oturuyorduk. İşte basket sahası, voleybol 
sahası, kömürlük mömürlük bir sürü yer vardı o tarz şeyler oynamak için. Bir 
de belki bilirsin böyle, askeri lojmanlarda klasik, birinci katın balkon 
hizasında, kapının üstünde çıkma yerde bir beton kısım vardır. Onun üstüne 
çıkabilirsin falan. Oradan aşağıdakini vurursun bilmem ne. İşte onu oynardık."  
Sertaç: "Boruları siz de bakkaldan falan mı yaptırıyordunuz?"  
Kemal: "İşte orada, çarşıdan yaptırırsın, kestirirsin. Mesela iki tane boru 
alırsın. İki boru arasına kibrit kutusu alır bantlarsın, ikili olur mesela o. 
Kendince tasarım uydurursun işte. Onun mesela üstüne bir şey koyarsın 
dürbünlü olur mesela. Onun içinden bakarsın dürbünlü olur hesabı."  
Sertaç: "Baya kalabalık mı oynuyordunuz peki?"  
Kemal: "Aynen. Çok kalabalık oynuyorduk ve arazi olarak da çok büyük bir 
yerde oynuyorduk biz. Öyle bir tane apartmanın köşesinde değil de baya tüm 
lojman hesabı."241 
                                                          
240 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “During my childhood, 
birthday parties were quite widespread. Let’s say you have a forthcoming birthday. You 
would visit the mothers of your friends a day before and ask for permission. … Then they’d 
go and buy you crappy gifts, you know, like books or pencils. Usually they’d buy books or 
toys. I remember one birthday where I got three of the same toys. It was a police kit with a 
helmet, plastic baton and belt. For something plastic, it kind of looked flashy. It would not 
worth much though, as it was out of the plastic. But it was huge. I received three of the 
same, in all possible colors. So what would you do next? You would not unpack the two 
and in the next birthday you would perhaps give it back to the child who bought it to you.”  
241 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: Kemal: “We would make 
cones out of small pipes and use them as guns.” Sertaç: “Blowpipes!” Kemal: “Yeah, like 
blowpipes. We would play it in the lodgings. We were staying in the military lodgings of 
[…] where there are twelve blocks. There were coal yards, basketball and volleyball courts 
to play such things. Maybe you know it. In the military lodgings, there are places made of 
concrete above the entrance doors of each blocks, at the first floor level, protruding to the 
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 Mustafa, on the other hand, while talking about the games he played acknowledges 
that he would not be an officer had he not seen the chain of command in his childhood:  
 
"Yani çocuklar oyundan ne anlayacak zaten. Askercilik oynuyorsun. Emir-
komuta zincirini görüyorsun. Emir-komuta çok hoşuma giderdi. Belki subay 
olmazdım asker çocuğu olup görmesem."242 
 
 As Mustafa confirms, knowing the hierarchies embedded in the institution, ranks of 
officers, chain-of-command, names of guns and vehicles and many other things related to 
the military and warfare makes an impact on the life course of children. But more important 
to their militarization in particular and subjection in general, I suggest, is the institutionally 
constructed conditions of children's isolation. Because, ensured by the effective control 
over their access to the life outside, by virtue of gateways and fences installed by the 
military institution all over the place, their isolation also amounts to the institutional control 
over the "convergence with other discursive regimes, whereby inadvertently produced 
discursive complexity” may "undermine the teleological aims of normalization" (Butler, 
1997a, p. 93). Put differently, discursive convergences constitute one venue where the 
possibility of subversion and resistance to normalization appears (Butler, 1997a, p. 93). 
And military institution's governmentality concerning children is rather based on the 
minimization of such convergences. This is by no means to argue that the military 
institution offers these children a setting where there is no heterogeneity, or discursive 
complexity. But it is one thing to argue that there are heterogeneity and discursive 
complexity involved in military settings, and quite another to posit that they overlap with 
the heterogeneity and multitudes in the life outside. Therefore, I conclude that, by 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
outside. You could climb there and shoot those below. We’d play that game.” Sertaç: “Did 
you get the pipes from the grocery too?” Kemal: “From here and there. You could find 
them downtown and have them cut. For example, you’d get two pipes and tape a matchbox 
in between. Then it would become a double gun. You can design however you want. You 
would add something to the top of the pipe and make it a sniper. You would look through 
it.” Sertaç: “Did you play it with a crowd?” Kemal: “Exactly. We would play it in hordes 
and on a zone range spanning a huge tract of land. We would play it across the whole 
lodgings area, not just in the corner of some apartment.” 
242 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “What do children know 
about playing games anyway. You play soldiers. You see the chain of command. Seeing the 
chain of command had an appeal. I would not be a military officer perhaps, had I not been a 
military brat.” 
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controlling convergences, the military institution controls the possibility of resistance and 
subversion. This is why, many children, when exposed to the life outside, usually through 
their education or working life, feel disenchanted:  
 
"Bana o zamana [ilkokula başlayana] kadar herkesin babası askermiş gibi 
geliyordu. Yani hiç sorgulamamışım o zaman, anladın mı? Sanki herkesin 
babası üniforma giyip çıkıyor evden gibi geliyordu. ... Babası asker olmayan 
çok fazla arkadaşım yoktu yani. Yakın, sık sık vakit geçirebileceğim arkadaşlar 
hep asker çocuğuydu."243 
 
"[B]u askeri ortamdan çıkıp normal sivil hayata başlayıp, bu genelde 
üniversiteyle birlikte başlar, bir süre sonra diyorsun ki: ‘Bambaşka bir hayat 
varmış dışarıda.’ İşin içindeyken anlamıyorsun bunu. 15 yaşındayken bunu 
fark etmiyorsun. Ama şu anda fark ediyorum. O zamanlar dışarıdaki insanlarla 
çok barışık olmuyorsun. Ama sen gidip kendine bir yaşam görüşü oturttuktan 
sonra bazı şeylerle barışıyorsun. ... Şimdi mesela bana çok daha normal geliyor 
daha muhafazakâr insanlar, daha kapalı insanlar. Umurumda değil daha 
doğrusu, öyle söyleyeyim yani. Böyle insanlar olduğunun da bilincindeyim. Ya 
da tam tersi insanlar olduğunun da bilincindeyim. Yani o zaman daha kapalı bir 
çevrede olduğun için herkes seninmiş gibi geliyor, senin ailenmiş gibi. Öyle 
yaşıyorlarmış gibi. Herkes 30 Ağustos'ta baloya gidiyormuş falan gibi geliyor 
da öyle bir dünya yok abi.  Kimisi için bir nefret nedeniyken kimisi için sevinç 
nedeni. Ama o zamanlar öyle hissediyorsun. Aslında onu hissetmiyorsun da, 
şimdi öyle olduğunu düşünüyorsun. Kısırmış biraz diyorsun. Hayatın bazı 
tatları, renkleri yok. Yani ne bileyim, bazı şeyleri bilmiyorsun işte.  Dışarıdaki 
adamların esnaf muhabbetini bilmezsin. Ya da çok zengin insanların hayatını 
bilmezsin. Çok fakirliği bilmezsin. Selamünaleyküm, aleykümselâm 
muhabbetini bilmezsin falan. Bunlardan hep ayrık yaşarsın. Kendin hayata 
karıştığın zaman öğreniyorsun bunları yani."244   
                                                          
243 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “Until the primary school, it 
seemed to me that everyone has a soldier father, leaving home in uniform. Prior to then, I 
had not questioned it, you know. … I had not many civilian friends. My close friends were 
always among children of military officers.”  
244 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “When you leave the military 
setting and enter the civilian life, and it generally takes place through the university, after a 
while you say that: ‘The life outside is a whole new ball game.’ You don’t dig it when you 
are around 15 years old and inside [the military setting]. But I dig it now. Back then, you 
are not in peace with the people outside. Only after settling on a world-view, you can come 
into reconciliation with some stuff. … For example, I regard conservative people as 
ordinary now. I don’t care, to be more honest. I know that these people or the opposite of 
these people do exist. But when you live in an enclosed environment, you suppose that 
everyone is like you, as if they are the family. As if everyone attends a ball on August 30, 
the Victory Day. There is no such thing of course. [The Victory Day] is a source of 
repulsion for some and a source of joy for others. Back then, you feel like that though. 
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 This brings us to another crucial conclusion to draw. The effects of normalization, 
both in and outside the context of the militarization of children, take a foothold in the lives 
of children, less through prohibitions, injunctions or indoctrinations, and more through the 
en-compassion of their lives by the institution. The majority of children comply with the 
conditions within which they live. This happens not because they are enforced or 
brainwashed to do so, through constant checks, injunctions and prohibitions, but basically 
because the experience of 'military dependency' can be empowering and disempowering at 
once.   
 
 Central to the dialectics of empowerment and disempowerment are economical 
considerations. The advantages offered by the military institution, on the one hand, relieve 
the children from anxieties concerning the hardships and costliness of the life outside. The 
life seems cheaper within the military complex, and it appears to remain so for a 
foreseeable future, if one accords well: 
 
"[Askeri kamp] valla güzel ya. Böyle 3 liraya 5 liraya Sex on the Beach falan 
içtiğin, hakikaten süper, ultra ucuz imkânları olan [bir yer].  Güzel ya, güzel 
zamanlardı yani. Çocuksun ve hoşuna gidiyor yani. Mesela ben bu sene yazın 
askerden sonra bir tatile gittim kendim. Dışarıda böyle iyi bir otele falan gittim. 
Dünyanın parasını verdim abi. O imkânları sağlamak kolay değil yani. Yok 
uçak bile biletiydi, yok bir gece kalma, 300 lira, bilmem ne..."245 
 
"Asker çocuğu olmak bence şu şekilde güzel: Sağladığı olanaklar bakımından 
paha biçilemez bir şey bence. Şu an yurdundan faydalanıyoruz yani, lojmanlar 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Actually you don’t feel it in the past, but you come to think of it later on. You say, it had 
been a bit barren. You say, certain flavors and colors of life had been lacking. I mean, you 
don’t know about certain things. You don’t know about the shopkeepers talk. You don’t 
know the lives of very rich people. You don’t know the poverty. You don’t know how to 
say ‘-Selamünaleyküm,’ ‘-Aleykümselâm.’ You live in a discrete world. You come to learn 
about those when you become involved in life.”  
245 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “(Sarcastically) [The military 
vacation camp] is good indeed. [It is a place where] you can drink Sex on the Beach for a 
penny. It is ultra cheap. Those were good times. You are a child and you like it. For 
example, I went on a vacation on my own dime in the previous summer, after finishing the 
military service. I stayed in a nice hotel. Man, I spent money like water. It is not easy to 
provide yourself the means offered by the military. [You have to pay for] [t]he plane 
tickets, 300 TL hotels fee a night and so forth.”  
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olsun, orduevleri olsun, kamplar olsun, bu yönden ele alınca muazzam geliyor 
bana ki hâlâ faydalanmaya devam ediyoruz."246 
 
"Oo! [Ordu Pazarı deyince bir şeyler] çağrışmaz mı hiç! Ordu Pazarı deyince 
aklıma genelde ucuz abur cubur geliyor. Çocukken çılgınlar gibi Ordu 
Pazarı'na gider, cips, çikolata falan alır sonra dönerdik mesela."247 
 
"Rahat olurduk. Askeriyede mesela kantin vardır. Oralar mesela çok ucuzdur. 
Askeriyenin en büyük şeyi odur zaten. Herkes, dışarıdaki insanlar da, ‘Sizin 
oralar çok ucuz ya, bir şeyler getirsene,’ falan derler. Hep o muhabbet olur 
yani. Ama gerçekten de öyle. Çok ucuzdu yani. O yönden de bir sıkıntısı 
olmazdı."248 
 
 On the other hand, the routine practice of cheaper consumption also may have 
backlashes for these children. They may find difficulty in adjusting to the economic 
conditions outside, as Nuri articulates in the rest of his statements, whose beginning was 
quoted above: 
 
"Oradan hemen dezavantajlara bağlayacak olursam, hani ekonomik durumdan, 
işte çok ucuz ya her şey, ona göre endeksliyorsun kendini ve bu çok büyük 
dezavantaj olabiliyor dışarıdayken. ... [D]edim ya, o ucuzluğa alışıyorsun. Her 
şey ucuzdu. Lokantalar ucuz, her şey ucuz yani. Yarı fiyatına diyebilirim yani 
dışarıdaki fiyatına göre her şey. Oradan çıkınca, tabii [bir de baba] emekli 
olunca ekonomik olarak düşüyorsun. E [baba] bir de iş bulamayınca... Tabii 
ondan da bahsetmek lazım aslında. Genelde asker emeklileri çok iş bulamaz 
hani. Yapamaz öyle özel sektörde. Alışamaz ona. O yüzden hani böyle asker 
çocukları dışarıya, [dışarının] ekonomik durumuna çok fazla ayak 
uyduramıyorlar, zorlanıyorlar. Bir dezavantajı o."249 
                                                          
246 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “I think being a military brat 
is great in the sense that the means provided by the military are unmatchable. I stay in its 
dormitories. It has lodgings, Officers’ Clubs and vacation facilities. In that regard, it is 
really incredible so I still benefit from them.”  
247 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “Ah! Of course it [the military 
supermarkets] rings a bell! It reminds me of inexpensive junk food. When I was a child, I’d 
go there and went berserk over chips and chocolates.”  
248 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “We were comfortable. For 
instance, there were commissaries in the military. The prices there were really cheap. As a 
matter of fact, that’s the most important thing of the military. Everybody, I mean, the 
people outside would say, ‘Everything is so inexpensive in there. Please bring us 
something.’ It’s ever the case. But they really are [inexpensive]. It was very cheap. So it 
gave us no trouble.”   
249 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “If I jump to the disadvantages, 
growing accustomed to the inexpensiveness of everything can turn into a disadvantage 
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 Coupled with the limited affiliation with the market until later ages because of their 
isolation and jobs of parents, the children's insecurity against the economic conditions of 
the life outside may occasion their sinking into the military complex, or a painful sobering, 
as Kemal suggests in the following:  
 
"Senin baban hiçbir zaman boyundan büyük borç almamış. Ya da bilinmeyen 
sularda yüzmemiş.  Soru işareti olan şeyleri denememiş. Girişimcilik ruhu 
denilen şeyden haberi bile yok. Garanti. Hep garanti, hep garanti, hep garanti. 
‘Aman çocuğum aman. Aman, aman, aman, aman...’ Ee, böyle aman aman 
yetiştin mi sen de aman aman oluyorsun yani. Sen nasıl bu sarmaldan 
çıkacaksın ki yani? Birden vahiy mi gelecek sana 20 yaşına gelince, ‘Oğlum 
çok süper bir şey geldi [aklıma], bütün hayatımı riske atacağım, şöyle 
yapacağım,’ falan [diye]? Yapamıyorsun bunu, anladın mı?  Böyle 
görünmeyen zincirlerin var aslında senin. Bu sadece askerliğe özgü değil. Bu 
tarz hayatlara özgü bir şey. Yani benim hayatta, mesela şöyle olsaydı 
diyeceğim bir tek şey böyle olabilirdi. Annem babam mesela farklı meslek 
gruplarından, kendi mesleklerini yapan, atıyorum mesela en basitinden bir 
pastane sahibi olsa. Çay ocağı işletse bile olur. En azından insan ilişkilerini 
bilir, müşteri ilişkilerini bilir. Bunu tanım olarak bilmez, ama uygulama olarak 
bilir. Yapar ama bunun literatür tanımını bilmez. Sen de gidersin eğitimini 
öğrenirsin, tanımını öğrenirsin, babandan da işi öğrenirsin, başka bir işe 
kalkarsın. Mesela bunu görmediğin zaman hep zannediyorsun ki okul 
okuyacaksın okuyacaksın, bitince böyle birden bire bir şey olacak. Çalışacaksın 
para verecekler. Ee çıkıyorsun, öyle değilmiş abi hayat. Bambaşkaymış."250 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
when you are outside. … As I said, you get used to that inexpensiveness. Everything was 
cheap. Restaurants were cheap, everything was cheap. Maybe for the half price when 
compared to the outside. When you leave that place and your father retires from the 
military, you decline economically… Actually one should address that as well. Usually the 
retired military officers cannot find jobs. They cannot manage in the private sector. They 
cannot get used to it. The children of military officers thus find difficulty in keeping up 
with the economic conditions of the outside life. They struggle. It is one of the 
disadvantages.”     
250 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Imagine that your father 
never borrowed money beyond his capacity. He never swam in unknown waters. Never 
tried things with question marks on them. He is completely ignorant of what is called the 
entrepreneurial spirit. He always takes the guaranteed route. Always the guaranteed route, 
always. ‘Oh my dear, be careful. Be very careful.’ When you are raised like that, you also 
become prone to go: ‘Oh my dear…’ How are you going to get out of this loop? Will you 
have a revelation when you turn 20, like: ‘Oh man, a great idea occurred to me last night, I 
will risk all my life to do this and that.’? You cannot do it, you feel me? You have invisible 
chains pulling you down. It is not only specific to the military. It applies to all lives similar 
to this. I mean, the only way I could have been better off would be something like this. 
Let’s say my parents have a different profession, like running a patisserie. Even a tea house 
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 Many children also feel anxious to be discriminated in their applications to work in 
public offices and private companies, especially since the last decade. This may also entail 
their turning to the bubble of the military institution, where they know that they can find 
economical relief, as long as they meet conditions to enter and comply: 
 
"Mesela şu an kamuda bir yere girmek istesem çok mümkün olacak bir şey 
değil yani. Şu an zaten askere bakılan gözle benim bir yere girmemin pek 
olasılığı yok diye düşünüyorum. Ama böyle olmalı mı? Bence olmamalı. 
Sonuçta kimse öyle ben asker çocuğu olarak doğmak istiyorum diye bir tercih 
yapmıyor. Ayrıca bundan da hiçbir zaman pişmanlık duymadım, gurur 
duyuyorum. Ama işte insanın kendi kişisel gelişimine, kendi eğitimine bakmak 
yerine bu tür şeylere bakıyorlar maalesef."251 
 
"Mesela şu an bir devlet dairesinde işe girmek istesen, önce bir geçmişini 
araştırdıkları için, geçmişi değil de hani saçma sapan sorular soruyorlar ya… 
Asker çocuğusun diye işe almayacak yerler var bence. Ben henüz iş aramadım 
ama çevremden duyduğum şeyler bunlar. Ben de mezun olacağım, aynı şey 
benim de başıma gelecek diye düşünüyorum."252 
 
Zeynep: “Hâlâ onun doruk noktasını yaşıyorum, ‘Acaba yanlış bölüm mü 
seçtim?’ diye. Yanlış bölüm mü seçtim derken tabii ki çok mutluyum 
okuduğum bölümden. Ama benim için bir gelecek sağlayacağını 
düşünmüyorum açıkçası. En azından bu ortamda. O da babamın mesleğiyle 
alakalı.”  
Sertaç: "Nasıl zorluklarla karşılaşacağını düşünüyorsun mesela tam olarak?" 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
would do it. They’d have at least known about human relations, or customer relations. They 
would not have known it by the book definition, but by practice. Then you’d go and learn 
the job from your father. Then you’d learn the book definitions by getting education and try 
something else. When you have never experienced it, you suppose that you will study 
enough in the school, something miraculous will happen. You will work and they will pay 
you. But then you come out and realize that the life is a whole different ball game.”           
251 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Nowadays it seems impossible 
for me to work in the public sector. With the country’s current perception of the military, I 
have little to zero chances. Should it be that way? I don’t think so. After all, no one chooses 
to be the child of a military officer. And I have never regretted that. I am proud of it. 
Unfortunately, they take into account such things instead of people’s education and self-
improvement.”   
252 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Now, I guess I cannot work 
in public offices for being a military brat, because you know, they are making background 
checks and asking ridiculous questions in job interviews. I did not start looking for a job 
yet. I heard it around though. I will graduate from school and I think I will also go through 
that.”  
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Zeynep: "Yani direkt ayrımcılık. Bunun başka bir açıklaması yok. Benim öyle 
subay çocuğu arkadaşım çok var. Asker çocuğu diye işe alınmayan çok var, o 
kadar başarılı olmasına rağmen. Özel şirketlerde de öyle. Mesela büyük 
holdinglerde babasının mesleğini soruyorlar, öğrendikleri anda ‘Biliyorsun işte 
durumları, o yüzden seninle iş yapamayız,’ deyip geri çevirdikleri oluyor. 
Bunu da etrafından gördüğün için benim mesela şu an iş aramamda da seçici 
davranmamın nedeni o olabilir. Çünkü ben biliyorum. Alınmayacağımı, kabul 
edilmeyeceğimi biliyorum. Benim bilgi birikimime bakmadan beni direkt 
eleyeceklerini biliyorum. O daha yeni yeni olmaya başladı açıkçası."253 
 
 However, the causes of their turning to the military complex do not only boil down 
to economical considerations. Another thing that I should attract attention is the prestige the 
children may enjoy within the borders of the military institution. The downfall of the 
military in public perception since the last decade may also entrench the children’s desire to 
stay inside the complex. The children may be unemployed, unsuccessful in the school, 
lacking confidence, perhaps no more than wandering somebodies in the life outside, but 
they know that they can command a modicum amount of respect within the military 
complex, especially from conscripts, if they can 'maintain a certain balance'. Unlike the 
cafes outside where they have to order a service to avoid the contemptuous looks and 
receive the recognition of waiters and shopkeepers, they can prefer perching on a chair as 
much as they want in an Officers’ Club, without being disturbed and disrespected. They 
can cling once more to the sense of being an elite member of a society in which this sense 
seems slipping away quite fast these days for those having ties with the military institution. 
As they age, they can be hailed by conscripts as 'commanders'. They can build up their 
                                                          
253 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: “Right now I am at 
the peak of it, asking myself: ‘Did I choose the wrong career path?’ Don’t get me wrong. I 
am quite happy to choose it, but I think it will not make a good future. I mean, at least 
under current conditions. And this is related to my father’s profession.” Sertaç: 
“Specifically, what kinds of difficulties do you think you might face?” Zeynep: “I mean, 
flat out discrimination. It has no other explanation. I have many friends who are children of 
military officers. There are many among them who were not employed, despite their 
success. The private companies are also the same. For example, the bigger holdings ask you 
the job of your father. As soon as they learn it, they turn you down by saying: ‘You know 
how it is nowadays. Therefore we cannot work with you.’ I see it around and perhaps this is 
why I am selective in looking for a job. Because I know what will happen. I know that I 
will not be accepted. I know that they will eliminate me, with no regards to my knowledge. 
It is a recent thing.”  
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confidence and mood, while requesting a cup of tea in the process as well, for the half price 
too:  
 
"Hiçbir zaman çocuklara kötü davranıldığını görmedim ben askerler tarafından 
da. Anlaşırdım bir şekilde. Ama senin de götün kalkmayacak. Dengeyi 
tutturacaksın. Sen rica etmeyi bileceksin o yapmak zorunda olsa da, sana 
hizmet vermek zorunda olsa da. Ben hep rica eder gibi davranırdım yani. 
Yoksa öbür türlü olduğu zaman lahmacunun içine sıçar yani. Öyle bir dengeyi 
tutturacaksın, kendi iyiliğin için yani."254  
 
 Finally, the securitization of the lives of children may increase their dependence to 
the military institution. Indeed, in some narratives, the concerns of my interlocutors for 
their safety, security and trust to civilian life seem quite exaggerated. As these interlocutors 
perceive the life through the lens of security, by subscribing to the pervasive discourse of 
security also disseminated by the military institution, the spaces offered by the institution, 
with its fences, walls, sentry posts and guards, become better destinations for them to 
respite from the complexity, disorder and insecurity of the daily life outside. Accordingly, 
in those narratives the words comfort and ease often go hand-in-hand with the words trust 
and security: 
 
"[…]’da ilk defa eve çıktığımda lojman dışında bir yerde kaldığımda ben 
bocalamıştım, ‘Nasıl oluyor?’ falan diye yani.  Hâlbuki dışarıdaki bir insanın 
bütün hayatı öyle geçer. Bizim ilk defa böyle bir deneyimimiz oluyor yani. 
[Askeriyede] Her şey sana daha güvenli geliyor. Kendini daha rahat 
hissediyorsun. Ortamı biliyorsun çünkü. Bir şeyden çekinmene korkmana 
gerek yok. Ama dışarıdaki hayat sana bir anda daha korkutucu gelebiliyor."255 
(emphases mine) 
 
                                                          
254 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I have never seen a soldier 
who treats the children badly. I would get along with them anyhow. But you should not get 
ahead of yourself. You should find the balance. You have to know how to request, even 
though he is under obligation to serve you. I would always approach them in a requesting 
manner. Otherwise, they’d take a shit on your lahmajoon. You should find the balance, for 
your own good.” 
255 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “When I first rented a house in 
[…], I was confused, like ‘How on earth…?’ In fact, the people outside pursue all their 
lives like that. But I was going through that for the first time. [In the military] you feel 
more in security. You feel more comfortable. Because you know the place. You don’t need 
to be afraid of anything. The life outside can appear more frightening.” (emphases mine) 
142 
"Lojman bir kere güvendi her şeyden önce. Aile demekti benim için. Çünkü 
bütün arkadaşların orada, bütün çevren orada. Herkesle muhabbetin var. Bir 
şeyden korkmuyorsun, bir sıkıntın yok. Dışarı çıkıp girme saatinde... Rahat bir 
ortam. Basket sahasıdır, şudur budur, olanakları çok fazla. Seni kısıtlayacak 
hiçbir şey yoktu hani. ‘Hapis gibi buraya da tıkıldık kaldık,’ diyecek hiçbir şey 
yoktu. Çünkü imkânları vardı hani. Aile ve güven ortamı diye 
tanımlayabilirim."256 (emphases mine) 
 
"[Subay çocuğu olmanın] avantajları, hani ilişkilerde bir kere güven sorunu 
olmuyor. Tanıyorsun, çok rahat [ilişki] kurabiliyorsun."257 (emphases mine) 
 
 To recapitulate, as the children feel that their empowerment 'inside' outweighs their 
disempowerment inside and outside, they become more prone to feel at ease within the 
military institution, which turns into a ‘heart of a heartless world’258, as it were. The more 
they find themselves at ease and in peace, without feeling any pressure whatsoever on 
them, the more they come to depend on it: 
 
"[TSK deyince] direkt lojmanlar geldiği için [aklıma] bana huzur veriyor. 
Huzur demek, bağlılık demek."259 (emphases mine) 
  
 And those who succumb into the military complex peacefully usually lose contact 
with the discursive complexity of the life outside. They may even prefer to ignore it, 
because they feel that it offers nothing for their identity, self-improvement or well-being, 
unlike the military institution:    
 
                                                          
256 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “The military lodgings meant 
trust above all else. It meant family to me. Because all your friends, all your acquaintances 
are there. You can talk to everybody. You are not afraid of anything. You don’t have any 
problems. In the check in or check out times... I mean, it is a comfortable place. It provides 
many opportunities, like basketball courts and so forth. There was nothing to limit you. 
There was nothing to make you say, ‘We are trapped in here like a prisoner.’ Because it 
had many opportunities. I can define it as an environment of family and trust.” (emphases 
mine) 
257 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “The advantages of being a 
child of a military officer are... I mean, you don’t have trust issues in your relations. People 
know each other and you can easily establish relationships.”  (emphases mine) 
258 A Turkish saying which is generally used in the context of family.  
259 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “As the TSK immediately 
reminds me of military lodgings, it gives peace to my mind. It means peace and loyalty.” 
(emphases mine) 
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"Ben orada benliğimi bulduğum için direkt huzur geliyor. Orada işte insanlarla 
olan bağlılığım geliyor. Birbirimizle olan diyaloglarımız, yaşadıklarımız, 
deneyimlerimiz, paylaştıklarımız... Benim için hep olumlu şeyler geliyor. Şu 
son dönemlerdeki şeyleri o yüzden pek umursamıyorum açıkçası. Şey gibi 
düşünüyorum: ‘Aman kim ne konuşursa konuşsun, kim ne düşünürse 
düşünsün.’ Ben bu camianın içindeyim ve bütün 25 yılımda buranın içinde 
büyüdüm. Ben büyüdüm diyorum ve umursamıyorum. Huzur geliyor ya 
aklıma, başka hiçbir şey gelmiyor açıkçası. Mutluyum yani ben."260 (emphasis 
mine) 
 
 Sometimes, militarization may make its way into the process of subjectivation to the 
extent that, some even find themselves unable to imagine 'a life otherwise': 
 
"[Asker çocuğu olmasam] böyle bir hayattan haberim olmazdı yani. Bu kadar 
bilinçli olmayabilirdim. Bu kadar lojman hayatı, kamp hayatı, böyle çok güzel 
şeylerim olmayabilirdi. Düşünmek bile istemiyorum. Bilmiyorum, çok da 
güzel olmazdı herhalde. İyi oldu böyle."261 
 
3.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
After returning from my field trip, I was sitting in a café in İstanbul at night, sipping 
my drink and reading the transcriptions of the interviews I conducted. There were five 
people, three males and two females in their early twenties, sitting at the table next to mine, 
reminiscing over past memories with fervor in a loud conversation whose bits were 
extending to my ears. I diverted my attention from the transcriptions to the conversation 
nearby upon overhearing the story told by one of the males, without the slightest intention 
to eavesdrop. In a spirited manner, he was conveying to others a story about some bullet 
shells he found with his friends while playing hide and seek in the lodgings where he 
                                                          
260 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “It means peace to me 
because I found my inner self there. It reminds me of my attachment to people there. It 
reminds me of our dialogues, experiences and what we’ve shared together… It always 
evokes positive things. Therefore I don’t care about the recent events. I think this way: ‘No 
matter what they say or think, I am a part of this community and I spent 25 years here 
growing up.’ I grew up and I don’t care. It really means peace and not something else. I feel 
happy.” (emphasis mine) 
261 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I would be unaware of this life 
[were I not a child of a military officer]. I could not be as aware aw I now am. I would not 
have had such beautiful memories in military lodgings and vacation facilities. I do not even 
want to think about it. I don’t know. I guess it would not be good. It is fine as it is.” 
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stayed in Mardin. At least this was what I presumed. At first, I thought that my senses were 
playing tricks on me, as I have never been a reliable eavesdropper anyway. After cleaning 
my ears and checking myself for a moment to understand whether I was still sane, I began 
to listen, all ears to find out if he was specifically talking about military lodgings or 
something else. As I was trying to squeeze the best out of my eavesdropping skills, they 
went out for a cigarette. I followed the group to the street where the other four were 
listening to the rest of the story, or perhaps already to the next one. The next moment, the 
storyteller’s full sentences ringed in my ears: “How many people would see a terrorist alive 
in their entire lifetime? I did.” Then I was convinced that the storyteller was one of the 
people whom I had searched for months to conduct interviews. Although I was finished 
with the phase of interviewing and willing to start writing, my curiosity overwhelmed me. I 
approached in an excusing manner and asked:  “I am sorry, but I just lent an ear to your 
conversation. Are you a military brat?” Silence hung in the air for a moment, in an 
awkward way which propelled me to continue with a proper introduction of myself: “I am 
studying at Sabancı University and writing a thesis on military brats.” Raising his 
eyebrows, he replied me: “In which department?” After answering the question, I decided 
to pull the trick that helped me out of such grave moments of suspense many times: “I am 
interested in it, partially because I am also a military brat. My father was a military judge.” 
A trace of smile pervaded the faces in front of me, which confirmed my admission into the 
group. Then he answered: “Yes I am. My father is a gendarmerie colonel. But actually I am 
not the only military brat here. We are all military brats.” Then I learned that, they were 
university students, using an Officers’ Club nearby as a dormitory from where they went 
out for a drink. I grabbed a seat and they asked me about my father’s rank, his transfers, the 
places I’ve seen through and so forth. And I asked their in return, as mutual trust between 
both parties grew to relieve us of our hesitations. I left them my cell phone number, in case 
they want to participate, perhaps in a later study. Then we parted ways, for them to avoid 
any trouble entering the Officers’ Club at a late hour. None of them called back, maybe 
because they felt insecure about carrying a random encounter to a step forward.   
  
So, what is the moral of the story? What particularly intrigued me in this encounter 
was the reception of my claim to the identity of the military brat. All of a sudden, my 
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‘halfie’ status in the field smoothened over the tensions and hesitations, at least for a 
moment and to an extent enough to make a lively conversation possible. It is intriguing, 
because the children of military families, on the one hand, with their liminal existence 
within the military complex, neither as fully recognized members of the military institution, 
nor as complete outsiders, can help us to put into question many binaries, including the one 
posed between military and civilian spheres. However, on the other hand, the assumed 
ruptures between the two life words, namely the life inside and the life outside, alongside 
their inhabitants seem hardly bridgeable and taken for granted in the narratives of many 
interlocutors, as were they in the random encounter I transferred above until my 
identification through the military institution. Accordingly, one of the most interesting 
things that I took notice during the interviews I conducted is the readiness, if not 
willingness, of many interlocutors to espouse the identity of “the military brat,” or “the 
military child,” while pitting the military “us” against civilian “them”. For instance, my 
interlocutors never overtly addressed themselves as part of the civilian world outside. 
Instead, they enacted themselves in the narratives as part of the military world inside, often 
with an appeal to the term military brat, regardless of their father’s retirement from the 
military. This quality is evident in Nuri’s following narrative:  
 
“Orduevi deyince aklıma yine böyle ucuzluk aklıma geliyor. Her şey ucuz. 
Hani öyle bir yer ki, gidiyorsun ve insanlar hep aynı. Bazen hep aynı yerlerde 
oturuyorlar. Böyle bir şey sanki, Erzurumlular lokali. (Gülüşmeler) Herkes aynı 
yani, hiç değişmiyor böyle. Dışarıdan [tayinle] birileri gelir, onlarla tanışırsın. 
Onlar da bir anda senden olur.”262 
  
Keeping alive the binary oppositions between “us” and “them”, military and civilian, 
male and female, I claim, is one of the dimensions wherein lies the fate of the military’s 
                                                          
262 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “The Officers’ Club reminds 
me of inexpensiveness. Everything is so cheap. It is a kind of place which you find the 
same with same people sitting there whenever you go. Sometimes, they [the people in the 
Officers’ Club] always sit on the same place. As if it is a lounge for people coming from 
the same place, like the lounge of the people from Erzurum. (Laughs) Everybody is the 
same, nothing changes. Sometimes some people would comes from outside [through 
transfers] and you’d get acquaint with them. All of a sudden, they, too, would become one 
of you.”  
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enterprise to produce subjectivities which cater to its institutional interests. However, it is 
not the military, but the children who often pick up the slack and keep these oppositions 
alive, by blithely responding to the military institution which hails them as military 
dependents. Otherwise, the military brat as a distinct identity, and indeed a strong one to 
lay claim would not exist as it does. Just as there are no ‘police brats’, ‘judicial brats’ or 
‘educational brats’, there would be no reason for the ‘military brat’ to not disappear. 
Therefore, I claim that, the term ‘the military brat’ is rather about performing, expressing, 
claiming and doing an assumed identity instead of simply being the result of being born 
into a family with a military officer parent. And this is perhaps the major cause which 
keeps the military boat afloat, despite being loaded by its bulky outliers.      
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IV. CHILDREN EVALUATING POLITICS AND THE MILITARY 
 
4.1. The Relative Normalization 
 
 In their preface to the Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu [A Social Group, A 
Political Party: Army in Turkey] compilation, Bayramoğlu, İnsel and Laçiner (2004) 
identify TSK as an institution that talks much more than the militaries of other countries, 
but is disturbed by talks about itself (p. 9). Contrary to the military's silent position in 
democratic countries concerning political and social affairs, they suggest, it is not the 
military, but the society that is expected to remain mute in Turkey, unless it is to acclaim 
the institution (p. 9). Almost a decade has passed since their diagnosis. Meanwhile, Turkey 
has arguably seen the most dramatic changes ever to occur in the field of civil-military 
relations, most particularly with regards to the military's role in politics. Unlike the times 
during which Bayramoğlu, İnsel and Laçiner wrote, today the tables seem to have turned. 
Soldiers at the top of the military hierarchy no longer seem as much willing to partake in 
discussions concerning the social, political and economic conditions of the country, 
whereas the military as an institution, along with the 'controversial' deeds committed by its 
personnel has gained much more centrality, visibility and criticism in media and public 
discussions. The current chief of the general staff Necdet Özel's recent response to those 
who were asking the reasons of his silence can be illustrative in that regard. Özel's 
emphasis on his position as a public servant who ought to refrain from speaking as much as 
possible is indicative of the growing reluctance to issue statements, at least on part of the 
top rank military officers, on affairs other than those directly related to the military.263 
  
                                                          
263 A.A. (2013, October 21). Genelkurmay başkanı Necdet Özel: konuşmuyorum çünkü. 
Radikal, Retrieved December 7, 2013, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ozel_konusmuyorum_cunku-1156469 
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Many settled with considering the period, roughly starting with the rise of the 
Justice and Development Party (hereafter AKP) into power and the EU harmonization 
process, as a period of 'normalization'. It may be indeed safe to concede a relative 
normalization in Turkey, especially in the field of civil-military relations, after due legal 
and institutional reformations. But it is worthwhile to draw attention to two conditions with 
respect to the process of relative normalization. On grounds of these recent changes, some 
popular opinion leaders have rushed to make a premise for the end of the military tutelage 
and even militarism,264 at the expense of delimiting militarism to the militarization of the 
political field, thereby leaving intact the more subtle, albeit baleful implications of 
militarism in the interrelated social, cultural, economic and political domains. It would not 
be far-fetched to contend that the 'generalized discursive erethism' within the Turkish 
society around the political autonomy of the armed forces, the trials that hold accountable 
the military officers for their deeds and the mechanisms established to ensure the 
democratic monitoring of the armed forces have not yet given way to a rigorous critique of 
militarism (Öğünç, 2013, pp. 21-22; Sünbüloğlu, 2013a, p. 33).  
  
Perhaps as equally important, those developments that have opened up cracks in the 
military's shield of invincibility and aura of sanctity do not directly translate into the 
transparency of the military institution. For instance, Mehmet Ali Birand (1986) in his 
pioneer foray to the erstwhile and ever murky field of military sociology, narrates in the 
following how he overcame his initial despair and impasse for conducting a study on TSK: 
 
"...[B]u çalışmama başlarken ümitsizdim. Yakın dostlarım, ‘Sen yapılmayacak 
işlere kalkışıyorsun, Türkiye buna daha hazır değil,’ diyorlardı. Ordunun 
tabuluğuna dikkat çekiyorlardı. En basit yolu denedim. Bir dilekçe yazıp 
Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'ndan, yapacağım inceleme için gerekli bilgilerin 
verilmesi ve yardımcı olunmasını istedim. Yanıt beni doğruladı. Ordu tabu 
olmak istemiyordu."265 (p. 14)     
                                                          
264 Altaylı, F. (2012, September 25). Bu dava militarizmin sonudur. Haber Türk. Retrieved 
December 7, 2013, from http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/fatih-altayli/779368-bu-dava-
militarizmin-sonudur  
265  "...I wasn’t optimistic when I began my work. My close friends were telling me: 
‘You’re trying to do what can’t be done; Turkey isn’t ready for this yet.’ They were calling 
attention to the taboo of the military. I took the simplest route. I wrote a petition and asked 
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 Birand wrote these lines right after the pinnacle of the military reign, in the mid 80s, 
when the military governing elite supposedly withdrew to their barracks from the political 
scene. Two decades after, the atmosphere of secrecy and closure surrounding the field still 
comes to haunt the researchers, who complain, perhaps more than Birand, about the lack of 
data and access to the field (Belge, 2008, p. 7; Ünsaldı; 2008: pp. 16-19; İnsel, 2004, pp. 
46-47; Biricik, 2013, p. 389). For example, Murat Belge (2008), in his foreword to 
Ünsaldı's Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset [the Military and Politics in Turkey] (2008), writes: 
 
"Türkiye'de asker üstüne çalışma yapmanın ne kadar güç bir iş olduğunu yazar 
‘giriş’ bölümünde özetlemiş. Bunun nedenini Ordu'nun çok katı bir biçimde 
içine kapanmasında görüyor: ‘Bu yüzden, kimi Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde, 
özellikle İngiltere ve Fransa'da ve daha da önemlisi Kuzey Amerika'da askerî 
sosyoloji alanında olağanüstü sayıda, kimi zaman etkileyici boyutlarda 
inceleme ve veri bulunuyorken, Türkiye'de askerî olgunun sosyolojik anlamda 
ciddi bir incelemesi söz konusu olduğunda, kapsamlı bir araştırmanın izine bile 
rastlanmamakta...’ diyor. Bu tabii çok doğru. Askerî herhangi bir yerin, mahut 
eli tüfekli asker resmi ve ‘fotoğraf çekilmez’ vb yazılarla donanmış tabela ile 
bir ‘yasak bölge’ haline getirilmesinden, askerî herhangi bir konunun bir devlet 
sırrı olarak görülmesine, savunma bütçesinin tam ne olduğunun bile 
bilinmemesine uzanan yığınla tedbir, dünyanın başka herhangi bir yerinde 
görülmemiş bir gizlilik atmosferi yaratmaktadır."266 (p. 7) 
 
 Then, interestingly enough, drawing information about this hardly penetrable field 
seems no more possible these days than it was in the past. And the possibility of having an 
insider look at the military still lies beyond likelihood, unless the researcher has a member 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the General Staff to help me get the information I needed for my investigation. The 
response affirmed me. The military did not want to be a taboo." 
266 "The author summarizes the difficulties of conducting research on the military in Turkey 
in the introduction. He believes that the reason for this lays in the severity of the way the 
military shuts itself off from the outside: ‘Therefore, while there are an extraordinary 
number of studies, some quite impressive, and data in the field of military sociology in 
Western Europe, particularly England and France, and, more importantly, in North 
America, the same cannot be said for the military in Turkey; it is impossible to find even 
the traces of a serious comprehensive study in the field...’ This is very true of course. 
Military zones are marked with the notorious picture of a rifle-wielding soldier and the 
written warning ‘Taking photographs is forbidden,’ turning them into ‘forbidden zones.’ 
Any information about the military is seen as a state secret; nearly insurmountable 
obstacles face efforts to learn the exact size of the defense budget. This creates an 
unprecedented secrecy surrounding the military not seen anywhere else in the world." 
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status. It is hard to proclaim that "the discrepancy between the military's strong presence 
and visibility" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 3) has disappeared over the course of time. In sum, the 
field seems no less murky today, nor does it seem more inviting to willing researchers who 
try to scratch and crawl their way into the field, sometimes only to find limited or 
unreliable data at their disposal. One can even argue that, as the civil-military relations 
takes on its path of relative normalization and military officers - once confident enough to 
loquaciously talk about themselves, the institution and politics - succumb to reticence, 
conducting a research on the military is becoming harder.267 One of my interviewees, 
Mustafa, addresses this additional thick layer of mist descended upon the field to the 
demise of researchers in the below: 
 
"Ya sen aslında Kara Harp Okulu'na gitsene. Bir sürü insan bulursun orada. 
Öğrenci Bölük Komutanı'na git. Nöbetçi subaya gitme sakın. Karacılarda kime 
geleceğin çok önemli. Gerçi 10 yıl önce olsa konuşacak insan çok rahat 
bulurdun. Şimdi korkarlar konuşmaya. Belki asker çocuğu olduğunu söylersen 
anca [konuşurlar]."268  
 
 Accordingly, those who subscribe to the theses of normalization in the literature 
usually dwell on institutional and legal aspects of the transformation. However, the 
repercussions of the relative normalization process in the larger segments of “the military 
society” (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 170), mainly consisting of professional military officers ranked 
lower than general officers, alongside their wives and children, remain largely unknown. 
Although few existing studies  argue for the existence of a positive change in the attitude of 
military officers as one of the steering factors that shape and  facilitate the transition to a 
                                                          
267 Nevertheless, I would advise the reader to take caution from buying into the argument 
that conducting a research on the military institution has become harder than it was ten 
years ago. This study, apart from Mustafa’s statements quoted below, cannot provide much 
to back up such a claim as well. However, I personally believe that conducting a research 
on the military institution has not become much easier than it was ten years ago either, 
despite the relative normalization process. 
268 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: “Why don’t go you go to 
the War College? You can find many interlocutors over there. First go and see the Student 
Company Commander. Don’t ever go to the Duty Officer. In the Land Forces, it is crucial 
whom you run across. Actually if it’d been 10 years before, you could have found people to 
interview with ease. They are afraid to speak now. [They may accept an interview], if you 
introduce yourself as a military brat.”      
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more normalized phase of civil-military relations (Gürsoy, 2012, pp. 29-37), there is no 
substantial study to date that examines these populations' reception of the normalization 
process, their perception of the recent shifts in the power relations of the country as well as 
the 'dirty' fragments of the past of which the military is an inseparable part. Then the 
following questions gain relevance in the context of this study. What do these segments of 
the military community think of the military in the past and now? How do they conceive 
the current political scene in Turkey? Has the process of normalization been perceived as 
'normal' and easily greeted by these masses? If not, how do they come to grips with it? 
  
At this juncture, the narratives of the children of military families concerned with 
watershed political affairs which have occasioned major transformations in TSK can be of 
help to better understand the prevailing discourses circulating in the military community. 
But these verbal accounts are not significant only owing to their 'Trojan' quality in an 
inaccessible field. They also yield results propitious to our understanding of the interactions 
between the disciplinary effects of certain institutions within the boundaries of which a 
childhood is spent, namely, the school, the military and the family, thereby helping us to 
grasp in its diversity the experience of being a child in a military family. Finally, some of 
the narratives can shed light upon grounds which are put into use to challenge or legitimize 
militarism. Therefore I devote this final chapter of my thesis to the narratives of children 
about the military and politics. Their views on particular topics and the discursive analysis 
of these views will be on the scope. Topics included will be, respectively, military coups, 
compulsory military service, the trials of Balyoz (Sledgehammer) and Ergenekon, the 
Kurdish Question and the Peace Process. 
 
 Before delving further into the narratives, I should convey some of my field 
observations. More than half of my interviewees stated that they have been familiar with 
politics since their childhood, mainly because of the enthusiasm commonly invested into 
politics in military families at dinner tables and living rooms. Of all the questions asked 
during the interview, those concerning contemporary politics constituted a section for 
which my interviewees were either least or/and most engaged to provide answers. One of 
them, Mustafa, decided to skip this part on professional grounds, as a military officer who 
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should not respond directly to questions with a manifest political content.269 In some cases, 
their readiness and willingness while sharing their opinions were enmeshed in conflicting 
emotions of frustration, withdrawal and hesitation which interrupted their speech. 
Especially two conditions were decisive in their level of irritation. Firstly, as the 
interviewees lay a claim for a privileged insider status whereby they contend that there is 
injustice involved in the topic at stake, their frustration escalated quickly. Sometimes the 
children's claim for higher consciousness than 'ordinary' civilians entrenched their 
frustration. For example, let's look at how İrem responded to a question about the Balyoz-
Ergenekon trials, as an intense wave of furore chimes into her statements:  
 
"Çok sinir oluyorum. Yani çok sinir oluyorum. Çok doluyum bu konuda. 
İçinde olunca yediremiyorsun yani, biliyorsun öyle olmadığını. Hepsinin bir 
oyun olduğunu biliyorsun. Zaten asker bırakmadılar, asker kalmadı yani. ... 
Aslında [insanlar] öyle bir şey olmadığını biliyorlar ama insanın gözüne soka 
soka, sen bunu bilsen de, doğrusu bu olsa da, ‘Bak ben sana bunu 
yapabiliyorum, benim gücüm bu kadar,’ diyebilen birisi var."270 (emphasis 
mine)  
  
Secondly, the children whom I interviewed seem to be thrown into confusion and 
frustration especially when the normalizing effects of institutions that surround the child's 
life coalesce, yet conflict with the hegemonic public view in a given subject. For example, 
Merve, in a sense of sheer astonishment, states the following in relation to the 1980 coup:  
 
"…‘O zaman iki taraf da, sağ taraf da, sol taraf da askerin gelmesini istiyordu,’ 
derler. … [T]amam, ben o zamanı yaşamadım. Ama durması için [oldu]. Ama 
şimdi bakıyorsun, ‘Yok o adam darbe yaptı,’ bilmem ne. Yani ya bana 
etrafımda anlatılanlar yanlış, evde anlatılanlar yanlış, benim okuduklarım 
yanlış, okulda öğrendiklerim yanlış; ya da insanlar çok büyütüyor bazı 
şeyleri."271     
                                                          
269 Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013  
270 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “It [the trials] makes me 
furious. It really makes me furious. It plagues me. When you are involved, you know 
otherwise. You know that it is all a game. They already left no soldiers. I mean, there are 
no soldiers left. … They [the people] also know that it is not true. But there is a person who 
pushes the issue by saying, ‘See what I am capable of doing to you. I have such power,’ 
despite what you know and truth is.” (emphasis mine)   
271 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “They say that, both the right-
wing and the left-wing wanted soldiers to come. … Alright, I did not live those times. But 
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 Interestingly, Merve's argumentation above eerily resembles Alparslan Türkeş's 
defence in the Racism-Turanism trial of 1944:  
 
"Milletimin, Türklüğün büyüklük ve üstünlüğünü ben önce anamdan, 
babamdan öğrenmiştim. Sonra bulunduğum bütün okullarda öğretmenlerim 
söylediler. Askerî hayatım başlayınca kıt'alarda kumandanlarım ve maiyetinde 
vazife gördüğüm bütün generaller bu gerçeği daima tekrarladılar..."272 (Cited in 
Bora T. , 2004, pp. 166-167)   
  
Of course, I draw on this parallel not to suggest that Merve has political views akin to 
Türkeş, but to demonstrate the extent to which three primary institutions, between which 
the children commute to and fro, may have an impact upon their political views, especially 
if each institution feeds on the others' effects of normalization. However, these effects 
should not be considered as ultimately informing the children. In other words, they do not 
cause the subject irreversibly and in its entirety. Such a perspective would amount to render 
the subject as mere reflections of effects relayed by structures, thereby foreclosing agency 
to the subject. Also, the effects of these institutions are far from being homogeneous and 
singular. For instance, Kemal addresses in the below that his perception of the process of 
normalization has changed positively during his compulsory military service:  
 
"Eskiden bazı şeyler askeriye açısından da saçmaydı. Hele askeriyeye gidip 
askerliğini yapınca bunu daha çok anlıyorsun. Bu AKP tayfasının normalleşme 
dediği şeyin doğruluk payı var aslında. Çünkü hiçbir görüş odağı yüzde yüz 
doğrudur diye bir şey yok abi hayatta."273   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
it was better off for things to come to a halt. You now hear speeches like, ‘This guy made a 
coup,’ though. I mean, either what they told me in the house, in the books and schools are 
wrong or people are exaggerating some stuff.”   
272 “I learned about the grandeur and superiority of my nation and Turkishness first from 
my mother and father. Afterwards, it was from my teachers in all the schools I attended. 
This fact was continually repeated by the general officers under whom I served under...” 
273 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Some things in the past were 
also disadvantageous to the military. You realize it much better when you do your military 
service. In fact, there is some truth in what the AKP people call normalization. No 
viewpoint is 100% right.” 
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In a similar vein, Tarık, regards his father as one of his sources of inspiration, while 
talking about his prolonged escape from the compulsory military service: 
 
"Babam da bir defasında demişti: ‘Bizde askerlik olmaması ne iyi, iyi ki bizde 
askerlik yok,’ gibi bir şey demişti. (Gülerek) Biz de gülmüştük. Adam asker 
yani ama, ‘İyi ki yok,’ diyor buna. Herhalde yeterli bir cevap olmuştur yani."274   
  
 Lastly, the effects of these institutions do not always add up to each other. Much as 
they can lend themselves to easy amalgamations which may inflect the political itinerary of 
the children to nationalist-militarist trajectory, they can also disrupt the effects of each 
other. For example, education may cause disconcertments within the family over political 
affairs: 
    
"Lisede çok fazla tansiyon oluşturmuyor tabii. Ama üniversite boyunca ve 
özellikle de daha da şimdi şimdi… Babamın işini yaptığı kurum beni artık 
rahatsız ettiği için onu sorgulamaya başlıyorsun. Onun üzerinden yaptığım 
sorgulamalar biraz tansiyon yaratıyor. ‘Sen üniversitede hep böyle oldun,’ gibi 
tartışmalar dönüyor falan. "275 
 
4.2. The Military Coups 
 
Military coups have a central place in a literature focused on civil-military and 
politics-military relations in Turkey. Despite this centrality, little do the studies taking on 
their scope the military coups in the history of Turkey convey the perceptions and 
interpretations of agents within the military field, with few noticeable exceptions (Akyaz, 
2009). Most of the time, it is the general officers and those who orchestrated the coups, 
irrespective of their rank, who acquire a voice in these studies. But the more we climb 
down the ladders of hierarchy to search for voices in the military community, the less we 
                                                          
274 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “My father once said 
something like, ‘It is good that we don’t have to do compulsory military service. Luckily 
we don’t have it.’ (Laughing) Then we had laughed. The man is a soldier but he says that it 
is better without the compulsory military service. I guess that will do for an answer.” 
275 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “It does not cause much 
tension during the high school, but during the university years and especially now… As 
you grew disturbed by the institution your father works for, you start questioning it. And 
questioning it causes some tensions, like ‘The university has changed you.’” 
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can find to hear. I hope this study will have a modest contribution in filling this gap in the 
literature.  
 
 I launched my set of questions about military coups, without making differentiation 
any differentiation between coups, except occasional references to the 28 February 1997 
'post-modern' coup.  The main motive behind this deliberate choice was to observe whether 
the children were going to feel any need to differentiate between coups. None of them did 
so, except Zeynep who explicitly reserved a different place and meaning for the 1980 coup:  
 
"Yani şimdi 80 darbesini ben kesinlikle tasvip etmiyorum. Ben Kenan Evren'i 
de sevmem ayrıca. Bana gerçekten çok narsist bir adam gelir ve narsistliğinden 
kaynaklı düşünürüm bu tavırları açıkçası. O [80 darbesi] ayrı yani. TSK ayrı, 
80 darbesindeki o kadro ayrıdır her zaman benim için. TSK o demek değildir. 
Ama şimdi öyle farkındaysan. Kiminle konuşursan konuş direkt 80 darbesini 
öne sürerler. Direkt o yönden seni vurmaya çalışırlar. ... [B]ence 80 darbesinin 
kadrosu TSK'yı anlatan bir kadro değil açıkçası. Çünkü onun içinde benim 
babam gibi, birçokları gibi çok farklı düşünen ve onlardan ayrılan insanlar var. 
O yüzden çok ayrı tutuyorum 80 darbesini. Asla ve asla tasvip etmiyorum."276 
 
 At first glance, this statement may strike one as a harsh denunciation articulated by 
Zeynep, resting on a personalized and psychologised account of the 1980 coup, with 
emphases on the distinction between cadres of this particular coup and the rest of TSK, and 
the heterogeneity of TSK to boot. However, the selection of the 1980 coup in particular as 
an unacceptable coup, one that was committed by aberrant military officers, leads us 
nowhere other than to the redemption of the military institution and other military coups. 
Also, Zeynep's 'externalization' of the remaining members of TSK while addressing the 
1980 military coup seems rather odd, since the 1980 military coup was carried out in chain-
of-command unlike the previous coups, including the unsuccessful attempts (Akyaz, 2009, 
                                                          
276 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I definitely do not approve 
of the 1980 coup. I don’t like Kenan Evren either. He strikes me as a narcissistic man and I 
think it all boils down to his narcissistic attitude. That [the military coup of 1980] is 
different I mean. The Turkish Armed Forces is one story and the cadres of the 1980 coup is 
quite another. TSK is not those cadres. Not anymore though, if you noticed. Whomever you 
talk to immediately brings forward the 1980 military coup to hurt you. … I think the cadres 
of the 1980 military coup do not represent the Turkish Armed Forces. Because in TSK 
there are many people who think differently and are distinct from them, like my father. 
Therefore I keep the 1980 coup separate and do not approve of it, ever.”      
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p. 12). Then, in Zeynep's case, the appeal to the motifs of personalization, psychologization 
and externalization does not only give legitimacy to certain forms of military coups, but is 
also driven by an urge to preserve an immaculate image of the military institution. 
  
If singling out unacceptable military interventions to politics is one way to 
undermine, if not accept, certain forms of military coups, another one to justify them is 
ignoring the coups whereby the military did not directly seize control of the government. 
Accordingly, I observed that some of my interlocutors were inclined to identify a coup 
through the physical visibility of soldiers on streets and governmental levels. Thus they 
often evoked 'old-school' coups in their narratives while elaborating their opinions on 
military coups. Especially the longest and most visible coup of all, 'the coup' of 1980 took 
the lead in their narratives, as though the word 'military coups' in my question was an 
indirect reference to it. Nevertheless, such framing of military coups in a way which gives 
priority to physical and visual elements tends to overlook the legal and institutional 
structures which brought about the “continuous coup regime” (İnsel, 1997, p. 15; Akça, 
2004, p. 254) in Turkey. Often the condition that I am referring to materialized in the 
reiterating sentence: "I/We have not seen a military coup." In some interviews, it seems as 
if it is not a military coup until and unless tanks are rolling through the solemn streets of a 
city, while a colonel is announcing the coup from a radio station. Particularly, this narrative 
turns a blind eye to the coup of 28 February and e-memorandum of 2007, both of which 
took place in the lifetime of the interlocutor:   
 
"Darbe yaşamadım bir kere. Sen de yaşamadın, ben de yaşamadım. Olmayanı 
üfürme metodu yapmak saçma geliyor bana. Yaşadığım şey hakkında, bilgi 
sahibi olduğum şey hakkında konuşurum abi. Bir fikrim olur [ama] 
yaşamadığın bir şey hakkında ne kadar doğru yorum yaparsın bence tartışılır 
yani. Karşıt olanlar da, darbeci olanlar da... Adam gerçekten bunun ızdırabını 
falan çekmişse eyvallah, saygı duyarım. [Ama] hiçbir bok görmemiş, işkembe-i 
kübradan sallıyorlar falan, onu sevmiyorum. Bilmediğim bir şey. Ha, ister 
miyim böyle bir şey olmasını? İstemem abi."277 
                                                          
277 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I have not experienced any 
military coup. Neither have you. I think it is ridiculous to talk through the hat. I talk about 
things I have experienced or know. I can have opinions without knowing, but they’d be 
open to debate. It is the same with those who oppose or support coups… If the guy has 
suffered from a coup, okay, let him talk. I respect the guy. But I don’t like those drawing a 
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The ending of Kemal's speech marks another pattern that recurs in some other 
interviews as well: 
 
"Darbenin tabii ki şu an olmasını istemem yani. İsteyen birisini de bilmiyorum. 
Varsa da yani şu an nasıl bir düşünce tarzı içinde onu bilmiyorum... Tabii şu 
anki dönemde darbe olmasını falan istemem yani. O saçma sapan bir süreç. 
Niye olsun yani durup dururken."278 (emphases mine) 
"...[S]açma buluyorum. Bugün olmasını istemem yani. Devamlı başında şey 
yapan [biri] seni böyle; ‘Şunu yapmayacaksın, bunu yapmayacaksın.’ Hiç hoş 
bir şey değil."279 (emphases mine) 
  
The more the sentence, "I would not want it to happen today" was repeated, the more 
I began to think about its implications. Were there any people in the world, waking up in 
their beds and calmly saying: "Until yesterday I was against it, but I guess it's enough 
already. I'd be glad to have my military coup today."? Also, the absurdity of the coup 
process comes to the fore at above quotations as the major cause as to why 'the coup today' 
is rejected. Therefore, I claim that, those seemingly anti-coup statements fall short of a 
categorical rejection of military coups, by implying the existence of presumed conditions 
with the fulfillment of which military intervention may become not only possible, but also 
reasonable. These conditions which confer the coup with an aura of reason were rarely 
qualified by my interlocutors in a direct manner. Only Yasemin explain them overtly in the 
following: 
 
"Darbeler genel olarak çok gerekli olduğu zaman, gerçekten devlet yıkılma 
boyutuna geldiyse, parçalanma boyutuna geldiyse bir nebze belki olabilir 
derim. Ama o da bizim ülkemizi, devletimizi koruyacaksa [olabilir]."280  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
long bow, without seeing anything in life. It is something I don’t know.  Would I want it to 
happen though? Of course I would not.”  
278 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I don’t want it to happen 
now of course. I don’t know anybody else who would want it either. Even so, I don’t know 
what they are thinking. … Of course I don’t want a coup in this period. It is an absurd 
process. Why should it happen for no reason?” (emphases mine) 
279 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I find it absurd. I mean, I 
would not want it to happen today. [There’d be] [s]omeone always watching, prodding you 
with a cane, like: ‘Don’t do this, don’t do that.’ It is not nice at all.” (emphases mine) 
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Apart from the worries pertaining to the survival, the following quotations provide 
the most deployed framework for rationalizing military coups:    
 
"Mesela ama 80 [darbesi] için şey derler: ‘O zaman sağcı-solcu olayları vardı. 
Sağcılar solcuları vuruyordu.’ Yani normal bir kavga değildi, silahlandılar. ‘O 
zaman iki taraf da; sağ taraf da, sol taraf da askerin gelmesini istiyordu,’ derler. 
O zaman istiyorlarmış herkes birbirini öldürüyor, o onu öldürüyor, bu bunu 
öldürüyor diye. O zaman herkes mantıklı bakmış. Şimdi ‘Yok o zaman siz 
darbe yaptınız, gene yapacaksınız,’ [diyorlar]. İnsanlar bazı şeyleri unutuyorlar 
bence."281 (emphasis mine) 
"Ama kimi insanlar da diyor ya: ‘O zaman bu darbenin olması gerekiyordu.’ 
Sen de illa ki duymuşsundur: ‘Böyle bir şey gerekiyordu, o zaman çok 
kötüydü,’ vesaire [diyorlar]. Şimdi olayın içinde olmadığım için 
[bilemiyorum]. Mesela annem de babam da konuştuğumuz zaman hep şey der: 
‘O zaman gerçekten dışarı çıkamıyorduk, darbe oldu ve öyle rahatladık.’ 
Annem, ‘Bu iyi ya da kötü bilmiyorum, ama gerçekten nefes aldık,’ derdi."282 
(emphasis mine) 
  
The former interlocutor presents almost a democratic portrayal of the 1980 coup as 
the culminating point of the collective desire, whereas the latter imbues the coup with an 
emancipating quality. Both highlight the dire conditions that inevitably precipitated the 
coup. The underlying premise in both narratives is that the military successfully stepped 
into the breach at a time when the dearth of civilian political measures could not prevent the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
280 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Overall, the military 
coups could be possible only if they become very necessary, only if the state is drifting to 
the brink of dissolution. [They can take place] [o]nly if they are to protect our country and 
the state. “  
281 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “For the 1980 coup, they say, 
‘Back then, there were clashes between rightists and leftists. The rightists were shooting the 
leftists on sight.’ It was not a normal fight. They were armed. They say that, both the right-
wing and the left-wing wanted soldiers to come. In those days they had wanted it to 
happen, because people were killing each other. Everyone had deemed it as rational. Now 
they say, ‘You staged a coup back in the day. You will do it again.’ People forget certain 
things.” (emphasis mine) 
282 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “But some people also say: 
‘It had to happen.’ You should have heard about it too: ‘That was necessary. It was really 
bad back then.’ I cannot know, because I did not see it. When I talk with my mom and dad 
they always say though: ‘We could not even go out. We relieved after the coup.’ My mom 
would say: ‘I don’t know it’s for the better or worse, but we really heaved a sigh of relief’ 
[after the coup].” (emphasis mine) 
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disintegration of the public order and possibility of a civil strife. As Altınay (2009b) duly 
notes, this framework holds civilians responsible for coups, while presenting the coups as 
inevitable and legitimate shelters to take against the irreversibly deteriorating conditions (p. 
1249).  
  
This framing also assumes that military coups were successful on different grounds. 
The attribution of success to the 1980 military coup is most salient in Zeynep's mother's 
'sigh of relief' after the intervention. This sigh echoes in some academic approaches to 
military coups infested with “methodological militarism” (Altınay, 2009b, p. 1250) as well. 
For example, Altınay (2009b) imparts William Hale's interpretation of the 1971 military 
coup:  
 
"1972-1973 yıllarında sıkıyönetim, terörü bastırmayı ve günlük yaşamda kanun 
ve düzeni makul ölçülerde sağlamayı başardı. Böylece Türkiye'ye siyasî 
şiddetten kurtulup nefes alma imkânı verdi."283 (Hale, 1996 as cited in Altınay, 
2009b, p.1250) (emphasis mine) 
  
In such accounts, the coups appear as a remedy, palliative and relieving in its effect, 
despite all undesired consequences. Therefore, the viewpoint foregrounding the success as 
the corollary of military coups is often accompanied by an inclination to undermine their 
'undesired consequences' (Altınay, 2009b, p. 1251). Zeynep mentions those consequences 
indeed, but refers to the capitalization of coups as a political stake for gaining ground on 
rivals as the undesired consequence, whereas İrem trivializes the plight of those upon 
whom the coup wreaked havoc:       
 
"Ama bunun [1980 askeri darbesinin] yarattığı enkazları günümüzde de, 
görüyoruz artık. Bundan siyaset yapılmaya başlandı."284 
"Ben askerin yaptığının çok yanlış olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Tamam, kötü 
şeyler yaşanmış evet, o hapis olayları, ceza olayları falan. Tabii ki de 
                                                          
283 “The state of emergency in 1972-1973 managed to suppress terror and to bring a 
reasonable return of law and order. By doing so, Turkey was given respite from political 
violence and the opportunity to breathe." 
284 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “But we are seeing the 
wrecks of it [the 1980 military coup] today. They began to do politics out of it.”   
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yaşanmaması gereken çok şey olmuş ama birilerinin de bir şeylere bir şekilde 
dur demesi lazım. Bundan anlıyorlarsa eğer böyle olması gerektiğini 
düşünüyorum."285 
 
 İrem is also the only interlocutor who categorically approves military coups. Her 
justification is predicated on the long-tradition of thought in Turkey which installs a binary 
between professional soldiers who are qualified enough to govern the nation without 
holding their personal, class or corporatist interests over national interests and incompetent 
politicians who seek after their personal and group interests to the detriment of the nation:  
 
"Ya ben aslında darbeye pek karşı bir insan değilim. (Gülerek) Değilim. Çünkü 
askeri eğitim gerçekten dışarıya göre çok farklı oluyor yani. Özellikle [eğitim] 
liseden beri geliyorsa [çok farklı oluyor]. Orada insanlara vatan millet 
sevgisini, tarihini çok güzel anlatıyorlar. Çok güzel ifade ediyorlar. Ve insanlar 
doğruyu öğreniyorlar. Ama [ülkenin] başına gelen insan sadece orada rant 
kavgası [yapıyor]. ‘Ben işte şunu oldum,’ diyen bir insanın da ülke 
yönetmesini bekliyoruz. Yönetemiyor, bilmiyor çünkü. O oraya sadece, ‘Ben 
oldum,’ demek için geliyor çünkü."286 (emphasis mine)  
  
Pitting soldiers against politicians, this stream of explanation often depicts the 
military institution as a graceful saviour who, when required, plunges into the swamp that 
we usually call politics, where politicians are dabbling in the mud, backstabbing each other, 
splattering lies and slithering their way into prizes offered by politics. Far from being a 
meddling presence, the military as a legitimate guardian of the republic is ascribed a 
regulatory character. Hovering above politics as the arbiter of all sorts of truths (Bora T., 
2004, pp. 174-176; Sünbüloğlu, 2013a, p. 13; Birand, 1986, p. 146) and the guide of the 
                                                          
285 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I don’t think that what the 
military did is wrong. Ok, bad things happened, like imprisonments and punishments. They 
should not have happened of course, but someone had to put a stop to that. I don’t know if 
they get it, but I think it’s the way it should be.” 
286 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Actually I am not much 
against military coups. (Laughing) I am not. Because military education is really different 
than the education taken outside, especially if it extends back to the [military] high school. 
There [in military schools] they are exceptionally good in teaching the history and love of 
nation. They express them very well. And people learn what is true. But the [civilian] 
person ruling the country only considers his own interests. We are waiting to be ruled by a 
person who says, ‘I have become the ruler.’ He cannot rule, because he doesn’t know how 
to. He is simply there to say, ‘I rule.’” (emphasis mine) 
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masses, the military institution emerges as the representative of the national consciousness 
in the last instance (Bora T., 2004, pp. 169-171; Öztan G. G., 2013, p. 87). İrem also 
annexes educatory functions to the military in the above quote, while privileging the 
education given in military schools in a way which hints at the militarization of knowledge 
(Altınay, 2004a, p. 79).  
 
 İrem is not the only one who carves space to TSK as the supra-political watchman 
of the state. Nuri, despite his initial contestation of the military coups also subscribes to the 
thesis that the Turkish military has a special position and mission:     
 
"... [Askerler] tabii ki Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin koruyucularıdırlar. Tabii bazı 
görüşlerden dolayı, bir tehlike sezdikleri zaman bir darbe yoluyla bunun önüne 
geçmek istiyorlar. Darbeler o şekilde oluyor yani. Ama şu anda o kırıldı yani. 
Değişti."287   
  
As I tried to show, contesting and legitimizing military coups can and does go hand in 
hand in the narratives of many children. Some of my interlocutors were more rigorous in 
their rhetoric while rejecting coups though. Kemal was one of them, criticizing the military 
coups for interrupting the natural flow of things:  
 
"Şu anda mesela şu tarz gelişmeler oluyor; daha bir İslamlaşma, kapanma, 
içine kapanma. İranlaşma tarzı. Olsun abi. Yapmak istiyorlarsa yapsınlar. 
Sonuçta bunlar da seçilmiş adamlar. Türkiye'nin bugüne kadarki sıkıntısı hep 
şeydi: Bir şeyi düşündükleri anda bir darbe. Öyle olunca bu adamlar mağdur 
oluyor. Adam aslında çok yanlış bir düşüncede [olabilir], ama ona rağmen 
mağdur oluyor. Mesela bir adam birini öldürecek, ama sen adamın kafasında o 
fikir var diye gidip onun kolunu bacağını kesiyorsun. Yahu belki 
yapmayacaktı. Belki yapsa cezasını çekecekti, başkaları da bunu görüp 
yapmaktan vazgeçecekti. Doğal süreci hep kesmişler bir yerde. Şimdi de öyle. 
Bırak yapsınlar. Bırak bakalım. Bakalım gerçekten alkolü %100 yasaklayacak 
mı ülkede? Yapabilecek mi bunu? Yapınca ne olacak? Bir kere kendimizi test 
edelim. Türkiye olarak herkes kendini bir test etsin, bunu istiyor muyuz, 
istemiyor muyuz diye. Belki istemiyor büyük çoğunluk. Bilmiyoruz ki... Bir 
                                                          
287 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Of course the military is the 
protector of the Turkish Republic. Because of some views, when they sense a threat they 
want to interfere by means of a coup. Coups take place that way. But it has changed now.”  
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şeyler sınırına kadar gelsin, yaşansın. Ak göt kara göt ortaya çıksın, ondan 
sonra herkes pozisyonunu alır."288 
  
However, Kemal's appeal to liberal majoritarianism for lambasting the trigger-
happiness of military elites for staging coups can be self-marring, given that the approval of 
the 1982 constitutional referendum in a landslide is one of the favourite arguments of those 
who want to bail out the military coup of 1980. Tarık is another interlocutor who condemns 
coups. But he does so in a manner too ambiguous to tell on which grounds he raises his 
objections. He acknowledges that the military coups may invoke sympathetic feelings in 
earlier stages of life, when children are mostly confined to the military setting. But he does 
not take this as an excuse:   
 
"Belki küçükken zararsız, olumlu bir noktada görülmesi olası olabilir. Ama 
tabii iyi kötü büyüyüp, bir şeyler okuyup düşünebildiğin zamanlar - ki bunun 
ortaokulu çok geçmemesi lazım - neyin ne olduğunu herkes görüp fark eder 
herhalde diye düşünüyorum."289 
  
Of all my interlocutors, Ayşe is the one whose principal objection to military 
interventions to politics is most obvious. She is categorically rejecting the military coups: 
 
                                                          
288 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Nowadays, things are rather 
trending towards Islamization, isolation, like Iranization. So be it. If this is what they want, 
let it be. After all they are elected people. You know what has been the problem of Turkey 
thus far? As soon as a thought crossed the minds, it was immediately followed by a coup. 
Then these guys become victims. Maybe they have had false thoughts, but they become 
victims despite that. Let’s say a guy plans to kill somebody, but you mutilate his limbs 
before he commits the crime because he thought of it. Maybe he was not going to do it. 
Maybe he would have been punished and others would have drawn a lesson from that. The 
natural flow of things has always been disrupted [in Turkey]. It is the same today. Let them 
do. Let them do for a moment and see if they will really prohibit alcohol consumption. 
Let’s see if he is able to do it? Let’s see what will follow if he does that? For once, let’s try 
ourselves. As Turkish people, let’s all ask if we really want this or not. Perhaps the majority 
does not want it. Let things play out and come to a certain limit. Let them be experienced. 
Let everyone show their flags, and then everyone will take a stance.” 
289 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “They [the military coups] 
may be perceived as harmless and positive, when little. But when one grows up enough to 
be able to read and think - and this should not be so much later than the secondary school 
years – everyone would realize them for what they are.”   
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"Ben darbelere tabii ki karşıyım. Darbenin iyisi, kötüsü olmaz. Her türlü 
darbeye karşıyız. ... Üçüne birden karşıyım; üçüne, dördüne, beşine [birden 
karşıyım]. Post-modernine de karşıyım, post-modern olmayanına da 
karşıyım."290  
 
4.3. Compulsory Military Service 
 
 In a literature dominated by the analyses of the relation between military and 
political fields, it is both pleasing and promising to see that the compulsory military service 
in Turkey has garnered attention from scholars. Apart from the studies which take the 
military service within their scope in order to lay bare the grounds on which the Turkish 
Armed Forces gain its legitimacy and political autonomy (Şen, 2010; Ünsaldı, 2008), its 
constitutive roles in the establishment of the modern Turkish nation-state (Altınay, 2004a; 
Zürcher, 2003; Beşikçi, 2010; Paker & Akça, 2010; Dogra, 2010; Ateş, 2012; Belge, 2012) 
in the configuration and reproduction of gender roles (Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2011a; 
Altınay, 2011b; Çınar & Üsterci, 2008; Selek, 2013; Akgül, 2011; Kaptan, 2009; 
Sünbüloğlu, 2013a; Sancar, 2012; Biricik, 2013; Açıksöz, 2013; Çoban, 2013; Turan, 2013; 
Öğünç, 2013; Speck, 2006), in the diffusion of militarist ideology and practices (Çınar & 
Üsterci, 2008; Şen, 2010; Şen, 2011; Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2011b; Öztan G. G., 2013; 
Turan, 2013) have been explored. Some scholars highlight the ways in which the 
compulsory military service caters to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production 
(Altınay, 2004a; Şen, 2010). Military service also constitutes a locus from which scholars 
can trace the transformation of citizenship since the beginning of modernization efforts, as 
well as the changing relations between subjects, military and the state (Dogra, 2010; 
Hacısalihoğlu, 2010; Aykaç, 2013; Bali, 2008; Bali, 2011; Belge, 2013; Zürcher, 2003; 
Altınay, 2004a). Accordingly, modernizing, civilizing, gendering, nationalizing, 
disciplining, subjectivating, citizenizing, standardizing and militarizing effects of the 
compulsory military service have been discussed through and through by many. 
Nevertheless, as Turan (2013) notices, research that draws on micro perspectives for the 
                                                          
290 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “I am against coups of course. 
There is no such thing as a good coup. We are against all sorts of coups. … I am against all 
three four, five of them. I am against postmodern coups as I am against usual ones.” 
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analysis of the compulsory military service in Turkey is still scarce (pp. 261-262). 
Therefore, the narratives of the children with whom I conducted interviews can be taken as 
a minor contribution to the literature in that respect.    
  
The views of the children on the compulsory military service are as diverse as their 
views on military coups. Many narratives parallel the findings derived from the studies 
referenced above. Let's start with the narratives of the interlocutors who support the 
continuation of the conscription system as it is.  
  
Yasemin, initially straddling between supporting and challenging the use of the 
compulsory military service, eventually deems it necessary on the basis of its nationalizing 
impact:  
 
Yasemin: "... [H]em gereksiz, hem de gerekli."  
Sertaç: "Niye gereksiz, niye gerekli?" 
Yasemin: "[Gereksiz, çünkü] çocukların hayatını değiştiriyorsun. Tehlikeye 
atıyorsun, hayatları söz konusu oluyor bir yerde. Gerekli, çünkü vatan, millet 
sevgisini askeriyede daha fazla alıyorlar. [Önceden] [v]atan-millet nedir 
bilmezken, o sırada kalbi pırpır [atarak], ‘Vatanımı koruyorum,’ diyor."291 
   
 Many scholars addresses that "the filling of national consciousness into (male) 
citizens" (Bora T., 2004, p. 165; Şen, 2010, pp. 55-62) has been one of the major functions 
of military service. The nationalizing effect of the barracks, they add, is often attended by a 
modernizing one. Eugen Weber, in his Peasants into Frenchmen (1976), also diagnoses the 
nationalizing and modernizing effects of conscription. According to Weber, in the early 
years of the French Republic, "by teaching the French language, literacy, civilization (diet, 
lodging, bedding, hygiene, dress, etc.), as well as what is meant to be a French citizen, the 
military turned out to be an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, 
                                                          
291 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: “It [the 
compulsory military service] is both necessary and unnecessary.” Sertaç: “Why is it 
necessary and why not?” Yasemin: “[It is unnecessary, because] you change the life course 
of these children. You put their lives on the line. It is necessary because they learn the love 
of nation and fatherland more deeply in the military. While knowing no such love before, 
they get butterflies in their stomachs there for protecting the nation.” 
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civilization, an agency as potent in its ways as the schools" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 68). In an 
interview, İrem describes the military in very similar terms to Weber as "the school of the 
fatherland" (Weber, 1976, p. 298) as she defends the compulsory military service on 
several grounds:  
 
"Olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Yani askere hiçbir zaman gidemeyeceğim 
için tabii ki de orada yaşananları bilemem. Ama ben de askeri bir ortamda 
yaşadım askere gitmesem de, o ortamın içinde bulundum yani. Babamın 
anlattıklarından biliyorum, kendi gözlerimle gördüğüm şeyler var. Her 
vatandaşın, her Türk erkeğinin diyeyim gidip orada eğitim alması gerektiğini 
düşünüyorum. Eğitim süresiyle ilgili bir yorumda bulunamıyorum. Aslında 
bununla ilgili en iyi yorumu eğitimi verenlerin söylemesi gerekiyor yani. 
Herkesin kafadan 15 gün olsun, 20 gün olsun demesiyle olacağını sanmıyorum. 
Çünkü orada eğitim veren insanlar var. Bu konunun uzmanı olan insanlar var. 
Ne kadar eğitim verilmesi gerektiğini onlar bilirler. Ve o Doğu'daki insanların 
askere gidip de çok şey öğrendiğini biliyorum yani. Okuma-yazmayı bilmeyen 
askerde okuma yazma öğreniyor. Bir meslek sahibi oluyor, eline bir şey alıyor, 
bir şey öğreniyor. Bir şey oluyor neticede. Çok faydalı bir şey olduğuna 
inanıyorum."292 (emphases mine) 
  
Obviously, İrem does not address the possible benefits of the military side of the 
education given in barracks during one's time of conscription. She instead praises the 
military as an institution where males learn through their compulsory military service 
several sorts of know-how required for their integration to an industrialized society. In her 
statements, the military does not appear as a coercive apparatus of the state in the least. 
Rather, she puts forward the civilizing and modernizing missions of the military institution 
in Turkey as an ideological state apparatus. Four points deserves to be highlighted with 
                                                          
292 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I find it necessary. Since I 
cannot be drafted, I cannot know exactly what happens in the barracks. But, I have also 
been in a military setting. I know about it from what my father tells and I was witness to 
certain things. I think every citizen or let’s say, every Turkish man should receive education 
there. I cannot comment on the length of the military service. It is better to leave it to the 
trainers [in the military]. Just because some people says so does not mean that it should last 
15 or 20 days. There are trainers in the military. There are experts. They know how much it 
should last. And I know that the people in the East learn so many things during their 
military service. Those who are illiterate learn to read and write there. They get a 
profession; they get a job and learn something. They end up as someone/something. I think 
it [compulsory military service] is a very useful thing.” (emphases mine) 
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reference to İrem's speech. First of all, İrem hints at the relationship between power and the 
process of subjectivation. To elaborate, İrem's speech rather dwells on the productive 
dimension of disciplinary power. This disciplinary power serves to the formation of docile 
and productive bodies (Foucault, 1979). Put differently, what is at stake in İrem's comments 
on military service is not so much a power above; as it is a power to (Massumi, 2002, p. 
223). In quite a Foucaldian vein, she underscores the aspects of disciplinary power that 
does not so much 'repress' subjects, as it 'informs' them (Massumi, 2002, p. 223). This 
materializing aspect of the disciplinary power is most evident in the somewhat vague 
ending of her remarks: "Those who go there [barracks] end up as something/someone". In a 
nutshell, İrem seems to suggest that power makes us subjects. Then, her remarks 
concerning the compulsory military service accords well with Helman's (1997) definition of 
the military service as an array of disciplinary practices constituting the subjectivity of 
individuals (p. 309). Secondly, as İrem goes on to talk about the possible benefits of the 
education taken in barracks, she pays more heed to the education of people living in the 
East, by suggesting higher rates of illiteracy and unemployment among them. Therefore, I 
think, she seems to be subscribing to the stream of modernization theses which postulate 
that the military can turn into an agent "in the network of power that bring the 'poor', the 
'underdeveloped', the 'malnourished', and the 'illiterate' into the domain of development" 
(Altınay, 2004a, p. 65; Akça, 2006, p. 52), especially in underdeveloped countries.293 Also, 
                                                          
293 Two statistics which I will share here can hopefully help the reader to understand the 
great extent to which the military institution has operated in that regard. First, Güvenç 
(2010) states that, “[t]hrough Law no. 291, 16 Literacy Schools for Privates were opened in 
1959. From 1959 to 1975, a total sum of 532,266 privates received an education in these 
schools. Of these, 392,777 successfully learned to read and write.” (p. 268). Secondly, Şen 
(2011), while writing about vocational courses given in the barracks transfers the statistics 
that,  “[i]n courses held in 1966, 2,800 motor vehicle operators, 38,000 drivers, 200 tractor 
operators, 316 compressor operators, 75 grader operators, 500 work machine machinists, 60 
work machine repairmen, 220 draftsmen, 500 workshop specialists, 350 welders, 3,000 
sanitation technicians, 200 blacksmiths,  240 band members, 819 motorists, 500 
electricians, ironsmiths, 450 plumbers, 108 machinists, and 126 fitters were trained. In 
addition to these courses, privates also received general culture lessons in their units and 
took a number of other courses one month before their discharges. In 1966, of the privates 
taking these pre-discharge courses, 3,508 were trained in agriculture and fruit growing, 
1,094 in animal husbandry, and 2,000 in beekeeping and poultry rearing." (p. 106). Ünsaldı 
(2008) seems to suggest that the function of the military institution as an ideological 
apparatus of the state still continues today, perhaps no less than in the past. He shares that 
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her emphatic remarks on contributions of military service to the lives of people of the East 
can be read as an implicit acknowledgement of the role played by the security apparatuses 
of the state in the "governmentalization of the modern nation-state and colonization of 
periphery" (Özbek, 2010, p. 51). Obviously, the compulsory military service is one of the 
main pillars helping to that cause by forging direct or indirect connections between central 
government and people in areas that remain within the boundaries of the nation-state, while 
residing beyond the effective reach of its infrastructural power. This function is also 
recognized by Şen (2010), who imparts that one of the main missions of the military, for 
whose accomplishment the compulsory military service has been proven useful has always 
been the abolition of the conflict between tradition and modernity, rural and urban, 
periphery and centre (p. 88). Thirdly, İrem discusses that the compulsory military service 
helps males to have a profession by increasing their docility-utility. It follows from that, 
equipped with professional skills which could have lacked otherwise; males who underwent 
conscription are prepared for jobs and can thus enter market relations with more ease than 
those who evade the compulsory military service or defined ineligible to attend it. We can 
draw two conclusions from there. First, as the compulsory military service increases the 
docility-utility of male bodies, it may also increase their compliance to the capitalist modes 
of production. Second, the compulsory military service often functions as a social 
placement mechanism, according to which male subjects who perform their gender roles by 
serving in the military are assigned to more privileged positions in society and market. This 
conclusion brings us to the fourth point, that is, the connection of the compulsory military 
service to the contexts of citizenship and gender. While citizenship is a status which 
ensures that all citizens are to be treated as full and equal members of society, İrem uses the 
words 'citizen' and 'Turkish man' interchangeably in the above quotation, as though women 
are less citizens than are men. This demonstrates how the compulsory military service 
militarizes the conceptualization of citizenship by introducing hierarchies into the concept 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
between the dates of 8 February 2000 and 30 September 2002, a total of 231.939 conscripts 
received education on different topics, while the number of conscripts attending literacy 
courses during the same span is 66.667 (p. 288). Predicting a 1/3 turnover rate, the rate of 
people attending literacy courses per year in this period more or less corresponds to the 
1960s. 
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on the basis of one's sex and conformity to assigned gender roles (Altınay, 2004a, p. 77; 
Altınay, 2008, p. 116).  
 
 İrem is not the only interlocutor whose comments demonstrate that gender and 
military service are imbricated to each other. Merve's thoughts also exemplify the 
conceptualization of military service as a masculinizing citizenship practice (Altınay, 
2004a, p. 62): 
 
"Benim ... asker çocuğu olup, ‘Ben askerlik yapmak istemiyorum,’ diyen 
arkadaşım da var. Bir erkek olarak, asker çocuğu olmasına rağmen nasıl böyle 
bir şey söylüyor [bilemiyorum]. Yani bence 5.5 - 6 ay, en azından üniversite 
mezunları için, çok da uzun bir süre değil. Baş edilebilir bir süre. Acıtmaz yani. 
Niye bu kadar komik[çe], ‘Hayır askerlik olmasın, kalksın. Yok paralı olsun,’ 
[diyorlar] anlamıyorum. .... Anlamıyorum yani, anlamıyorum neden çekinip 
korktuklarını."294 (emphases mine) 
  
In Merve's case, the experience offered to males by the military is designated to be a 
masculinizing one. For her, it is incomprehensible to see that, any male with enough 
discretion and age would deprive himself of the experience of serving in the military. The 
only possible reason that comes to her mind for their hesitation is fear. For Merve, they are 
fleeing because they should be afraid. Merve sees their manhood in jeopardy, until they 
become conscripts, by asking, "how can a man refuse the military service?". "It is not a 
long time," she says. "It is manageable, it would not hurt". By saying, "it would not hurt," a 
phrase most common in use, ironically, to soothe the male children when they are 
circumcised, Merve brings into consideration how the militarized discourse invites to 
barracks those who refuse the military service, by inciting their masculinity. Also, her 
statement connotes that military service is integral to the construction of the category of 
man, and thence woman, by being another "rite of passage" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 77; Selek, 
                                                          
294 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I have a military brat friend 
as well, saying, ‘I don’t want to go to military service.’ I don’t understand how he can say 
that as a male and a military brat. 5.5-6 months, I mean, it is not a very long time, at least 
for university graduates. It is manageable. It would not hurt. I mean, I don’t understand 
why they say ludicrous things, like: ‘No, there should not be a military draft. It should be 
abolished. It should be paid.’ … I really don’t get it. I really don’t understand what they are 
afraid of.” (emphases mine) 
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2013, pp. 10-11; Turan, 2013, p. 321; Öztan G. G., 2013, p. 88; Speck, 2006, p. 51) in 
men's life. She demonstrates how through the military service men's manhood is 
constructed in relation and contradistinction to women and children (Turan, 2013, p. 279; 
Çoban, 2013, pp. 195-196; Altınay, 2004a, p. 79). To recapitulate, Merve's comments 
illustrate how the military service is one of the agents constantly circumscribing the ambit 
of hegemonic heterosexual masculinity. It seems that to participate in the military for men 
is to engage in an array of practices offered by the military which allow males to perform 
masculinity and seal their manhood.  
  
Nevertheless there is also an additional cause which adds up to her perplexity. She 
seems to presuppose that the children of military families should have a penchant for being 
conscripts. Nuri is another interlocutor who shares Merve's conviction in that regard:     
 
"Benim için, asker çocuğu olduğum için, öyle ekstrem bir olay değil [zorunlu 
askerlik]. Çok garip bir şey gibi gelmiyor bana. Ama dışarıdaki insanları 
gözlemlediğim zaman, çok şey yapıyorlar. İşte, ‘Ne yapacağız, ne edeceğiz?’ 
falan. Bende nedense öyle bir şey yok. Asker çocuklarında o olmaz yani. Çok 
daha rahat olurlar. ... Ve şöyle diyeyim hani: Bedelli askerlik olsa veya zorunlu 
askerlik olmasa ben yine [de]  giderdim, gidebilirdim yani. Çok koymaz bana 
yani."295 
   
 As we will return to the thesis which suggests a correlation between one's status as a 
child of a military family and his readiness for military service, let's hear first what Nuri has 
to say more about the compulsory military service:    
 
"...Geçen hafta liseden yakın arkadaşlarımdan birisini askere yolladık. Dediğim 
gibi, kutsal bir meslek olduğu için onu [zorunlu askerliği] çok çabuk 
                                                          
295 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “It [compulsory military 
service] does not strike me as an extreme thing, as I am a military brat. It is not something 
odd for me. When I observe the people outside, they make a fuss about it though, like, 
‘What are we going to do?’ I don’t feel that way somehow. I mean, military brats do not 
feel that way. They happen to be very comfortable with it. … Let me put it this way: 
Although it would be paid or removed, I would still go to serve in the military. I mean, I 
could. It would not bug me.”   
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kabullenebiliyorsun. Bundan dolayı mutsuzluk hissetmiyorsun. Tabii biraz 
garip bir şey."296 
  
Nuri naturalizes the compulsory military service by assuming sanctity to the military 
profession. In this way, he puts the military service in a zone which extends beyond the 
reach of any question directed at its legitimacy. In fact, neither Merve nor Nuri bother 
much with providing arguments for purposes of legitimizing the compulsory military 
service. Cut adrift from its rationale and implications, they simply take it as a natural 
phenomenon to which all Turkish men should oblige and muster in, regardless of their 
differences in thought, shape, and social origins, by dragging their (un)willing bodies to 
barracks where they will have given rewards and punishments falling to their lot in the 
common experience that we call the military service. As seen in their narratives, they think 
that there is not much use in invoking hue and cry over an impending event of nature.  
  
But how common is the common experience of military service? The nationalist-
militarist imagination likes to depict the compulsory military service as a force towards 
which all the males of the nation equally gravitates as the bells of conscription begins to 
chime, a homogenizing force by virtue of which the differences among conscripts in terms 
of class, religion and ethnicity eventually melt away under the waving flag of the nation, 
and within the uniforming embrace of barracks. In this instance, the military appears as an 
isolated setting, a cauldron full of seething sentiments invested for the nation and wherein 
all tensions normally existing in the outer world are left to stew, only to be placated and 
dissolved through the common experience of military service. A speech of Seyfi Kurtbek, a 
soldier and a statesman, known for his unimplemented plans aiming at military reformation 
and for his service as a minister of national defense under the DP government, deserves a 
special mention to instantiate this viewpoint. Kurtbek enacts his nationalist-militarist 
imagination at a radio talk, just before the general elections of 1950:   
 
                                                          
296 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Last week we sent one of my 
close friends from high school to the military service. As I said, just because it is a sacred 
profession, you can accept it [compulsory military service] easily. You do not feel unhappy 
about it. It is a bit odd though.” 
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"Demokrat Parti Silahlı Millet teorisini, demokrasinin askeri ifadesi sayar. 
Milli varlığı korumak için asker sivil farkının kaldırılması ve Milletin 
Ordulaştırılması lazımdır. Milletin bütün ekonomik kaynakları, Milli Savunma 
için teşkilatlandırılmalıdır. Milli Eğitim, Adalet, Maliye ve İdare ve Ulaştırma 
hizmetleri kâmilen Milli Savunmadaki yerlerini alırlar."297 (Cited in Özcan, 
2010, pp. 214-215; Akyaz, 2009, pp. 67-69) 
  
Kurtbek's speech is nothing short of phenomenal and simultaneously cringeworthy, in 
its efforts to promote Prussian militarist ideals in the garb of democracy. However, his 
attempt to reconcile democracy and the theory of nation-in-arms is significant, because at 
the intersection point between them, he has to locate the compulsory military service as a 
democratizing and homogenizing vehicle. Yet, the reality seems a far cry from Kurtbek and 
his conceptualization of the military service. Let alone being a democratizing agent, in 
studies where we can hear the voices of soldiers, it becomes clear that the military service 
is not a homogenizing force. On the contrary, military service even intensifies in many 
cases the inequalities and injustices endemic to social life (Mater, 2012; Altınay, 2004a; 
Turan, 2013).298 In line with Turan (2013), I assert that the promise of equality given by the 
military service on the basis of its uniforming and standardizing effects is nothing but a 
colossal myth (pp. 268-269). As Altınay (2004a) proclaims, military service does not offer 
bare and singular experiences to all males; "there are various differences - mainly along the 
lines of class, education, ethnicity, and religion - which disrupt that bareness" (p. 77). 
  
The continuum of the differences between the life outside the barracks and life inside 
the barracks, as well as the injustices embedded in the conscription system are actually 
                                                          
297 "The Democrat Party considers the armed-nation theory as the military expression of 
democracy. Abolishing the military-civilian distinction and the Militarization of the Nation 
are necessary to preserve national existence. All of the economic resources of the nation 
should be organized for National Defense. The services of National Education, Justice, 
Finance and Transportation take their wholly roles in the National Defense.” 
298 This problem even seems to extend back to the Ottoman times. Although the 
conscription ballot system was instituted in order to remove the differences between rich 
and poor in their military service, in an official report of Dâr-ı Şura-yı Askerî (Military 
Council) dating back to 1848, it is stated that there is not even one child of eşraf (notable, 
rich families) among those who arrived for their conscription through the ballot 
(Hacısalihoğlu, 2010, p. 85). 
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affirmed in some interviews. For example, Yasemin finds the injustice in the arbitrariness 
of the system:  
 
"Yani aslında çok adaletsiz bir şey. Çünkü hani bazıları gidiyor Doğu'ya 
bazıları Batı'da kalıyor. Hiçbir adaleti yok bunun."299  
  
On the other hand, Merve refrains from acknowledging the influence of class and 
status by instantly shifting to a third person narrative. Despite her resort to 
depersonalization, she seems to imply in the following sentences that the paid military 
service would exacerbate the injustices already existing in the current conscription system 
by systematizing them. However, she turns this predicament into an argument in favor of 
the continuum of the conscription system as it is:    
 
"...[Z]aten tamamen karşıyım bedelli askerliğe. Yani bu sefer parası olmayan 
tamamen şey olmuş olacak… Hani derler ya: ‘Yok general çocuklarının, parası 
olanın [askerliği] hiçbir zaman Doğu'ya çıkmaz.’ Bu sefer de bunu iyice 
sistematikleştiren bir şey olacak."300 
  
Similarly, Deniz objects to the paid military service by stating that it would entail 
discrimination and inequality on the basis of one's class. As the lesser of two evils, the 
current conscription system once again earns the halo of reason and gets his nod:   
 
"Zorunlu askerlik hizmeti bence mantıklı bir uygulama. Bu işi bedelli 
yaparsınız biraz ayrımcılık oluyor gibi geliyor bana. Sonuçta ... bedelli 
askerliği karşılayabilen aileler var, karşılayamayacak aileler var. Bu yönde bir 
eşitsizlik söz konusu olabilir."301 
                                                          
299 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “In fact it is quite unfair. 
Because, you know, some go to the East, some stay in the West. There is no justice to it.”  
300 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I am completely against the 
paid military service. Then people who do not have the money will be like… You know 
how they say: ‘The sons of general officers and rich people are never sent to the East.’ It 
[the paid military service] would systematize that further.”   
301 Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “I think the compulsory 
military service is a rational implementation. If you make it paid, it would lead to 
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 Zeynep too acknowledges some problems in the current conscription system. 
Differently from others though, Zeynep is also the only interlocutor who churned out 
multiple arguments to legitimize the compulsory military service on several grounds:  
 
"Bu bizim geleneğimiz ya, ben bunu böyle görüyorum. Biz Amerika değiliz. 
Biz sonradan kurulu bir ülke ya da devlet değiliz. Onlar kadar rahat da değiliz. 
Bizim jeopolitik konumumuz da öyle, siyasetimiz de öyle. Bak bence bizim her 
zaman dış politikamız başka ülkelerin yönlendirmesiyle oldu. ... Bu ülkenin 
güvenliğe gerçekten ihtiyacı var... [B]u zorunlu askerlik olayı zaten çok 
önceden gelen bir şey, kuruluşumuzdan gelen bir şey."302 (emphases mine) 
  
The first thing that we encounter in between these lines is the good old "myth of the 
military nation."303 The thrust of the thesis of the military nation is that, "Turks" have 
always fostered a different kind of affiliation with the military, since their foundation. As a 
corollary, they have a special knack and predisposition for soldiering and combat. In this 
framework by which soldiering as well as sets of values related to the military institution 
are ethnicized, dehistoricized, essentialized and thence naturalized, the military and the 
nation is seen coeval with each other. More importantly, the myth of the military nation 
displaces the military service from a legal and institutional register according to which the 
civic duty of conscription is incumbent on all male citizens, to a social and cultural one 
where soldiering turns into a practice of one's (male) culture and citizenship rights (Altınay, 
2004a, pp. 29-30; Altınay, 2004b, pp. 187-188; Altınay, 2008, pp. 114-115; Şen, 2011, pp. 
35-36). Accordingly, Zeynep assumes a distinction between Western countries like the 
United States where soldiering is not part and parcel of the nation and Turkey where it is 
ingrained in the tradition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
discrimination I guess. After all … there are families who can afford it and others who 
cannot. It [the paid military service] would create inequality in that regard.”  
302 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “It is our tradition. This is 
how I see it. We are not the United States. We are not a state or a country established 
recently or later than others. We are not as comfortable as them either. This is how our 
geopolitical position and politics are as well. I think our foreign policy has always been 
guided by other countries. … This country really needs security... And after all, this 
compulsory military thing dates back to a long time ago, to our foundation.” (emphases 
mine) 
303 For an extensive study on the genealogy, use and implications of the myth of the 
military nation, see: Altınay, 2004a   
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 Zeynep also adds to her arsenal of arguments "the discourse of geopolitics"304 to 
justify the compulsory military service. Instead of the commonly frequented theme of 'the 
dislike for a strong Turkey' to combine with 'the geopolitical significance of the country' 
(Kancı & Altınay, 2007, pp. 59-65), she resorts to 'the impotence of Turkey in foreign 
policy' in order to underline the geopolitical vulnerability and security deficit of the 
country. 
  
However, her take on the myth of the military nation varies from more orthodox 
deployments of it. Zeynep does not subscribe to a static understanding of culture. She 
leaves a room for the slight possibility of change, despite her contentment with the way 
things are going as it is. For her, the possibility of change is dependent on developments in 
the arena of international politics where Turkey has no power for setting its own agenda. 
Eventually, she advises to 'take it slow' though, lest that the society, which is assumed to be 
unprepared for such a change of normalization, should lag behind the pace of change: 
 
Zeynep: "Şu an [zorunlu askerlik için] kötü bir uygulama demeyebilirim, 
demem. Ama ileride dönüşeceği durumlarda neler gerektirir? Zorunlu askerlik 
olayı kalkabilir. Kalkamaz da. Bilmiyorum. Bunun tamamıyla bizim dış 
politikamızla alakalı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu tamamıyla yapısal olarak 
dönüşmeye bağlı bir şey. Ama dediğim gibi bizim dış politikamız da bence dış 
ülkelerin politikalarıyla alakalı. Biz kendimiz yön veremiyoruz. Biz 
yönlendiriliyoruz. Ben bunu tipik komplo teoriciler gibi, ‘Amerika bizi 
yönlendiriyor,’ bilmem ne diye söylemiyorum."  
Sertaç: "Ama gündem belirleyici gücümüz yok diyorsun." 
Zeynep: "Kesinlikle. Biz gündem belirlemiyoruz yani, yönlendiriliyoruz. Bu 
kadar basit. Zorunlu askerlik şu anda mecburi; olması gereken [de bu]. Bunu 
sen bir anda dönüştüremezsin. Bir anda, tepe taklak, ‘Kaldırıyorum,2 
diyemezsin. Çünkü zaten askerin ordunun çok hâkim olduğu bir ülkede 
yaşıyoruz. Eskiden inanılmaz[dı] hani.  Son 10 yıldır o yavaş yavaş ortadan 
kalkıyor. Sen bu uzun dönemde askerin etkisini, zorunlu askerli[ği] de bu 
bağlamda [ele alırsak], bir anda ortadan kaldıramazsın. Bu anca dönüşerek, 
zaman içinde [olacak]. Değişim hızı bunda çok önemli. Değişim hızına 
toplumun da ayak uydurması lazım. Ama tabii ki önden gidersen çatlaklıklar 
                                                          
304 For a study on the utilization of the geopolitical discourse for purposes of legitimization 
with respect to the modern nation state's monopolization of violence, see: Bilgin, 2010 
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illa ki olur. Bu olmayacak bir şey değil. Tabii ki kaldırılabilir, ama şu anda 
normal."305  
  
On the flipside, the compulsory military service, alongside the thesis that being a 
child in a military family smoothens male children's transition to barracks, is heavily 
contested in other narratives. Military service may indeed be "the greatest engine the world 
has yet seen for the manufacture of a particular type of human intellect and body" (Cited in 
Altınay, 2004a, p. 62), as the British General Sir Ian Hamilton put it in 1910. Nevertheless, 
Bröckling notes (2008), the militaries do not only produce docile, obedient and courageous 
soldiers equipped with technological skills. Deserters, pacifists, rebels, defectors, war 
neurotics and self-mutilating soldiers feigning trouble are also the products of the militaries 
(pp. 26-27). Military brats prove no exception to this. The following narratives shatter the 
image of a military brat, prepared and looking forward to fulfill his obligations to the nation 
by serving in the military.  
  
To begin with, Ayşe, once again, raises her fundamental objections, this time from an 
anti-militarist standpoint. Without any compromise, she opposes the military service as 
well as any other alternative that may be called to fill the vacuum left after the abolition of 
the compulsory military service, in case that happens:  
 
                                                          
305 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: “I would not call it 
[compulsory military service] bad. I don’t. But what would follow in case it is transformed? 
The compulsory military service may be removed. Or may not. I don’t know. I think it all 
boils down to our foreign policy. It all boils down to a structural change. However, our 
foreign policy depends on other countries as I said. We cannot navigate it on our own. We 
are guided by others instead. I am not saying it like typical conspiracy theories, arguing ‘the 
Americans rule us.’” Sertaç: “But we are deprived of the power to set the agenda, you 
say…” Zeynep: “Absolutely. We cannot set the agenda. We are rather guided. It is that 
simple. The compulsory military service is currently compulsory and this is how it should 
be. You cannot change it overnight. You cannot instantly announce that, ‘I am abolishing 
it.’ We are already living in a country where the military is powerful. Its power was even 
more incredible back then. Now it is withering away since the last decade. If we take into 
account the deep-rooted influence of the military, you cannot instantly remove the 
compulsory military service. It will only take place through time. The pace of change is 
crucial here. Society has to keep up with the pace of change. If you outpace the society, 
there will be ruptures for sure. The change is not impossible, but what we have is normal 
for the time being.”   
176 
Ayşe: "Ona da [zorunlu askerlik] karşıyım, zorunlu askerliğe de karşıyım." 
Sertaç: "Peki profesyonel ordu tadında bir şey mi alternatif olarak gördüğün 
yoksa..." 
Ayşe: "Yok ben tamamen orduların olmadığı, sınırsız, savaşsız bir dünya 
taraftarıyım."306  
  
 For Tarık, the military service is a looming obstacle, standing adamantly between 
his present and future. He thus reflects mainly on strategies rather typical of the middle 
classes to dodge the military service, considering even desertion as an option: 
 
"O [zorunlu askerlik] orada durduğu sürece ya bir an önce gideyim halledeyim 
veyahut da olabildiğince erteleyelim diyorsun. Örneğin ben geçtiğimiz yıl 
kendi işimi kurdum, ama kendi işimi devam ettirebilmek için bir engel 
olmadan ya [işe] kısa bir süre ara vermem ya da [işimi] bir an önce birilerine 
devredip gidip gelmem gerekiyor. Onun da böyle bir sürüncemede kalmaması 
gerekiyor. ‘Şu zaman gideceğim ve geleceğim,’ diyebilmem gerekiyor. 
Atıyorum gittim; uzun dönem çıktı. Böyle bir sürprizin olmaması gerekiyor. 
Ya da olabildiğince erteleyebilmem gerekiyor akademik eğitime, hayata devam 
ederek. Yahut da ne bileyim, bakayaya kalıp kaçarak, şudur budur..."307  
  
On the other hand, Kemal is the only interlocutor who finished his service in the 
military. In his narrative, we can bear testimony to the self-subverting characteristics of 
power (Foucault, 1979; Foucault, 1990) and observe the ways in which military service can 
have transformative impacts on people in such ways that undermine, if not thwart, 
disciplinary power's own "teleological aims of normalization" (Butler, 1997a, p. 93). Kemal 
stated repeatedly during and after the interview how he grew impatient with the military 
                                                          
306 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Ayşe: “I am also against it. I 
am against the compulsory military service as well.” Sertaç: “Then do you see any 
alternative to that, like the paid military service?” Ayşe: “No, I am in favor of a world 
without militaries, borders and wars.”  
307 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “As it [compulsory military 
service] hovers above your life, you think of overcoming it by registering for the draft as 
soon as possible or postponing it as far as possible. For example, I set up my own business 
last year and I have to suspend or hand over the business to someone else during that time 
in order to keep things afloat. There should be no lagging. I should be able to tell when my 
departure and return are due. Let’s say I draw the short straw and become a conscript for 
long-term. There should be no such surprises. Or I should postpone it as much as possible 
by pursuing further academic education or, I don’t know, by evading the draft and so 
forth.”      
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institution since his service. His was "a short-term one, easy and a perfectly normal stint in 
the West,"308 he recites, but took enough tolls on him, inducing him to mobilize reverse-
discourses. He informs that, the military service has strengthened his liberal beliefs.309 
When asked what comes to his mind when he hears the words TSK, the army or the 
military, he erupts as he goes on to answer the question, chuckling and shaking his head in 
disapproval at once:  
 
"Benim için büyük bir komedi sahnesi geliyor. Ama bu asker çocuğu olduğum 
için değil, askerliği yaptıktan sonra daha da idrak ettiğim bir şey. Mesela 
KBRN diye bir şey vardır askeriyenin içinde; Kimyasal-Biyolojik-Radyoaktif-
Nükleer diye bir şey. Onların kısaltması, kısaltması bile komik. Abi o kadar 
komedi ki biz denetlemelerde KBRN timiyiz, tamam mı? Eğitim falan alıyoruz 
güya. O kadar saçma şeyler ki; mesela nükleer saldırı olduğunda belirli bir 
pozisyonda yatıyorsun, postallarını dikiyorsun yere falan. O seni koruyormuş. 
Saçma sapan, hiçbir fiziksel gerçekliğe dayanmayan, safsatadan ibaret, sırf 
şekil olsun diye [yapılan şeyler]. Nükleer tatbikat yani. İşin komik yanı, albay 
geldi: ‘Sizin,’ dedi ‘gaz maskeleriniz kaç tane?’ Sordu böyle. (Gülerek) 
Komutan da dedi ki: ‘Bir tane.’ Bütün karargâhta bir tane. Komedi ya. Dalga 
mı geçiyorsun yani! Kim takacak onu? Bir tane var, onu da takmış koluna 
duruyor. Çok büyük bir komedi sahnesi. Daha geçen gün haberlerde vardı: 
‘Türk Ordusu Kimyasal Saldırılara Hazırlanıyor.’ İşte [askerler] KBRN eğitimi 
alıyor falan diye yalandan bir video çekmişler. Çadırın içini gazla 
doldurmuşlar, maskelerle içine girip çıkıyorlar falan. Ama işin içine girince, 
komedi ya... İçindeyken gülemiyorsun ama gerçekten büyük bir komedi yani.  
Oradaki bütün komutanlar da farkında. Bazı şeyler çok hantal, değişmesi 
zaman alıyor, ama değişecektir yani. Çok saçma, çok komik yani aptalca bunu 
iyi bir şey olarak düşünmek. Zannetmiyorum, bu kadar aptal olamaz 
insanlar."310 
                                                          
308 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013  
309 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013 
310 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “It evokes in my mind one 
big comedy stage. Not because I am a military brat, but I had a better grasp of it after 
finishing the military service. For example, there is something called the KBRN squad in 
the military. KBRN is the abbreviation for Chemical-Biological-Radioactive-Nuclear. Even 
the abbreviation is ridiculous. It is all ridiculous man. We are the KBRN squad in 
inspections, alright? We are getting trained for that and so forth. In case there is a nuclear 
strike, you take a position lying down with your boots facing the sky. It is supposed to save 
you from a nuclear strike. Now, all there is to them is stupid nonsensical gimmicks, going 
against the simple laws of physical reality. The funny thing is, one day the colonel came 
and asked: ‘How many gas masks do you have?’ He asked that. (Laughing) And the 
commander said: ‘One, sir.’ Only one gas mask for the whole military quarters. It is a farce. 
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 Out of 214 words in his Turkish speech, Kemal manages to use the words comedy 
and comic 9 times. It is all staged according to him, where the farcical spectacle continues 
incessantly and the curtain never falls down as newcomers always replace those who 
depart: 
     
"Bir komedide rol alıyorsun, sonra biri senin yerine giriyor, oyun devam ediyor 
hep yani. Büyük bir perde yani."311 
  
Kemal's poignant delineation of his military service brings to mind Çoban's (2013) 
conceptualization of "the militarist spectacle power" (pp. 189-194), in which everything 
operates through an 'as if' rationale. For Kemal, his military service was a waste of time.  
 
"Ömrümden çalınmış bir seneyi ifade ediyor [zorunlu askerlik]. Şu anda 
mesela 1 sene daha tecrübeli olabilirdim yaptığım işte. Ya da bir level daha 
yukarı çıkmış olabilirdim. Tamamen zaman kaybı ya, tamamen zaman kaybı. 
Bir de insanın özgüvenini törpüleyen bir şey. Çok saçma ya. Sadece okumuş 
insanlar için değil, okumamış insanlar için de saçma. Eskiden belki ulaşım 
imkanları, iletişim imkanları yokken birileri için bir şey ifade ediyor olabilir. 
Belki insanlar okuma-yazma öğrendi, şehir ne onu gördü falan. Artık bence 
hiçbir anlamı yok ya. Herkes için zaman kaybı. 15 ay uzun dönem [askerlik 
yapan] lise mezunu çocuklar için de zaman kaybı. Onlar da mesela gidip bir 
yerden bir kariyer başlatabilirler yani. İlla üniversite okumaları gerekmiyor. 
Onlar da iki senesini kaybetmiş oluyor. Belki o bir yere girecekti, en tabandan 
girecekti. Belki bir level yukarı çıkacaktı. Ama onun için de zaman kaybı abi. 
Herkes için öyle ya. Çünkü kimse orada asker olmuyor."312 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Are you kidding! Who will wear that mask? There is only one and he is already holding it 
in his hands. It is just one big comedy stage. Few days ago I saw in the news: ‘The Turkish 
Military is Getting Prepared for Chemical Threats.’ They took footage of soldiers feigning 
training, diving with gas masks into tents full of gas and so forth. When you become 
involved, you see that it is ridiculous though… You cannot laugh inside, but it is pure 
comedy. All the commanders also know it. They know there are many sluggish things in 
the military. It takes time to change them, but they will change. It is ridiculous so much that 
it’d be stupid to think that as something good. I believe people cannot be that dumb.” 
311 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “You take part in a big 
comedy stage, then someone replaces you and the play goes on. It is a big act.”   
312 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “It [compulsory military 
service] means to me a year stolen from my life. I could have been a year more experienced 
in my job. Or I could have been a level higher. It is a complete time-waste. It also hurts 
your self-confidence. It is ridiculous. Not only for educated, but also for uneducated people. 
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 Two points are worth attention in Kemal's narrative. First is Kemal's riposte to İrem 
that the civilizing and integrating functions of the military as the school of the fatherland 
has expired. His position anticipates Şen's contention that the pioneer position of the 
military institution and the function of the military as an ideological state apparatus in 
Turkey dwindles as the "infrastructural power" (Mann, 1993) and the "administrative 
power" (Giddens, 1985) of the nation state grew enough after 1980s to enable its reach to 
regions where it had little if any control before (2010, pp. 166-174). Kemal thus articulates 
that, the military service is proven useless not only for him, but for everyone. Secondly, he 
attracts attention to the inadequacy of the military training given in barracks, in a manner 
quite antithetical to the myth of the military nation. "Nobody becomes a soldier there," he 
concludes, while seeing the resolution of the predicament in a transition to a professional 
army:  
 
"Ben liberal görüşlü bir insanım.  Hiçbir şeye aşırı bir tutkum, sempatim yok. 
Ama bu işin oluru nedir biliyor musun? ... Bu sistem nasıl yürür biliyor musun? 
Dediğim gibi [profesyonel] askerler yaratırsın, onlara da parasını verirsin. ... 
Bu işin gerçekten profesyonelleşip, böyle büyük bir kitle ordusu halinden çıkıp, 
askerliğin içindeki angarya kısmını çıkartıp, yani oradaki kadroları elimine 
edip sadece işi gerçekten askerlik olan profesyonel insanların istihdam 
edilmesini isterdim ben. O zaman zaten bu tarz problemler olmaz. Hani bu 
filmlerde gördüğün özel birlikler gibi adamlar yetiştirirsen; o tarz adamlar, 
yaşlanınca da onların komutanı olacağı daha kemik birlikler..."313 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
When there were little to no means of communication or transportation back in the old 
days, perhaps it meant something for some people. Perhaps people learned how to read and 
write, saw a city for the first time in their lives and so forth. But it has no longer any 
meaning to it. It is a time-waste for everyone. It is a time-waste for high school graduates 
on long-term service for 15 months as well. They could start a career in that two years they 
lose. One doesn’t have to graduate from university to do that. Maybe he was going to get a 
job and start from the bottom. Maybe he was going to get a promotion in what he does 
during that time span. It is also a time-waste for him, for everybody. Because nobody 
becomes a soldier there.”   
313 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I am a liberal person. I don’t 
have excessive passion or sympathy for anything. You know what would be doable? … 
You know how it would work out? [It would work out] [i]f you create [professional] 
soldiers and pay them. … I would like this job to become professionalized instead of being 
a huge mass military, its drudgerous parts to be removed, by the elimination of lousy units 
in the military alongside their cadres, and the employment of professional people whose job 
will regard only and only the military. Then there would be no such problems, if you were 
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 I should add a caveat here with reference to Kemal's arguments. Unlike Ayşe, 
Kemal's loud protests against the military institution do not much amount to a critique of 
militarism. Kemal rather calls for the end of mass military so that it can be replaced with a 
smaller and more concentrated, highly mobile, precisely striking, outsourcing, flexibly 
organized and even exportable professional army, consisting of well-equipped and trained 
mercenaries of the modern age, and engaging not so much in conventional wars as in peace 
operations, 'humanitarian' interventions, crime on missions and counter-insurgency acts 
(Bora T., 2006, p. 26; Laçiner, 2004). As these changing patterns, whose emergence have 
been referred by many as the birth of the "post-modern" (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 
2000) or "post-Fordist military" (King, 2006), are appropriated for the Turkish context, 
Kemal believes that the system will work with less frictions. Because the efficacy of the 
new organizational pattern, Kemal thinks, would pry loose the military institution and 
nation state by releasing the burdens that the compulsory military service lays on them in 
terms of financing, administration and governmentality. But Kemal is a proponent of the 
professional army on another ground as well. He supposes that it should relieve the tensions 
in civil-military relations of Turkey:  
 
"Hem de böyle soru işaretleri olmaz kimsenin kafasında abi. ‘Aman orada 
[askeri tesislerde] bedava yaşıyorlar; aman böyle aman şöyle yapıyorlar’ 
[demezler]. Kapat gitsin abi. Oraya harcayacağın paraya çekirdek bir ordu kur, 
onlara 10 kâğıt maaş ver abi. Adam da nerede ne bok yemek istiyorsa yıllık 
izninde yapsın. Milletin ağzından, dilinden de bu laflar kalksın abi."314 
  
Basically, Kemal propounds in the above statement that, reshaping the tasks and 
organization in accordance with the market rationale may also help to the secularization of 
the military in public perception (Bora T. , 2006, p. 26). But more importantly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
to create special units just like you watch in movies. I mean that kind of guys working in 
core units, where they will become commanders as they get older…” 
314 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Then there’d be no question 
marks on people’s minds as well. They would not say: ‘Oh, they are living there [in 
military facilities] for free. They are doing this and that.’ Shut them down already. Create a 
core [professional] military instead and pay them good. And let these guys do whatever the 
heck they want to do during their annual leave, so that such words in the mouths of people 
should disappear.”   
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annoyance of Kemal by the 'words in the mouths' and 'question marks on the minds' of 
others in fact mark the dimension which makes the rejection of the military service even 
harder for the children of military families. Because they are obliged by laws to serve in the 
military, like every other male citizen, yet in their case expectations soars even higher. In 
the public imagination, they all feast on lush conditions provided them by the military. 
However, even they procrastinate their inevitable military service. Suffice it to remember, 
one way to refer the injustices of the military service is stating that, as Merve denoted: 
"Even they (especially, the sons of general officers) do not do their military service in the 
East." Then, harking back to one of our original questions which motivated and guided this 
study: What happens when a military brat decides to be a fugitive, rotten,315 deserter or a 
conscientious objector? What happens if these children slip out of the heterosexual matrix 
and become ineligible for their military service? Conscientious objection is already a blow 
knocked against the myth of the military nation, by showing that no one is born a soldier. 
What happens if this blow comes from a child brought up within the military community, 
by a military family? Their resistance would not only be understood as an act which 
endangers the security of the nation, or a riot against the legitimacy of the state (Beşikçi, 
2010, p. 148), but also as an outlandish rebellion and a fundamental objection raised against 
the myth of the military nation. The discursive universe on which the whole myth is 
predicated would be put into disintegration even more radically. For they would show that 
even the children brought up within the military community as members of military 
families of a supposedly military nation are not born soldiers. Therefore, it is of immediate 
significance for the military and defenders of the myth of the military nation to contain 
these children within a heterosexual matrix and manufacture their consent in order to keep 
intact the pillars on which the myth rises. Otherwise, these children would not only cast a 
shadow of doubt on their own masculinity, citizenship and loyalty to the nation, but also on 
the myth of the military nation, even more than other conscientious objectors, simply 
because they are its softest belly. Since it is also arguably harder to marginalize and 
criminalize these children than other conscientious objectors on ethnic, religious or socio-
economic grounds as well, it is also probably better for the military elites to see that people 
                                                          
315 The word "rotten" (çürük) has been substituted by "those ineligible for military service" 
in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, with the changes ratified on 27.10.2013  
182 
keep and spread 'the word' out in the streets and 'the question mark' in their heads, about 
how the son of a general officer in their town lazes away his military service in such and 
such a military post of a Western city, rather than beholding in fear that 'the eminent and 
true children of the nation' turn into 'flies hard to swallow' (Öğünç, 2013, p. 161) and 
completely refuse to turn themselves in to the military. As their sting would be doubly 
impactful, fraught with more significations and implications, they should have been 
rendered doubly invisible. Perhaps this is why, we do not hear much from Ferda Ülker, 
whose invisibility is tripled as a female conscientious objector.316 Perhaps this is why 
another troubling figure like the children of military officers, Yuri, who was once strolling 
within the institutional borders of the military as a young cadet, has not been taken to the 
court for his offenses as a conscientious objector unlike numerous others.317 And perhaps 
this is also why Tarık, after our interview and while driving us home, told me how he will 
most probably yield to the relentless "interpellation of the military" (Turan, 2013, pp. 310-
311) in the long run. After a moment of silence, he began talking again, as he stared at the 
brake lights of the cars ahead us, waiting for the stoplight to turn green. "The pressure is too 
high," he said with aplomb, "to take other routes."318 I first took his words as a regular 
apology issued for the city’s usual afternoon traffic jam and dull scenery. Then I realized 
that maybe the ambiguous sentence spilled from him, because he was bereft of the hope 
that he could dodge military service. I still do not know in which context he used the 
sentence. I did not ask what other routes were available for him. Whatever they may be, 
Frost’s "roads less traveled" (Altınay, 2004a) seems destined to be the "paths almost 
unbeaten" for children of military families if and insofar as the wind, whispering the words 
'even they', continues to blow by the dilapidated road sign on which is written 'en route to 
the zones of discomfort'. 
 
4.4. The Trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon 
 
 Another burning issue which has galvanized the public opinion on the military 
institution is the cropping up of legal cases, namely the controversial Balyoz and 
                                                          
316 To learn more about Ferda Ülker's story, see: Öğünç, 2013, pp. 104-113 
317 To learn more about Yuri's story, see: Öğünç, 2013, pp. 48-59 
318 From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013 
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Ergenekon trials, in which the military was seated on the dock. The trials were 
unprecedented and paradigmatic in the sense that they symbolized the widening fractures in 
the military’s shield of invincibility (Maktav, 2006, pp. 81-84; İnsel, 2004. p. 47), a shield 
that is especially renowned for its capacity to hold at bay any interventions coming from 
the field of law.319 The columns written on these trials are dime a dozen. However we did 
not get to learn much about how the legal process put a dent in the military organization, 
even after the cathartic closures of the trials in 2012 (Sledgehammer) and 2013 
(Ergenekon). Nor do we know the ways in which it has been perceived by the military 
community, except the public statements of some angry general officers and resignation 
letters of military officers pouring in hordes from all quarters.  
  
Let's proceed now to the narratives of the children to better understand the reception 
of the trials which caused a tremor in the military as well as to observe if the trials 
prompted a change in the perception of the children with respect to the institution. I did not 
advertently separate the trials while asking my questions, once again to see whether my 
interlocutors were going to feel the need to pose a distinction. No one felt such a need. This 
shows how the trials are welded together in the perception of the children whom I 
interviewed.  
  
I can roughly divide the approaches of the children to the trials into two categories. 
The metaphor of 'game' predominates in the former group. In the first approach, the 
metaphor is deployed to exhibit the artificiality of the whole process: 
 
"Çok ispatlanmış şeyler varmış [Balyoz ve Ergenekon'un] olmadığına dair. 
Ama sonuçta askerler içeride. Ya zaten Ergenekon diye bence çok saçma sapan 
yaratılmış bir şey var. … Oyun mu diyeyim, ne diyeyim…"320 (emphasis mine) 
                                                          
319 For the historical analysis of the dicephalous character of the judicial apparatus in 
Turkey, which caters to the autonomy of the military institution, see: Kardaş, 2004   
320 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “They say there are many 
things proving that they [Ergenekon and Balyoz] do not exist. But soldiers are behind the 
bars anyway. There is already something called the Ergenekon, which is nothing but a 
ridiculous invention. … Shall I call it a game or what...”  (emphasis mine) 
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"Çok doluyum bu konuda. İçinde olunca yediremiyorsun yani, biliyorsun öyle 
olmadığını. Hepsinin bir oyun olduğunu biliyorsun. ... Askeri bitirmek için çok 
güzel bir oyun kurdular. Hatta o ... saçma sapan iddianamelerin bile ne kadar 
geçersiz, ne kadar saçma olduğu, ne kadar anlamsız olduğu bile ortaya 
çıkarılmasına rağmen [iddianameler işleme konuluyor]."321 (emphasis mine) 
  
Nuri's narrative also revolves around the same metaphor. He makes use of it, again to 
attract attention to the possibility that the trials may be concocted in their nature:   
 
"Asker çocuğu olduğum için ‘Balyoz, Ergenekon, böyle şey olmaz,’ 
demektense her zaman her şeye eşit yönden bakmaya çalışıyorum. Ben böyle 
şeyler olduğuna çok inanmıyorum. Bir oyunmuş gibi geliyor. Ama çok da hani 
böyle masum da değillermiş gibi geliyor bir yandan da."322 (emphasis mine)   
  
Differently from İrem and Merve, Nuri suspects that convicts may not be innocent. 
At the presence of such doubts the theme of the 'rotten apples in the barrel' is often 
introduced to the conversations. Zeynep is another interlocutor who thinks that the trials are 
bogus, while conceding that some of the military officers can be guilty. According to her, 
they are throwing the baby out with the bathwater: 
 
"Düzmece. Direkt. ... [B]azı şeyler o kadar açık ki. Şöyle düşünüyorum: Evet, 
belli bir kaç kişi var suçlu [olan]. Belki de 10 kişi. Her neyse. Ama bunları 
göstererek bir torba davaya dönüştü bu [hukuki süreç]. Bu dava adı altında, bu 
suç adı altında masum insanları öç alma pahasına yargılıyorlar. Daha doğrusu 
ölüme terk edecekler yani. Benim düşüncem bu. Ben asla ve asla 
inanmıyorum."323 
                                                          
321 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “It [the trials] plagues me. 
When you are involved, you know otherwise. You know that it is all a game. It is a set up 
to do away with the military. Even despite the ridiculous accusations are proven wrong and 
meaningless [they run the charges].” (emphasis mine) 
322 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Rather than saying, ‘There are 
no such things as Balyoz and Ergenekon,’ because I am a military brat, I always try to take 
an equal distance from varying perspectives. I don’t believe such things exist. It seems to 
me as a game. However, it also seems to me that they are not much innocent.” (emphasis 
mine) 
323 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “It is nothing but a fraud. … 
Some things are so obvious. I think this way: Yes, there are few guilty people. Perhaps ten, 
whatever. But they turned it into a mass trial to pack everyone into prison under the guise 
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  The interlocutors in the first group more or less concur on certain motives 
navigating the legal process. For them, the primary motive behind the contrived trials is to 
sap the strength of the military, by capturing or defaming it:    
 
"Tamamen askerleri indirme, askerleri geri çekme ve polis devleti oluşturma 
gibi bir amaçları var bence. O yüzden bence nasıl çekebiliriz dediler. Olmayan 
bir şeyi ortaya atıp bütün askerleri toplamak en iyi çözüm. İçeride ne 
yapabilirler? Hiçbir şey yapamazlar."324 (emphasis mine) 
"Tamamen asker düşmanlığı, askeri aşağılamak için yapılmış küçük bir şey 
yani. Oyun mu diyeyim, ne diyeyim."325 (emphases mine) 
"Ben Genelkurmay Başkanları dâhil, [askerlerin] darbe yapacaklarını çok 
düşünmedim. Belki geçmiştir. Belki böyle bir düşünce geçmiştir [akıllarından]. 
Olabilir. Ama [bu düşüncenin] çok uygulanabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Belki 
onu yakalamışlarsa işte hazır fırsat diye... Çünkü ele geçiremedikleri tek güç 
asker kalmıştı."326 (emphasis mine) 
"Hepsinin bir oyun olduğunu biliyorsun. Zaten asker bırakmadılar, asker 
kalmadı yani. Kalanlar da sürekli istifa ediyorlar. Çünkü gururlarına, onurlarına 
yediremiyor insanlar. Çok da haklılar. ‘Ben bu insanlara mı hizmet edeceğim?’ 
diyorsun yani. ‘Niye edeyim ki? Niye uğraşayım, niye kendi canımı ortaya 
koyayım ki?’ diyorsun. İşte askeri bitirmek için çok güzel bir oyun 
kurdular."327 (emphases mine) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of judging them [few guilty people]. Innocent people are put into trial just for sake of 
revenge, in the name of justice. In fact, they will be left for dead. This is what I think. I 
never ever believe it.”  
324 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “They simply aim to 
overthrow the military and create a police state instead. Thus they thought how they can 
accomplish it. The best solution is to make up something in order to collect all soldiers. 
What can they do behind the bars? Nothing.” (emphasis mine) 
325 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “It is done out of enmity 
towards the military in order to insult the military. Shall I call it a game or what...” 
(emphasis mine) 
326 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “I never thought that the 
soldiers, including the General Staff, are going to stage a coup against the government. 
Perhaps it crossed. Perhaps it crossed their minds. It is possible. But I don’t think it is 
doable. Maybe they caught it [the idea] and capitalized on it… Because the military was the 
only force they could not conquer.” (emphasis mine) 
327 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “You know that it is all a game. 
They already left no soldiers. I mean, there are no soldiers left. As for the rest of them, they 
continuously resign. Because their pride and honor cannot take it anymore. And they are 
right. ‘Will I serve these people?’ you ask. ‘Why should I bother? Why should I put my life 
on the line?’ It is a set up to do away with the military.” (emphases mine) 
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In these narratives the military institution sometimes appears as the last bastion, 
remaining unconquered and untarnished under the expansionist aspirations of the current 
government party, until the legal process. However, more often, it seems to be the victim 
who falls prey to the power which emanates from a summit wherein reside all the current 
prime minister's men, without compromising their absolute power. 
 
"Bu iktidarın olduğu yerde darbenin olabileceğine ne olursa olsun 
inanmıyorum. Çünkü çok güçlüler."328 (emphasis mine) 
  
 This power attributed, usually to the Prime Minister Erdoğan, is not only absolute, 
but also mesmerizing: 
 
"Tabii onun [davanın] içinde bir sürü gazeteciler var, şunlar var, bunlar var. 
Ama hepsinin düşünceleri bir yerde aynı yere çıktığı için adam, ‘Tamam o 
zaman. Ben böyleyim, o zaman siz de Ergenekoncusunuz,’ dedi. ‘Sizin darbe 
planınız var,’ dedi. Der yani. Adamın gücü var. Yüzde 50 oy alıyor adam. 
İnsanlar da ağzı açık bir şekilde onu dinliyor. ‘Ha, tamam o zaman,’ 
diyorlar."329 (emphasis mine) 
"İnsanımızda şöyle bir şey var. Ne söylenilirse ona inanıyorlar, özellikle 
başbakana. Yaptıkları şeyi göre göre dediklerine inanıyorlar. Öyle olduğu için, 
Balyoz'dur falan böyle işlere giriştiler. Adamları aldılar, hâlâ, ‘Adamların 
yaptığı bir şey yoksa neden içerdeler? İçerdelerse bir şey yapmışlardır,’ diyor 
insanlarımız."330 (emphasis mine)  
  
                                                          
328 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “I don’t believe that there will 
be any military coup as long as the current government stays in power. Because they are 
too powerful.” (emphasis mine) 
329 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “In this law case, there are 
many journalists who are tried and so forth. But because their ideas more or less reach to 
same ends, the guy said, ‘Well then. This is who I am and you are members of the 
Ergenekon.’ He said, ‘You are devising coup plans.’ He says because he can. He has 
power. He gets the half of votes. And people admiringly listen to his trumpet. ‘Well, alright 
then,’ they say.” (emphasis mine) 
330 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Our people believe 
whatever is said to them. They believe especially to the prime minister. They continue to 
believe what he says, despite seeing what he’s done. That’s why they [the government 
party] engaged in such things like Balyoz. They sent soldiers to prison and our people still 
say, ‘If they did nothing, why are they imprisoned? If they are imprisoned, they surely have 
committed something.’” (emphasis mine) 
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Moreover, some children also seem to think that those who wield this absolute power 
enjoy practicing it on the military so that they can showcase its sheer magnitude:   
 
İrem: "Aslında herkes her şeyi biliyor. Aslında öyle bir şey olmadığını 
biliyorlar. Ama insanın gözüne soka soka, sen bunu bilsen de, doğrusu bu olsa 
da, ‘Bak ben sana bunu yapabiliyorum, benim gücüm bu kadar,’ diyebilen 
birisi var.”331 (emphasis mine) 
 
"Ben [Ergenekon ve Balyoz iddianamelerinin] hepsini okumadım haliyle. Ama 
inanmıyorum ya. Kesinlikle öç alma meselesi, başka bir şey değil. Ben 
öndeyim, bunları da yapabilirim davası."332 (emphasis mine) 
 
In sum, what we see in these accounts is nothing but a castrated military institution. 
The institution emerges as the lamented victim who has no choice but to buckle eventually 
down against the onslaught of the hostile government party. Then, the game metaphor to 
which the children in the first group often appealed does not denote a game in which 
players start competing fairly by devising strategies according to the rules of the game and 
decks dealt in their hand. Rather, for them, this is a rigged game, whereby the military 
institution, ousted from the reticulations of power, is enforced to take a chair in the card 
table, only to be condemned to perpetual defeat under the unmitigating power of its ill-
willed foes. Perhaps this is the reason why many interlocutors in the first group employ a 
legalist perspective so as to show the injustices, ambiguities and incoherence embedded in 
the judicial process. They are mostly preoccupied with legal and technical considerations, 
emphasizing the flimsiness or fictitiousness of evidence used in the trials. An impression I 
had from the interviews is that the children who are related to the Balyoz and Ergenekon 
trials via friends whose fathers were adjudicated seemed more inclined to employ the 
legalist viewpoint. Zeynep's narrative in the following exemplifies this point:   
 
                                                          
331 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: İrem: “Actually, everyone 
knows everything.  They [the people] also know that it is not true. But there is a person 
who pushes the issue by saying, ‘See what I am capable of doing to you. I have such 
power,’ despite what you know and truth is.” (emphasis mine) 
332 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I did not read all of them 
[the charges in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials]. But I don’t believe. It is definitely a 
matter of getting revenge and nothing else. It is a trial of ‘I have the edge, so I can do that 
to you.’” (emphasis mine) 
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"Benim arkadaşım Dursun Çiçek'in kızı. Yani arkadaşım dediğim şöyle. 
Tanışıklığımız yok. [...] Üniversitesi'nden mezun. Biliyorum, aynı ortamda 
oluyorduk falan. ... E delilleri çıkıyor işte. TÜBİTAK bilirkişi raporunu belki 
okumuşsundur. O kadar çok şey var ki. Ve bunlara [rağmen] hiçbir açıklama 
yapamıyorlar. Bir defa avukatları davaya almıyorlar. Adamın orada avukatı o 
ya; nasıl almazsın ki sen bunu? Bir defa [hukuka] aykırı ya. Hukuk devletiyim 
diye geçiniyorsun ama senin yaptığına bak. Mesela iddianame üzerine de 
benim konuştuğum hocalar devamlı aynı şeyi söylüyor, İddianamenin evirip 
çevirip aynı şeyin üzerinde durduğu, ama kesinlikle bir yargıya varılamadığı 
söyleniyor. Muğlâklıklar var."333   
 
 On the other hand, such legal and technical considerations also seep into the 
narratives of interlocutors falling under the second group. They also keep their reservations 
with regards to the justice and persuasiveness of the trials. These narratives, also teemed 
with people who are suffering and wronged due to the judicial process, do not look much 
different from the first group of narratives in those respects. For example, Kemal tells in 
the following how he has lost his faith in the judicial system of Turkey: 
 
"[A]ma çok üzüldüğüm şeyler oldu. Bir kere bu polisin sorgulamalardaki delil 
yaratma, insanların hayatının karartma muhabbeti çok ciddi bir şey. Türkiye'de 
ben artık hukuk mukuk olduğuna inanmıyorum. Gerçekten inanmıyorum. Her 
şey adalet sisteminden başlıyor abi. Öyle Başbakanlığa bağlı adalet sistemi 
falan, komedi bunlar abi. Patagonya uygulamaları bunlar. ... Bazı insanlara 
öyle ceza[lar] verildi ki, mesela adama babalık haklarından mahrumiyet diye 
ceza verdiler. Ulan böyle bir şey olabilir mi ya?  Hangi azılı suçluya böyle bir 
ceza verilmiş?"334 
                                                          
333 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “My friend is the daughter 
of Dursun Çiçek. When I say friend, I don’t know her personally. I know her though. 
Because she has graduated from […] and I was around. … The evidences come out one by 
one. Maybe you read the expert report of TÜBİTAK. There are so many things in it. And 
they do not release any statement despite all of that. Before everything else, they do not let 
the lawyers into the courtroom. He is their [the accused party] lawyer for god’s sake. How 
dare you disallow him? First of all, it goes against the law. You pretend to be a country 
governed by the rule of law, but look at what you are doing. The teachers I talked to also 
say the same. They say the bill of indictment dwells on the same stuff, without reaching to 
any conclusion. There are ambiguities.” 
334 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “But there were things which 
made me sad. The lives of some people fell apart by evidences fabricated by the police and 
it is something quite serious. I believe there is no longer any law in Turkey. I really don’t. It 
all starts from the judicial system. Can you believe that the judicial system is held 
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 However, they differ from the first group of interlocutors in their conceptualization 
of power relations. They do not deny power to the military institution while accounting for 
the events, irrespective of the conclusions they draw at the end. Instead, they render the 
trials as a moment within a succession of events during which two actors, vying with each 
other, strive for power. Therefore, they do not hastily relegate the institution to the position 
of victimhood, by relocating the military within the networks of power. Accordingly, the 
phrase linking the second group of narratives is 'power struggle':  
 
"Askerler tarafından AKP'nin komplosu olarak algılanıp, AKP tarafından da, 
‘İşte kesin bunlar darbeci,’ şeklinde algılandığı için şöyle düşünüyorum: Eğer 
bu AKP ile ordu arasındaki bir güç savaşıysa ... ordunun dünyanın en temiz 
kurumu olmadığı da bir gerçek sonuçta. Böyle bir şey mümkün. "335 (emphasis 
mine) 
"Çok basit bir güç savaşı olarak görüyorum. İyi kötü, er geç bir yerden 
döneceğine ve bugün mağdur edilenlerin yarın taltif edileceğine 
inanıyorum."336 (emphasis mine) 
"Bu işler siyasi olaylar abi. Tamamen diş geçirme muhabbeti anladın mı? Ben 
sana diş geçiriyorum, yarın öbür gün sen bana diş geçiriyorsun falan. Güç 
savaşı yani."337 (emphasis mine)  
 
 As they designate the power relations reciprocally, without assuming a perfect 
asymmetry of power between the actors involved in the process, the affect that creeps into 
the narratives is rather an apathetic anticipation, instead of resentment or an elegiac mood. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
responsible to the prime minister’s office? It is ridiculous. It is Patagonian. … Some people 
got such sentences, for instance, they deprived the guy of his paternal rights. Can you 
believe it? Even the most wretched and violent criminal would not get such a sentence.” 
335 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “As soldiers perceive it as the 
conspiracy of AKP and AKP perceives soldiers like, ‘They are definitely rooting for a 
coup,’ this is how I think: If it is a power struggle between AKP and the military … it is 
quite obvious that the military is not the cleanest institution of all. It is possible.” (emphasis 
mine) 
336 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “I see it as a simple power 
struggle. I believe that the honor of those who are victimized now will be eventually 
restored somehow.” (emphasis mine) 
337 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “Man, this is political stuff. It 
is like arm wrestling, dig it? I am pinning your arm onto the table today, you are pinning 
mine some another day. It is a power struggle I mean.” (emphasis mine) 
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Another reason which results in the lack of identification with the 'victims' of the trials is 
that the interlocutors in the second group are not acquainted with anyone who has 
undergone the legal process. Tarık puts this in the following: 
 
"Bizim etrafımızdan bu soruşturmalar dâhilinde mağdur olan çok fazla insan 
yok. Mesela benim hiçbir arkadaşımın babası bunlardan dolayı bir ceza almış, 
gözaltına alınmış değil. Belki bundan dolayı, [soruşturmaları] kişiselleştirilmiş 
bir şekilde, kendime ait hissettiğim bir kimliğe ya da alt kültüre bir saldırı 
olarak algılamıyorum. [M]ağdur olanların tecrübeleriyle de çok 
özdeşleştiremiyorum kendimi."338  
  
All the interviews hint the great extent to which the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon 
are eclipsed by the controversies surrounding the judicial process. Despite their pivotal 
implications, it seems unlikely that these trials, riddled with blind-spots, question marks 
and opacity, will lend themselves in longer terms to a substantial critique of the military 
institution and militarism within the military community. Nor will they seem to contribute 
to the normalization process in these circles, unless the stumbling blocks hindering access 
and understanding to the trials are removed so that everyone can get a better grasp on them, 
instead of watching the spectacles of two bulls fighting, or a giant trampling its victims.   
 
4.5. On the Kurdish Question and the Peace Process 
 
 Finally, I asked the children about their assessments on the Peace Process. Besides 
Mustafa, who, on professional grounds, swallowed his comments concerning the major 
political events which have entailed sweeping transformations with regards to TSK, Deniz 
is another interlocutor who preferred to "tread lightly on such a delicate subject" upon 
which he does not find himself knowledgeable enough to issue comments. Most of the 
children whom I interviewed spent some time in the East, some in OHAL regions or 
neighboring provinces, due to the relocations of their fathers. Some of them have more 
                                                          
338 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “I don’t have many people 
around me who suffered from these investigations. For example, none of the fathers of my 
friends was sentenced or detained. Perhaps this is why I don’t take it personal, as an offense 
against an identity or a subculture to which I feel attached. I cannot put myself in the shoes 
of those who are suffering either.”   
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vivid recollections, whereas Deniz and Nuri hardly remember their time in the East because 
they were still babies when their fathers left their posts 'over there'. On the other hand, Ayşe 
have never been 'there' as a daughter of a commissioned naval officer, since there is not any 
naval post or assignment in the area for which her family could be relocated. Zeynep is 
another one whose stay in the region was relatively short. Because her father decided to 
leave the family behind, when he was assigned to duty in an Eastern city, where Zeynep 
paid monthly visits to him in order to see 'if he is doing okay'. Overall, the children I 
interviewed are in agreement with each other on the necessity of 'doing something' about 
the East. Tarık articulates in the following how the experiences of the children of military 
families in the East give way to the actualization of an exigent necessity to do something: 
 
"Dediğim gibi, oraya giden herkesin [aklında] bir şeyler yapılması gerektiği 
hususunda bir düşünce oluşur diye düşünüyorum yani. Biraz sağına soluna 
bakan herkesin, [durumun] bu şekilde çok uzun, çok sürdürülebilir bir şekilde 
devam etmeyeceğini fark etmesi gerekir diye düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla bir 
şeyler yapılmalı mı? Evet, yapılmalı."339  
  
However much they concur with each other on this necessity, the solutions the 
children propose to the burning issue of whose causes they diagnose in different registers 
are as diverse as their experiences. Their experiences in the East impinge on their 
judgments concerning the Kurdish Question and the Peace Process; and these experiences, 
just like their experiences in other places, are mostly shaped by the material conditions 
within which they lived in the region. These experiences vary across the region, depending 
on many parameters, including the ones such as their age, grade of education, ethnicity, 
class and gender. Other than that, their fathers' place of duty, rank and force should be 
brought into consideration to account for the diversification of these experiences. Further, 
the policies of the Turkish state and the military concerning the Kurdish Question and 
Kurdish armed struggle have a lot to say in the formation of these material conditions. 
Lastly, as stated in the previous chapter, the military institution, through its organizational 
                                                          
339 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “As I said, everyone who goes 
there would come to the idea that something should be done. I think that anyone who takes 
a looks around for a little bit should realize that the situation is not sustainable as it is. So, 
should something be done? Yes, it should.”  
192 
and spatial arrangements often has a funnelling and homogenizing effect on the array of 
experiences the children could have had in the region. On the other hand, the school 
sometimes emerges as the site which disrupts these effects, by being the major site of 
contact between the children and locals. However, as stated again in the second chapter, to 
conceptualize the effects of the school as always at odds with the military or family setting 
would be to overstate its significance in that regard. Because the children are often sent to 
schools in the region where the composition of students are relatively homogenous in terms 
of class, status, language and ethnic identity. Accordingly, Tarık recounts how his 
experience in the school of an Eastern city induced him to mull over the Kurdish Question, 
by engendering a rupture in his mind:   
 
"75. yıldı o gittiğimiz sene, 1998 yılı. O zaman 75. yıl rozetleri falan modaydı. 
Asker çocuğu mu hatırlamıyorum, sınıfta bir kız vardı. Asker çocuğu değildi 
galiba. […]'da bir galeri sahibi ya da bir sermayedarın, bir kapitalistin kızıydı 
diyelim. Bir Rus romanı tadı yakalayalım böylece. (Gülüşmeler) Oydu 
yanılmıyorsam, 75. yıl rozeti takmış[tı] işte. Oğlanın biriyle atışmıştı. ‘Ben 
Cumhuriyet çocuğuyum,’ demişti kız. Oğlan da işte ‘Ben de PKK çocuğuyum’ 
mu ‘Apo çocuğuyum’ mu ne bir şey demişti. Ben de, ‘Niye böyle düşünüyor ki 
bu eleman? PKK veya Apo ona ne verebilir ki?’ diye şaşırmıştım. Yani 
bununla ilgili bir şey düşündüğümü hatırlıyorum. İşte bunu düşündüğümde orta 
1 öğrencisiydim, ne kadar derin düşünebilirim yani... Ama en azından algıda 
bir çatlak, bir şey yaratıyor. ‘Niye böyle?’ diye soruyorsun. ‘[…]'da böyle 
miymiş?’ diye soruyorsun bir yerde."340 (emphasis mine) 
 
 Despite all the efforts of the military elites and their supporters to plug it, the rupture 
mentioned by Tarık actually transpires in other narratives as well, as a force which propels 
                                                          
340 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “We arrived there in 1998, in 
the 75th anniversary of the Republic. 75th year badges were quite widespread at that time. I 
don’t know if she is a military brat, but there was this girl in the class. She isn’t a military 
brat I suppose. She was the daughter of a rich dealer or something. Let’s say she was the 
daughter of a capitalist to have the tenor of a Russian novel. (Laughs) It was her if I’m not 
mistaken, wearing one of those 75th year badges. She got into a quarrel with one of boys. 
She was saying, ‘I am a child of the Republic.’ Then the guy said to her something along 
the lines of ‘I am a child of PKK’ or ‘I am a child of Apo.’ I was surprised, thinking, ‘Why 
does he think this way? What can PKK or Apo give him?’ I mean, I was thinking 
something about it. It was the sixth grade and to what depth could I possibly think about it 
in that age… Even so, it engenders a rupture in your mind. It makes you ask, ‘Why is it this 
way?’ It makes you ask, ‘Is this how it happens in [that city]?’” (emphasis mine) 
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the children to reassess the frames of interpretation they use to understand social reality. 
But the ways in which they come to grips with this crack in order to bring it into limits of 
intelligibility differ from each other. Let's now capture how the interactions between 
ruptures and cover-ups figure within the contexts of the Kurdish Question and Peace 
Process. 
  
It is possible to sort the narratives of the children gave in response to my questions 
about the Peace Process in four groups. The first group regards those who do not think that 
it will solve any problems, basically because the Kurdish Question does not genuinely 
exist. One of the common grounds which link these narratives to each other is that they all 
claim that there has not been much problem between Kurds and Turks until the intrusion of 
the actors, who arrived to the scene in order to reify the content of the Question, to the 
detriment of the national unity. The most notable actor among all which marks a rupture 
between the times of peace and conflict is PKK. Accordingly, these narratives argue that 
the Kurdish Question is manufactured. In fact, some suggest, it has been nothing but the 
PKK Question since its beginning. For nothing in the world would the ties between Kurds 
and Turks have severed, had they not been gnawed by agents who were extrinsic to the 
relations between them. Merve's narrative in the following illustrates this claim:  
 
"Tabii belki bu biraz benim cahilliğim, ama ben önceden hiç Kürtlerle Türkler 
arasında illa bir şeyin çözülmesi gerektiğini veya ‘Siz Kürdistan'ı kuracaksınız, 
biz ayrıyız,’ diye bir şey olduğunu hatırlamıyorum. Diyorum ya, belki bu 
benim cahilliğimden [kaynaklanıyor], ama bilmiyorum. Bu sorun şeyden çıktı. 
Biraz büyüdü. Tamam, gene PKK problemi vardı. Ama Kürt-Türk diye bir 
problem yoktu bence."341 
  
Zeynep agrees with Merve's contention that the Kurdish Question has been invented 
and thence blown out of proportions by the efforts of PKK. She also takes the implicit 
                                                          
341 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “Perhaps it’s my ignorance 
but, have you ever heard before that there is something to be settled between Kurds and 
Turks? Or I don’t remember something said like, ‘You will establish Kurdistan and we are 
distinct from you.’ As I said, perhaps it’s my ignorance. I don’t know though. The problem 
is caused by, or I mean, the problem has gone a bit bigger. Ok, the PKK Problem was ever 
there. But I think there was no ‘Kurdish-Turkish Problem’ before.”   
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assumption in Merve's speech a notch up and confessedly states that the Kurd is an 
imagined identity, without questioning the authenticity and originality of the Turkish 
national identity which she takes for granted: 
 
"Sen bu zamana kadar, tırnak içinde söylüyorum, 'Kürt Sorunu' diye bir şey 
duydun mu? Şahsen ben duymadım. Ben [Doğu’da bir şehir]’e de gittim. O 
zamanlar ki en hareketli zamanlardı. Ben hiçbir zaman 'Kürt Sorunu' ya da 
'Kürt' diye bir şey duymadım. O zaman her zaman için, babamın annemle 
konuşmalarında, iş arkadaşlarıyla konuşmalarında duyduğum PKK'ydı. Hiçbir 
zaman Kürt lafı geçmezdi, ‘Bunlar Kürt, Kürt bilmem neler,’ falan diye. ...  
[Bunlar] ailede devamlı da konuşulan mevzular, ama bu zamana kadar ben 
hiçbir zaman Kürt Sorunu diye bir şey duymadım. Ama şu anda [o şehire] 
gitsem bu benim karşıma çıkacak. Eminim diyecekler ki: ‘Bizim o zamanlarda 
bilmem kaç tane kardeşimiz katledildi.’ Biliyorum ben bunu. Çünkü böyle bir 
algı yaratıldı. Bence bu bir algı. ... Ben böyle bir algı içinde yetişmedim. Ama 
mesela şimdi biriyle tanıştığımda, ‘Nerelisin?’ diye sorduğumda kafamda, 
‘Acaba Kürt mü?’ diye bir soru işareti yanıyor direkt. Ama eskiden böyle bir 
şey yoktu, Neden son zamanlarda çıktı ki yani? Ben bu konularda devamlı 
okuyan da bir insanım, ki bölümümle de alakalı bir şey bu [konu]. Bu zamana 
kadar öyle bir şey çıkmadıysa neden sen bu zamanda çıkarıyorsun, 
ediyorsun?"342 (emphases mine) 
 
 Of course, these are assimilationist narratives, par excellence. They deny the 
existence of a distinct Kurdish identity, by replicating some of the primary motifs of the 
                                                          
342 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “Have you ever heard, I’m 
saying it within quotation marks, something as ‘the Kurdish Problem’ before? Personally I 
have not. I went to [the city in the East] too. Those were the most heated times. I never 
heard there such a thing as ‘the Kurdish Problem’ or ‘the Kurd’. What I always heard was 
PKK. I heard it in the conversations of my father with my mother and his work workmates. 
They have never mentioned anything like, ‘They are Kurdish, they are this and that.’ … We 
also discuss these matters in the family, but I have never heard something as ‘the Kurdish 
Problem’ before. But if I were to go there now, I know that I will encounter it. I am sure 
that they will say, ‘Such and such brothers of ours were massacred then.’ I know that. 
Because such a perception was created. I think it is just a perception. … I did not grow up 
with such a perception. But when I meet someone and ask, ‘Where are you from?’ a 
question mark pops up in my brain, asking, ‘Could s/he be Kurdish?’ But it [the question 
mark] was absent in the past. Why did it appear recently? I also read a lot on such topics, 
because they are related to my field. If there was no such thing in the past, then why do you 
make it up now?” (emphases mine) 
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mainstream nationalist state discourses343 deployed before and during the times of 'low-
intensity conflict'.  
  
Another salient characteristic of these accounts is that they designate a "mythical 
time" (Ahıska, 2003, p. 367), preceding the souring relations between Kurds and Turks. 
They uphold an idyllic account of the past, according to which Kurds and Turks had always 
lived in peace, without any conflict or discrimination prior to the intrusion of PKK. The 
bitter past of the nation-state, replete with bloody stories of repression, violence and 
dispossession brought by the dual and inseparable projects of nation-constitution and 
modernization, with their homogenizing accompaniments such as ethnic cleansing, social 
and demographic engineering, is displaced by these accounts. Instead, they perceive the 
birth of the nation as an "immaculate conception" (Berktay, 2004, p. 16). Therefore, the 
years of the Independence War turns into a repository from where the interlocutors draw 
support to their construction of a pristine past. Accordingly, İrem puts into circulation the 
brothers-in-arms rhetoric to allege that the Kurdish Question is a problem without real 
historical origins:   
 
"[Barış Süreci'ni] çok saçma buluyorum. Çok saçma bir şey. Zaten Kürt ile 
Türk'ü düşman ettirtmek kadar saçma bir şey olacağını aklım hayalim almıyor. 
Onlar da bu ülkenin vatandaşı. Birlikte kurtardık bu ülkeyi, birlikte savaştık. 
Hiçbir zaman da Kürt-Türk ayrımı yapılmamıştır."344 
  
As a consequence of the construction of such a gilded age, the Kurd thus emerges in 
these master narratives as a figure who has little if any capacity to act as a "subject 
endowed with a sense of history" (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 40). Sometimes the colonial 
imagination lurking in these narratives leaks out more explicitly. For instance, İrem is 
particularly keen on casting the Kurd as a 'figure of lack', grievously incomplete and in dire 
                                                          
343 For a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish state discourses in relation to the Kurdish 
Question, see: Yeğen, 1999  
344 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I find it [the Peace Process] 
ridiculous. It is nonsense. I cannot imagine a single thing as ridiculous as making the Kurd 
and the Turk enemies. They are also the citizens of this country. We saved the country 
together, we fought together. There has never been a distinction made between Kurds and 
Turks.”  
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need to be educated and "worlded" (Spivak, 1990) vis-a-vis the Turk who is already 
consummated in form and substance throughout history. For her, deprived of 
consciousness, and unaware of its own past, the Kurd is often an uneducated and gullible 
figure, perhaps a noble, albeit rudimentary soul who seems vulnerable against the seductive 
powers of PKK. Thus, İrem's recipe to resolution for the Kurdish Question seems to be the 
"dissemiNation" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 157) of education as a vehicle of "colonial doubling" 
(Bhabha, 1994). Only this way, İrem believes, the Kurd can recover itself from the confines 
of false consciousness and can come to the realization that its persistence for the 
recognition of difference cannot but be a result of a grave misrecognition. 
 
"Hâlbuki oraya [Doğu'ya] da bir şeyler yapılsa... Her şeyin başı eğitim zaten. 
İnsanları bilinçlendirilse korkulacak bir yanı yok zaten. ... Ama bazı insanlar 
maalesef bizi ayrıştırmaya çalışıyorlar. Bunların gene eğitimden 
kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum. Bilinçli olmadığın sürece kandırılman çok 
kolay. Cahillikten dolayı oradaki insanları bir şekilde kandırıyorlar, 
ayaklandırıyorlar. Sonra da diyorlar ki işte: ‘Siz çok kavga ediyorsunuz. Siz 
ayaklanıyorsunuz. Gelin biz sizi barıştıralım.’ Aslında böyle bir şey yok. 
Aslında dış etkenler olmasa ya da başımızdakiler kavga çıkarmasa biz zaten 
kardeş kardeş yaşayacağız. Ama maalesef buna izin verilmiyor."345 
  
Apparently, there is a certain ambivalence in these first group of narratives, in the 
sense that the Kurd seems to be simultaneously present and absent in them. In other words, 
they oscillate between the recognition and disavowal of the difference of the Kurd. On the 
one hand, the Kurd is sometimes recognized independently from the Turk as an unruly 
being, resistant to change. What is meant by 'change' here is often tantamount to a 
possibility of the actualization of colonial doubling. On the other hand, in these narratives, 
the Kurd is also robbed of existence. The Kurd indeed appears to be just another Turk, a 
                                                          
345 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “If only something would be 
done there. Education comes first. If the awareness of the people there is raised, then there 
is nothing to fear. … But unfortunately, some people are trying to separate us from each 
other. I think that these [problems] have their source in education as well. If one is not 
aware enough, then it is easy to be manipulated. Because of ignorance, they trick these 
people in the region somehow and make them rebels. Then they say: ‘You fight too much, 
too often. You rebel. Come on, let us bring you to peace.’ As a matter of fact, if it weren't 
for the outside external factors or our rulers who instigate such things, we will live without 
fighting, in a brotherly way. But it is not allowed.” 
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tenuous figure waiting for its further Turkification as well as realization of its authentic 
identity. The Kurdishness of the Kurd comes into existence only as a fiction, in between the 
fissures of Turkishness.  Overall, in these narratives, the Kurd often appears as a "subject of 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86). Accordingly, 
Yeğen duly coins the term "prospective Turks" (2006) to account for the ambivalent 
positioning of Kurds either within or at the margins of Turkishness. This ambivalent 
construction of the Kurd, I propose, gestures towards a desire for "colonial mimicry" 
(Bhabha, 1994, p. 86), a desire which is perhaps most evident in Zeynep's speech where she 
projects the charges of ethnic nationalism onto Kurds, while stating that there would be no 
problem, if only the Kurds would think like her:   
 
"Şu anda aslında onlar, ben öyle bir ayrım yapmak istemiyorum ama, tırnak 
içinde 'biz' diye söylüyorum; bizi suçluyorlar ya hani ırkçılıkla, milliyetçilikle, 
bilmem neyle, vesaire... Aslında milliyetçilikle suçlama adı altında bence onlar 
kendileri Kürt milliyetçiliği yapıyorlar. Onlar da benim gibi düşünse aslında 
böyle bir sıkıntı olmayacak."346 (emphasis mine) 
  
Therefore, I think that, the primary link between the narratives of the interlocutors in 
the first group is their mobilization of a colonial discourse. Heeding Bhabha's minimal 
definition of the colonial discourse (1994), this discourse is "an apparatus that turns on the 
recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences" (p. 70). It is a discourse 
which incorporates a functional ambivalence so that it can always produce "its slippage, its 
excess, its difference" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86) in order to maintain a distinction between the 
authentic-superior Turkish identity and inauthentic- inferior Kurdish identity. Furthermore, 
there is a dissonance at the very heart of the colonial discursive enterprise, Bhabha reminds 
us, which makes the complete domination of the colonized an impossible quest to fulfill 
(2004, p. 1167). However, it is not only ambivalence that inheres in the colonial discourse. 
For Bhabha, the colonial discourse is also marked by an anxiety. As the colonized imitates 
                                                          
346 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I really don’t want to make 
any distinction, but I am saying this within quotation marks. You know how they are 
accusing ‘us’ of racism, nationalism and so forth… Actually, it is them who propagate 
Kurdish nationalism, while accusing ‘us’ of nationalism. If they were thinking like me, 
there’d be no such trouble indeed.” (emphasis mine) 
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the colonizer, it endangers the very difference that the colonizer tries fervently to install in 
the colonial situation in order to legitimize its rule and authenticate its identity. Then, the 
colonial doubling and mimicry comes to trouble the self-image of the colonizer as well. 
Just because the interlocutors in the first group imply that the colonial doubling has failed 
in the case of the Kurdish Question, it is hard to follow in these accounts the inklings of 
such anxieties integral to the colonial discourse. Nevertheless, there are some moments in 
which something comes to spook the image of a coherent and authentic self-identity 
assumed by the interlocutors. For example, Zeynep, perhaps in a moment of alienation 
from what she believes to be her true identity, confesses that the Turkish identity to which 
she clings may not be as authentic as she presumes. A moment later, she brushes her doubts 
away, before relapsing into further contemplation about the construction of the Turkish 
identity, and continues to complain about the resolute attachment of people to an imagined, 
distinct Kurdish identity:      
 
"...[Doğu’da bir şehir]’e gitmeyi çok istiyorum açıkçası. Gitmeyeli çok uzun 
zaman oldu. Gidip gezmeyi, görmeyi istiyorum. Ama oradakilerin kafasının 
değişmediğini bildiğim için...  Hâlâ farklı algılar yaratılıyor demeyeyim de, işte 
onların beyninde farkı algılar var. Bir algı içinde büyümüşler. Belki de biz de 
öyleyiz. Ama ben öyle olmadığımın farkındayım. Ben öyle değilim en azından. 
... Ben böyle bir algı içinde yetişmedim."347 (emphases mine) 
  
Although the interlocutors in the first group raise their objection to the Peace Process 
on a more fundamental ground, by refuting history and reality to the Kurdish Question, 
anxieties concerning the indivisibility of the nation-state and loyalty of other minorities 
usually complement their primary objection. Accordingly, both Merve and İrem maintain 
that any negotiation with Kurds which would result in territorial losses would set a bad 
precedent for other ethnic minority groups whose loyalty to the nation is dubious. For them, 
the Peace Process may trigger an avalanche, under the burden of which the nation-state 
                                                          
347 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “…Actually, I really want to 
go to [the city in the East] again. It’s been a long time since my last visit. But because I 
know the way people think there has not changed… I don’t want to say various perceptions 
are created, but in any case, they have a certain perception in their minds. They grew up 
with that perception. Perhaps we are like that too. But I am aware that I am not. At least I 
am not like that. … I was not raised in such perceptions.” (emphases mine) 
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might be torn to pieces eventually. This is quite apparent in their slippery slope 
argumentation, which I would like to call 'the argumentum ad Laz-Circassian': 
 
"Ona bakarsan Laz'ı var, Çerkez'i var bir sürü. O zaman herkes birlikte 
ayaklanıp ufak ufak şehirler kursa, koloniler halinde yaşasa yani."348  
"Yani bu çok klasiktir, herkes söyler: Türk var, Kürt var, Laz var, Çerkez var, 
şu var bu var. Sonuçta biz bu zamana kadar hep böyle yaşamışız. Bundan sonra 
neden Kürtler ayrı bir devlet, Lazlar ayrı bir devlet kursun? Öyle bir şey 
olduktan sonra neden Laz'ın biri çıkıp, ‘Haydi biz de ayrı bir devlet kuralım,’ 
demesin ki? Çok yanlış bence yani."349 
  
On the other hand Kemal stands at a diametrically opposed edge, from where he 
recounts how he lost interest in politics, ever the acerbic.  
 
"Ya bir süre sonra öyle bencilleşiyor ki insan, ben aynı işi yapıp aynı düzeni 
sağlayabileceksem, yemin ediyorum İstanbul'dan sonrasını cart diye ayırsınlar, 
18'e bölsünler, 180 bayrak koysunlar sikimde olmaz, anladın mı? … O eski 
militarist duygular, milliyetçi duygular, bilmem neler. Geçti abi o işler. Neden 
biliyor musun? Herkes cebine girene bakıyor abi. Öyle bir devirdeyiz ki, 
sistemden bir an çıksan, bir an tökezlesen borç gırtlağa kadar çıkar. Geberip 
gidersin açlıktan. … Diyarbakır'ı bağlasınlar abi şeyE [Kürdistan'a], umurumda 
değil. Zaten gitmiyorum ki. Gitmediğim yer benim değil ki zaten. Ben gitmeye 
ihtiyaç duymuyorum ki. Benim olan yerler, gittiğim sevdiğim yerler, okey, 
eyvallah. Ama zaten gitmiyorum. Trabzon'u mesela, bir kere gittim gördüm. 
Bir daha da görmem zaten. Onu da Pontus yapsınlar. Çok merak ediyorsam, 
gerekirse vize alır giderim. O açıdan hiçbir şey kalmadı bende. Tamamen 
sıfırlandı. Hiç umurumda değil ya. İsteyen istediğini yapabilir."350 
                                                          
348 Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “If you look at it that way, 
there are Laz, there are Circassians and so forth. Then why don’t everyone rebel and 
establish small cities on their own, living in colonies?” 
349 Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I mean it is a classic thing 
told by everybody: There are Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians and so forth. All in all, we 
have always lived like that. From this time forth, why should Kurds establish a different 
state? If so, why would not a Laz come out and announce: ‘Let’s establish our own state 
too.’ I think it is very wrong.” 
350 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “After a while you become so 
selfish to the extent that, if I can do to same job and maintain the same status, I swear to 
God, I don't give a damn if they would shred the rest of the country from Istanbul; split it to 
18 parts and plant 180 flags, you feel me? Those old militarist feelings, nationalist feelings, 
and all the other stuff. Those are over man. You know why? Everyone cares about what 
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Unlike Merve and İrem, Kemal does not mind in the least, if one decides to gift-wrap 
the rest of the country to supposedly covetous minorities as long as he can see to himself 
within the maelstrom of working life where conditions of workers are getting more 
precarious with each passing day. We can situate his statement under the second group of 
narratives where one can trace a blending of apathy and mistrust towards the Peace Process. 
Put differently, this group rather consists of cynical accounts. On the one hand, the 
interlocutors falling under this group claim indifference to the unfolding of the process; but 
on the other hand, their indifference does not automatically evolve into a free pass given for 
the actualization of the Peace Process. It remains unclear as to whether they support the 
Peace Process. If so, it would be still hard to pinpoint on what conditions and for which 
reasons they would support or decline it. Only seldom do they reflect on the Kurdish 
question unlike the interlocutors belonging to the first group. Rather, these interlocutors 
grapple with the Peace Process by questioning its 'sincerity'. For example, despite his 
claimed apathy, Kemal goes on to vent his complaints in the following, where he expresses 
that the Peace Process is more populist razzle-dazzle than substance: 
 
"Komplo teorisi gibi [olacak], ama herhalde 10-15 senelik bir plan çizilmiş, 
oynanıyor abi şu an. Yalan bu işler abi. Ne oldu? Hayvan gibi saldırılar oldu, 
ne oldu birden durup dururken? Ne oldu hani, geri gidenler vardı, dönenler 
vardı? Ne oldu? Kim görüyor, kim biliyor? ... Komedi abi ya. Şimdi 
görüyorsun adam 3 sene önce bir şey demiş, 3 sene sonra gönülden inanarak 
tam tersini söylüyor. Düşün, ben üç sene önce sana ana avrat küfrediyorum, 3 
sene sonra, ‘Sen benim en iyi arkadaşımsın.’ Böyle bir şey olabilir mi ya? 
Olabilir mi yani? Olamaz abi. Tamam, siyaset belki biraz palavra sıkmaktır. 
Ama bu kadar değil abi. İkiyüzlülüğün, samimiyetsizliğin bokunu çıkardılar 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
goes in and out of the pocket. We are in such times that if you would step out of the system 
even for a second, if you would trip for a moment, you would be buried in debt. You'd kick 
the bucket and starve to death. … Let them make Diyarbakır a part of Kurdistan, I don't 
care. I already never go there. A place that I don't go to is not mine anyways. I don't feel the 
need to go there. If those were places I like, places I go, alright. But I am off those places in 
any case. Trabzon for example, I went there and saw it once. I won't see it again. Let them 
make it Pontus for all I care. If I get really curious, I'll get a visa and go. Nothing is left in 
me in that regard. I am through with it. It really doesn't matter to me. Everyone can do as 
they please.”   
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Türkiye'de. Bir gün adam cemaatçi oluyor, öbür gün ateistten yana oluyor, öbür 
gün gayden, travestiden yana oluyor, öbür gün..."351 (emphasis mine) 
 
 Kemal is not the only one who feels insulted by the 'insincerity' of the government 
elites who is responsible for carrying out the Peace Process. Yasemin also considers that 
the Peace Process is a sham, simply because she has no trust for Erdoğan. Despite all the 
good wishes she makes for her fellow-citizens, she does not seem to embrace the Peace 
Process, as she interrogates the sincerity of the prime minister in the following: 
 
"Ben başbakanın yaptığı hiçbir şey hakkında bir şey söylemek istemiyorum. Şu 
an başbakanı sevmiyorum. Yaptığı her şeyin altında bir bit yeniği var. 
Samimiyetsiz buluyorum. Her yaptığı şeyin altında kendi çıkarıyla ilgili bir şeyi 
vardır mutlaka."352 (emphasis mine) 
 
 On the other hand, Nuri is the only interlocutor whom I think belongs to the third 
group of narratives. He does not tackle the Kurdish Question within a frame of security. 
Rather, his take on the issue is economically driven. For Nuri, the permanence of the 
Kurdish Question does not bode well with the progress and welfare of the nation. 
Therefore, he acknowledges the urgency of a solution regarding the Kurdish Question from 
a developmentalist viewpoint:   
 
                                                          
351 Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I know this is going to 
sound like a conspiracy theory, but perhaps there is a plan for the next 10-15 years which is 
being played out right now. This is all a sham man. What happened? There were brutal 
attacks. What happened all of sudden? What happened? There were those who were going 
back, who were returning? What happened? Who sees it, who knows it? ... It is a comedy 
man. You see the guy saying something 3 years ago, 3 years later he tells the opposite, 
wholeheartedly. Think about it, 3 years ago I swear a blue streak at you; 3 years later I tell: 
‘You are my best friend.’ Can something like that happen? Is it possible? No, it is not man. 
Ok, being a loud mouth and spinning a yarn may be a part of politics. But not this much 
man. They went on a binge of hypocrisy and insincerity. The guy supports the Gülenists 
today, the next day he roots for the atheist and another day he sides with gays and 
transvestites, and another day…” (emphasis mine) 
352 Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “I don’t want to talk 
anything about the prime minister does. I do not like the prime current minister. Whatever 
he does, there is a hidden catch attached. I find him insincere. There is always something 
involved in whatever he does, catering to his own interests.” (emphasis mine) 
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"Bu ülkede bir yerde barış sağlanmalı. Mesela terörizm artık bitmeli. Çünkü 
ileri gidemiyoruz. Dediğim gibi, Doğu'daki insanların yaşam standardı çok 
düşük. Onları da yükseltmek lazım. Hepimiz bu ülkede eşitiz ama öyle değil 
yani. Eşit değiliz. O insanlara yaşıyor denmez yani. Hem tiplerine baktığın 
zaman, hem giydikleri kıyafetler olsun çok zor şartlarda yaşıyorlar. Orada 
yapılabilecek bir sürü ekonomik gelişmeler [var]. [Bunlar] Türkiye'yi daha çok 
rahatlatabilir. Bu yönden destekliyorum. Boşu boşuna kaç senedir bu ülkede 
terörizm var yani."353 
  
Although Nuri downplays them by proclaiming the utter uselessness of terrorism, he 
does not completely bracket off in his considerations the possible causes which have given 
way to the armed struggle of the PKK. Unlike the previous interlocutors, Nuri grants that 
citizenship rights do not guarantee the equality of all citizens in Turkey. He delineates the 
Kurd as a figure, barely living under harsh conditions in which s/he is less equal than 
others. His interpretation parallels Yeğen, who points out that the Kurd has been perceived 
in Turkey as a "pseudo-citizen" (2006), as a result of a discursive shift seen around the new 
millennium. Therefore, Nuri finds merit in the Peace Process, for it can improve the 
conditions within which Kurdish populations live. However, Nuri's conception of equality 
is couched in an economical framework. He presents the Kurdish Question as a problem of 
regional backwardness whose roots are buried within the economic underdevelopment of 
the East. He hardly addresses the systematic disinvestment and violence directed at the 
Kurdish population. Nor does he refer their cultural rights. In fact, some of these rights 
demarcate his 'red-line' that should not be crossed through the Peace Process:  
 
"Ama oradaki şey şu: Evet, Barış Süreci önemli. Ama ne gibi bir bedel 
ödeyeceğiz bu Barış Süreci'nde? Bu bedel ne? O bence çok önemli. Ne 
veriyoruz hani? Tamam, işte teröristler, barış, silahları çekin falan ama onlara 
ne veriyoruz? Bir şey vermeden, [teröristlerin] bir anda ellerini kollarını 
sallayarak çıkacaklarını düşünmüyorum. Ha eğer Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 
                                                          
353 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “The peace should be sustained 
at some moment in this country. For example, terrorism should come to an end. As I said, 
the living standards of the people in the East are very low. They [the standards] should be 
raised as well. We are all equals in this country, but it is not like that. We are not equals. 
These people [in the East] cannot be said living. Their appearance, their clothes, I mean 
they are living under harsh conditions. Many economic developments can be achieved 
there. These [economic developments] would relieve Turkey. I support it in that way. I 
mean, there has been terrorism in this country for how many years, for no reason.” 
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çıkarlarını etkileyebilecek bir şey verdiysek Barış Süreci olmasın diyorum. … 
Bölünmezlik, özerklik falan, bunlar bence kırmızı çizgiyle çizilmesi gereken 
şeyler." 354 
 
 In the last group of narratives, perhaps the issue of cultural rights as well as ethno-
political dimensions of the Kurdish Question, which have been consistently silenced in 
state discourses (Yeğen, 1999, p. 222) continues to remain above the fray. Perhaps the 
Kurdishness of the Kurdish Question is not acknowledged (Yeğen, 1999), more than do the 
previous groups of narratives. The difference rather stems from the unconditional support 
that the interlocutors give to the Peace Process. Although they have their own share of 
reservations concerning the process on different grounds, both Tarık and Ayşe seem to 
cherish the possibility of a solution. Tarık's reservation emerges even in the first moment as 
he heads to a response through negating a negative. But his hesitation rather stems from 
hopelessness about the results of the process. Because he seems to propose that if there is to 
be a substantial and effective resolution, it should come rather from below, in the interstices 
of daily practices and encounters, and through empathy. While doing so, he does not turn 
his hesitations into an argument in opposition of the Peace Process.  
 
"Temel olarak çok olumsuz bakmıyorum. … Bildiğim tek şey, bu mesafeden 
bakıldığında hiçbir şeyin doğru anlaşılamayacağı. Oralara gidip şöyle bir hafta, 
10 gün dolanıp, çay içip gezmenin de çok etkili olmayacağı. Yani insanın orada 
yaşayıp, oranın insanı gibi, kendini oraya sunulan hizmetin odağına koyması 
lazım. Yani oradan hizmet alması lazım. Sen bugün devletten hizmet alıyorsan, 
bir Van, Siirt, Bitlis mukimi bir insan olarak hizmet alman lazım. Oranın 
hastanesine gideceksin, postanesine gideceksin ki bir fikrin oluşsun."355  
                                                          
354 Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “But the deal there is this: Yes, 
the Peace Process is important. But what is the price we will pay? This is very important I 
think. I mean, what do we give in return? Ok, the terrorists, peace, ceasefire, it is all good, 
but what do we give them? I don’t think they [terrorists] will simply give everything up and 
walk away. If we are giving something going against the interests of the Turkish Republic, 
I could live without it [the Peace Process]. … Indivisibility of the state, autonomy and so 
forth, they are things which should be crossed out.”  
355 Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “Fundamentally, I don't view it 
[the Peace Process] in a negative light. … All I know, you cannot get anything right from a 
distance like this. Or going to those places and wandering around for a week or 10 days and 
drinking tea wouldn't do the trick as well. The person should be as if living there, and place 
the self at the center of the service provided there. One should get the service from there. If 
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On the other hand, Ayşe gives her support to the process, for quite a simple reason. 
Life, instead of death, she suggest, will win if the process unfolds without any obstruction: 
 
"Barış Süreci'ne olumlu bakıyorum tabii ki. Ateşkes olduysa eğer bir yerlerde 
güzel oldu tabii. Özellikle hani senin de bir yerlerde arkadaşların oluyor askere 
gitmesi gereken, arkadaşlarının askerlik zamanı geliyor falan. Öyle olunca 
birilerinin askere gidip ölmeyeceği düşüncesi mutluluk veriyor tabii. Diğer 
taraftan da daha fazla Kürdün ölmeyeceği düşüncesi mutluluk veriyor tabii."356 
 
4.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
Despite the overall public perception, I hope I could show that in the entire of this 
last chapter, it is not possible to do away with the political views of the children of military 
families simply as derivations of Kemalism. I believe that the diversity of the narratives of 
children in this final chapter indicates the limits of normalization and diversity of 
experiences one can have as a child of a military family. Although the diversity in political 
subjectivities to the extent even including anti-militarist stances, I also think that one 
particular, yet essential dividing line which connects certain narratives thematically to each 
other, while differentiating the rest, strikes the eye throughout these narratives. To elaborate 
on this dividing line, as the children come to identify and express themselves through their 
ties with the military institution, it seems that their reactions, feelings and arguments in the 
face of the developments which have changed the military and its relationship to the 
political establishment and the society at large ossify and intensify in favor of the military 
institution. Perhaps, at this juncture, it is worth to remind the reader of Tarık’s response to 
the question about his perception of the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon, perhaps as the 
most indicative expression of this dividing line. Tarık stated that, he does not take the trials 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
you are being served by the state, you should get it as a person who lives in Van, Siirt, 
Bitlis. You should go the hospital, the post office there in order to get a sense of things.”  
356 Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “Of course I look at it [the 
Peace Process] positively. If there is a ceasefire in anywhere in the world, it is a good call. 
Especially, when you have friends who have to go to the military service, it makes you 
happy to know that they will not go and die there when their time [for the draft] comes. On 
the other hand, the idea that the Kurds will no longer die also makes you happy.” 
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of Balyoz and Ergenekon as an offense committed against him in person, or against a 
particular identity or subculture to which he feels attached. However, this is exactly how 
some of my interlocutors approach the issues. The sentiments arousing in their narratives 
are resentment, frustration, disappointment, withdrawal and nostalgia, occasionally 
gesturing toward a lamenting over the downfall from the halcyon era of the military: 
 
“Şeyi özledim: Tamam, ben büyüdüm, başka bir çevrem oldu, başka bir 
ortamım oldu. Ama yine de herhalde ben orada [lojmanlarda] olsaydım şu 
zamanda, illa ki ben o bahçeye çıkıp otururdum. Orada ben huzurumu 
bulurdum ya. Çünkü orası benim yuvamdı.”357  
  
As those children yield to the colonization of their everyday life by succumbing into 
the military setting at ease and in peace, they also lose contact with other discursive 
regimes which would undermine the military’s aim of normalization. Especially those 
interlocutors who identify their political subjectivities mostly in a dialogue with the 
military seem to be engulfed into arguments that have been deployed by the military elites. 
In their narratives, the military institution is often rendered outside the power relations and 
as a victim falling prey to those who possess the power, as is apparent in some reactions 
concerning the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon. Or these narratives tend to whitewash or 
normalize the past deeds of the military, as in the cases of the Kurdish Question and 
military coups. Or in the case of compulsory military service, they grant normalcy to the 
militaries, soldiers and militarism as inevitable and even beneficial facts of life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
357 Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I missed it: Ok, I grow up 
and had different relations and friends, I had a different setting. But if I were in there 
[military lodgings] now, I would definitely go out and sit in that garden [of military 
lodgings]. I would find peace there. Because it was home to me.”  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Written on a topic which remains largely, if not completely, unexplored this thesis 
perhaps raises more questions than that it answers, while seeking an understanding of a 
field and signalling its prospects awaiting the attention of other researchers. Let’s begin 
with the easier task that pertains to remembering the findings of this thesis chapter by 
chapter, before delving into some of the questions this thesis prompts.     
 
In the introductory section written to give a broader sense of being a child in a 
military family and within a military setting, roughly between the 1990s and 2010s, I 
attempted to conceptualize the childhood of the children raised in military families in 
several snapshots and then proposed that there are three crucial institutions not only 
involved in, but also spatially and temporally surrounding the great portion of the lives of 
the children of military families. The institutional triangle, all of whose members are 
known for their normalizing effects, consists of the family, the school and the military. 
Then I proposed that they are the institutions without the examination of which one could 
hardly make sense of the experiences entailed by being a child raised in military families. I 
noted that, the specificity of the institutional triangle in the context of Turkey lies in the 
claims made by each institution regarding the roles of the other. Meanwhile, I also 
emphasized that the normalizing effects of these institutions should not be taken at absolute 
value, denying agency to the subjects in question; nor should they be deemed as always 
working with each other for the ultimate subjection of the children. Therefore, I tried to 
distance myself from an adamant structuralist outlook so as to reserve more wriggle room 
for the subjects, while embarking on my analyses on the children.  
 
In the latter section of the introduction, written on the historical roots of the military 
family in Turkey, I tried to provide the reader with a historical context for the military 
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family. While doing so, I extended back to the first military modernization efforts in the 
Ottoman Empire, and traced the emergence of military families. What I found was that the 
fully fledged formation of the military family as we know it today delayed until the 1960s 
for several reasons, among which the structural tension between marriage and the military 
profession embedded at the heart of the institution takes the lead. After highlighting the 
growing tensions between the rise of a pro-natalist discourse with the foundation of the 
Turkish nation-state and the deep-rooted institutional aversion towards the marriage of 
officers, I marked the 1960s as a turning point, signalling at shifts towards a new form of 
governmentality in the military. And I asserted that the emergence of the military family 
coincides with the emergence of this new form of governmentality. In this new mode of 
governmentality, the financial and discursive disincentives for military officers to marry 
were gradually removed and the military, instead of discouraging the military officers from 
marriage, embraced the military families to be cocooned inside the demarcated zones of the 
institution, mushrooming quickly after the 1960 military coup, with the accelerating 
construction of military lodgings, Officers’ Clubs, military vacation facilities and military 
hospitals.   
 
 After contextualizing the construction of the military family, in the first part of 
Chapter 1, I first looked at the military family in question, which has transpired after the 
1960 military coup. I attracted attention to the forceful discourses disseminated by the 
military with regards to the members of the military family and analyzed the universe of 
ideals upheld and disseminated by the institution concerning these members. Then I 
attempted to forge connections between this universe of ideals as well as imaginations 
circulating in the institution and the life in military families with recourse to the narratives 
of my interlocutors. Seeing upon the shortage of discourses provided by the military 
specifically aiming at the children of officers, unlike the cases with male military officers 
and their wives, I tried to conceptualize the distinctive characteristics of a “model military 
brat”, by drawing on the analytical frameworks used by Cynthia Enloe in her book 
Maneuvers (2000). I underscored that, the most significant role tailored for the children of 
military families is working in tandem with the other members of the family to assist the 
father, mostly in his military job and the primary way suggested to achieve this end is seen 
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as not leaving the minds of the parents preoccupied, by immersing the self within the 
military complex. Thereafter, I directed attention to the educational life of the children of 
military families and outlined the tensions between the significance invested by military 
families in the educational lives of children in order to reproduce and reify their social 
position, while preserving hopes for upward class mobility and the obligations originating 
from the military profession. Accordingly, I proceeded to demonstrate a set of strategies 
employed in military families to reconcile with this particular tension.  
 
 In Chapter 2, I took on my scope the concerted efforts of the military to govern its 
multitudes, largely consisting of “womenandchildren,” and to handle the tensions arising 
within its institutional borders, while pursuing the workings and implications of a new form 
of governmentality whose emergence was noted in the section on the historical roots of the 
military family. Underlining the role played by the military institution of Turkey in the 
governance and regulation of internal tensions, I sought an answer to the question as to how 
the military, in order to render its services more effective and legitimate, comes to grips 
with its bulky outliers consisting of the children, spouses and parents of military officers. I 
proposed that the military institution exercises institutional control over the bodies of 
children, with the caveat that this control should not be only understood along the lines of 
“technologies of domination.” Otherwise, I suggested, we would run the risk of bypassing 
the juxtaposition of the 'ease' and 'peace' that many of my interlocutors feel within the 
confines of an institution identified by its strict discipline, the command of ‘Attention!’ and 
‘warfare’. Rather, I argued, the enclosure of these multitudes has to do less with a desire to 
repress subjects and more with producing regularities in subjects, or in other words, 
producing nationalized, gendered and militarized subjectivities catering to the interests of 
the military institution, who do not find the conditions of their enclosure undesirable or 
oppressive. Therefore, I claimed, if we want to have a better grasp on the ways in which the 
military exercises institutional control over children, we have to put the emphasis less on 
the prohibitions, injunctions, indoctrinations or punishments which might rather act upon 
bodies, and more on what I called “encompassion,” a neology pertaining rather to the 
productive aspects of power which inform bodies. Accordingly, I first explored the 
interplay of restrictions and resistance within the military complex, through the narratives 
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of my interlocutors. It was followed by an examination of the three cornerstones in the 
process of subjection, namely nationalization, gendering and militarization which proves 
essential to the military’s aim of producing subjectivities which feed its institutional 
interests. During these examinations, I brought into consideration the conditions common 
and specific to the experience of children in military families and within the military 
complex and concluded that the encompassion of the lives of children amounts to an 
attempt to control the possibility of resistance and subversion, by controlling convergences 
with other discursive regimes to prevent discursive complexity. Meanwhile, I also 
formulated a nuanced definition of the social and gendered process of militarization in the 
case of the children of military families. I argued that the militarization of these children 
hinges on forging linkages between the bodies that the judicial discourse of the military 
pigeonholes as “the military dependents” and the discourse itself. 
 
 In the final chapter, I traced the subjectivities emerging out of the field described 
above, by presenting and analyzing the perceptions and voices of my interlocutors 
concerning the watershed political affairs which have occasioned major transformations in 
the position, perception and practices of TSK. I tried to understand the reception of the 
process of relative normalization in civil-military relations by my interlocutors, while 
sharing their viewpoints on the recent shifts in the power relations of the country. I have 
done so, by trying my best to represent the due complexity and diversity of their narratives. 
I realized that, neither the process, nor the political affairs were greeted easily by many of 
my interlocutors. Especially those interlocutors, who identify their subjectivities in a 
dialogue with the military institution, seemed to be engulfed into the set of arguments 
deployed by the institutional elites. As they narrated, I came to the conclusion that the 
military’s legitimacy and position in the relations of power indeed depends so much on its 
governing enterprises concerned with whom the institution hails as the military dependents.      
 
 Finally, I would like to mention some shortcomings and further prospects offered by 
the field. First of all, this study is predicated on interviews conducted with children who 
were born in mid to late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, I argue that my interlocutors 
grew up in a period during which the military’s spatial organizations as part of its new 
mode of governmentality could yield more effective results. However, understanding the 
210 
continuing shifts taking place in the field would benefit from a study conducted with 
younger interlocutors. Just to name an exemplary question: As new media technologies 
penetrate our lives and dismantle many spatial and temporal barriers existing before, does it 
require more than the organization of space for the military to ensure the control of 
children? If so, how do new media technologies influence the governmentality employed 
by the military institution? How does the military adapt itself to it? How do these 
developments alter the distinctions imposed and perceived between the lives inside and 
outside of the military setting, by connecting us at will to the rest of the world? Secondly, I 
conducted interviews with interlocutors who, in many ways, complied with the military 
institution. However, those who fell out of the military setting, by transgressing the 
institutional order imposed by the military are still required to be lent an ear. The 
juxtaposition of their narratives to that of those who complied would expand our 
understanding of military governmentality with regard to children. Last but not the least, if 
we take into account that some of the narratives in response to the Kurdish Question or 
military coups rely on discursive frameworks that are mostly abandoned, even by many 
political elites pursuing very obvious nationalist agendas, what does the stream of 
responses provided by the children of military families tell us in the context of youth 
studies? How do the efforts of the military to squeeze itself into every imaginable gap, 
temporal and spatial, opening up in these children's lives, echo in the generation to which 
they belong? Is it possible to claim that the military’s mode of governmentality results in 
significant gaps among people whom we assume belonging to the same generations, along 
axes related, yet irreducible to class and gender? If so, how do such disjunctions contribute 
to the maintenance of the boundaries between the lives inside and outside? I hope that these 
questions, and more, will garner the interest of researchers to grow a better understanding 
of the field.  
 
 
 
 
 
211 
Bibliography 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1988). Fieldwork of a Dutiful Daughter. In S. Altorki, & C. F. El-Solh 
(Eds.), Arab Women in the Field (pp. 139-161). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Açıksöz, S. C. (2013). Kürt Sorunu Bağlamında Gaziliğin Vücuda Gelişi: Egemenlik, 
Erkeklik ve Sakatlık. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de 
Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 463-485). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Ağaoğlu, S. (1972). Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri Bir Soru. İstanbul: 
Baha Matbaası. 
Ahıska, M. (2003). Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern. South Atlantic 
Quarterly (102(2-3)), 351-379. 
Akça, İ. (2004). Kolektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri. In A. 
Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 225-269). 
İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Akça, İ. (2006). Militarism, Capitalism and the State: Putting the Military in Its Place in 
Turkey. Unpublished doctoral dissertation in Political Science and International Relations. 
Boğaziçi University. Istanbul.   
Akgül, Ç. (2011). Militarizmin Cinsiyetçi Suretleri: Devlet, Ordu ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet. 
Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları. 
Akyaz, D. (2009). Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Althusser, L. (1994). Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. In S. Zizek (Ed.), 
Mapping Ideology (pp. 100-140). New York: Verso. 
Altınay, A. G. (2004a). The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and 
Education in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Altınay, A. G. (2004b). Eğitimin Militarizasyonu: Zorunlu Milli Güvenlik Dersi. In A. 
Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 179-200). 
İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Altınay, A. G. (2006). Militarizm'den Miligösteri'ye Türkiye'de Anti-Militarizmin Yeni 
Yüzleri. Birikim (207), pp. 56-61. 
Altınay, A. G. (2008). Künye Bellemeyen Kezbanlar: Kadın Redçiler Neyi Reddediyorlar? 
In Ö. H. Çınar, & C. Üsterci (Eds.), Çarklardaki Kum: Vicdani Red, Düşünsel Kaynaklar 
ve Deneyimler (pp. 113-133). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
212 
Altınay, A. G. (2009a). Can Veririm, Kan Dökerim: Ders Kitaplarında Militarizm. In G. 
Tüzün (Ed.), Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları II: Tarama Sonuçları (pp. 143-165). 
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları. 
Altınay, A. G. (2009b). Tabulaşan Ordu, Yok Sayılan Militarizm: Türkiye'de Metodolojik 
Militarizm Üzerine Notlar. In Ö. Laçiner (Ed.), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 9: 
Dönemler (pp. 1245-1257). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Altınay, A. G. (2011a). Giriş: Milliyetçilik, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Feminizm. In A. G. 
Altınay (Ed.), Vatan Millet Kadınlar (pp. 15-32). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Altınay, A. G. (2011b). Ordu-Millet-Kadınlar: Dünyanın İlk Kadın Savaş Pilotu Sabiha 
Gökçen. In A. G. Altınay (Ed.), Vatan Millet Kadınlar (pp. 261-294). İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayıncılık. 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Ateş, S. Y. (2012). Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek: II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Beden Terbiyesi, 
Askerî Talim ve Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Aykaç, Ş. (2013). Şehitlik ve Türkiye'de Militarizmin Yeniden Üretimi: 1990-1999. In N. 
Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, 
Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 141-179). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Bali, R. N. (2008). II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Gayrimüslimlerin Askerlik Serüveni: Yirmi Kur'a 
Nafıa Askerleri. İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları. 
Bali, R. N. (2011). Gayrimüslim Mehmetçikler: Hatıralar-Tanıklıklar. İstanbul: Libra 
Kitap. 
Barlas, D., & Güvenç, S. (2010). Bir Cumhuriyet Kurumu Yaratmak: Atatürk'ün 
Donanması, 1923-1939. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve 
Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 223-253). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Bayramoğlu, A. (2004). Asker ve Siyaset. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, 
Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 59-118). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Bayramoğlu, A., İnsel, A., & Laçiner, Ö. (2004). Giriş. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel 
(Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 7-12). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Belge, M. (2008). Önsöz. In L. Ünsaldı, Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset (pp. 7-11). İstanbul: 
Kitap Yayınevi. 
213 
Belge, M. (2012). Militarist Modernleşme: Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye. İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayıncılık. 
Belge, M. (2013). Askerin Önemini Öğretmek ya da Türkiye'de Profesyonel Ordunun 
İmkânsızlığı Üzerine. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de 
Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 181-186). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Berkes, N. (1978). Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma. Ankara: Doğu-Batı Yayınları. 
Berktay, H. (2004, November). Söylem ve Gerçeklik. (Nokta, Interviewer) 
Beşikçi, M. (2010). Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Devlet İktidarı ve İç Güvenlik: Asker 
Kaçakları Sorunu ve Jandarmanın Yeniden Yapılandırılması. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça 
(Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 147-171). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Beşikçi, M. (2011). İhtiyat Zâbiti'nden Yedek Subay'a: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Bir 
Zorunlu Askerlik Kategorisi Olarak Subaylık ve Yedek Subaylar, 1891-1930. Tarih ve 
Toplum (13), 45-89. 
Bhabha, H. K. (1994). The Location of Culture. London : Routledge. 
Bhabha, H. K. (2004). Signs Taken for Wonders. In J. Rivkin, & M. Ryan (Eds.), Literary 
Theory: An Anthology, Second Edition (pp. 1167-1184). Blackwell. 
Bilgin, P. (2010). Türkiye Coğrafyasında Yalnız Güçlü Devletler Ayakta Kalabilir: 
Jeopolitik Gerçeklerin Türkiye'deki Kullanımları. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), 
Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (B. Özçorlu, Trans., pp. 453-474). İstanbul: 
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Birand, M. A. (1986). Emret Komutanım. Milliyet Yayınları. 
Biricik, A. (2013). 7. Ok - Militarizm: Vatandaşlık, Borçluluk ve Çürükleştirmek Üzerine. 
In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, 
Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 369-392). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Bora, A. (2012). Aile: En Güçlü İşsizlik Sigortası. In "Boşuna mı Okuduk?" Türkiye'de 
Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği (pp. 181-201). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Bora, T. (2004). Ordu ve Milliyetçilik. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir 
Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 163-178). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Bora, T. (2006). Anti-Militarizm, Ordu/Askeriye Eleştirisi ve Orduların Demokratik 
Gözetimi. Birikim (207) , pp. 22-26. 
214 
Bora, T., & Erdoğan, N. (2012). Cüppenin, Kılıcın ve Kalemin Mahcup Yoksulları: Yeni 
Kapitalizm, Yeni İşsizlik ve Beyaz Yakalılar. In "Boşuna mı Okuduk?" Türkiye'de Beyaz 
Yakalı İşsizliği (pp. 11-44). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Bora, T. (2013). Futbolda Erkeklik, Militarizm, Milliyetçilik: Tek Kale. In N. Y. 
Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, 
Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 487-512). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Bourdieu, P. (2001). Masculine Domination. (R. Nice, Trans.) Stanford University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (2010). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. (R. Nice, 
Trans.) London and New York: Routledge. 
Bröckling, U. (2008). Disiplin: Askeri İtaat Üretiminin Sosyolojisi ve Tarihi. (V. Atayman, 
Trans.) İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları. 
Butler, J. (1997a). The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. California: Stanford 
University Press. 
Butler, J. (1997b). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (1999). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and 
London: Routledge. 
Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cizre, Ü. (2004). Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir 
Analiz. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 
135-161). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Çınar, Ö. H., & Üsterci, C. (Eds.). (2008). Çarklardaki Kum: Vicdani Red. İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Çoban, B. (2013). Gösteri İktidarı ve Militarist Erkeklik. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek 
Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 187-204). 
İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Dogra, A. Ö. (2010). İktidarın Kılcal Damarları ya da Türkiye'de Zorunlu Askerlik, 
Jandarma ve Devlet. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik 
Siyaseti (pp. 433-452). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Ehrenreich, B. (1989). Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class. New York: 
Pantheon. 
215 
Enloe, C. (1990, September). Womenandchildren: Making Feminist Sense of the Persian 
Gulf Crisis. The Village Voice . 
Enloe, C. (2000). Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives. 
London: University of California Press. 
Enloe, C. (2008). Kadınlar Askerî Vicdani Reddin Neresinde? Bazı Feminist İpuçları. In Ö. 
H. Çınar, & C. Üsterci (Eds.), Çarklardaki Kum: Vicdani Red, Düşünsel Kaynaklar ve 
Deneyimler (B. N. Kenter, Trans., pp. 103-112). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Erdoğan, N. (2012). Sancılı Dil, Hadım Edilen Kendilik ve Aşınan Karakter: Beyaz Yakalı 
İşsizliğe Dair Notlar. In "Boşuna mı Okuduk?" Türkiye'de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği (pp. 75-
115). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Erkanlı, O. (1972). Anılar Sorunlar Sorumlular. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası. 
Erker, Ş. G. (1939). Ordu Sosyolojisi Yolunda Bir Deneme (Vol. 1). İstanbul: Bûrhaneddin 
Matbaası. 
Flake, E. M., Davis, B. E., Johnson, P. L., & Middleton, L. S. (2009). The Psychosocial 
Effects of Deployment on Military Children. Journal of Developmental and Behavioral 
Pediatrics (30), 271-278. 
Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Foucault, M. (1988). Technologies of the Self (A Seminar with Michel Foucault at the 
University of Vermont, October 1982). In L. H. Martin, H. Gutman, & P. H. Hutton (Eds.), 
Technologies of the Self, A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press. 
Foucault, M. (1990). The History of Sexuality, Vol.1: An Introduction. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (pp. 87-104). Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Giddens, A. (1985). The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Giddens, A. (1999). Toplumun Kuruluşu: Yapılaşma Kuramının Ana Hatları. (H. Özel, 
Trans.) Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yayınevi. 
216 
Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates. New York: Anchor Books. 
Gürsoy, Y. (2012). Türkiye'de Sivil-Asker İlişkilerinin Dönüşümü. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Güvenç, S. (2010). ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960. In E. 
B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 255-284). 
İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Hacısalihoğlu, M. (2010). İçerme ve Dışlama: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Askere Alma. In 
E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 79-103). 
İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Helman, S. (1997). Militarism and the Construction of Community. Journal of Political 
and Military Sociology (25), 305-332. 
İnan, A. (1988 [1969]). Medeni Bilgiler ve M.Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları. Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 
İnsel, A. (1997). MGK Hükümetleri ve Kesintisiz Darbe Rejimi. Birikim (96), pp. 15-18. 
İnsel, A. (2004). Bir Toplumsal Sınıf Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri. In A. Bayramoğlu, & 
A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 41-57). İstanbul: Birikim 
Yayınları. 
Kancı, T., & Altınay, A. G. (2007). Educating Little Soldiers and Little Ayşes: Militarized 
and Gendered Citizenship in Turkish Textbooks. In M. Carlson, A. Rabo, & F. Gök (Eds.), 
Education in 'Multicultural' Societies, Turkish and Swedish Perspectives (pp. 51-70). 
Bromma: The Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. 
Kancı, T. (2008). Imagining the Turkish Men and Women: Nationalism, Modernism and 
Militarism in Primary School Textbooks, 1928-2000. Unpublished doctoral dissertation in 
Political Science. Sabanci University. Istanbul.  
Kardaş, Ü. (2004). Askeri Gücün Anayasal Bir Yargı Alanı Yaratması ve Yürütme Erkini 
Etkin Bir Şekilde Kullanması. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: 
Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 295-310). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
King, A. (2006). The Post-Fordist Military. Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
(34), 359-374. 
Laçiner, Ö. (2004). Türk Militarizmi II: "Ordular İlk Hedefiniz Piyasa" mı Oluyor? In A. 
Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 29-39). 
İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
217 
Lemke, T. (2000). Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique. Rethinking Marxism. Amherst. 
Lemke, T. (2013). Biyopolitika. (U. Özmakas, Trans.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Lipietz, A. (2001). The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Post-Fordism. In R. Albritton, M. Itoh, 
R. Westra, & A. Zuege (Eds.), Phases of Capitalist Development: Booms, Crises and 
Globalizations (pp. 17-36). Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Lucassen, J., & Zürcher, E. J. (1999). Introduction: Conscription and Resistance. The 
Historical Context. In E. J. Zürcher (Ed.), Arming the State: Military Conscription in the 
Middle East and Central Asia (pp. 1-20). London and New York: I.B. Tauris. 
Lutz, C. (2001). Homefront: A Military City and the American 20th Century. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
Maktav, H. (2006). Vatan, Millet, Sinema. Birikim (207), pp. 71-84. 
Mann, M. (1993). The Sources of Social Power Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-
States 1760-1914. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Marcus, G. (1995). Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography. Annual Review of Anthropology (24), 95-117. 
Massumi, B. (2002). Navigating Movements. In M. Zournazi (Ed.), Hope (pp. 210-44). 
London: Pluto Press. 
Mater, N. (2012). Mehmedin Kitabı. (N. Mater, Ed.) İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. 
Moskos, C., Williams, J. A., & Segal, D. R. (Eds.). (2000). The Post-modern Military. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mosse, G. (1983). Nationalism and Sexuality in Nineteenth Century Europe. Society (20), 
75-85. 
Nadas, M. (1944). Milli Müdafaa Politikası. İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi. 
Newman, K. S. (1988). Falling From Grace: The Experience of Downward Mobility in the 
American Middle Class. New York: Free Press. 
Öğünç, P. (2013). E, O Zaman Kimse Gitmez ki Askere. In Asker Doğmayanlar (pp. 12-
23). İstanbul: Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınları. 
Özbek, N. (2010). Osmanlı Taşrasında Denetim: Son Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 
Jandarma (1876-1908). In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve 
Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 47-78). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
218 
Özcan, G. (2010). Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi. In E. B. Paker, 
& İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 175-221). İstanbul: 
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Öztan, G. G. (2013). Türkiye'de Milli Kimlik İnşa Sürecinde Militarist Eğilimler ve 
Tesirleri. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, 
Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 75-113). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Öztan, T. (2013). Bir "Aşkınlık" Anlatısı Olarak Şimal Yıldızı... In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), 
Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 115-140). 
İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Paker, E. B., & Akça, İ. (2010). Giriş: Ordu, Devlet, Güvenlik Siyaseti Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik 
Siyaseti (pp. 1-32). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Park, N. (2011). Military Children and Families: Strengths and Challenges During Peace 
and War. American Psychologist (66(1)), 65-72. 
Parla, T. (2004). Türkiye'de Merkantilist Militarizm. In A. Bayramoğlu, & A. İnsel (Eds.), 
Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu (pp. 201-223). İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 
Posada, G., Longoria, N., Cocker, C., & Lu, T. (2011). Attachment Ties in Military 
Families: Mothers' Perception of Interactions with Their Children, Stress, and Social 
Competence. In S. M. Wadsworth, & D. Riggs (Eds.), Risk and Resilience in U.S. Military 
Families (pp. 131-147). New York: Springer. 
Rutz, H., & Balkan, E. (2009). Reproducing Class. New York: Berghahn Publishers. 
Salih, S. (2002). Judith Butler. London: Routledge. 
Sancar, S. (2012). Erkeklik: İmkansız İktidar: Ailede, Piyasada ve Sokakta Erkekler. 
İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. 
Segal, D. R. (2006). Military Sociology. In C. D. Bryant, & D. L. Peck (Eds.), 21st Century 
Sociology (pp. 353-360). Sage Publications. 
Selek, P. (2013). Sürüne Sürüne Asker Olmak. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Sjoberg, L., & Via, S. (2010). Introduction. In L. Sjoberg, & S. Via (Eds.), Gender, War, 
and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives (pp. 1-13). California: Praeger. 
Speck, A. (2006). Dünyada Çağdaş Red ve Red Hareketlerinin Ana Hatları: Savaş Karşıtı 
Uluslararası Hareket İçinde Red. Birikim (207), pp. 42-54. 
219 
Spivak, G. C. (1990). The Post-Colonial Critique: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. (S. 
Harasym, Ed.) London and New York: Routledge. 
Sünbüloğlu, N. Y. (2013). Giriş: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik ve Erkek(lik)lere Dair 
Bir Çerçeve. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, 
Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 9-44). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Şaylan, G. (1978). Ordu ve Siyaset. AÜSBFD Kanun-i Esasi'nin 100. Yılı Armağan . 
Şen, S. (2010). Cumhuriyet Kültürünün Oluşum Sürecinde Bir İdeolojik Aygıt Olarak 
Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizm. İstanbul: Su Yayınevi. 
Şen, S. (2011). Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin Toplum Mühendisliği. İstanbul : Su Yayınları. 
Şerifsoy, S. (2011). Aile ve Kemalist Modenizasyon Projesi, 1928-1950. In A. G. Altınay 
(Ed.), Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar (pp. 167-200). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In P. B. Evans, D. 
Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back In (pp. 169-191). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tokay, G. (2010a). Osmanlı'da Modern Devlet, Güvenlik Siyaseti ve Ordunun 
Dönüşümüne Dair Bir Değerlendirme. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça (Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, 
Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 35-46). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Tokay, G. (2010b). Makedonya Reformları ve Güvenlik Güçleri. In E. B. Paker, & İ. Akça 
(Eds.), Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti (pp. 125-146). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Turan, Ö. (2013). "Esas Duruş!": Kışla Deneyimleri ya da Türkiye'de Zorunlu Askerliğin 
Antropolojisi. In N. Y. Sünbüloğlu (Ed.), Erkek Millet, Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, 
Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler (pp. 261-335). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Uluboy, N. (1945). Askerin Bilgi Kitabı. İstanbul: Askeri Basımevi. 
Ünder, H. (1999). 30'ların Ders Kitaplarından ve Kemalizm'in Kaynaklarından Biri: Milleti 
Müsellaha ve Medeni Bilgiler. Tarih ve Toplum (192), 48-56. 
Ünsaldı, L. (2008). Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset. (O. Türkay, Trans.) İstanbul: Kitap 
Yayınevi. 
Vagts, A. (1959 [1937]). A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. Meridian Books, 
Inc. . 
220 
Wacquant, L. (1991). Making Class: The Middle Class(es) in Social Theory and Social 
Structure. In S. G. McNall (Ed.), Bringing Class Back In: Contemporary and Historical 
Perspectives (pp. 39-64). Boulder: Westview Press. 
Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-
1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Willerton, E., Wadsworth, S. M., & Riggs, D. (2011). Introduction: Military Families 
Under Stress: What We Know and What We Need to Know. In S. M. Wadsworth, & D. 
Riggs (Eds.), Risk and Resilience in U.S. Military Families (pp. 1-20). New York: Springer. 
Yeğen, M. (1999). Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Yeğen, M. (2006). Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler. İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Yiğitgüden, R. (1941). Askerlik Psikolojisi. Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaası. 
Yirmibeşoğlu, S. (1999). Asker ve Siyasi Anılarım. İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları. 
Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal. (2006 [1918] ). İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları. 
Zürcher, E. J. (2003). Teoride ve Pratikte Osmanlı Zorunlu Askerlik Sistemi. In E. J. 
Zürcher (Ed.), Devletin Silâhlanması: Ortadoğu'da ve Orta Asta'da Zorunlu Askerlik 
(1775-1925) (M. T. Akad, Trans., pp. 87-104). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
